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Political and Military History of Tibet

Volume II



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Political & Military History of Tibet

Vol-II

Gyaltse Namgyal Wangdue
(Ex - Dapon)

Translated by
Yeshe Dhondup

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Contents



| | |
|---|-----|
| Foreword | v |
| 11. The Invasion of Tibet by Manchu Lu Chun's Army, and their Expulsion from Tibet | 1 |
| 12. Internal Power Struggle during the Periods of Regent Reting and Regent Taktra | 63 |
| 13. The Status of Tibet on the Eve of the Chinese Communist Invasion | 95 |
| 14. The Chinese Communists Invade Tibet | 119 |
| 15. Tibetan Resistance Movements | 149 |
| 16. Chinese Military Suppression | 199 |
| List of Names | 253 |
| Appendix | 263 |
| Bibliography | 301 |

Foreword



Like all countries, small or large, Tibet had its own military to protect itself against foreign invasion and harassment, until it lost its independence. Unfortunately, even though the Tibetan army played a very important role in the preservation of Tibet's independent status and the protection of its people against enemies throughout the country's history, appropriate due attention has not been paid to its historiography. The result is that there is hardly any literature available about the Tibetan army.

It is therefore a great pleasure for us that Mr. Namgyal Wangdu, a retired army officer in the Special Frontier Force (SFF), who also served in the traditional Tibetan army before 1959, has composed a Tibetan military history. The volume illustrates in detail how the Tibetan army evolved throughout history and the various wars it has fought with foreign forces up until 1959.

This volume may not be technically a scholarly work, but because it is the first comprehensive history of the Tibetan army this volume will definitely serve as an important source of reference for the study of Tibetan history and its political status pre 1959 in general, and about Tibetan military history in particular. The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives is very happy to make this volume available in the complete English translation, as a part of the library's extensive activities for the preservation and promotion of Tibetan culture and history.

This book on the Tibetan Army unfortunately also contains stories of killing between the Chinese and the Tibetan army. You will be able to clearly see the helplessness of the Tibetans in the face of the massive Chinese invasion of our country first of all, and secondly that repeated efforts to find a peaceful solution had no effect on the Chinese leaders. This book also makes it clear that the relations between Tibet, at least since the communist takeover of China has been a relationship of continuous deception, lies and cold-blooded distortion of facts from the Chinese side versus a sustained attitude of trust and hope from the Tibetan side. The Chinese side had a determined strategy that they should invade Tibet through deceptive means in the 'sweet name' of liberation and so forth, for their own gain.

The book also tells the story of how Tibetans are treated by their two big neighbors, one which so generously provided a home and healing for the Tibetan

refugees in their country and the another which ruthlessly invaded, looted and murdered Tibetans and in many cases forced them out from their own country.

This book also gives the message that if the world, and humanity, and especially the leaders of the world support only those bigger countries that have the allure of money and business, and completely turn a blind eye and shut off their conscience to truth, justice and the long term well-being of this planet, the whole of humanity will suffer, and suffer terribly, whether by conflict, recession, environmental degradation or increasing shortage of natural resources like water.

It also illustrates the pertinent truth to Tibetans and others in a similar situation that unless you take care of yourself no one can really take care of you, in the true ultimate sense of the term.

The translator, Yeshi Dhondup, is on the staff of the Research and Translation Department of LTWA. His enthusiasm and hard work has made this translation possible, despite the many challenges that were presented by such an endeavor. I would like to thank him for this great translation as well as the research that he has undertaken to complement the text with the necessary footnotes and references. I also would like to thank Dawa Tsering, an ex-Tibetan army officer in Tibet who had personally experienced the conflict with the Chinese army as detailed in this book. It is mainly his initiative and insistence that helped us translate and publish this English version. I also like to thank Mr. Matt Gruninger, the former Head of the Tibet Relief Committee, for looking after the expenses incurred in translating and publishing this two volume book on the Political and Military History of Tibet.

We dedicate this publication to all the Tibetan soldiers who laid down their precious lives for the sake of the Dharma, polity and people of Tibet.

Chapter Eleven

The Invasion of Tibet by Manchu Lu Chun's Army, & their Expulsion from Tibet



A. Manchu Lu Chun's army invades Tibet

To understand the history of the Chinese invasion of Tibet, I have to go back a little in time. As mentioned previously, in 1896 when the Chakla T'u-Ssu (local ruler) seized Dranagshogsum (*sbra nag shog gsum*) (in Nyagrang), the warlord of Sichuan (Chao Erh-feng) sent troops under an officer named T'ang-li to back him. The army of T'ang-li carried out extensive killings, looting and plundering in these areas, and finally arrested the Derge king, the queen and the two princes, and took them to Chengdu, where they were imprisoned. The troops also stole a large amount of their religious treasures and other property.

The Tibetan government sent a defensive force and also sent representatives by sea to Peking for talks. Soon after that, T'ang-li withdrew his troops from the area. The king and queen of Derge died in prison, but the two princes were rescued by the Tibetan government. The elder son, A-kya, took his father's place, the power of Derge was restored and the situation returned to normal. However, shortly after that, in 1904, Chang We-len of Dartsedo (Tachienlu) dispatched a large number of troops to mine gold near Garthar Monastery of Dotö, which was founded by the Seventh Dalai Lama. Fighting broke out between the Chinese miners and the monks. The Chinese killed or wounded many monks and sacked the monastery. They also attacked neighbouring monasteries such as Dhondup Ling, Dechen Ling and Ngophu, causing tremendous destruction and oppression.

In 1905, on his way to Lhasa, Feng Chien, the new Amban to Lhasa, recruited local men from Litang into his army. He resided in Batang for a long time, during which he extorted food from Chode Monastery, inducted many monks into his army and forced many others to become farmers. This was too much for the local people, lay and monastic, who finally revolted and killed him, along with some of his servants¹. In the wake of this incident, the Chinese General Ma Wei-ch'i² reached Batang leading a large number of troops, burned down the monastery, destroyed many sacred objects and executed all those who were involved in the incident. Soon after that, Chao Erh-feng also arrived in Batang, along with his

troops. En route, he stopped in Litang where he captured the two chiefs, beheaded their chamberlains and stole all the money and valuables from their headquarters. On arrival in Batang, he indiscriminately had 322 people, both monks and laity, beheaded, and destroyed the monastery altogether and looted all of its property. The chieftain of Batang, along with his family, were taken to Sichuan and imprisoned there. Accusing Chatreng Samphel Ling Monastery of having conspired with Ba Chode Monastery, they burned down the monastery and killed around 1,200 people, both monks and laity, and committed other such heinous crimes.

In 1906, four elderly monks from Gangkar Namgyal Ling Monastery went to surrender to Chao Erh-feng, but he beheaded them on the spot. He also killed two aged caretakers of the monastery and three local Tibetan men. He then raided Yangteng Monastery and beheaded 48 monks. The rest of the monks managed to escape. All the sacred objects, property, horses and cattle of the monastery were seized. They melted the bronze and copper statues to make bullets. They used religious texts to line the soles of their shoes, and burned the rest.

In November 1906, Din Kon-tai led a military expedition into Tibet, killing 25 monks of Dzogang Dzong Monastery and beheading nine of the monks who surrendered to him. He seized 1,000 *khal*³ measure of grain, and all the swords and guns from the 60 families of Dzira Bese and Do Chupa villages. His army burned down the monasteries of Tsawa Menkhung and Lhundup, and sacked Bultog, Jangmar and Drayel, stealing innumerable quantities of grain and cattle, and using military force without restraint. The Tibetan government, on the other hand, was not in a position to send adequate troops to safeguard the northeastern border areas of Tibet against the Chinese incursions, since Tibet had just fought the Anglo-Tibetan war (1904), which forced the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to flee to Mongolia and even the combined strength of local forces was insufficient to protect their own territories. The situation was therefore disastrous.

In the meantime, the elder and younger princes of Derge had a dispute over their dominions (*mnga' ris*). Akya [Dorji Senge], the elder brother, came to Lhasa to present his case. The government issued an order reprimanding the younger brother, and sent the elder brother back to Derge escorted by a small force made up of soldiers from the three regions of Marzosangsum (Markham, Dzora and Sangnyen). This restored peace temporarily, but later that year, Akya and his supporters suddenly captured his younger brother and imprisoned him, and persecuted his supporters. The younger brother's supporters secretly mobilized troops and released him from prison. Thereafter, they enlisted men from Dzachuka and Golok, preparing for civil war. The governors of Nyarong and Kham tried to mediate as best as they could, but in 1908, Sichuanese troops invaded Kham, massacring, looting and destroying monasteries, and under the pretext of supporting Akya, they entered Derge and seized power.

Prompted by these events, the Tibetan government as well as several monasteries of Kham sent emissaries and petitions one after another to the Dalai Lama, who was on a visit to Mongolia and China. Therefore, halting his religious activities in China for the time being, the Dalai Lama left Peking on December 21, 1908 heading for Tibet. Before he left, he expressly requested the regent Prince Chun⁴, the father of Manchu emperor Xuantong⁵, to continue the "priest-patron relationship" between China and Tibet as before. En route, the Dalai Lama stopped at Kumbum Monastery in Domé. The younger Derge prince Ngawang Jampal, along with his senior officials, came there to plead his case. The Dalai Lama granted him the rank of *dapon* (*mda' dpon*)⁶, middle rank post in the Tibetan government, and promised to help him in every possible way.

In that year (1908), new Tibetan currency coins were struck in Lhasa. The silver coin in the denomination of 1 *srang*⁷ had on one side a figure of a lion in the centre and the inscription "Ganden Phodrang Chokle Namgyal"⁸ in Tibetan running around the border. The obverse of the coin had a flaming jewel (*nor bu me 'bar*) at the centre and the inscription "43rd year of the 15th Rabjung" along the edge. Copper coins in the values of 2½ *zho* and 1 *zho* 5 *kar* were also struck, with a double square design (*pa tra*) in the centre on one side, and a flaming jewel with the inscription "Ganden Phodrang Chokle Namgyal" running around the border on the back.⁹

On 15th day of the 4th month of 1909, the Dalai Lama left Kumbum, seen off by a large crowd of Chinese, Tibetans and Mongolians. He travelled via Nagchu and Reting, and arrived at Purchok Hermitage (near Lhasa) where he was received with a grand welcome ceremony arranged by his prime ministers Shatra, Sholkhang and Changkyim.¹⁰ They had their investiture audience (*gsar mjal*)¹¹ with the Dalai Lama. On the 9th day of the eleventh month, the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhasa amidst a grand reception organized by Tibetan government officials, monks and lay people, with a parade by the Tibetan army. People, both monastic and lay, joined in presenting welcome performances and extensive offerings to him, including a golden seal bearing an inscription in the *uchen*, *lantsa* and Mongolian scripts¹². The first Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office was established, headed by Khenchung Gyaltzen Phuntsok and Rimshi Khemepa Rinchen Wangyal.

In 1906, China and Britain declared¹³ that they accepted the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty signed in Lhasa [in 1904]¹⁴, but did not inform or consult Tibet about that. In 1908, when the British, Tibetan and Chinese representatives met in Calcutta (nowadays Kolkata) to negotiate a treaty on trade regulation,¹⁵ Kalon Tsarong [Wangchuk Gyalpo], the Tibetan representative, signed the treaty at his own discretion, without consulting the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. Because of this mistake and suspicions about his connection with the Chinese, Kalon Tsarong and his son were murdered during the Sino-Tibetan war of the Water-Rat year [1912] in Lhasa, as explained below.

In 1907, Russia and Britain concluded a secret treaty on Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet at St. Petersburg without the knowledge of the Tibetan government.¹⁶ The treaty said that both parties should involve China in political matters concerning Tibet, while the British had the right to deal directly with Tibet on trade issues and Russia with Tibet on religious matters. This contravened the Anglo-Tibetan treaty signed in Lhasa in 1904, which reiterated Tibet's independence, and Britain thus became an object of criticism for duplicity and unreliability, changing its policy in accordance with the situation for its own advantage.

B. Lu Chun's troops arrive in Lhasa and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama proceeds to India, along with his retinue

Concerning Lu Chun's army advance on Lhasa in 1908, it was said that the Amban in Lhasa used a distorted interpretation of the British-Tibetan-Chinese Trade Convention to justify Chao Erh-feng ordering Lu Chun's army to march into Tibet. When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama went to Peking, he emphatically told the Manchu government that the relation between Tibet and China was only that of "Uncle and Nephew (*dbon zhang*)"¹⁷, and that they were separate from each other, as was evident from steles bearing the inscriptions of Sino-Tibetan treaties, which have endured to this day. He reminded them that the Great Fifth established "Priest and Patron" relationship with the Manchu emperor Xuanchi, and that the two nations shared a relation of mutual cooperation rather than supremacy of one over the other. He further told them that some officials of Sichuan and Yunnan, and Manchu Ambans in Lhasa, misinterpreting the Sino-Tibetan relationship, had annexed parts of Kham and were treating the people cruelly. He asked them to withdraw all of those Manchu officials immediately, to restore the "priest-patron" relationship between Tibet and China and to extend support to the British-Tibetan trade agreement in every possible way. The Manchu government consented.

After that, the Manchu government offered a gold seal with the inscription "The Seal of All-knowing Dalai Lama Vajradhara, the Lord of all the Buddhists in the Western Realm, Who is Obedient to the State,"¹⁸ but the Dalai Lama declined it. Later on, when he was in Xining, the Manchu government again offered to him a gold seal with a slight change in the wording of the previous gold seal, which now read as the "All-knowing Dalai Lama Vajradhara, the Lord of all the Buddhists in the Western Realm, Who Respects the State,"¹⁹ which too was refused and sent back. This made the Manchu emperor and his ministers feel that the Dalai Lama was not loyal to them, and they ordered General Chao Erh-feng to dispatch Lu Chun's troops to Tibet.

The Manchu government's representative in Calcutta Chang Yingtang, after making an agreement on the amendment of trade regulations among Britain, Tibet and China in Calcutta with the Tibetan government's representative Lonchen Tsarong Wangchuk Gyalpo, arrived in Lhasa by way of Darjeeling. Soon he started to interfere a lot in the Tibetan political affairs.

It was mentioned in the trade agreement that 6,000 Chinese troops were to be stationed at various trade marts in Tibet as security forces. Under this pretext, with the real aim of controlling Tibet, more than ten thousand Chinese troops marched into Tibet and set up headquarters in Chamdo. They also announced that all the areas from Dartsedo to Kongpo Gyamda had been incorporated into Xikang prefecture of Sichuan province, and set up Chinese signboards in these areas and so on, with no regard for law or custom of Tibet. The Tibetan government and all the people therefore strongly protested to the Peking government and sent several letters through Ambans at different times detailing Chao Erh-feng's criminal actions in Kham, such as sacking monasteries and houses, looting and killing people. The Tibetan government requested that the Manchu government withdraw all its civil and military officials and troops from Tibet, stating that there was no need for Lu Chun's troops to be in Tibet to police the trade marts because the Tibetan government had its own police force to guard them. The Manchu government did not acknowledge the letters. The Tibetan government therefore sent officials to Calcutta to telegraph the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office and Military Department, and a copy of the message was sent to the British government of India, along with a petition requesting its support.

The Manchu Amban in Lhasa brought many troops in Lhasa in addition to his bodyguard troops, and also asked Lu Chun's forces to proceed to Lhasa as soon as possible. Therefore, all the people, monks and troops of U-Tsang and Kham resolved to fight the Chinese. However, since the Dalai Lama was not yet back in Lhasa from Mongolia and China, the Kashag and the National Assembly of Tibet (*bod ljong tshogs 'du*)²⁰, followed the strategy of peaceful reconciliation with the Chinese for the time being, and sent emissaries to the Dalai Lama, requesting his immediate return to Lhasa. By the time the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhasa, the Chinese troops had already penetrated into Kham and were marching towards Lhasa with the excuse of coming to police the trade marts. To stop the Chinese troops moving further into Central Tibet, the Tibetan government sent Khenchung Jamcho (Jampa Chosang), along with seven assistants, with a letter from the Kashag and the Tibetan National Assembly, to negotiate with them. They met the Chinese troops at Tar Dzong, a few days after the Chinese left Chamdo. Without bothering to talk, the Chinese troops arrested all eight members of the Tibetan delegation and beheaded them on arrival at Kongpo Gyamda, en route to Lhasa; such was their illegal and oppressive actions.

The Dalai Lama was about to reach Lhasa and Monlam Chenmo, or the Great Prayer Festival,²¹ was about to start. Disturbed by the prospect that the Chinese troops would create tremendous disturbances after their arrival in Lhasa, representatives from the Tibetan National Assembly, Tita, the Gurkha ambassador to Lhasa and leaders of Kashmir Muslim community went out to persuade the Chinese troops, wherever they met them on the way, to stop. However, despite their best efforts, the Chinese did not listen. Finally, on the 3rd day of the first month of that year (1908), the advance Chinese cavalry arrived in Lhasa. The Amban (Lien Yu) and his assistant staff happily went to Lhadong Shenka (the ferry near the river to the east of Lhasa) to receive them. During that evening, both the Chinese cavalry and infantry soldiers marched through the streets of Barkor up to the Lupuk Yamen²¹. Yu fired on Tibetan soldiers and police in each locality, leaving many of them dead or wounded, and arriving in front of the Tsuglakhang Temple, fired many shots. At that time, when Taiji Phunkhang Tashi Dorji, who was in charge of the Great Prayer Festival, with Tsedron Jamyang Gyaltzen, was coming down from the Potala Palace, after a meeting, to make seating arrangements at the Tsuglakhang temple, they met the Chinese soldiers on the way, and were fired on. Phunkhang was only injured, but his horse, one servant and the Tsedron were killed. They took Phunkhang to the Yamen, beating him along the way. Turning towards the Potala Palace where the Dalai Lama resided, they fired nine shots in the air, clearly demonstrating their intention of seizing his power over Tibet. All the people therefore remained ready to fight against them. At that time, the Tibetans could easily have defeated the Chinese force, made up of a few bodyguards of the Amban and the newly arrived troops, who lacked resources in all respects, and also the Tibetans had the advantage of being in their own land. Nevertheless, since fighting would take the lives of many people, both Chinese and Tibetan, and moreover, the outcome was unpredictable, the Dalai Lama advised his people to be patient and peaceful. He and his ministers decided to flee for the time being for the benefit of the religion and polity of Tibet, and to remain in continuous contact with Peking and to request it to withdraw all the Chinese troops. That night, the Dalai Lama called the throne-holder of Ganden Tsemonling Hutuktu²³ to his residence, appointed him as the regent and gave him detailed instructions on handling the political affairs and offering silver coins (*tam dkar*) for the Great Prayer Festival, besides other duties. Khenchen Neushag Khyenrab Phuntsok was appointed as assistant to the Regent. In that very night, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, accompanied by prime ministers Shatra, Sholkang and Changkyim, Master Chamberlain Ngoshiwa, Kalon Sarjungwa and deputy ministers Samdup Phodrang and Lama Gungtang Tenzin Wangpo, escorted by an elite bodyguard, and crossed the Rama Gang (ferry crossing across the Kyichu, south of Lhasa). The next morning, when the Chinese at the Yamen heard of the flight of the Dalai Lama, they immediately held a meeting, and a Chinese army commander named Wu²⁴ and a

Chinese named Gyamabo Chuchik of Ramoche Gyalgodong²⁵ promised to pursue the Dalai Lama. Leading a few hundred mounted soldiers, the two officers rode in hot pursuit of the Dalai Lama. Reaching Chaksam Chuwori next day, the Dalai Lama and his party heard that Chinese troops were chasing them. They therefore hurried on to Samdhing Monastery²⁶ in Yamdrok, leaving some of his bodyguards behind at the Chaksam ferry²⁷ as a rearguard. Led by Chensel Namgang, also known as Dasang Dradul, and Captain Kalsang Dradul of the Drapchi Regiment, the rearguard occupied strategic positions on the mountain behind Chaksam. When the Chinese troops arrived, they attacked them with various kinds of weapons, including machineguns, using strategy and military skills and courage, for two consecutive days and nights. Having suffered heavy casualties, the Chinese troops finally gave up the pursuit of the Dalai Lama and returned. Therefore, in recognition of their valiant feat of resistance, Dasang Dradul was rewarded with membership of the Tsarong family²⁸ through marriage, and Captain Kaldam [Kalsang Dradul] of the Drapchi Regiment was promoted to the rank of Colonel.

On the eve of his departure from Samdhing, the Dalai Lama sent a messenger with a letter to the British Trade Agent [Basil Gould] at Changlo in Gyantse²⁹, to send a petition to the government of British India, with the request to allow him to enter India and to assist him, should it be necessary. Then, along with his entourage, the Dalai Lama crossed the Kharo-la pass, travelling on through Ralung and upper and lower Nyangru. After that, when the party crossed the Phari Dang-la pass, they faced great hardship, riding through snow up to their stirrups. They stopped at the lower monastery of Phari.

The people of both monastic and lay communities along the route lent excellent help for the Dalai Lama's security day and night. At Phari, the Dalai Lama was received by the British Trade Agent, who escorted him, accompanied by his bodyguard, up to Dromo (Yatung)³⁰. The Trade Agent and two army officers from Gyantse³¹ had also come to meet the Dalai Lama at Phari, and joined his retinue. Manchu commander Tung Li in Dromo also met the Dalai Lama and requested him to stay temporarily at either Dromo or Phari. Replying that he would consider this, the Dalai Lama rode on.

There was a small Chinese garrison near the gate of the upper Dromo. The local people [of Phari and Dromo] declared that no Chinese should come out of their houses on the day the Dalai Lama passed through or else they would destroy all of them. As a result, the Dalai Lama and his entourage managed to pass smoothly through the garrison, reaching lower Dromo by the evening. Although the Dalai Lama had planned to stay temporarily near Dromo Nadong with the aim of negotiating with the Peking government, hearing of the arrival of Manchu troops in Phari in pursuit of him, he felt unable to remain there and decided to proceed, along with his entire entourage, to India.

Previously when the British troops came to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama was forced to go to Mongolia and China, and this time he had to seek protection from the British government of India. Therefore, there was a big alteration in Tibet's political and religious relationship with these countries. When the Dalai Lama and his party left Geteng Koti house in Dromo, he left a letter with McDonald³², a British officer, who was acquainted with Tibetans for many years, to be forwarded to the British government of India through the Political Officer of Sikkim. In the letter, the Dalai Lama said:

Recently a large Chinese cavalry arrived in Lhasa and they are greatly oppressing the Tibetan people. They fired on the Police force and people of Lhasa, killing or wounding many of them. Due to danger to my life, I, together with my six ministers, had to leave Lhasa to seek asylum in India for the time being, with an intention to consult and getting help from the British government. Since my departure from Lhasa I have been greatly harrassed on the road. A force of two hundred Chinese troops from a Chinese camp at Dham pursued me up to Chaksam bridge. A group of my bodyguards stayed back to stop the Chinese force, and a fighting took place between them there. In the fight, seventy Chinese soldiers and two Tibetan soldiers were killed.

I have left the Regent and acting ministers at Lhasa, and gave them instructions about their duties and responsibilities. I and the ministers who accompany me have brought our official seals with us. I have received warm reception and assistance from the representatives of the British government during my journey, for which I am grateful. The relations between the British government and Tibetan government is similar to that of a father to his children, and I therefore believe that the British government will give us protection and necessary guidance. I hope to give full information on my arrival in India.³³

Thereafter, having crossed Dzaleb-la pass, the Dalai Lama and his entourage arrived at Kalimpong, where they were received with great honour by the British government's representative and Bhutanese government's representative Raja Kazi Ogyan Dorji. The Dalai Lama stayed at Raja Kazi's residence (presently called the Lower Koti of Kapuk)³⁴ for a week as his guest. After that, he proceeded to Darjeeling, staying at a house called Patabuk Koti, which had been arranged to him by the Indian government. Sir Charles Bell [1870–1945]³⁵, the Political Officer in Sikkim, acted as his liaison with the British government. The Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling was assigned the responsibility of his security and other necessary facilities from the area, and he offered his best service to him. From Darjeeling, through the British government, the Dalai Lama sent seven telegrams, one after the other, to the Manchu government of China, writing in detail about the unlawful activities of the Ambans and Chinese civil and military personnel in Tibet, and requesting it to withdraw all its troops from Tibet, leaving none behind.

However, far from replying to those telegrams, the Manchu emperor declared in many Chinese newspapers that he had deposed the Dalai Lama, and that he would choose the next Dalai Lama by means of the golden-urn method³⁶. Posters were pasted and pamphlets were distributed in Lhasa circulating the same report. In this way, disregarding the Tibetan government and the Tibetan people—the owners of Tibet—the Manchu troops not only invaded Tibet but also openly demonstrated the extremely repressive nature of their militarism. This further intensified the Tibetan people's anger and hatred towards them, ultimately leading to widespread resistance movements in various parts of Tibet.

After that, the Dalai Lama followed the policy of not making direct negotiation with the Manchu emperor or the Chinese government. Evoking the Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1904, he asked the British government to intercede with the Manchu government on behalf of the Tibetans. After that, at the invitation of the British government, the Dalai Lama and his entourage proceeded from Darjeeling to Calcutta by a special train (on a small mountain railway) and by a boat on the River Ganges. There, he was given a warm and elaborate reception by a large crowd of British army and civil officers, with artillery shots in his honour, military parade and salutes by guards of honour, and he was escorted in a regal carriage drawn by four horses to Hastings House, the residential palace of the British Viceroy for India. Attendants and guides were assigned to him. The Dalai Lama and his retinue stayed there as guests.

On March 14, 1910, during discussion about Tibet's issue with the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto,³⁷ the Dalai Lama recounted to him the details of the past and the current situation in Tibet and requested his help in the future. Lord Minto expressed his pleasure to meet him, and told him that he would report all details of their discussion to his government and that he would inform the Dalai Lama later when the reply came from his government. The record of their conversation has been archived amongst the secret documents of the British government. Thereafter, Minto took the Dalai Lama sightseeing to various towns. The British government offered extraordinary hospitality to the Dalai Lama with great honour in Calcutta, but it did not give any clear-cut replies to him on Tibet's issue for a quite long time, because immediate changes were expected in China due to active revolutionary riots taking place in China at that time.

In Tibet, all the people, monastic and laity, stopped cooperation with the Chinese, and began to confront them, overtly, internally and secretly, and they put dung on the Chinese posters and banners. Whenever there were official ceremonies and functions, the robes of the Dalai Lama were brought, and the government offices were opened and closed daily as if the Dalai Lama were present. The Amban [did not like this and] therefore bothered the Tibetan government on various excuses. They replaced the Tibetan police force in Lhasa with Chinese troops, and ransacked and

robbed all the government and private treasures. They accused the government of not doing justice in Tengyeling Demo's case in 1899³⁸ and raised old issues. When the government officials and some individual Tibetans secretly went to deliver gifts to the Dalai Lama in Darjeeling, the Manchus stopped or arrested them on the way. In such ways, using their military power, the Manchus engaged in many unlawful things at their will without restraint.

Khenche Neushag, the assistant to the Regent, was honest in his official duties and popular among the people. The two Ambans, making false accusations against him, ordered his arrest and execution. Due to strong protests from the people, on 27 August (1910), instead of murdering him, they put a cangue around his neck and banished him to Dartsedo, where he died within one year.

The Manchus oppressed the Tibetan people by imposing different types of taxes, such as grain tax (*rgya 'bru*), resources for Chinese (*rgya gsos*), money to buy pigs, firewood, fodder, horses, pack animals and corvée. Therefore, people in various parts of Tibet revolted against the Manchu officials and troops, but also stopped providing them with resources, horses, pack animals and so on, causing much difficulty to the Manchus in Tibet. The government officials, members of the Three Monastic Seats and Tibetan masses protested, and argued with the Manchus on the issue of the deposition of the Dalai Lama. Since the situation in Lhasa deteriorated day by day, the Manchu emperor issued an order to the Amban: "General Lo T'i-t'ai has been already sent to resolve the matter. As per the telegrams from the Foreign Affairs Office and Military Department of China, you should invite the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa." Accordingly, in the ninth Tibetan month that year, the Amban went to Darjeeling, and deceitfully requested the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, saying that the Chinese would not interfere in the powers of the Dalai Lama and internal affairs of Tibet, and that peace had been restored in Tibet. He also approached the cabinet ministers. However, the Dalai Lama replied in both written and verbal communication that it was impossible for him to return to Tibet until and unless there was a concrete solution to the Sino-Tibetan problem through mediation by the British government. He handed a letter, written in Tibetan and Mongolian languages, dated 13th day of the ninth Tibetan month of that year [1910], bearing his official seal, to General Lo T'i-t'ai to be forwarded to Peking. I have not copied here the full body of the letter, but the gist of the letter is as follow:

In the past since the time of the first Dalai Lama, by virtue of the "priest-patron" relationship between Tibet and China, China protected Tibet. The Dalai Lamas and Manchu emperors exchanged honorific titles. Tibet has been an independent country since ancient times. The Manchus disregarded the "priest-patron" relationship of Tibet and China, even the Dalai Lama's rule over Tibet. It is now impossible for Tibet to continue the formal relationship with China. Tibet henceforth will not make contact with China without mediation by the British.³⁹

The above letter, in which the Dalai Lama had presented his real views for Tibet's independence, was regarded as the guiding principle for Tibet's policy towards China by the successive regents and prime ministers of Tibet.

I will now draw a summary of the entire political military history of Tibet and China. The 13th Dalai Lama established relationships first with Russia and then with Britain because the Chinese government was trying to annex Tibet by means of various peaceful and forceful methods, through the implementation of its deceptive policy, secretly, openly or directly, which was evident to the whole world. Both Russia and Britain intervened in the Sino-Tibetan issues in support of Tibet's independence, understanding the importance of Tibet's independence to the whole world. It is very clear that neither of them had evil plans to annex Tibet, in contrast to China, who shamelessly wanted to invade Tibet first and then ultimately to annihilate it. Therefore, in 1911, from Kalimpong, India, the 13th Dalai Lama sent a letter to the Russian emperor Nicholas II⁴⁰, which read as below:

To the Great Emperor,

Our country Tibet is related to its neighbor Manchu country by "priest and patron" relationship, and Tibet is not under the dominance of the Manchu. However, with the intention to annex Tibet gradually, the Manchus are trying to deceive the Tibetan people in an attempt to seize all their powers and rights. They are harming the Dharma, killing religious practitioners and exploiting the monasteries and people to the extreme, beyond description. Therefore, it is impossible for us to remain as its neighbor, as before, even for a moment. Tibet has been able to manage its own affairs independently, thanks to the treaties signed by the great countries of Britain and Russia on Tibet. At present, all the leaders and the people of Tibet unanimously seek support from the two great nations and to maintain my rule in Tibet: to this end, I request the two great nations to have immediate discussion on our issue, and to tell other big foreign countries about it. Moreover, since there is a danger that the Manchus with evil intention will send their troops to Tibet to claim Tibet as part of China, I request the two great nations to help us maintain Tibet's independence and my rule in Tibet. As you had given permission, I have built a Buddhist temple⁴¹ in your country and have appointed an abbot and sixteen lamas to perform rituals for the welfare of your majesty the Great Emperor, princes and queen, and for the success and stability of your rule. I request you to permit all the Tibetans, Mongolians and Torgo Buddhist people to stay anywhere in Buryat and other parts of your country. The present site of the temple is too congested, so if possible, kindly grant another piece of land. I have sent my attendant Dorjieff³² with assistants to make offerings to the monasteries and an edict to all the Buddhist peoples in the lower northern regions of Russia to advise them to adhere to the noble principles of the Dharma. I have sent some students to your country and I request you to kindly arrange their admission into a university. I am sending a monk's robe and an old image of the Buddha as a gift to you.

The Russian emperor Nicholas replied in this way:

We always have affection and concern for Tibet, and it is very important to discuss this matter with Britain. Therefore, Your Holiness should not feel worried, as everything will happen in accordance with your wishes.

In the fall of that year, the Dalai Lama, accompanied by his entourage, went on a pilgrimage to various holy places in India and Nepal, facilitated by the government of British India and the local people, with excellent arrangement of travel and accommodation facilities. In the same year, the Manchu government invited the Panchen Rinpoche⁴³ to Lhasa, with the aim to use him as a political instrument to achieve their ends. This created a very bad impression about him. Moreover, previously, the Panchen Rinpoche went to Calcutta to meet the Prince of Wales at his own discretion. As a result, there erupted a friction between the Tibetan government and the Panchen Rinpoche's monastic estate (*labrang*).⁴⁴

By that time, foreboding signs ripened for the Manchu civil and military officials and the Chinese soldiers living in Tibet. Most of the Chinese troops who arrived in Lhasa were from Sichuan and Yunnan, and they had different groups. There were also factional conflicts between Manchu and Chinese troops. They faced shortages of food supplies and salaries. Around September 1911, they entered into violence, killing each other. The Amban in Lhasa beheaded a leader of Ko-lao-hui, a revolutionary secret group of Chinese. The officials engaged themselves in criticizing and accusing one another. Four Chinese officials, including Hsieh Kuo-liang, sought refuge from the Tibetan government and hid inside Sera Monastery⁴⁵ in the disguise of monks.

In China, the revolutionary movement steered by Sun Yat-sen⁴⁶ intensified, and on February 12, 1912, the army general Yuan Shih-kai dethroned the Manchu emperor Xuantong and the Republic of China was proclaimed under the leadership of the revolutionary party. As soon as the news reached Lhasa, Kao-hue attacked the Amban and other Manchu officials. This led to internal fighting amongst the Chinese at Yamen.

The Manchu Amban Lien Yu fled from Yamen, seeking asylum in the Tenma residence at Drepung Monastery⁴⁷, but the rebel troops caught him and took him as hostage to Tashi Lhunpo⁴⁸, where they demanded their salary in advance in exchange for his release. After mediation by the Manchu General Chung Yin, he was released. Soon the rebel Chinese soldiers asked all the Chinese soldiers in the outlying districts of Lhasa to report to Lhasa to march en bloc to China. Therefore, a large number of Chinese soldiers from different corners rushed to Lhasa, plundering and robbing the villages and towns along the way.

In Dokham, Chao Erh-feing⁴⁹ had set up his headquarters in Chamdo. As soon as he heard the news of the victory of the revolutionary party in China, he appointed his deputy to his place and returned to Chengdu, the capital city of

Sichuan. There, he was either beheaded after conviction, or was killed in the civil war, according to different rumours spread at that time.

Around that time, Kanam Depa of Powo launched a large scale revolt against the Chinese and killed all the officers and soldiers in charge of grain procurement in Powo. The Chinese General Chung in Lhasa sent the troops of Lo Chang-chi, and Chang Dotai sent Din Kon-tai's force to Powo to suppress the revolt. However, due mainly to the tough terrain of the region with its steep, narrow and rocky passes, the Chinese troops suffered a humiliating defeat and went back empty-handed.

C. Tibetans Expel the Chinese Forces from U-Tsang and the Dalai Lama Returns to Lhasa

In Darjeeling, some young lay and monk Tibetan officials in the retinue of the Dalai Lama voluntarily went to U-Tsang secretly to join the Tibetan resistance forces to expel the Chinese. Making Dujung as their base, they collected militias from various areas of Tsang and made several attacks on the Chinese troops in Shigatse and Gyantse. However, due to lack of experience and proper organization, they suffered a bad defeat and came back to Darjeeling in the same year, greatly humiliated and disheartened. Surprisingly Minister Shatra summoned them and complimented them for their bravery and dedication, and for fighting the enemy at the cost of their own lives. He gave them some encouraging advice that they should not feel discouraged, because it was possible sometimes to face some minor failures in a great mission. He also told them that if everyone, without losing courage, made efforts for the benefit of the common goal of the Tibetan people, they would achieve that goal. In short, giving them much advice from the Dharma and a political context, Shatra boosted the morale and confidence of the young volunteers.

Greatly encouraged by his advice and praise, the volunteers embarked upon a second mission, to drive out the Chinese from U-Tsang. There, through secret contact and discussion with the local leaders, they collected many local militias from Dujung and Wangden, and thereby launched a series of guerilla warfare attacks on the Chinese in Gyantse and Shigatse. They inflicted heavy damage on the Chinese, who ultimately were forced to retreat from Tsang to Lhasa. Tsang was thus cleansed of the Chinese presence.

The volunteer force thereafter proceeded to Lhoka, where after collecting some local men, they attacked and defeated the small Chinese force camped at Tsethang. Thereafter, the volunteer troops of Lokha remained ready for deployment in Lhasa, as and when they were needed.

In the meantime, the British Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, arrived in Darjeeling and visited the Dalai Lama. They had frank and long discussions on Tibet's issue, and a few days later, the Dalai Lama went to meet him at his residence.

From Lhasa, Tsedrung Danma Dzopa was sent to Kham to advise the villages and monasteries on political and religious issues and to proclaim the decree, impressed with the seal of the Dalai Lama, calling for all the local people, monastic and civilian, to stand united, "like a chisel with one edge"⁵⁰, for the Dharma and polity of Tibet.⁵¹ Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama and his entourage left Darjeeling for Kalimpong, and stayed at Raja Ogyan Dorji's palace, the Phodrang Migyur Ngonga, or the Palace of Unchangeable Joy.

During that year, the Dalai Lama made Khendrung Jampa Tendar and Tsipon Trimon Norbu Wangyal, both in Lhasa, commanders-in-chief of the Tibetan army. He granted them a decree bearing his seal, instructing them how to drive out the Chinese troops from U-Tsang and Kham, and instructed them to contact him directly in Kalimpong in the event of any dilemmas. This gives us the impression that the Dalai Lama was not confident in the Kashag in Lhasa. At that time, all the Chinese army based in Dagpo and northern Tibet and other parts of U-Tsang were concentrated in Lhasa, and their total number came to around seventeen thousand. However, they were disorganized, and they black-marketed their weapons. Taking that opportunity, the two Tibetan commanders-in-chief procured a large quantity of arms from the Chinese through secret purchases from traders. In addition to the Tibetan national troops, many militias from various parts of Tibet and monk volunteers from the Three Monastic Seats were placed around the Potala, Norbulingka and Tsuglakhang for security.

China was in complete chaos then as the immediate result of the revolutionary movement; the Chinese troops in Tibet thus had no hope of receiving salaries and military supplies from China. The roads for them had been occupied and blocked by the Tibetan forces. Therefore, Chinese civil and military leaders decided to capitulate and return to China on the condition that the Tibetan government made their travel arrangements. In the blind belief that it would be good if the Chinese voluntarily returned to China without war and bloodshed, the Tibetan government provided them with horses and 180,000 Chinese Yuan, and asked them to go straight back to China without staying at the Chinese army camps in Kham and without harassing the Tibetans along their way. After receiving this amount, instead of leaving Lhasa, the Chinese however dillydallied on various excuses. Therefore, from Kalimpong, the Dalai Lama wrote an appeal to both the Chinese and Tibetans in Tibet, advising them that it would be beneficial to both the Chinese and the Tibetan if the Chinese, without fighting war, returned taking the money and horses from the Tibetan government. Unexpectedly, the Chinese, instead of leaving Tibet, hatched a plot to revolt against the Tibetan government. To obtain victory, they planned to seize Sera Monastery⁵⁵ first, and then to launch war continuously. Having sensed this plan, the two commanders-in-chief immediately sent the Khampa tea traders from Banagshol to guard Sera Monastery. Those Khampas enthusiastically

went to protect the monastery. In the evening of February 5, 1912, the Chinese forces attacked Sera Monastery. The Khampas fought back fiercely to prevent them from entering the monastery. The Chinese for three days attempted to capture the monastery, but upon failure, they set fire to the hermitages of Sera and Choding. From Jerag, they shelled Sera Monastery from the front to enable their troops to rush into the monastery from the mountain behind. The Chinese troops managed to enter up to the Samlo House quarters of the monastery. At that time, some Chinese including an official named Shao Kon-tai, who had taken asylum in Tibet, revealed the entire Chinese military plan to the Tibetans. On February 8, the Tibetan army declared war on the Chinese, and fired from the foot of the Potala onto the Chinese artillery base at Jerag grove, forcing them to move away from Sera Monastery. The battle lasted for 96 hours, causing severe casualties on the Chinese side, and ultimately all the Chinese troops at Sera retreated to Lhasa.

Lhasa at that time had become like a battlefield. The Chinese occupied all the areas between Yamen and Drapchi, whereas the Tsuglakhang and other northern portion of Lhasa were held by the Tibetan forces. Most of the buildings and houses in Lhasa were converted into barricades, and the doors, windows and roofs were blocked with sandbags and fortifications of stones and bricks were built. Both the sides had occupied many large houses and tall buildings. Many new passages were made in the city, leading from one house to another. They exchanged gunshots for many days and nights. They dug underground tunnels into the enemy's zone to explode the outposts. When soldiers of the two sides came close to each other, they hurled abuse at each other and engaged in extended verbal fights. Though it was decided to send Tibetan troops to garrison Tengyeling Monastery, the monks of the monastery insisted and gave written assurance that they themselves would defend the monastery, without the help of the Tibetan troops.

At that time, the Tibetans had strong Tibetan forces in Lhasa, made up of the national army and local militias and monk volunteers. However, they were ill equipped—they had only a few machine guns and the rest of their weapons were Tibetan homemade guns, wooden-wheeled cannons, swords, spears, axes, etc. Nevertheless, the Tibetan forces and general populace had a very strong and indestructible courage and determination to expel the Chinese troops from Tibet, for the sake of Tibet's religion and polity. Tibetans occupied all the roads leading from Lhasa to Dotö and Domé, and blocked the passage of the Chinese backup troops, salaries, food and other military supplies to Lhasa. After a few months, much exhausted and strained, and having no option, the Chinese troops were on the brink of giving up fighting. Unfortunately, wealthy Tengyeling Monastery, which had large stores of food, gave asylum to the Chinese. All the Chinese at Yamen shifted to Tengyeling. This helped the Chinese bolster their stamina to fight, and the battle was prolonged. They burned Shide Monastery in the night.

The Dalai Lama appointed Chensel Namgang, otherwise known as Dasang Dradul, as the chief of the Tibetan army and ordered that he and the two Tibetan commanders-in-chief in Lhasa—Khendrung Jampa Tendar and Tsipon Trimon—work jointly to drive out the Chinese forces from Tibet. In March 1912, when the Dalai Lama arrived back in Lhasa, the war was still going on. With the support of monk volunteers, the Tibetan forces charged at the Chinese army cantonment at Drapchi, but due to its strong and high boundary walls, the Tibetans suffered heavy defeat as many of their soldiers were either killed or wounded. One night, during an incidence at Juding, Tsipon Trimon received a serious injury on his right shoulder. He, notwithstanding, did not lose his courage, and after receiving treatment for a few days, he again went to the battlefield to command his troops.

Lhagyari's younger son Namgyal Wangchuk, the commander of Dagpo and Kongpo regiment, a valiant warrior, led his army to Lhasa and fought the Chinese. Using the technique of digging underground tunnels to explode the enemy's outpost, he caused severe damage to the Chinese forces in Lhasa. One day after that, when he and Jampa Tendar were patrolling around the Lupug Norzin Park, the Chinese at Yamen opened fire at them, leaving Namgyal Wangchuk dead on the spot. As for Namgyal Wangchuk, previously when he was at Dromo on his way back to Tibet from India, it coincided with the arrival of the Dalai Lama at Dromo. The Dalai Lama called him to his residence and appointed him to the post of brigadier. Presenting him with a small Buddha statue sanctified by Lord Atisha as a representation of faith, and a fully loaded Russian pistol, the Dalai Lama instructed him to expand the Tibetan military power and expel the Chinese, and at the same time asked him to bring back some required goods from the government's treasury. Thereafter, arriving in Lhasa, Namgyal Wangchuk met the two Tibetan commanders-in-chief and discussed with them his plan. He then set off to Shotarlhosum, Dagpo and Kongpo to mobilize local militias. Having collected around 2,000 local recruits, he first launched an attack on the Chinese at Drip Tse Choling, located to the south of Lhasa. Thereafter, he crossed the Kyichu River and attacked the Chinese at Chabdzing Lingka Park and then in Lhasa. I heard from Lhagyari Trichen Namgyal Gyatso [the father of Namgyal Wangchuk] that the two commanders-in-chief worked jointly with him in their mission. A brief account of the same was narrated in the Shakabpa's *Tibet: A Political History* and Yutok Lhacham Dorji Yudron's *House of the Turquoise Roof*. At the close of the third month of that year [1912], battles slowed down in Lhasa, so people sang the street song:

The Commander-in-Chief Namgang arrived.

The long days of spring dawned.

By performing the Drime Kunden⁵²

Shide [Monastery] was given in alms.⁵³

The song sarcastically refers to the gradual slow down of the battle with the arrival of Namgang in Lhasa. The monks of Sera Monastery, who were guarding Shide Monastery, performed Drime Kunden opera⁵⁴, and that very night the Chinese soldiers set fire to Shide Monastery.

One day just before the *Saka Dawa* month [in 1912], some colonels and captains of the Tibetan army and a group of monks from Sera went en masse into the Potala Palace while the cabinet was in session, arresting the ministers and officials who were under their suspicion and taking them to Shol. They executed Kalon Tsarong Wangchuk Gyalpo, his son, cabinet secretary Tsagur Shakpa, Khendrung Phunrabpa, Lachag Khenchung Samkharwa and Tsedrung Losang Dorji near the inner pillar of Shol. The rest of the arrested members, including the acting-minister Lama Tenzin Chodrak, deputy ministers Rampa and Langthongpa were imprisoned in the Shol office⁵⁵ for several days. Regarding this incident, as I have briefly mentioned above, Kalon Tsarong at his own discretion signed a trade treaty with Chang Yin-tang, the Manchu government's representative in Calcutta. Later in Lhasa, he kept close relations with the Amban Lien Yu. This aroused suspicion among the members of the Tibetan National Assembly and leaders of the Tibetan army about his duplicitous behavior. At that time, the street song became popular:

In morning, he goes to the Upper Labrang, calling himself a golden bird;

In evening, he goes to Yamen, calling himself a turquoise bird;

The minister, who is neither Chinese nor Tibetan, conspires with outsiders.⁵⁶

Tsashakpa, the cabinet secretary, was executed because he was suspected to be close to Kalon Tsarong and his son. Khendrung Phunrabpa and Lhachag Samkharwa of Tengyeling Monastery were executed because they had supported the Chinese army during the Sino-Tibetan battle in Lhasa [in 1912] despite having guaranteed to safeguard their monastery without the help of the Tibetan forces. Tsedrung Lobsang Dorji was at that time among the servants of Lachag Samkhar; he lost his life in his struggle in defense of his master. Some other ministers, officials and persons under suspicion were also arrested. The Kashag was nearly taken over by the army.

While these incidents took place in Tibet, Lhasa sent many envoys to India one after another to invite the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama finally decided to return with the great hope of driving out all the Chinese from Tibet as soon as possible. He thanked the British government of India for its kind hospitality and gave it a letter, emphasizing the importance of friendly and peaceful coexistence between India, Tibet and China in the future. Before he proceeded to Tibet, he thanked and rewarded Pa Namgyal and his wife Yudron for their kind services offered to him with great dedication during his stay in Darjeeling. He also gave presents to Kazi Ogyan Dorji and Thupten Sangmo, in appreciation of their kind hospitality during his stay in Kalimpong.

By that time, the Chinese troops in Tibet were faced with many difficulties from all sides. In addition, the British ambassador to China advised the Chinese government to withdraw all the Chinese troops from Tibet. Therefore, the Chinese government ordered the return of all its troops, except for a small number of Amban's bodyguards. However, since all the roads had been blocked by the Tibetans, the Chinese troops were unable to travel. The Chinese, therefore, through the Nepalese ambassador in Lhasa, informed the Tibetan army chiefs that all the Chinese troops would capitulate and negotiate for a ceasefire.

On May 10, 1912, the Dalai Lama and his entourage left Kalimpong for Tibet amidst the elaborate farewell by the Tibetans in India and British, Bhutanese and Sikkimese dignitaries. When the Dalai Lama and his party arrived at Phari Dzong fortress through Dzaleb-la pass, having come by way of upper and lower Dromo, he issued a decree to all the villages and monasteries in Dokham advising them to expel the Chinese troops from their areas, and safeguard their territories. He promoted his personal secretary, Shelkhar Lingpa, to the post of cabinet minister on the ground of his efficiency in discharging his official duties. He rewarded the tea trader Khampas in Lhasa with gifts, and a decree was issued in praise of their great performance in their patriotic fight against the Chinese.

From Dromo, the Dalai Lama was protected and escorted by thousands of people, including Tibetan officials, Tibetan soldiers, local militias, monk volunteers from the Three Monastic Seats and Khampas, until he arrived in Lhasa. Pomda Nyima Gyalpo, Gojo Chopatsang and other rich traders also came to escort him. The Panchen Rinpoche arrived at Ralung from Tashi Lhunpo to meet the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama stayed at Samdhing Monastery in Yamdrok for three months, during which he was met by Commander-in-Chief Dasang Dradul aka Tsarong inconspicuously for important consultations.

In the meantime in China, Sun Yat-sen had overthrown the Manchu emperor and established the Kuomintang government. Yuan Shih-kai, general of the Manchu emperor, was appointed as the president of the new government. The British ambassador to China, Sir John Jordan, strongly protested to the new Chinese president against his plan to amalgamate Kham into a Chinese province. After that, the Chinese president ordered the Amban in Lhasa to return to China and the Manchu Commander-in-Chief Chung Yin take his place. The Chinese in Lhasa, however, were in a very pitiful condition as their food supply had been exhausted and Tibetans had blocked the passage of their replenishments. The food stock of Tengyeling had been completely emptied. They had to sustain themselves on leather sacks, straws of rice, horses, donkeys and dogs. Finally, the Chinese, through the Nepalese ambassador in Lhasa, informed the Tibetans that they had decided to surrender. The two Manchu Ambans and the commander Chung Yin petitioned to the Dalai Lama to send his representatives during the surrender. The Dalai Lama

sent three representatives, led by minister Changkyim with two assistant staff Tsawa Tritul of Sera Mé college and Tsedron Tenzin Gyaltzen, to witness the surrender. At that time, the following street song became popular in Lhasa:

The Tengyeling monks
Did not listen when they were told not to do so.
Now they eat horses and donkeys—
It is their own fault.⁵⁷

This song refers to the lamas and monks of Tengyeling Monastery helping the Chinese troops, despite that they were urged not to aid them. As a result, they finally had to suffer the bad results of their own actions. Then there was another street song sung by the people:

Tibetan artilleries are dumb;
The gunners of artilleries are also dumb;
The Shells broke the legs of a frog
In the pond of Tengyeling Monastery.⁵⁸

This song alluded to the fact that some shells fired from the Tibetan artilleries landed onto the pond in the compound of Tengyeling Monastery, instead of hitting the enemy.

After due deliberations, the Chinese troops and the Tibetan government, with mediation by the Nepalese ambassador in Lhasa, finally reached an agreement, written in Tibetan, Chinese and Nepalese languages, bearing the signatures and seals of all the representatives of the respective countries. Each party kept a copy of the agreement. The Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau and the Gyantse trade officer sent the report of the agreement to the British government of India via telegram on 28 August and 31 August respectively. The British government of India in turn sent a memorandum containing the above three-point agreement to the Chinese government on 3 September. The full content of the agreement is as follows:

The representatives of the Chinese and the Tibetan governments met in the presence of the Nepalese witnesses to discuss the three-point proposals, approved by the Dalai Lama in his answer to the letter submitted by Amban Lien [Yu] and Amban Chung [Ying] on the 29th day of the 6th [Tibetan] month. On the 30th day, the parties carefully discussed the matter and agreed to have the three-point proposals drawn up in the Chinese, Tibetan and Nepalese languages, and to sign and seal them.

Agreement between the Chinese and Tibetans
(August 12, 1912)

I. All the military equipments including Chinese machine guns (machine guns and Lewis guns) in the possession of the Chinese at Drapchi and Tseling in Lhasa shall be collected and sealed in the presence of the representatives of the two parties and witnesses, and shall be entrusted to the custody of the Government of Tibet. Within fifteen days before the departure of the Chinese officials and soldiers from Tibet, all the arms and equipments must be deposited to the Yabshi Langdun's house and the bullets and gunpowder in the Doring Storehouse and the witnessing Gorkha ambassador shall arrange security for the houses.

II. The Chinese officials and soldiers shall leave Tibet in three batches within fifteen limit days. Tibetans shall appoint their representative along with troops to escort the Chinese, and arrange to supply the necessary pack animals and riding ponies. The Tibetans will supply against adequate payment and according to local rates foodstuffs such as rice, flour, barley flour, meat, butter and tea to the Chinese at the rest stops up to the frontier, and the Tibetan officials escorting them shall make the purchase arrangements. There shall not be any delay in supplying pack animals and riding ponies along the way. The Chinese shall not take by force any pack or riding animals beyond the frontier.

III. The representatives of the two parties shall remove all Chinese officials and soldiers from Yapshi house and the Tibetan soldiers from Doring house tomorrow, in order to keep the arms and ammunition in these houses.

All the arms and ammunition belonging to the Chinese government at Drapchi and Tengyeling in Lhasa, including those in the possession of the Chinese private traders from China, shall, according to the letter of the 29th day of the 6th month from Ambans Lien and Chung, be produced before the representatives of the two parties and witnessed on the 1st day of the 7th month together with an inventory. There must be a written declaration that no part of these arms and ammunition had been hidden, sold or given away. Ambans Lien and Chung for their protection shall, as suggested by the witnesses, be allowed to retain sixty rifles and ammunition. All other military equipments shall be put in the Doring storehouse, which shall be sealed by the two representatives and the witnesses. The Gorkha shall arrange security for the armoury. After all the arms, including rifles, Maxim guns and Lewis guns in Drapchi and Tengyeling have been collected, they shall be deposited, without hiding, losing, selling or giving away. The list will be made of the arms genuinely belonging to the private Chinese traders and the representatives and the witnesses shall discuss matters concerning their return to them.

This agreement bears the signs and seals of the Tibetan and Chinese representatives and the witnesses; neither party is allowed to breach any of its provisions.

Joint seal of the Dalai Lama's representatives:

Tritul and Tsedron Tangyal

Seals of the representatives of Ambans Lien Yung and Chung Ying:

Luchang Krang Loyun Jij (Yulji Lu Langrin)

Lau Le U Yon Krephu Wang Chiuujin

Envoy of the Gorkha Darbar:

Major-Captain Bahadur Khatri Chhetri

Lieutenant Lal Bahadur Basnyat Chhetri

Dittha Kul Prasad Upadhyay

Subedar Ratna Gambhir Singh

Khatri Chhetri

30th day of the 6th month of the Water-Mouse Year, corresponding to 12 August 1912.

According to the agreement, the Chinese were to leave Lhasa within the fifteen days from 12 to 27 August 1912. However, they did not adhere to the terms. Though the first batch of Chinese soldiers and Amban Lien handed over their weapons to the Tibetan government in August and left for India via the southern river, the rest of the Chinese soldiers dillydallied in Lhasa on various excuses, sometimes even engaging in fighting with the Tibetan troops. Hence, from June 1, 1913, the Tibetans forcefully seized weapons from the Chinese troops one by one. They were then divided into different groups. Led by Brigadier Dokharwa, the Dromo Governor Brigadier Pal Shiwa and Shol Steward Kalsang Lhundup, along with one hundred Tibetan troops, were assigned the main responsibility of escorting the departing Chinese troops. Rimshi Tadowa and Letsen Lobsang Norbu, jointly with the district officers of all the districts along the way, were given the responsibility of providing pack animals and travel facilities to the Chinese troops. The Tibetans escorted the Chinese troops to the Indian border, passing through the Tsangpo River, Yamdrok, Phari and Dzaleb-la pass, and handed them over to the British government. From India, they were sent to China by sea.

Some traitorous monks of Tengyeling Monastery, embarrassed about their past shameful acts, dressed themselves as Chinese. Tibetan women who were married to Chinese soldiers also left with their Chinese husbands. On arrival in India, most of the Chinese troops returned to China, but many of them remained in Sikkim and other parts of India, where their descendants still live.

When the Dalai Lama was at Chokhor Yangtse in Chushur, he received a letter from Yuan Shih-kai, the president of the Kuomintang government, apologizing for

the excesses of the Chinese troops in Tibet and restoring him to his former post. The Dalai Lama replied that he did not want any post from the Chinese, because he already was the both spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet. This statement of the Dalai Lama, as Sir Charles Bell maintained, is a clear proclamation of Tibet's independence.

The Sino-Tibetan battle in Lhasa lasted almost one whole year, leaving one third of the city in ruins. The golden tops (*rgya phib*) and roofs of Ramoche and Tsuglagkhang temples were gravely damaged. Even houses that were not ruined did not escape being cracked. The streets and alleys of the city were all filled with dead bodies of humans, horses and donkeys, and street dogs gnawed at the corpses. People dared not go out during the nighttime in fear of the dogs, as the dogs had developed the habit of eating human flesh. The war left more than 1,300 Chinese soldiers, and far greater numbers of Tibetan civilians, including monks, either killed or wounded. Drapchi areas suffered the most severe damages and many monks from Sera Monastery were lost during the war. Without even reckoning the pillage in other parts of Tibet, the goods, food and moneys looted from the Tibetans just in Lhasa by the Chinese would add up to many tens of millions of Indian rupees. All these are detailed in the *Collection of Simla Records*.

On January 17, 1913, the Dalai Lama, accompanied by his retinue, arrived in Lhasa from Chokhor Yangtse. He was greeted with a grand reception ceremony, with officials of the Tibetan government, monks of the Three Monastic Seats, soldiers of the Tibetan national army and local militiamen standing in line along the way. Led by the lama procession and dance and song performances by the people, the Dalai Lama proceeded to the Potala Palace.

On the 8th day of the first month of the Water-Ox year [1913], the Dalai Lama issued a decree, bearing his seal, to all the people of Tibet, as a guideline for their behaviour and actions. This and the Dalai Lama's previous refusal of the post and titles offered by the Chinese president Yuan Shih-kai alone established Tibet's independence once again, as everyone acknowledges. The content of the decree has been quoted in various books, so I will not bother to include it here.

Just before that, in January 1913, Tibet and Outer Mongolia entered into a treaty, in which they declared their independence and agreed to continue their religious and political relationship.⁵⁹ The Dalai Lama granted Regent Trichen Tsemonling the title of "Hutuktu" and a square seal, in honour of his excellent and dedicated performance in his official responsibilities during the absence of the Dalai Lama. Commander-in-Chief Khendrung Jampa Tendar was elevated to the post of minister with the title Kalon Lama and Tsipon Trimon Norbu Wangyal was made Deputy Commander-in-Chief with the title of *Taiji* (third rank in the Tibetan government). The Commander-in-Chief Dasang Dradul was raised to the rank of *Dzasak* and his marriage into the Tsarong family was sanctioned.⁶⁰ The Sera

Governing Council (*Se ra bla spyi*) was rewarded with eight camps (*brgya shog*) of Dam and Gyare Lhopa, and the Ganden Governing Council (*Dga' ldan bla spyi*) with half the district of Tsona as a reward for their services to the government. All the Tibetan officials, soldiers, traders and civilians who made outstanding performances during the national struggle for independence were also rewarded in accordance with their performances. Likewise, those who committed mistakes were punished. In this regard, the biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama recounts:

As for those who valiantly fought during the Tibetan's struggle to drive out the enemy from the country by sacrificing their own welfare, for the benefit of the country's religion and polity—some were compensated with offerings for their funeral ceremony, while others with either posts, cash or material gifts in accordance with their performances. The Dalai Lama thus made clear recognition of people's dedicated works.

In the same year (1913), he issued the first Tibetan currency notes in the denominations of *Srang* 50, 25, 15 and 5. Afterwards, in 1931, altering the old currency notes, he issued a new 100 *Srang* note. In that year, the mounted postal service from Phari to Lhasa via Gyantse, and from Lhasa to Kongpo Gyamda were withdrawn and a new modern postal service was introduced and new postal stamps were issued in the values of 1 *kha*, 5 *kar*, 7 ½ *kar*, 1 *zho*, 1 *tam*, 2 *tam* and 4 *tam*. All the stamps had lions at the center, postage values on the top and the letters "Tibet" in English at the bottom.

With aid by the British government, four children of Tibetan government officials were sent to a Rugby School in England. The four children were Mondrong Khyenrab Kunsang, who specialized in mining; Gokhar Sonam Gonpo in military systems, Jangngopa Rigzin Dorji in electrical engineering and Kyipugpa Wangdu Norbu in telegraphy and map making. Tsipon Lungshar Dorji Tsegyal was sent to assist and guide them. Lungshar was a very intelligent and capable man. During his stay in England, he made keen observation of the people and place, and learned various kinds of skills. After he returned to Lhasa, he served as Finance Minister as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army for a brief period.

In 1913, as previously the Dalai Lama and Gonsuke Haya, the Japanese Minister in China had discussions in Peking, a Japanese veteran, Yasuijro Yajima, arrived in Tibet via Kham. The Tibetan government appointed him as military instructor to teach Japanese military system to one of the units of the Tibetan army. He spent six years in Tibet. He was allowed to keep *tachok* (*skra cog*), an official hairstyle, and to attend official functions and ceremonies as a Tibetan government official. A barrack for the Bodyguard Regiment at Norbulingka was constructed in Japanese style. Around that time, there were several Japanese in Tibet, who had come to study Buddhism⁶¹. That marked the beginning of Tibet's political relationship with Japan. Later, a Japanese man named Tokan [Tada]⁶²

who spent ten years at Sera Monastery in Tibet wrote books on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in Japanese and English.

The Dalai Lama learnt from his exile in India, China and Mongolia that Tibet had made a major mistake by remaining aloof from the rest of the world, and he realized the importance of learning foreign languages and military systems. He thus embarked upon many changes in the country upon his arrival back. However, some conservative Tibetan people created tremendous obstructions to his plans in the name of religion. In addition, the successive governments of China interfered in the Tibetan national affairs, with evil aims. Therefore, the wishes of the Dalai Lama remained unaccomplished.

D. Expulsion of Chinese Forces from Dotö

After all the Manchu troops were driven out from U-Tsang, the Tibetan government appointed Kalon Lama Jampa Tendar as the Governor-General of Kham, and deputed many lay and monk officials such as salary officer and medicine dispenser to Kham. He was given full power to appoint district officers, treasurers and other civil and military officials to all the districts under his jurisdiction as the need arose. Eight new brigadiers were appointed and deputed to the Tibetan army regiments of Shigatse, Gyantse, Dingri and Drapchi, and Donmag force⁶³. Three commanders were appointed, one each to the local armies of Shotarhosum (Shopando, Palbar and Lho Dzong), Mardzosangsum (Markham, Dzogang and Sangen) and Richabpasum (Riwoche, Chamdo and Pasho). The brigadiers were Phulungwa, Jingpa, Dhokhar Sé, Khyungrampa, Tethongpa, Trelingpa, Tsogowa, Marlampa and Tanawa. The commanders of the local militias were Khenchung Dawa, Serngag Tsedrung Shabchung and Tsedrung Ngodup.

In that year, from Lhasa, the Tibetan army in two columns embarked upon military campaigns to flush out the Chinese troops from two directions. Following the southern route, the Drapchi and Shigatse troops and Donmag reserves marched to Kongpo Gyamda and Shopando, pushing out all the small Chinese forces remaining there across Lho Dzong. There they set up a headquarters for the Governor-General of Kham and made war preparations. Following the middle northern route, the Gyantse and the Dingri regiments and volunteer army marched to Sog, Rongpo Gyalrab Thang, then crossed four mountain passes, finally reaching Khyungpo where they battled with the Chinese forces continuously until they drove all the Chinese troops up to the Chonyi-la pass of Sertsa. There the Tibetan force was confronted by a large Chinese force, the accumulation of the Chinese troops that were expelled from Khyungpo and those who were based in Tengchen. The two sides fought an intense battle, during which some Tibetan officers and troops,

including Brigadier Jingpa were killed. On the battle site, stones were stacked and *Mani* mantra (*Om ma ni pad me hum*) inscribed on them in memory of those Tibetan soldiers who lost their lives in the battle. The Tibetans were in a favourable position, while the Chinese, unable to hold ground, retreated through Tengchen and Karme up to Doshul. Unfortunately, at that time, a traitorous Tibetan monk named Garwa Lama helped the Chinese troops making plans. As a result, the Tibetan force faced some difficulty. The Tibetans, however, fought with great courage and effort, killing, wounding or capturing many Chinese officers and soldiers. At that time Chamdo, Riwoche, Chaksam, Nangchen Gar, Drayab and Derge Joda were the main bases of the Chinese forces.

After that, in order to resolve the Sino-Tibet borders and political issues, the Tibetan government requested the British government of India to arrange a conference between Tibet and China with the British government as mediator. Accordingly, after obtaining confirmation from both China and Tibet, the British informed Tibet and China to send their representatives to Simla⁶⁴, the venue of the convention. The Chinese government sent Chen I-fen and his assistant staff to the meeting. Sir Henry McMahon [1862-1949)]⁶⁵, British Foreign Affairs Minister, represented the British government of India. On October 3, 1913, the delegates of the three countries met at the summer headquarters of the government of India on equal footing⁶⁶. On the first day, they had an introductory meeting, at which they showed their letters of authorization to each other. During the actual meeting, the Tibetan representative (Lonchen Shatra) presented his case with strong arguments, pressing that Tibet was an independent country and not a part of China. He backed his case by furnishing reasons and historical documents. The Chinese representative on the other hand presented his case merely based on irrelevant and forceful verbal arguments, without any historical and legal documents as evidence. The Tibetan representative asserted that the Chinese forces had annexed many areas of Dotö and Domé. Intense debate took place between the Chinese and the Tibetan delegates during the meetings, which lasted for several days. Finally, on February 27, 1914, in order to bring compromise between the two sides on controversial Sino-Tibetan borders, McMahon proposed a division of Tibet into "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet,"⁶⁷ with Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Although the Tibetans were not willing to accept the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and the Chinese did not want the division of Tibet into outer and inner Tibet, both sides accepted the proposal of McMahon so that they could reach a treaty to solve the Sino-Tibet problem. On the map of Tibet, the borderline of Tibet was drawn in red, while the line between the "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet" was drawn in blue. According to the treaty, the British and Chinese were not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the Outer Tibet, and the Tibetan government had the power to manage religious affairs of the Inner Tibet and to appoint and send monastic officials to the

monasteries lying in it. The draft of the treaty, which consisted of twelve points, was initialed by the representatives of all the three countries. However, when the draft was finalized, the Chinese representative refused to put his signature and seal on it, saying that he had received an order from Peking not to sign it. Despite the British representative Sir McMahon tried his best to gain the goodwill of the Chinese, the Chinese kept stalling. On June 25, 1914, the British government of India therefore sent an ultimatum to China, saying that if China did not sign the treaty by the end of the current month, the Tibetan and British governments would make a separate bilateral treaty. Later, on July 3, McMahon emphasized this also at a meeting in the presence of members of all the three nations, yet the Chinese side still did not accept the treaty. At that very meeting, the British and Tibetan representatives initialed the final draft of the Convention with their official seals.

Then, His Majesty's British government and the Tibetan government made a separate agreement to amend the original treaty, stating that the governments of Britain and Tibet acknowledged the Convention to be binding to them, and that as long as the government of China withheld signature to the Convention, she was barred from enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom. The declaration, dated July 30, 1914, was in two copies, signed and sealed by both the British and Tibetan representatives. Consequently, the Chinese not only lost its suzerainty over "Outer Tibet" and political rights over "Inner Tibet", but also lost its rights over Tibet accrued from the bilateral treaties previously made by China and British India on Tibet, as they were nullified under the article 7 of the Simla Convention.⁶⁸

Besides that, British India and Tibet entered into an eleven-point bilateral trade agreement. Tibet thus enjoyed its independence and made treaties with foreign countries on an equal footing, demonstrating Tibet's political status clearly to the world. For further information about the Tibetan and British relationships in terms of borders, trade and military affairs, please refer to Shabapa's *Tibet: a Political History*.

At that time, Silon Shatra (the Tibetan representative) forwarded a letter dated 15th day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year [1914] to the Foreign Secretary of the British government of India, requesting it to sell machine guns along with ammunition and to provide military support to Tibet. His letter stated to the effect that:

Nowadays, resistance fighting against the Chinese is ongoing in Kham. To safeguard our own territories we request that your government sell to us 5,000 new model machine guns, 20 artilleries with good quantities of ammunitions and shells, and to hire to us two or three arms mechanics to repair the damaged artilleries in Tibet, for a fixed period. Since China did not accept the Simla Treaty, it may attack Tibet at any time, from any side. So we request the British government to extend military assistance to Tibet, in the event of a Chinese military attack on Tibet.

McMahon, preoccupied with his impending travel to England, replied that he would respond to this request later on, as soon as possible. When Shatra arrived in Gangtok from Simla, he received a letter from the British government of India through the Political Officer in Sikkim [Basil Gould]. The letter said that the government would offer 5,000 rifles (long nozzle rifle .303) and 500,000 rounds of ammunition, machine oil and cleaning cloths, which were collected from various army camps in India. In the first consignment, he received 1,000 rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 20 tins of machine oil and 6 boxes of wiping cloths. He acknowledged the above arms with the receipt dated July 7, 1914 bearing the seal, and left the receipt with Sonam Laden La [1876-1936] to be forwarded to the British government.

One month after the Simla Convention was concluded, the World War I⁶⁹ between the allies led by the British and the Central Powers led by Germany started in Europe. As soon as the news about this reached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government sent a letter dated 15 July to the British government through Basil Gould, proposing to send 1,000 soldiers to help the British allies. In the reply letter dated July 27, 1914, the British government said that it was very pleased at the Tibet's willingness to help it, and that it would ask for help later in the event of need.

On September 17, 1914, with a sense of great satisfaction with the Simla Convention, Shatra and his assistants arrived back in Lhasa. He submitted his work report enclosed with a detailed record of the Convention to the Dalai Lama, the Kashag and the National Assembly. However, since he did not announce the content of the agreement and did not explain the pros and cons of it, people were left in the dark and various kinds of rumours about it circulated widely.

In that year, Commander-in-Chief [Tsarong] Dasang Dradul was elevated to the post of minister, retaining his army post. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief Taiji Trimon Norbu Wangyal was also made a minister, in honour of his remarkable performance during the Sino-Tibetan battle in the Water-Rat year [1912], and thereafter his dedicated assistance to Siron Shatra during his mission to the Simla Treaty. Yulha Tenpa Tsewang was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Drumpa Dzasak and Doring Taiji, who returned after completing their military training in the British system under Changlochan in Gyantse, were appointed brigadiers of the newly mobilized the *kangdon gyena* soldiers⁷⁰, an infantry whose soldiers were recruited as tax.

The Tibetan government appointed Yasuijro Yajima, a retired Japanese army officer, as military instructor to give military training [of the Japanese military system] to one unit of the Tibetan army. Sogpo Tenpai Gyaltsen, who had returned from Russia after receiving military training, was appointed instructor to teach the Russian military system to another unit of the Tibetan army. In 1916, on the

northern ground of the Norbulingka Palace, the four units of the Tibetan army, which had received training in Japanese, Russian, British and the traditional Tibetan systems, held a four-day military drill competition in the presence of the Dalai Lama, ministers and officials of the Tibetan government and many thousands of spectators. The competitions included parades; maneuver; skills in detaching, assembling and firing new rifles and artilleries; attacking techniques; horse riding; and swimming. The Dalai Lama presented gifts to those who performed the best in the competition. He found the British military system the best, so he adopted it as the model for the Tibetan army. In order to apply this system uniformly to all the army units in Tibet, the Dalai Lama issued edicts to all the army barracks in Kham and sent military instructors to give them training. Besides this, the Tibetan army was divided into regiments, numbered in Tibetan alphabets (i.e. ka, kha, ga, nga, etc.), created new military and national flags, codified written military laws for the Army Headquarters and announcements were made all over the country about them. The biography of the great Thirteenth Dalai Lama states:

In the past, not only did this land of Dharma have only a small frontier force to guard its territorial borders against foreign attacks from four sides, but also no efforts were made to keep a trained army to overpower enemies. As a result, in recent years, some foreign countries with evil intentions have begun planning to control Tibet's political power. Moreover, since the country was on the decline in the period of strife (*rtsod ldan gyi dus*), [the Thirteenth Dalai Lama] recruited thousands of soldiers to reinforce the Tibetan army, which was indispensable for the common efforts of civil and military activities, which are the life force for happiness. At the same time, he introduced different types of military trainings to the Tibetan troops on the model of foreign military systems, and awarded prizes to those who emerged successful in their training in accordance with the level of their performance. In order to identify the best military systems and to adopt it as a model, a three-day military drill competition was held to test which military system—Russian, British and Japanese—was the best, and the Dalai Lama kindly observed them. In the final day, a stone lifting competition was held. After that, he granted vajra-knotted threads to all the army officers and soldiers led by the Commander-in-Chief of Army, Kalon Tsarong, and granted military flags (*sba dar*), insignias and other trophies to the participant teams as per the merit list prepared by the Kashag. It was followed by a parade by the troops in honour of him.

As mentioned thus, whenever there were military skill competitions, the Dalai Lama used to witness them and gave them advice and suggestions.

After that, the Tibetan government sent some bright young government staff and soldiers, including Sampo's son Palden Chowang, Dingjawa Dorji Gyaltsen, Junior Kyibug Sonam Wangyal and Norgye Nangpa Sonam Dorji to Calcutta and Shilong (in Assam) to receive training in the operation and maintenance of

new model British artilleries and machine guns. Upon arrival back in Lhasa after completion of their training, they were appointed military instructors to various regiments. New weapons were also purchased from the British government. To meet the military expenses, revenues were collected through various possible ways, such as creating different types of taxes like the "ear tax" (*rna khral*) on rich people. In this way, at one point of time in Tibetan history, the Tibetan military power and system was in great progress.

Previously, during the time when Britain, China and Tibet held a tripartite convention in Simla (1914), Lama Jampa Tendar, the Governor-General of Kham, ordered his forces to halt the fighting temporarily in order to avoid disturbance to the convention. He sent a proposal of truce to the Chinese military leaders: Feng Ch'un-lin in Chamdo, Chin Ch'un-lin in Batang and Chang Wulen in Dartsedo. Two of the Chinese commanders did not give any reply, while Feng sent a packet containing yak dung. Feng also sent a message, saying he would lead his force to Kongpo. This was one of the causes that rekindled the Sino-Tibetan war. Another cause that provoked the war was as below. The Chinese Riwoche regiment of the Chamdo base under the command of Chang and Tien had 1,600 troops and two artilleries. The Chinese soldiers who were collecting fodders captured two Tibetan army horse keepers at Doshul and imprisoned them at Riwoche prison. The Governor-General of Kham sent a letter to the Chinese commanders in Riwoche and Chamdo to release the two Tibetan soldiers. However, instead of releasing the two soldiers, the Chinese took them to Chamdo. The Tibetans ambushed them on the way and rescued the two Tibetan soldiers. This incident escalated the tension between the Tibetans and the Chinese.

In 1916, the Governor-General of Kham received information that the Chinese army camp in Chamdo was receiving large numbers of additional troops, army salaries and weapons from Kandze and Batang bases. He also chanced upon one of letters exchanged between the Chamdo and Riwoche Chinese military bases, according to which they were planning to advance to Kongpo Gyamda after receiving additional troops and weapons. In addition, he received requests from villages and monasteries of Markham, Gojo, Sangen, Drayab and others through secret letters and messengers, asking for protection from the Chinese, and saying that the Chinese troops were greatly troubling them. Therefore, the Governor-General of Kham once again, after making strategic plans and mobilizing troops and supplies, planned to expel the Chinese troops from Dotö, by attacking them from three sides. He ordered one battalion to march to Riwoche and Dzesam bank, and to surround Chamdo from the northern side to block the route for the Chinese soldiers arriving from the Derge side. The second battalion was ordered to march to Chamdo from the western side through Lagong Nyenda and Lamda. The third one was commanded to march via Tsawa Pasho and attack the Chinese forces in Drayab

and Markham, and also to obstruct the road for Chinese troops advancing from Batang, and finally to attack Chamdo from the southeastern side. They did so.

The Tibetan force, comprising Brigadier Phulungwa of the Gyantse Regiment, Dingri Regiment and voluntary local recruits, who were to surround Chamdo, encountered a Chinese force at Dzesam bridge and Doshul Riwoche. At that time, the Tibetan force was on the mountain to the west of the bridge and the Chinese force on the eastern mountain. Unfortunately, a Tibetan named Garwa Lama assisted the Chinese, and because of this, the battle was prolonged for many days. During the battle, Brigadier Phulungwa, showing extreme courage, made several attempts to charge against the Chinese by jumping from the bridge. One day he was seriously wounded on the battlefield and he passed away after a few days in a very dignified manner.

Soon additional Tibetan troops arrived at Riwoche from Shotarlhosum led by Chikhyab Khenchung Dawa. The Tibetan forces, deploying one batch after another, made recurrent attacks on the Chinese so that within a few months, they were able to push the entire Chinese troops out of the area (Riwoche). Except for two senior Chinese commanders and around 600 soldiers, who escaped to Chamdo, all the Chinese troops were either killed or arrested. A large number of Chinese weapons, including two large artilleries of German model, fell into the hands of the Tibetans. Then, in June 1917 as preplanned, the Tibetan forces advanced to Chamdo via the Dzesam bridge, the Ngomchu and the Dzachu rivers.

From another side, the Tibetan force, comprising troops of Brigadier Trelingpa of the Drapchi Regiment and Tsogo along with local militias, faced the Chinese forces at Nyenda and Lamda, where there was the largest concentration of Chinese troops. It took the Tibetans many days to push the Chinese to Chamdo. Thereafter, the Governor-General shifted his headquarters from Lho Dzong to somewhere near Shabye bridge, while his troops made continuous advance to Chamdo.

In the meantime, the Tibetan forces comprising the troops of Brigadier Khyungrampa of the Drapchi Regiment, Tana's company and local militias were combating the Chinese in Drayab, Lhadun and Markham. They finally managed to drive away all the Chinese forces beyond the Bumla Pass, where they constructed a garrison and obstructed the advance of the Chinese troops from the Batang side. Thereafter, in accordance with their plan, they headed to the southeast border of Chamdo. The Chinese forces in Chamdo had no roads except the road between Kandze and Dartsedo to connect with their other bases. At that time, there were already more than 4,000 Chinese soldiers in Chamdo. From Kandze, Commander Wu Kontei was leading more than 1,000 soldiers to Chamdo via Derge Monastery. En route, he collected 2,000 local militias from Horkhog. When they arrived at Topa Drugu Monastery, they were crushed by the Tibetan army. The Tibetans seized two artilleries of German model and a large quantity of shells from the Chinese. Finally,

the commander Wu Kontei and his soldiers, along with their weapons and military goods, surrendered to the Tibetans. Wu Kontei was the one who previously pursued the Dalai Lama up to Chaksam and then to Phari when the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa to India. Wu and his soldiers were handed over to the Governor-General of Kham. He was sent to Lhasa, whence he was sent to Senge Dzong in Lhodrak, where he was imprisoned. During an investigation in prison, he recounted the following:

At the order of Commander-in-Chief Chang Wulen, I led 1,000 troops from Dartsedo for Chamdo, carrying a large quantity of weapons and salaries, to support the Chinese force in Chamdo. En route, I recruited around 2,000 local militiamen from Horkhog and took them with me. We arrived at Topa Drugu Monastery, close to Chamdo, in the evening and stopped there for the night. During that very night, a few Tibetan soldiers came near the river (Drichu), just close to the monastery and fired a few shots in the air and left. I felt sure that they would come again to attack us. I immediately deployed some soldiers at the boundary of the monastery, a few more soldiers at the riverside and the local militiamen on the hillside, behind the monastery, and instructed them to remain alert.

At midnight, the Tibetan troops came and started firing at us. We fired back. Intense firings took place between us. Some shells landed inside the compound of the monastery, where we were hiding. At dawn, I found that all the local recruits I had brought from Horkhog had joined the Tibetan force, and they too were firing at us.

The Tibetan force had occupied the back hill of the monastery, so we had no options but to hide inside the monastery. We fired from inside the monastery. However, the Tibetan forces surrounded the monastery. Finding that it was impossible to defeat them, I discussed with my junior officers about surrendering. I gave a signal of peace by tying a Tibetan scarf on a tall tree above the boundary wall of the monastery and went to surrender. There were Brigadier Kyungrampa and another [Tibetan] brigadier. Many of our troops had fled during the previous night. We officers and soldiers who had remained there surrendered all our weapons and salaries to the Tibetans, who sent us to the Shabye bridge to be handed over to the Governor-General of Kham. I had carried with me a good ruby rosary (*pad ma raga phreng ba*) and a gold bracelet given to me by my wife. When I offered them to the Governor-General, he declined. He arranged me a riding horse and other necessary things, and sent me to Lhasa along with my soldiers, escorted by a Tibetan force.

From Lhasa, all the Chinese soldiers, except me, were sent to India to be deported to Yunan through Burma. Rimshi Tara Dopa sent only me, accompanied by a messenger, with an order and escort force, to Senge Dzong in Lhodrak. I was very afraid that I was being taken there to be executed. There district officer Nyima Gangpa read the order, which said that I was sentenced for pursuing the Dalai

Lama up to Chaksam Bridge previously when the Dalai Lama fled to India. My legs were chained and a small cangue was put on my head. I was greatly relieved as I realised I had escaped execution.

Previously when the Lu Chun forces arrived in Lhasa, I was among them and held the rank of *dukan*. I rode up to Phari in pursuit of the Dalai Lama. I have a big mole on my forehead, so because of this they must have recognized me. At that time, I was young and gaudy, so aristocrats and many girls whom I knew called me “Bu tra tra” (*'bu khra khra*), meaning “colourful worm”.

The Tibetan forces had surrounded Chamdo from eight sides. However, Chamdo, sandwiched between two rivers, the Ngomchu and the Dzachu, had a rough and tough terrain. Moreover, all the surrounding mountains had been occupied by the Chinese troops who possessed sophisticated weapons. The Tibetan forces faced great difficulty in taking Chamdo. At that time, the Tibetan army received 2,000 British rifles, which were previously gifted to Tibet by the British government. They were distributed among the Tibetan forces at different positions, in accordance with their strategic importance. This greatly boosted the morale of the Tibetan forces. They were able to take all the mountaintops of Chamdo, and occupied both sides of the bridge. Therefore, they used to say, “This long nozzle gun is auspicious to us!” The four large artilleries seized from the Chinese troops at Riwoche and Topa Drugu Monastery were taken to Chamdo. Tibetan soldiers learned how to operate them and used in wars.

The Chinese commanders held a meeting to discuss about their plan. At the meeting, a commander named Nui suggested that they should surrender, but some others accused him of being a Tibetan spy and decapitated him. After several days, in October 1917, as the majority of the Chinese soldiers refused to go to war, the Chinese submitted a letter of surrender, signed and sealed by Feng Ch'un-lin, to Khendrung and Rimshi officials, the representatives of the Governor-General of Kham. A brave Chinese commander named Chang, carrying his gun, along with his wife and son, committed suicide by jumping into a river from a bridge.

In 1918, the World War I came to end with the defeat of Germany and her allies. In that year, the Tibetan troops marched into Chamdo and restored Tibetan rule. They hoisted Tibetan national flags at Chamdo Monastery and at all the villages of Marthang that had been destroyed by the Chinese. The Tibetans called out the names of each Chinese army and civil officer one by one, and took their weapons. In total, 11 Chinese army officers, led by Feng Ch'uan-lin and 1,400 Chinese soldiers were captured and imprisoned. Many Chinese soldiers lost their lives in the war or died due to an epidemic disease. Many others escaped.

Garwa Lama, a member of Shabdrung Labrang in Riwoche, was arrested for traitorous acts and conspiring with the enemy. All the Chinese civil staff and traders

were issued identity cards and restricted from moving beyond Chamdo district. The Chinese soldiers alleged Feng Ch'uan-lin had secretly kept their salaries. After this was investigated, about 40,000 yuan was recovered from a coffin hidden underground. Soon after that, Kalon Lama Jampa Tendar, with his aide-de-camps, arrived in Chamdo, where he set up a local government of Kham. He was saluted by all the Chinese army and civil officers, including Feng Chu'an-lin. According to Eric Teichman's book (*Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*), in those times, the flag of the headquarter of the Governor-General of Kham and all the army regiments had a yellow background with a white snowy mountain, two snow lions facing each other and a sun and moon above the two lions. All the money found in the hidden coffin was distributed equally among the Chinese commanders and soldiers. Providing each soldier with 5 *drey*⁷¹ measures of rice and other necessary things, all of them were sent to Lhasa, escorted by a contingent of Tibetan army. Fen Chu'an-lin was allowed to carry all his personal belongings. Garwa Lama was taken bound and gagged since he was a black magician.

As soon as the Chinese war prisoners captured in Chamdo arrived in Lhasa, they were sent off to India, from where they were deported to Yunnan via Burma, with the help of the Indian government. Feng Chu'an-lin was sent to Lhodrak Dowo Dzong for life imprisonment. Later, he married a local woman from Lhodrak and they had a son and a daughter. In 1930, when he died, he left a will to his wife, telling her to give one third of a small amount of gold dust he had left with her to the Dalai Lama. As per his will, his wife went to Lhasa and offered it to the Dalai Lama. According to some people who had seen his son and daughter, the son was slightly mentally retarded, while the daughter was intelligent and beautiful.

Garwa Lama was sent to the estate holder Dron Wangchuk in Jayul, Lhoka, for life imprisonment, but he escaped. Colonel Nyelungpa, the one who was commanding the soldiers who had been employed at a tea plantation in Jayul, and Trendong Letsen Jampa Kalsang reported to the Tibetan government that Garwa Lama had died of an illness. A few years later, news circulated that Garwa Lama was in Nanking. From Nanking, he went to Dartsedo where he distributed pamphlets to the local people and campaigned against the Tibetan government. Colonel Nyelungpa and Jampa Kalsang were investigated and punished severely. In 1936, he left Barang for Nyarong when he heard the Chinese troops were on their way to Nyarong during "the Long March" of the Red Army. There, he was murdered by the local Tibetan people who were in favour of Tibetan government.

Thereafter, Kalon Jampa Tendar granted rewards to those who had made outstanding performances during the wars, and punishments to all those who conspired with enemies and spread rumours. He appointed district officers and garrison guards in all the Tibetan areas recently taken back from the Chinese. He issued edicts to various districts of Kham, stressing that the people pay taxes to

the government, observe the laws and accept the circulation of the Tibetan army's money, which they received as salary. He allowed his soldiers to return to their homes to have a few months of rest. However, soon after that he received repeated requests from the monasteries of Derge, Nyarong, Horkhog, Batang and Litang to send Tibetan forces urgently to protect them from Chinese oppression. Those areas, on their part, were also trying their best to resist the Chinese. Thus, he ordered four regiments of U-Tsang and local militias to go to Chaksam of Dartsedo, the border of Sichuan, via Derge and Horkhog. He ordered another three regiments of U-Tsang and a local militia to proceed to Ju Atundze (in Kham) on the border of Yunnan, through Markham, Batang and Litang, to drive out the Chinese. Accordingly, all the Tibetan troops headed to the above places. With the support of the local people, they fought the Chinese in Derge, Sangen and Gojo. Thereafter, they advanced towards Horkhog, Nyarong, Batang and Litang. The Tibetans living in Dartsedo and to the west of Satham, who were anxiously waiting for the Tibetan troops, were greatly encouraged and filled with hope. Due to the extremely boisterous news of the arrival of the Tibetan troops, the Chinese army general of Batang division requested Dr. Shelton, an American Christian pastor, who was residing in that area, to mediate and arrange for an armistice with the Tibetans. The Chinese commanders of Sichuan and Yunnan units also strongly suggested to the Chinese government that they should come to peaceful negotiation with Tibet. Prompted by these requests, the Chinese government asked the British consul, Eric Teichman (stationed at Tachienlu) to negotiate with Tibet. The Tibetan government, at the proposal of the British government, agreed to hold negotiations. Teichman, as the British representative and Li Jichuan, the Governor of Batang-Litang region, as the Chinese representative, came to Chamdo to meet the Governor-General of Kham. At that time, the Tibetan troops in Rongpa Tsa and Tsakha Lho were fully engaged in their mission to drive away the Chinese troops. For the detailed and true descriptions of the Tibetan and Chinese wars during that time, please see Eric Teichman's *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*.

The Tibetan and Chinese representatives met in Chamdo and they negotiated on border issues in the presence of the British representative for many days, and finally concluded a 13-point agreement on August 19, 1918. They made the Drichu River the temporary border between China and Tibet. According to the agreement, except Derge and Palyul, all the Tibetan areas to the east of the Drichu River were parts of China, while the Tibetan government had powers over the religious affairs of the monasteries lying on the west of the Drichu River that were currently under Chinese control.

Teichman visited the Sino-Tibetan battle site at Rongpatsa, where the Chinese and Tibetans again signed a four-point agreement on September 5, 1918, with both sides agreeing to the withdrawal of their troops from the area. For the full body of

the agreement, please see Shakabpa's *Political History of Tibet*. In accordance with the agreement, both Chinese and Tibetan troops withdrew from the battlefield within the time limit fixed by the agreement. From the wording of the treaties and the situation of that time, it is very clear that Tibet's military power was not too weak to be overpowered easily. Moreover, the Tibetans concluded accords with China and Britain on equal footing, which clearly demonstrated Tibet's political status at the time. As evident from many historical sources in Tibetan and English, had the British government not mediated at that time, the Tibetan forces would have easily retaken the lost territories, including Dartsedo and Jyekundo, from the Chinese.

In the meantime in Derge, the two sons of the Derge chieftain had a dispute over the inheritance of their father's power and dominions. Kalon Lama Jampa Tendar decided that both sons had the right over their father's power, and their succession to the chieftainship would be decided when they attained the age of majority. He appointed Brigadier Khyungrampa and Tethongpa to be in charge of the administration of Derge in the interim, according to the wishes of the officials of the late Derge chieftain. He then issued a decree on the 24th day of the tenth Tibetan month of the Earth-Horse [1938] to the people of Dokham as guidelines to their behaviour and actions.

Previously, in 1896, Chao Erh-feng led the military campaign in Kham during which his troops destroyed many monasteries and tortured the people to the extreme. Twenty long years of Sino-Tibetan conflicts in Kham thereafter brought tremendous suffering to all the people of both the monastic and lay communities. Now, as the Chinese forces were driven away, the people saw a slight ray of happiness. On the other hand, since Tibet and China always lived in suspicion of each other, and remained ready to fight a territorial war, a large number of Tibetan troops were stationed at Tibetan border areas. As a result, the local people faced some difficulties, as they had to arrange accommodation facilities, fodder, firewood and labour for transportation of the army's grain (salary), with or without wages for their labour.

E. The situation in Lhasa and Eastern Tibet

As mentioned above, apart from improving the Tibetan military system in accordance with the changes over time, the entire Tibetan military was divided into different regiments, numbered in Tibetan alphabets (Ka-dang, kha-dang, Ga-dang, Nga-dang, etc.), and adopted various military insignias and titles. Those boys who had completed training in the British military system in Gyantse were appointed to different regiments, with particular responsibilities. In this way, Tibet once again made great improvements in their military system, in accordance with the needs of the modern times.

Initially, the government mint, the main source of the government's revenue, was located at Shol Dopal. Later, during the time of Meru Ta Lama Tenzin Chodrak and Chibje Drumpa's son Tseten Wangdu as in charge of the Machine Project, the government set up a mint and armoury at Metog Kyetsel, a silver and bronze stamping factory at Dagpo Lhasol and a gold-coin mint at Nortolingka in Lhasa. Silver monetary coins of 5 *zho* in the series from 45th to 51st year of the 15th *Rabjung* cycle were produced. Thereafter, copper monetary coins of 20 *srang* as well as 1 *zho* and 5 *kar* in the series of 51st to 54th years of the 15th *Rabjung* cycle were produced and issued for circulation.

Thereafter, when Jangngopa Rigzin Dorji arrived from England (after training), he set up a hydroelectric power station at Dogde in Lhasa, and shifted the mints to Dogde. An electrical powered machinery factory called the "Treasure of Extensively Amazing Powers of Mind⁷²" was built at Drapchi, and there currency notes and coins, as well as weapons and weaponry parts were manufactured. A branch machinery workshop was also set up at Nerbu Tsokhyil in Dromo.

The government at that time was planning to deploy a large army to the borders. In order to collect grains towards the salary of the army, the government imposed a grain tax on all the landlords, chieftains and aristocrats who held large estates and manors. The government ordered Tashi Lhunpo administration to contribute annually one fourth of the total quantity of grain spent on the army in a year, instead of paying a fixed quantity of grain as tax. Tax officers and their assistant staff were appointed in U-Tsang, Kham and Domé. In such ways, the government continuously collected grains through different methods, to provide for the army.

Tashi Lhunpo, a kind of second capital of Tibet, was large, rich and politically powerful. In 1923, when the government ordered it to give grain tax, the Panchen Rinpoche, accompanied by a small retinue, left for Mongolia and China, at the instigation of some of his officials. The Kuomintang government, though not in a position to extend any assistance to him, took advantage of the situation and used him extensively to achieve their political goals.

In ancient times, Tibet established a religious relationship with India. In the process, the Indian religion [Buddhism] and culture spread in Tibet. Later on, Tibet developed close relations with Mongolia and China, and as a result of this, China and Mongolia wielded some influence on Tibet in terms of military systems, language and culture. At one point of time in history, Tibet also had good relations with Nepal, hence a Nepalese school was founded in Lhasa, which continued for some years. Afterwards, when Tibet became close to Britain, the need was felt to learn English, which thus led to the founding of an English school at Gyantse in 1923, with F. Lodlow as the teacher. The school was however closed after three years under the strong pressure of monastic sections, who argued that the school would spread western culture in the country and harm the Dharma.

Regarding the Tibetan military system, it underwent substantial changes over the course of time, and finally the British military system was adopted as the model. The Tibetan government sent young soldiers to India and Changlochan in Gyantse to receive training in the British military system.

Commander-in-chief Tsarong Shape⁷³ showed great respect to his subordinate young officers. The young officers took interest in fashions and western lifestyles. They played polo on the grounds of Drapchi. They conducted maneuvers, such as rock climbing and target practice, on the hillsides of Sera and Drepung monasteries. In this way, because of their inclination towards western culture, they became an eyesore to some senior lay and monk officials of the government and some older monks of various monasteries who were hostile to modernization. Then, during a stocktaking at Shol armoury, some British model rifles were found missing. The Vice Commander-in-Chief Gajang Tenpa Tsering was as a result demoted to the rank of ordinary office secretary (*drung kyus*). One day after that, when the Assembly was in session, discussing the taxation of the cabinet members and army officers to increase the revenues to meet the expenditure of the proposed recruitment of 1,000 new troops in the Tibetan army, some commanders, including Drumpa Dzasak, Doring Taiji, Brigadier Shankhawa of the Bodyguard Regiment, Brigadier Tsogo, Salungpa and army staff Yeshe Wangyal and Tamdin went en masse into the conference hall, and strongly demanded the inclusion of army representatives in the Assembly. This caused friction between military officers and government officials. The Kashag urgently called monks from Sera and Drepung monasteries, and stationed them at Potala and Norbulingka, and assigned security guards to the residences of government *drungtsi* officials⁷⁴. The army officers in response issued guns to the soldiers. Due to misunderstandings between the two sides, a bitter clash nearly took place. The Dalai Lama, through Prime Minister Sholkhang, advised the *drungtsi* officials who had summoned the meeting and the army officers to come to terms through peaceful reconciliation. The Master Chamberlain conducted an investigation into the matter, and submitted a report to the Dalai Lama, who accordingly issued an order. Kalon Khemepa Rinchen Wangyal was demoted to the *Dzasak* rank. Sampho Taiji, the secretary of the Assembly, was made receptionist. Brigadier Shankawa and Tsogo were demoted to the post of junior secretary. Besides them, others who were involved in the case were given punishments according to the seriousness of their acts. The case was solved in this manner.

Rumours had it that the Dalai Lama felt disappointment with Kalon Tsarong for his alleged involvement in the case. Soon after that, Tsarong was sent to visit the Machinery Factory at Dromo Norbu Tsokyil and on business trips to India. During his tour in India and Nepal, he was accorded warm official receptions and necessary arrangements by the Indian and Nepalese governments, as deserving for a commander-in-chief of the respective countries. When he arrived at Chushur on

his way back to Lhasa from India, he received a short notice from the Dalai Lama's secretariat, saying that his army position had been withdrawn, and that he was to continue as minister only. In utter sadness, he arrived in Lhasa.

The army officers had to bear some disgraces that year. In place of Tsarong, Drumpa Dzasak Namgyal Gyaltzen was appointed, with some hopes on him. However, since he was easygoing, addicted to drugs and indulged in gambling and entertainments, his poor leadership seriously weakened military affairs. He was soon replaced by Tsipon Lungshar Dorji Gyaltzen in the post of Commander-in-Chief and Brigadier Nangkarwa Wangchuk Tharchin was appointed as his assistant. In that year, Kalon Jampa Tendar, the Governor-General of Kham, passed away, and Kalon Trimon was appointed in his place.

Kalon Jampa Tendar, though not highly educated, was generally knowledgeable in various fields, and was brave, tough and patriotic. He was capable, good-natured and exceptionally honest. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Dalai Lama during the time when the Tibetans were struggling hard to purge the Lu Chun's troops from Lhasa, with great hopes placed on him. He successfully expelled all the Chinese troops from Lhasa. After that, he was sent to Kham to drive away the Chinese forces. Under his leadership, the Tibetan army expelled the entire Chinese force from Kham, as if dust was blown away, and brought peace and happiness to the region. During his tenure as the Governor-General of Kham, he not only successfully carried out his military and secular responsibilities, but also looked after his subjects with great love and kindness, and did not harrass them. Because of that, he was liked and respected by everyone. He set up schools in Riowche, Chamdo, Drakyab and Markham, and appointed government staff to teach in these schools. Many students who attended these schools later emerged proficient in written Tibetan language, and since then the tradition of learning written Tibetan language greatly spread in those areas.

That year, with the help of the British government of India, Tibet launched postal services, connecting Gyantse to Shigatse, Gyantse to Lhasa and Lhasa to Kongpo Gyamda, and postal stamps were issued. Landline phone connections were set up, joining Dromo and Lhasa via Gyantse. Tibet was thus heading towards modernization. At the same time, the former *shodrun* officers⁷⁵ were appointed as army officers, who had to perform military tests of skills such as shooting guns and arrows and throwing spears from horseback and archery in the presence of cabinet members and large spectators. These displays proved greatly beneficial for the improvement of the military skills of the Tibetan army.

In 1928, the Finance Department of the Tibetan government suggested to the Dalai Lama that since there were many new weapons, it would be good if military tests of skills for new army staff included majorly the equestrian sports, target firing as well as dissembling and assembling guns of various sizes, machines guns,

in addition to the traditional military tests. The Dalai Lama replied that for the time being it should be left that way. Actually, he was said to have faced a dilemma because of the difference in opinion between the army and civil officials on this matter, and I think this is true.

The arrival of the Lu Chun forces had badly damaged the police system of Lhasa. In order to restore it, Sonam Legden [S. W. Laden La, 1876-1936]⁷⁶, an expert in the British police system, was invited from Darjeeling to Tibet to teach the police system to the Dadang Regiment of Lhangam Phunsum. After the training was over, Sonam Legden was appointed as the Superintendent of Police in Lhasa, with the *Dzasak* rank, and Mondrong Khenrab Kunsang, who studied in England, as his assistant. Dhokhar Sé Phuntsok Rabgye, Lhading Sé, Mipon Gyaldrong Nangso, Tsedrung Khenrab Tsultrim and Shodrung Jingpa Surpa were appointed as police officers. It was widely said that with the institution of the police force in Lhasa, there was great improvement in law and order, the cleanliness of the areas, and public security in and around Lhasa city.

In the same year, the governments of British-India and Tibet agreed to construct motorways, joining Dromo to Lhasa through Gyantse for the special purpose of transportation of commercial goods and military supplies from India to the British trade mart in Gyantse. A motorway up to Gyantse was constructed, with stations at every night stop. Soon a few jeeps started to arrive in Lhasa by that road. In 1929, however, the villages that lay along the road between Dromo and Gyantse complained strongly to the Tibetan government that transportation of goods by vehicles harmed their economy of riding transportation, which was their main source of livelihood, and requested the government to halt road construction. Hence, compelled by a strong concern for the welfare of its citizens, the Tibetan government had to postpone the construction of roads indefinitely.

In 1929, the Dalai Lama conceived an idea that he should first import four small vehicles from India and use them whenever he visited Drapchi Powerhouse and other places in and around Lhasa, to make people accustomed to the sights, so that he could gradually construct roads throughout the country and vehicles could be used on these roads. However, faced with various obstructions, he could not carry out his plans. Actually, this is not the case just with Tibet: it is a universal phenomenon that if the time is not ripe, any kind of innovative project will face different kinds of hindrances.

The government passed a law strictly prohibiting not only the consumption, but even the importing of opium, cigarettes and tobacco from foreign countries because they are not only extremely harmful to life, but also they are very unethical from a religious point of view. The law also prohibited all types of gambling such as *thupacu*, cards and *mahjong*, that were sources of quarrelling and fighting. The law also forbade people from hunting and killing all kinds of wild animals, living on

dry land or in water, thus protecting the lives of animals. The Dalai Lama made a great attempt to rule the country in accordance with the principles of the Dharma, but he faced difficulties in practical terms. For example, some people of the Gurkha community in Lhasa⁷⁷ engaged in drug dealing with the support of the Gurkha community in violation of the country's law. When the police went to arrest one person, he ran away and sought refuge in the Gurkha Embassy. The police entered the house and arrested him. The Gurkha ambassador complained that this was a violation of international law. This nearly caused a war between Nepal and Tibet. The Tibetan government immediately ordered the regiments of Dingri and Shigatse to be ready in the event of war. It decided to order Colonel Kyisur to bring his force to Lhasa if the need arose. Immediately, the British government mediated in the dispute and the Tibetan government apologized to the Gurkha ambassador for the mistake of allowing the Tibetan police officer to enter the Gurkha Embassy. The crisis was thus resolved.

Since most of those who were engaged in gambling, such as dominos (*sbag*), *mahjong* and cards were government officials, businesspersons, senior monk officials of monasteries and officials of large lama estates, the police faced tremendous difficulties in checking them.

Around that time, the Russian government sent to Lhasa a Mongolian monk and a Russian man named Dzangpo, and thereafter a Russian army commander, with the purpose of restoring the relationship between Tibet and Russia. Bound by the Tibet-Britain Simla Convention, Tibet did not accept Russia's proposal of friendship. Rumour had it that after three months, those Russian envoys left Tibet in despair. Sometime later, the Kuomintang requested the Tibetan government to allow its representatives to make an official visit to Tibet, but the permission was not granted. In 1927, when Abbot Konchok Jungne of Yangon Monastery returned to Tibet from China, Chang Kai-shiek sent through him a letter and gifts to the Dalai Lama. The letter stated that if Tibet accepted China's suzerainty over Tibet, the Chinese would help and support Tibet anytime, and they would arrange the return of the Panchen Rinpoche to Tibet. The Dalai Lama replied that while he appreciated the friendly relationship between Tibet and China on an equal status, he would not entertain the idea of China's suzerainty over Tibet.

In those days, the general situation in Eastern Tibet was calm and peaceful. However, due to the frequent movements of the staff of the Governor-General of Kham, Tibetan army camps, army salary officers and district staff from one place to another created great difficulties to the people living along the way, as they imposed corvée and free pack animals to the people. Moreover, they engaged in many corrupt practices, such as buying grains wholesale from people and reselling them at a high price, and dishonesty in the implementation of tax systems and laws. Therefore, the local people made repeated complaints to the government against those civil and

army officers. This led the Dalai Lama in 1929 to issue an edict bearing his seal to all the civil and military officers and monasteries in Kham, stating that they were not allowed to exploit the citizens by any means, directly or indirectly. At the same time, he instituted a probe into the matter, and punished all those who were found to be corrupt or dishonest in their duties, and bestowed gifts and honours on those who worked with dedication and looked after the people with love and care.

For the political and religious status and territorial safety of Tibet, the Tibetan government started to initiate relations and make correspondences with neighbouring countries. In 1931, for example, the Tibetan government sent a letter to Mahatma Gandhi, an Indian freedom struggle leader, who used non-violent methods to fight for Indian independence. In the 1930s, through Suydam Cutting⁷⁸, the first American to visit Tibet, the Tibetan government sent a letter to the US President Hoover (Herbert Clark Hoover) in connection with trade and political matters. Similarly, through Tokan Tada, the Tibetan government exchanged many letters with the Japanese Prime Minister. I have mentioned these only as examples, as in fact the Tibetan government exchanged letters and made contact with all the small and large countries.

At one time, Commander-in-Chief Kalon Tsarong Dradul, Finance Minister Tsipon Lungshar Dorji Tsegyal and the Dalai Lama's favored attendant Thupten Kunphel were favourites of the Dalai Lama and were very powerful and popular figures of the Tibetan government of the time in terms of both wealth and status in both political and military spheres. However, the three were very jealous and competitive among themselves for power. When Tsarong was serving as Commander-in-Chief, some rifles were found missing, he was hence demoted to the post of *dzasak* (third rank). He still continued as a favourite of the Dalai Lama.

In 1931 with the consolidation of the government's mints at Make, Sertam and Dogde under Drapchi Electrical Machine Office, Thupten Kunphel was appointed its supervisor and Khendrung Ngoshi Thupten Kunkhyen and Tsipon Chaluba Sonam Phuntsok as his assistants. The new factory produced monetary copper coins and colorful paper notes, as well as manufactured arms, including ammunition. In 1932, Dzasak Tsarong (formerly Kalon Tsarong) was appointed to the Drapchi Electrical Machine Office.

After that, Drumpa Dzasak, Changchen Gung and Doring Taiji and his soldiers, Yutok Sé Taring and many other officers and troops were sent to Changlochen in Gyantse to receive British military training under him. The training included maneuver, target practice and assembling and operating guns and artilleries. After completion of their training, they were appointed to various regiments as training instructors.

British model rifles such as Lewis guns, machine guns and artilleries brought from India and kept at the Shol armoury were shifted into the newly built armoury

at the Drapchi Electrical Machine Office. There again, some guns were found missing according to the arm register of the Army Headquarters. Due to this mistake, among others, Lungshar was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief, and he was to continue as Tsipon only. The assistant to the Commander-in-Chief, Nangkar Wangchuk, who was the Brigadier of the Bodyguard Regiment, was made the Commander-in-Chief. He did not have a government post, but he had full powers over military affairs. The preamble of the rulebook of the Drapchi armoury, bearing the seal of the Dalai Lama, read as below:

In the Wood-Tiger year of the 15th *Rabjung* cycle, [1914], when Prime Minister Shatra Paljor Dorji was returning to Lhasa from India after he had concluded a tripartite treaty between Britain, Tibet and China for the peaceful coexistence between Tibet and China in the future based on their "priest and patron" relationship, the British government sent through him 5,000 British rifles, including ammunition, to Tibet as gifts. The Regent, Prime Minister Shatra and all the cabinet ministers including Sholkhang, Changkyim, Kalon Lama Jampa Tendar and Kalon Tseten Wangchuk, through unanimous agreement, deposited them at the Shol armoury. The Commander-in-Chief Dzasak Dasang Dradul and the vice Commander-in-chief Yulha Tenpa Tsewang, who replaced Trimon Norbu Wangyal, when the latter was appointed to the post of minister, were put in charge of the armoury. The two were instructed to maintain a proper register for all the arms, and to deal with all the matters relating to arms, including their maintenance, in accordance with the rulebook of the armoury. Though such an exemplary system was adopted, the two commanders whiled away their time and neglected their responsibilities. Therefore both of them were thus removed from their posts one after another. After that, Dzasak Drumpa Namgyal Gyaltzen was appointed the Commander-in-Chief with the *Dzasak* rank in hope that he would perform his duty better because he was a relative [of Dalai Lama]. Nevertheless, instead of realizing the kindness shown to him and putting all his efforts towards his responsibilities, he did not keep a proper register of all kinds of arms, and neglected the maintenance and preservation of the arms. Though he was from an aristocratic family and enjoyed high status, he fell under the influence of bad friends and indulged in opium use and other unethical habits regularly. Though a committee of monk and lay officials was appointed to witness the charge handling between the outgoing and incoming commanders-in-chief, he dillydallied and did not hand over the charge to the new incumbent promptly and properly. With the result, a special punishment was given to him. After that, Tsipon Lungsharwa Dorji Tseten was appointed as Commander-in-Chief to work jointly with Brigadier Nangkarwa of the Bodyguard Regiment. Despite quite efficient and knowledgeable about legal systems, and obliged to perform his responsibilities with great dedication and sincerity in accordance with the wishes of His Holiness, he organized a weeklong party in the

name of celebration for the new post even before he had had a ceremonial audience with His Holiness. He took great advantages of his post and always sat at a *dzasak's* seat during official functions and kept guards at his residence. Except on a few assigned duties and plans, he made decisions at his own discretion against the orders of the government, without even consulting his colleague Brigadier Nangkarwa. Without keeping any reserve for the regular army salaries, he submitted many proposals to the government, only to boast his personal achievements. Moreover, more than 300 arms were found short in the arm register of the Army Headquarters. Though he was to make immediately a new proper list of the British model rifles of all sizes and their parts, after thorough checking, to the government, he did not attend his office regularly and neglected his work. He was thus removed from the post of senior commander-in-chief for the safety of whole country.

The above situation clearly shows the general situation in Tibet of the time. At that time, Thupten Kunphel, the personal attendant of the Dalai Lama, was at the peak of his power. Though he did not hold any post in the government, he had the privilege of occupying a seat among the senior monk officials of the rank of *khende* (title of monk officials) whenever there were official ceremonies and functions. When he visited in and around Lhasa and Drapchi, he used to travel in a black Austin A-40. When he sometimes visited the Kashag, even the ministers had to stand up for him, in respect. He created a new regiment called the Drongdak Regiment, the "Regiment of Well-to-do Families". He collected 1,000 boys, one each from the rich and aristocratic families of U-Tsang against their wishes. He still recruited new soldiers. He appointed Yutok's son Tashi Dhondup, Acting Brigadier Taring's son Jigme Sumtsen and Colonel Ngabo's son Ngawang Jigme, who had completed British military training at Changlo in Gyantse, as commanders of the new regiment. This regiment had better uniforms, food and medical facilities. This caused some dissatisfaction among other Tibetan army regiments. Since all the soldiers of this new regiment came from well-to-do families, they did not like hard military training and the routine disciplines of the army. Some families hired other boys to send to the army in place of their sons. The barrack of the Drongdak Regiment was located near and to the west of Drapchi Electrical Machine Office. Rumours circulated that Kunphen-la established the regiment in order to secure his power.

F. Suppression of the Revolt led by Powo Kanam Depa

The communities of Powo in upper Kham used to pay nominal taxes annually to the Tibetan government, and lived happily and peacefully. Later, Lu Chun army penetrated into Kham and greatly exploited the people of Powo by forcefully

extorting grains, furs and so on. The Powo people rose up in revolt against the Chinese troops. China sent a huge number of additional Chinese troops in separate batches to suppress the revolt. However, due to the extremely rough and tough terrain of the region, with narrow paths, steep valleys, rivers and thick forest, the Chinese troops suffered defeat after defeat on the way, and finally they returned without being able to suppress the revolt. Afterwards when the Tibetans expelled all the Chinese troops from U-Tsang and Kham, the people of Powo approached Kalon Jampa Tendar, the Governor-General of Kham, and told him that they would adhere to the government's laws and pay taxes to the government as before. It was agreed that they would cooperate with the army salary collectors as and when they came to collect grains from them, and that they did not have to give any extra taxes to the government. Hence, they lived peacefully and happily thereafter.

Later, during the time of Kalon Trimon as Governor-General of Kham, the salary officer Rutsa Khenchung dispatched grain collectors to Powo. After that, when Kalon Menkhab Topa was serving as Governor-General of Kham, he dispatched one platoon of the Tibetan army to guard the army's grain store. The army's salary staff and the Powo people got into clash, and the people of Powo made a surprise attack on the salary office, and killed all of the salary staff and guards of the grain store. In 1927, Kalon Menkab dispatched Brigadier Tanawa of the Jadang Regiment with his regiment troops from Lho Dzong to Powo to suppress the revolt. The Powo people ambushed the Tibetan troops in a forest valley, killing Brigadier Tanawa and some of his soldiers. The troops retaliated and the fighting lasted for several days. In this incident, about 200 Powo men and 90 soldiers of the Jadang Regiment were killed or wounded. The remaining soldiers of the Jadang Regiment, with the excuse of having no commander to lead them, ran away to Rowoche.

Thereafter, the Tibetan forces surrounded Powo from different sides. From Chamdo, Khenchung Dawa, leading the local militia of Shotarlhosum, marched to Powo via Khyungtor-la pass and Powo Chudo. Brigadier Dhokharwa and his troops advanced to Powo from the side of Gangring. Five hundred troops of the Dingri Regiment advanced to Powo from Dung-la pass from northern side. The Jadang Regiment troops commanded by Brigadier Tsogo headed to Powo from the side of Tsa-la pass. Brigadier Kheme of the Drapchi Regiment led his troops to Powo via Kongpo Luna. At Dungla pass, the Dingri Regiment troops faced resistance from Powo army, and both sides suffered high casualties. Without further fighting, Kanam Depa and his main supporters fled to Assam. The Drapchi Brigadier and some of his troops pursued them, but could not catch them. Kanam Depa's chief officials including Nyilog Depa, Khartag Depa, Gontsa Depa and Khardo Depa and two other *depas* (chiefs) were arrested and sent to Lhasa. The rest of the troops of Kanam Depa surrendered, and the Tibetan government re-established its rule over Powo.

Later, when Menkab Topa became the Governor-General of Kham, he, along with his staff, personally visited Powo where he conducted a survey and reorganized the tax sources. The Jadang Regiment, under the command of Brigadier Tsogo, was stationed at Powo as security force and the rest of the Tibetan troops were withdrawn. Soon after that, at the request of the people of Powo, the Jadang Regiment too was withdrawn from Powo.

The following is a short excerpt from the report of Lieutenant Ogyen Dorji of the Gadang Regiment, who took part in the Tibetan army's war with Powo:

I joined the army at the age of sixteen. I was sent to Shopando where I received military training under Gadang Brigadier Salungpa, Garu Yulha and Captain Changshing. At that time, the Kanam Depa led an uprising against the Tibetan government; the Governor-General of Kham dispatched our platoon to Powo to suppress the revolt. Through a snowy mountain called Akhu-la Mountain, marching days and nights on foot, we arrived at Shorag. As most of us suffered from frostbite, we had to spend the night there. After that, starting from Yuro Monastery at upper Powo, we fought with the rebel troops as we went on, until we reached Sho Dzong and Chudo Dzong of Powo. We met Brigadier Tsogo and Khenchung Dawa with their soldiers. There I heard in detail that Powo troops had murdered Brigadier Tanawa and some of his soldiers, and captured some soldiers near the place called Dashing.

Thereafter, the Tibetan army captured most districts of Powo. Though Kanam Depa and some of his men managed to flee to India through Dora Range, his chief officials were arrested and sent to Lhasa. Soon after that, the Governor-General of Kham visited Powo and conducted a census. He presented all the soldiers and commanders with a feast and rich rewards. After that, all the regiments were withdrawn from Powo. As per his instruction, our unit proceeded to Derge Changra via Lho Dzong to defend the region. There we met most of the commanders and troops of the Shigatse, Gyantse and Dingri regiments, including Brigadier Trethong and Brigadier Thangpon.

In the Iron-Horse year, 1930, after several years serving as the security force at Dzingkhog in Derge, the Gadang Regiment, commanded by Captain Chagphug and the Second Brigadier, got an opportunity to return home. In its place came the Nyadang Regiment under the command of Brigadier Demon.

G. The War of Resistance against the Xining Chinese and the Kuomintang Chinese

In 1918, with Britain as mediator, Tibet and China concluded an agreement in Chamdo for a ceasefire in Rongpatsa. In accordance with the terms of the agreement,

both sides withdrew their troops from Rongpatsa and remained peaceful for some time. Not long after that, however, Trehor Sadhutsang's son, the reincarnation of a lama of Nyarong Monastery of Beri, and the chief of Beri did not get along in their "priest and patron" relationship. The Beri chief seized the estates and documents of Nyarong Monastery, forcing the lama to seek asylum in Dargye Monastery. This led to a dispute between Dargye Monastery and the Beri chief in 1928 over the monastic estates of the Nyarong lama, subsequently leading to violence between the two sides. The Beri chief was backed by Sichuan's warlord Lui Wen-hui who led a large force on Dargye Monastery. The Governor-General of Kham commanded the militias of the six tribes of Trehor and the Gadang Regiment troops of Brigadier Tethong who were on defense duty at Changra in Derge to help Dargye Monastery. After a bitter fight, the Chinese side suffered tremendous casualties and retreated to Kandze Monastery. On the way, they captured Sadhu Chondze Tagla and other members of Dargye Monastery alive and took them along with them. They killed or wounded Garu Yulha and many of his troops. With the help of Dargye Monastery and the local militias, the Tibetan force made rapid assaults on the Chinese, and retook all the Tibetan areas up to Tau Draggio and Nyarong. At the end, the Chinese troops and the local leaders of Nyarong submitted to the Tibetans. The Tibetan force seized all their arms, and dispatched all the seized men, including their belongings and animals to the Governor-General of Kham, escorted by a small Tibetan force.

At the same time, in southern Markham, backed by local militias and monk volunteers led by Ge Acho and Adruk of Gongkar Labrang, the Tibetan force under the command of Colonel Kalsang and Colonel Kala Dorji Tseten of the Khadang Regiment launched a rapid and continuous attack on the Chinese, killing, wounding or capturing alive many Chinese officers and soldiers, thereby retaking the whole region of Batang from the Chinese control. They seized about 200 rifles of different sizes, and handed them over to the Governor-General of Kham. Having emerged victorious in the above two battles, the Khadang Regiment remained there for two years defending the territory.

The main credit for the victory of the Tibetan forces in the battles of Horkhog and Batang should go to the valorous and concerted support offered by the local people and monks of Dargye Monastery, and the Gongkar Labrang, for the safeguard of their country and religion. Another reason for the Tibetans' victory was that the Tibetan troops had been provided with several hundreds of long-nozzle British rifles, along with ammunitions, by the Tibetan government with great hopes placed on them since they were like the guards of the eastern gate of Tibet.

Soon after that, Tan Kaun-sen and Liu Tsien-ting, the representatives of Lui Wen-hui of Sichuan, requested the Governor-General of Kham to negotiate for truce. The request was accepted, and the Tibetan's control over Horkhog and Dartsedo was restored.

In 1931, Kalon Ngabo Tamdin Phuntsok⁷⁹ replaced Kalon Montopa as Governor-General of Kham. At that time, the Tibetan government continuously sent weapons and reserve troops to Kham. The regiments of Khadang, Gadang, Jadang, Nyadang and Thadang were posted in Horkhog and Derge. A collection of troops of the Khadang, Gadang, Jadang and Thadang regiments were stationed in Markham and Batang. The Ngadang and Cadang regiments, the militia of Shotarlhosum, the troops of four divisions of northern Tibet and the local militia of Khyungpo were posted in Nangchen and Kyido (Kyegudo).

In that year, the Shigatse Regiment, under the command of Brigadier Khyungrampa, was dispatched to support the Tibetan force in Horkhog. Thereafter, with Brigadier Demonpa of the Nyadang Regiment in Horkhog, Brigadier Khemepa and Brigadier Sheling Sé of the Khadang Regiment in Nyarong, without knowing the strength of the enemy's force, without making a proper logistic plan and preparation, and without informing the Governor-General of Kham, he led a military expedition to Drebo with the hope of retaking the lost Tibetan areas up to Dartsedo. In response, Liu Wen-hui applied his entire force on Nyarong, Beri Sekhar Monastery and Horkhog. The Tibetan forces led by Colonel Yarlung Tashi Dawa and Colonel Anan Dawa of the Khadang Regiment, Captain Gongma of the Gadang Regiment, Colonel Lobsang Yonten of the Chadang Regiment, Captain Dripa Dorji of the Nyadang Regiment and Colonel Gonpo of the Tadang Regiment, backed by the local militias and local people as well as the monk volunteers of the region, defended their position for many days and nights with great force. However, due to the overwhelming size of the Chinese forces and their superior weapons, the Tibetan forces gradually lost ground, as they lost more than one hundred officers and soldiers, including the 3rd captain the Gadang Regiment, Lieutenant Dradul of the Khadang Regiment, Lieutenant Dwagpo of the Nyadang Regiment and Chunang Karchen. Many of their soldiers were wounded. In short, overwhelmed by the enemy's large force, the Tibetans retreated to Kamthog Druga ferry of Derge, while the Chinese raided and destroyed Dargye Monastery. All the monks fled and gathered at Trawo Do, to the west of the Drichu, where they created an army camp.

At the urgent request of Ngabo, the Governor-General of Kham, the Tibetan government sent the Chadang Artillery Regiment and representatives from the Three Monastic Seats, along with their assistants (*gdan 'thus ab phrug*), to help him. The British government of India suggested to the Koumintang government that they mediate and arrange a negotiation, but it replied that it was helpless because the Sichuan prefecture was independent of Kuomintang government. After that, when the Kuomintang Chinese (*smad rgya*) launched offensives in Batang, the Tibetans troops, jointly with local recruits, monks and people, put up a stiff resistance, days and nights. However, the Tibetans suffered defeat due to lack of reserve troops and military supplies arriving in time, and gradually lost Batang to the Chinese. The

Tibetan troops fled to the west of the Drichu (Yangtse) and remained separately at Markham Bum, Yusho and Sampa Druga boat crossings and Chidzong Range.

The Tibetans suffered heavy defeats in the battles of Horkhog, Nyarong and Batang, thus losing all those areas to the Chinese. Brigadier Khyungrampa of Shigatse, Chinese commander Tse Lieyang (tang) and a tea proprietor Rigzin Dorji agreed to negotiate for a ceasefire. Consequently, in February 1932, the Tibetans, having no other option, concluded a truce with the Chinese, deciding on the Kamthog Druga ferry crossing of Derge as the border between China and Tibet. The Chinese released Sadhu Chondze Takla, who had been taken to Dartsedo for imprisonment, in exchange for Nyarong chieftain and others who had been captured from Chamdo by the Tibetan forces. A brief account of the above Sino-Tibet wars is found in the autobiography of Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji of the Gadang Shigatse Regiment who fought in the above battles. Following is a short excerpt from his account:

In the Iron-Sheep year, 1931, when Beri and Dargye Monastery were plunged into internal strife, the Tibetan government ordered the dispatch of five hundred troops of the Gadang Regiment, under the command of Brigadier Khyungrampa and the first and second colonels, to help the Tibetan forces in Horkhog. We [the troops of the Gadand Regiment] travelled on a forced march via Nagchu for many days and nights until we reached Kandze. In the twelfth month of the year 1931, the Chinese forces attacked us from three different directions—Nyarong, Tongkhog and Drago. We made counter attacks and the battle continued until the seventh Tibetan month of the year 1932. At that time, the Tibetans had a large force, comprising the troops of Brigadier Kheme and lieutenant Narag of the Khadang Regiment, Brigadier Demon and Colonel Gonpo of the Nyadang Regiment, militia of Shotarlhosum and the monk volunteers of Dargye Monastery. Collectively we fought the enemy for many days and nights with great courage and effort for the sake of the country. Both the Chinese and Tibetan sides suffered heavy casualties. Since we did not receive additional troops, arms or food supplies on time, we faced extreme difficulties, due to which we eventually had to flee to Kamthok Druga of Derge. Then we remained on the west of the Drichu river while the Chinese remained on the east of the river. Thereafter, Brigadier Khyungrampa and Captain Ringzin Dorji negotiated with the Chinese for a ceasefire, barring either side from crossing the Drichu.

Coinciding with the above battle, a dispute arose between the army of Ma Pufeng, the warlord of Xining, and Tibetan army over the religious matter of Surmang Namgyal Lhatse of Nangchen. The Xining Chinese attacked Jyekundo and Dengko simultaneously. In response, the Tibetan forces, comprising the troops of the Khadang, Gadang, Ngadang, Cadang and Chadang regiments with the support of the militia of Shotarlhosum, made prolonged counter attacks. Moreover, a

Tibetan detachment commanded by Colonel Narag Gyurme Tseten of the Khadang Regiment, who was famous for his bravery, made repressive attacks on the Chinese, so that they managed to retake the areas beyond Chokhor Monastery up to a distance of a one-day's march.

At another battlefield, a narrow valley to the north of Dolma Lhakang, the Gadang Regiment under the command of Captain Bugangpa and the Xining force, led by Yintang Gyau, a famous Chinese commander of the time, fought for many days. The Tibetans killed many Chinese officers and troops, including Yintang Gyau. Several officers and troops were also killed or wounded on the Tibetan side. The Tibetans emerged victorious, and remained there and relaxed. In the third Tibetan month of the same year, the Xining force, having received large additional troops, launched a stormy war on Dengko, forcing the Tibetan troops to pull back to the west of the Drichu River. At that time, due to a mistake on the part of the Tibetan enemy-watchers (*rgyang so*) for not sensing the arrival of the Chinese troops, the Chinese launched a sudden attack on Chokhor Monastery under the cover of night. Except for the vanguard force, the rest of the Tibetan army, along with their artilleries, shells and other important weapons moved back. Despite the Tibetan vanguard making strong counterattacks, the Chinese force overwhelmed them, in both number of troops and quality of weapons. The Tibetans were finally besieged by the Chinese forces. Colonel Naragpa of the Drapchi Regiment; Colonel Sangda Lasampa, Captain Trinley Paljor, Phuntsok Dorji, Trakhog and about 100 soldiers of the Artillery Regiment; Lieutenant Rigzin Paljor of the Chadang Regiment; Colonel Gonpo and some soldiers of the Tadang Regiment; and more than ten senior members of Derge were captured, beaten and taken away by the Chinese. It was widely talked that due to the stiff resistance put up by Brigadier Tsogo of the Dzadang Regiment and his few soldiers with such great courage and determination, the rest of the Tibetan troops and important weapons did not fall in the hands of the Chinese.

The above Sino-Tibetan battles fought at two different sites lasted for a long time. The Tibetan troops not only faced shortages of supplies of weapons, but also faced extreme shortages of food, so much so that they were compelled to sustain themselves on plants and leather. They faced tremendous hardships and many of them became ill. Nevertheless, without losing their determination to protect their religion and country, they firmly maintained their ground and prevented the Chinese from bypassing Chokhor Monastery.

In Jyekundo, the Tibetan troops and local militia were fighting the Chinese force of Xining near Jatsang Topo range and Jyekundo. There were heavy casualties on both sides, but there was no victory or defeat on either side. At that time, Brigadier Chapel, Colonel Gyande Tengpa and Colonel Bumlugkhang, all from the Ngadang Regiment, jointly launched several night attacks on the Chinese camps in Jyekundo,

and the Chinese fled and remained at Janyer. At that time when a Chinese cavalry of about one hundred troops arrived near a narrow riverbed to the eastern side of Jyekundo, the Gyantse force, under the command of Lieutenant Kharsam Gyalpo, ambushed and killed almost all of them. In that battle, about fifty Tibetan officers and troops, including Ngadang Lieutenant Nyingme Sithar and Chukala Wangdu, were killed or wounded. On the Chinese side, around a hundred troops were either killed or wounded. Although the Tibetans fought continuously, they lost ground in Dengko and retreated to the western bank of the Drichu River. This gave an opportunity to the Xining Chinese to reinforce their attacks in Jyekundo.

The Xining army increased their strength greatly by recruiting many local Tibetans who were in favor of the Chinese. Unable to confront the Chinese force, the Tibetan troops pulled back up to the border of the 39 Hor states. At that time, the Tibetan force fighting the Xining force comprised the Ngadang Regiment under the command of Brigadier Chapel, the Tadang Regiment under Brigadier Shenkawa, the Jadang Regiment under Brigadier Surkhang Surpa, the Gadang Regiment under Brigadier Thangponwa and local militias of Shotarlhosum. Though the Tibetan force engaged in Xining war was large and had sufficient weapons, due to the defeat of the three most powerful Tibetan army units fighting in Dengko, they lost courage and morale to fight. Had the Chinese force of Xining made continuous attacks, the Tibetan forces would have fled from the border.

In that year [1932], the Tibetan forces in both northern and southern sides suffered heavy defeat. In the wake of this, in accordance with the Dalai Lama's divination, Thupten Kunkhen Ngoshiwa was appointed the Governor of northern Tibet and about 20 lay and monastic officials were assigned to him as his aides-de-camps. Assigning the Artillery Regiment and many new weapons to him, along with his team, he was urgently dispatched to the above borders in the sixth month that year. Travelling on a forced march via Nagchu and Tengchen, they reached Khyungpo, where the Governor drew up plans to attack the Xining, and sent orders to all his commanders and troops stationed there to be ready. At that time, a rumour spread widely that the new Governor of northern Tibet and his aides-de-camp, along with a great number of troops equipped with modern weapons, were coming to Khyungpo Tengchen. Hearing this, the Xining Chinese proposed a ceasefire to the Tibetans. Through Tsega Chogyur Lingpa, as Chinese intercessor and ex-treasurer Tsedrag of Riwoche Shabla as the Tibetan intercessor, the two sides agreed on an armistice. Leaving the rest of his aides-de-camp at Tengchen, Thupten Kunkhen Ngoshiwa, accompanied by a few of his assistant staff, went to Riwoche. He sent Brigadier Surkhang Surpa Wangchen Tseten and Tsedrung Chongye Dorji Yugyal as the Tibetan negotiators to a border place called Drilchung.

In Kham, Ngabo, the Governor-General of Kham, was not in good health. The humiliating defeat of the Tibetan forces at both the northern and southern battles,

and disrespect to his orders by some sections of his troops further aggravated his illness. He passed away in the 10th Tibetan month of the year (1932). Ngoshiwa was ordered to assume governorship of both northern and eastern Tibet until a new Governor-General of Kham was appointed. Following this he shifted his headquarters to Riwoche.

The reason for the defeat of the Tibetan forces at Horkhog, Nyarong, Derge and Batang and hence the loss of large territorial areas to the Chinese was that Brigadier Khyungrampa, Brigadier Demon, Brigadier Shelingpa and Brigadier Kheme Sé, without proper plans and preparations, carried out a failed military campaign in Drebo. Their mission was a complete failure. Further, at their own discretion, they entered into treaty with the Chinese, deciding on Kamthog Druga ferry crossing in Derge as the common border of Tibet and China. As punishment for their mistakes, they were demoted from the post of Brigadier to junior secretary, and new brigadiers were appointed in their places.

The following short excerpt is found in the last section of Kheine Sonam Wangdu's *Dentam Nawai Dutsi (Truthful Testimony, a Nectar to Ears)*, an eye-witness account of how the young Fourteenth Dalai Lama was recognized and brought to Lhasa:

In 1931, in accordance with the the government's order, we retook Nyarong from the Chinese and handed all the Chinese soldiers we caputred, along with their belongings and livestock, over to Khyungrampa, the Governor-General of Kham, without inflicting even the slightest harm to them. Thereafter, having concluded a treaty with the Chinese, Khyungrampa secured the release of all the Tibetans, including Sadhu Chondze Takla, a staff of Dargye Monastery who had been imprisoned at Dartsedo by the Chinese, in exchange for the Chinese prisoners kept by the Tibetans. It was a great benefit for both the government and individuals. After that, the second colonel of the Khadang Regiment was instructed to remain at Nyarong for its defense. From Horkhog the Nyadang Regiment, under the command of Brigadier Demon, was sent to Nyarong to back the Khadang Regiment. I was instructed to go to Derge. While I was in Derge, Khyungrampa, who signed a treaty at Horkhog, in a hasty manner, suddenly launched an attack on Drebo. In the process, the Tibetan territories up to Beri Sekhar Dzong were lost to the Chinese. This caused Tibetans to lose further ground and subsequently they lost Nyarong, Dargye Monastery and Derge to the Chinese forces since Tibetan forces were no match for the Chinese, both in number of troops and quality of weapons. Therefore, as Khyungrampa, Demonpa and I were withdrawn from our duties; we arrived at Lhasa in 1932, the Water-Monkey year.

In 1933, Deputy Minister Trethong Gyurme Gyatso arrived in Chamdo as the new Governor-General of Kham. He met with Khendrung Ngoshiwa at Nyenda (near Chamdo) to discuss the north and south borders and the proposed Xining-Tibetan treaty. He sent Brigadier Surkhang Surpa [Wangchen Tseten] and Tsedrung

Letsen Dorji Yugyal as Tibetan representatives to Trotsa Monastery of Nangchen to negotiate with the Chinese. They were received by the Xining Chinese, lamas, monks and officials of Nangchen. Since it was wartime, there were no proper preparations, such as lodging, for them at the site where they were to meet for negotiation. The monastery had been surrounded by security troops. In the monastery, there were many Chinese army and civil officers, including a bearded old commander named Ma Xun-chi and a young man named Li Tsen-mo, who knew Tibetan a little. They were the representatives of Ma Pu-feng of Xining. At the meeting, the representatives of both sides were introduced to each other. On that day, the Xining Chinese offered a party to all the members. On June 15, the representatives of both sides assembled again and drafted the treaty. The treaty was written in both Tibetan and Chinese languages on a traditional Tibetan paper. The translators read the treaty. The Tibetan representative Brigadier Surkhang put the seal of the Governor of northern Tibet and the Chinese commander Ma Xun-chi put the seal of Ma Pufeng. After that, the Chinese took photographs of the signing of the treaty and a group photo of all the members in front of the meeting hall. Thereafter, the Tibetans arranged a simple party for the Chinese. There were no tables; stacks of stones covered with furs were used instead of tables. There were only a few varieties of dishes, including fried meats and *momos*, and there were no fruits, vegetables, fishes, etc. Local wines of Xining, black tea and boiled water were served in abundance. The Tibetan members took photos of the Chinese army camps and weapons. The gist of the treaty is as below:

The war prisoners are to be exchanged. The borders between China and Tibet that existed before the battle are to be restored and respected. There shall be no restrictions on pilgrims and traders crossing the borders. If Tibet violates the treaty, Tibet must surrender Riwoche, Chamdo and Pasho to China; If China violates the treaty, the 25 regions of Dhimchi must be handed over to Tibet.

After the meetings ended, the tea proprietor Rigzin Dorji arrived there, claiming that he had come to act as witness in the treaty, but it seemed that neither side had invited him.

Under the terms of the treaty, the Tibetan soldiers who had been captured by the Chinese during the previous war, including Colonel Narag Gyurme Tseten of the Khadang Regiment and Colonel Lobsang Yonten of the Chadang Artillery Regiment were secured release in exchange for Chinese soldiers who were captured by the Tibetans. Both the Chinese and Tibetans withdrew their frontier forces, and peace was restored. After that, the Tibetan government instructed the Governor of northern Tibet and his staff to report to Lhasa before the birthday of the Dalai Lama. Accordingly, he and his assistant staff rode to Lhasa. Immediately after his arrival, he sought an audience with the Dalai Lama through a special

arrangement, and reported to him in detail the situation in northern Tibet and Dokham. He submitted the copy and details of the treaty he had concluded with the Xining Chinese.

In the same year, Colonel Chongye Narappa of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment was elevated to the post of Brigadier of the Central Military Division in recognition of his long-term service in the army and his patriotic and valiant performances in many wars of the country against the enemy. He was respected by the majority of his troops. He rose from ordinary soldier to the rank of colonel, then to brigadier. Previously in the Earth-Horse year [1930], when he was posted to Drayab, he invented Tibetan artillery called the "Tibetan Short-range Artillery" (*bod bzos dpag thung*). He handed the artillery to the Governor of northern Tibet, and it was kept in the Chamdo armoury. Because of his advanced age, he died soon after his promotion before he got his special audience called "sarjel" with the Dalai Lama. Therefore, his younger son, Sonam Tashi, was appointed to the post of colonel under special consideration.

Lieutenant Rigzin Paljor of the Chadang Regiment was promoted to the rank of captain, colonel thereafter, in appreciation of his great services during the country's wars. Previously, during the war between Xining and Tibet, he fell into the hands of the Chinese and was taken to prison. The Chinese had beaten him so severely that he became unable to stand upright. After he was released from the Chinese prison, he had to walk with a bent body, so he was nicknamed "Rupon Guru" meaning the "Crooked Colonel".

In 1932, the Water-Monkey year, the Nechung Oracle⁸⁰ advised that both the government officials and the people of Tibet should perform a long life prayer for the Dalai Lama. Accordingly, the Prime Minister, the cabinet ministers and the Chief Official Abbot conducted a long life prayer of Sutra system for the Dalai Lama. On that occasion, they appealed to the Dalai Lama on behalf of all the citizens of Tibet, "We the subjects pledge to keep your advice in our hearts and dedicate ourselves to our duties; please calm down your anger!" To this, the Dalai Lama gave an advice cum testament, which later became known as the Water-Monkey Testament of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama,⁸¹ to the people. In it, the Dalai Lama had prophesied the fate of Tibet in the future and asked all the government officials and citizens of Tibet to strive for the progress of the religion and polity of Tibet. He had urged all the civil servants to perform their duties sincerely in accordance with their titles. He had advised the people regarding their duties and responsibilities for the longevity of the happiness and peace they were enjoying at the time. The testament had emphasized the importance of army, saying that Tibet should maintain friendly relationships with India and China as they were militarily powerful, and Tibet must keep strong and trained troops at Tibetan border places

where conflicts occur, to overpower the enemies. He gave this advice to the Tibetan people, just as a father gives advice to his child.

From the previous year, many bad omens started to appear in different parts of Tibet. Divinations were performed, and in accordance with the the divinations' answers, extensive prayers and rituals were performed. In spite of that, the Dalai Lama fell ill in the beginning of the 10th Tibetan month of the Water-Bird year, 1933. Rituals and medical treatment did not improve his health. Finally, the collective merits of the beings of Tibet failed to keep him, and he passed away at the age of fifty-eight at his Norbulingka Palace in the evening of the 30th day of the 10th Tibetan month of the Water-Bird year, corresponding to December 17, 1933.

Immediately after his death, the Prime Minister, the Kashag and the Master Chamberlain as well as other related officials assembled to discuss the matters relating to the funeral ceremony of the Dalai Lama, and appointed a committee for the funeral ceremony. On the third day of the eleventh Tibetan month of that year [1933], while the Tibetan National Assembly was in session to discuss about the appointment of a regent, the soldiers of the Drongdak Regiment suddenly marched en masse to the Norbulingka Palace [to demand the disbandment of their regiment], without caring about the political and religious affairs of the country. It was not known who instigated them to do, but they acted under the influence of some evil people. They proceeded to Lhasa and stayed that night at Shol. The Kashag ordered half the troops of the Bodyguard Regiment to be deployed with arms at Drapchi offices and Drongdak Regiment headquarters for security, and instructed Nangkarwa, the Brigadier of the Bodyguard Regiment cum Commander-in-Chief, to shoot whoever resisted with violence.

As a result of the mutiny led by the soldiers of the Drongdak Regiment, which was his main source of confidence, Kunphen-la, the favourite attendant of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, did not get support in the National Assembly for his candidacy to the post of Regent (*srid skyong*).⁸² Furthermore, his opponents in the Assembly accused him of keeping the Dalai Lama's illness secret and not providing proper medical treatment and rituals for him. They voiced strongly that he was to be investigated thoroughly. The Assembly thus put Khunphel-la on trial at the secretariat office in the Norbulingka Palace and then placed him in custody for several days at Sharchen Chog prison on the 25th day of the eleventh Tibetan month (in 1933). Along with him, Tashi Dhondup, Dechen Yingsel, Amchi Jampa Yeshi and the medium of Nechung Oracle were also investigated. After investigation, the Assembly convicted Khunphel-la of not informing the Prime Minister and the Kashag about the illness of the Dalai Lama immediately and exiled him to Chabnag Monastery in Kongpo. The Dalai Lama's physician Amchi Jampa and the medium of Nechung Oracle were charged with minor guilt of not taking care in the medical treatment of the Dalai Lama. Amchi Jampa was banished to Gyatsa in Dagpo. The

medium of the Nechung Oracle was placed under house arrest, and was not allowed to move outside Drepung Loseling. Tashi Dhondup was exiled to Kongpo Kunam. In this way, hardly a few weeks had passed since the 13th Dalai Lama passed away when the Drongdak Regiment was dissolved and the Dalai Lama's attendants were convicted, which marked the beginning of internal conflict and the degeneration of the Tibetan political state of affairs.

Thupten Norsang, a minister in the Tibetan government before 1959, notes in his memoir that Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to the Tibetan government through the Tibetan Bureau Officer in Nanking, stating that China would return to Tibet all the Tibetan areas lying to the west of Dartsedo. He also mentions that Liu Jichuan of Sichuan too wrote to the Tibetan government, confessing his past mistakes and promising to return all the Tibetan areas seized by the Chinese to Tibet. However, due to the degeneration of the collective merits of the Tibetan people, those promises did not materialize.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Two French Catholic priests were also killed
2. Tibetan spelling: rMa thi thal. He was the military commander of Sichuan
3. A standard Tibetan measure of volume equivalent to about 30 pounds of barley.
4. The second Prince Chun (1883-1951) was born Zaifeng. He was the leader of China between 1908 and 1911, serving as the regent for his son Puyi, the Xuantong Emperor.
5. Puyi (1906-1967) of the Manchu Aisin-Gioro ruling family was the last Emperor of China between 1908 and 1924 (ruling as the Xuantong Emperor between 1908 and 1911, and non-ruling emperor between 1911 and 1924), the twelfth emperor of the Qing Dynasty to rule over China. He was married to the Empress Gobulo Wan Rong at the suggestion of the Imperial Dowager Concubine Duan-Kang. Later, between 1934 and 1945, he was the Kangde Emperor of Manchukuo. In the People's Republic of China, he was a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference from 1964 until his death in 1967 under the Chinese name Aixinjueluo Puyi. His abdication being a symbol of the end of a long era in China, he is widely known as the *Last Emperor*.
6. *Dapon* is a title of army officer commanding about 500 troops in the traditional Tibetan army. The title is still used in the Tibetan army in India called Est. 22 based at Chakrata, Dehradun.
7. 10 *zho* makes 1 *srang*.
8. Tibetan: Dga' ldan pho brang phyogs las rnam rgyal; the full title of the traditional Tibetan government founded by the Great Fifth in 1642.

9. For more information, see the *Currency of Tibet*, Wolfgang Bertsch, published by LTWA, Dharamsala, India.
10. Shatra Paljor Dorji, Sholkhang Tseten Wangchuk and Changkyim Ngawang Khyenrab Palsang.
11. Ceremony for officials when they first enter government service or when they get appointed to top position that involve an audience with the Dalai Lama or Regent. In traditional Tibetan government, whenever an official enter government service or get appointed to a high position, a ceremony was held that involve an audience with the Dalai Lama or Regent.
12. *'phags pa'i yul nas sangs rgyas kyi bka' lung rgyal dbang 'jig rten gsum mgon dus kun sa steng gi kun khyab rgyal bstan yongs la mnga' dbang sgryur ba thams cad mkhyen pa 'gur med rdo rje 'chang rgya mtsho'i bla ma lha mi yongs kyi spyi bos mchod pa'i yid bzhin dbang gi rgyal po'i phyag rgyal* (Tsepon Shakabpa Wangchuk Deden, *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs, vol. II*)

(This is the seal of the Sovereign of the three worlds, the Lord of the three times, the Authority of Buddhism, who is omnipresent, omniscient and unchanging Dorji Chang Gyatso Lama, the Wish-fulfilling King venerated by all humans and gods, as prophesied by Lord Buddha from the land of the Aryas.)

13, 14, 15 and 16, see the Apendix section.

17. "Uncle", which here means maternal uncle "*zhang bo*", refers to Chinese, and "nephew" refers to Tibetans.
18. Nub phyogs su dge ba'i zhing gi rgyal bstan yongs rdzogs kyi bdag po rgyal khab kyi bka' bzhin sgrub pa thams cad mkhyen pa ta la'i bla ma bha dza rda ra'i tham kha//
19. Nub phyogs su dge ba'i zhing gi rgyal bstan yongs rdzogs kyi bdag po rgyal khab la gus bskur zhu ba pa thams cad mkhyen pa ta la'i bla ma bha dza rda ra'i tham kha//
20. Bojong Tsogdu (*Bod ljongs tshogs 'du*) met irregularly at the request of the Kashag to consider and give oppinions on specific questions supplied to it by the Kashag.
21. It is the office or residence of Manchu Ambans.
22. Monlam Chenmo, or the Great Prayer Festival falls on 4th-11th day of the first Tibetan month. The event in Tibet was established in 1409 by Tsong Khapa, the founder of the Geluk tradition. As the greatest religious festival in Tibet, thousands of monks (of the three main monasteries of Drepung, Sera and Ganden) gathered for chanting prayers and performing religious rituals at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa.

In 1517, Gendun Gyatso became the abbot of Drepung monastery and in the following year, he revived the Monlam Chenmo, the Great Prayer Festival and presided over the events with monks from Sera, Drepung and Ganden, the three great monastic Universities of the Gelugpa Sect.

The main purpose of the Great Prayer Festival is to pray for the long life of all the holy Gurus of all traditions, for the survival and spreading of the Dharma in the minds of all sentient beings, and for world peace. The communal prayers, offered

with strong faith and devotion, help to overcome obstacles to peace and generate conducive conditions for everyone to live in harmony.

Examinations for the highest Lharampa Geshe's degree (a degree in Buddhist philosophy in the Geluk tradition) were held during the weeklong festival. Monks would perform traditional Tibetan Buddhist dances (cham) and huge ritual offering cakes (*tormas*) were made, that were adorned with very elaborate butter sculptures. On the fifteenth day, the highlight of Monlam Chenmo in Lhasa would be the "Butter Lamp Festival" (Chonga Chopa), during which the Dalai Lama would come to the Jokhang Temple and perform the great Buddhist service. Barkhor Square in front of the Jokhang would be turned into a grand exhibition site for the huge tormas. At the end of the festival, these tormas would be burned in a large bon-fire. During the Cultural Revolution, the Monlam festival was banned, and although it was revived once in 1985, it was prohibited again in 1990 by the Chinese government. In the newly established monasteries in India, the Monlam festival is gradually being revived.

23. Ngawang Lobsang Tenpai Gyaltzen, the fourth reincarnation of Tsemonling. Tsemonling Monastery is located near Shide Monastery, to the west of Ramoche Temple, and was founded by Jampal Tsultrim the second reincarnation of Tsemonling in the Wood-Bird year, 1825.

Meaning "Most Venerable" in Mongol, "Huthoktu" is a title given to high Tibetan and Mongol lamas by the Manchu emperors.

24. Wu Kon-tai was later captured in Kham and sentenced to life imprisonment in Senge Dzong.
25. Ra mo che rgyal sgo gdong rgya ma bod bcu gcig, meaning, "Chinese-Tibetan halfcaste eleven fingers residing in the Gyalgodong area of Ramoche."
26. Samding, a town to the east of Nangartse on the Lhasa-Gyantse road, is famous for its monastery founded in the 12th century by Khetsun Shonudrub. The monastery's abbess, Dorji Phagmo, is revered as the highest female incarnation in Tibet.
27. Chaksam means "iron bridge" in Tibetan. It got its name after the remains of the iron suspension bridge built by Thangtong Gyalpo (1385-1464). It is a site famous for its ferry crossing across the Tsangpo.
28. Tsarong and his son were executed in 1912, leaving no male heir in the family, so the Dalai Lama allowed him to join the family as bridegroom (*mag pa*).
29. British Trade Agency: The treaty of 1904 negotiated by Francis Younghusband gave the British the right to set up three trade agencies in Tibet. They were located at Gyantse and Yatung (southern Tibet) and at Gartok in western Tibet. The agencies functioned as trading centres as well as sites of political surveillance for the British during the years of their involvement in Tibetan affairs.
30. Yatung is the site for one of the three trade agencies set up the British in Tibet, the others being Gyantse and Gartok. A trading town in Chumbi valley, Yatung was chosen for its strategic location in southern Tibet.

31. Gyantse is the third largest town in Tibet after Lhasa and Shigatse. Its dzong was built in the 14th-15th century and Gyantse owed its prosperity and importance for being located at the junction of a number of trade and military routes. It is famous for the Palkhor Chode religious complex that includes the spectacular Kumbum. It was chosen as the site for one of the three trade agencies the British set up in Tibet after the events of 1904 and was by far the most important one.
32. McDonald was a British Trade Agent of Dromo. He had been to Lhasa with the Young husband mission in 1904. He spoke and wrote Tibetan extremely well.
33. The original letter has been quoted in Shakabpa's *Tibet: A Political History of Tibet*.
34. This palace is known today as Bhutan House, and to the Tibetans, it is still called Migyur Ngonga Phodrang, meaning "Palace of Unchanging Delight."
35. Sir Charles Alfred Bell (1870–1945) was appointed Political Officer in Sikkim in 1908. He soon became very influential in Sikkimese and Bhutanese politics, and in 1910 he met the 13th Dalai Lama, who was forced into temporary exile by the Chinese. He got to know the Dalai Lama quite well during this time, and he was later to write his biography (*Portrait of a Dalai Lama*, published in 1946). At various times he was the British Political officer for Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet. After travelling through Tibet and visiting Lhasa in 1920, he retired to Oxford, where he wrote his series of books on the history, culture and religion of Tibet. Some of his photographs that he took whilst in Tibet can be found in the Pitt Rivers museum in Oxford. Some of these photos can be found in a recently published book 'Tibet Caught in Time'.

His English-Tibetan colloquial dictionary was first published, together with a grammar of colloquial Tibetan, as *Manual of Colloquial Tibetan* in 1905.

36. The Golden Urn (*Gser-bum*) method of determining the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama originated in a decree issued by the Chinese emperor Qianlong in 1792, and was used in the selection of the 10th, 11th, and 12th Dalai Lamas and 8th and 9th Panchen Lamas. After defeating the Gurkha invasion in 1792, Emperor Qianlong issued "The 29-Article Royal Decree for Better Governing in Tibet," in which Article 1 ordered the new protocol for deciding the reincarnations of Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. It states: "Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama are the heads of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Traditionally their reincarnations are decided by divination in front of the Four Protectors, and that is found to be inaccurate due to human errors. To promote Gelugpa Buddhism, the Emperor grants the Golden Urn (to Tibet)... Since the Dalai Lama is the mentor for Panchen Lama, and vice versa, therefore each side should find the reincarnation of the other party by divination with the Golden Urn."

Melvyn C. Goldstein recorded the procedure for using the Golden Urn in his book *The Snow Lion and the Dragon*: the names and dates of birth of each candidate were to be written in the Manchu, Han and Tibetan languages on metal slips and placed in a golden urn provided by the Manchu emperor. After prayers before the

statue of the Buddha in the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, a slip was drawn, the Buddha ensuring that the correct slip was selected. There are two Golden Urns issued by Qianlong. One is enshrined in Jokhang Temple in Lhasa for choosing Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama reincarnations, the other is in Yonghe Palace, or Lama Temple, in Beijing for choosing Mongolian Hutuktu reincarnations. The 7th Panchen Lama, Palden Tenpai Nyima, used the Golden Urn for the first time in 1822 to choose the 10th Dalai Lama, Tsultrim Gyatso. The Golden Urn method is not only used in selecting the reincarnations, but also used in deciding important secular dilemmas.

37. Lord Minto served as Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1905 to 1910.
38. Demo Trulku, the head of Tenkyeling Monastery, served as regent of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama from 1886 to 1895. After the Dalai Lama assumed the full rulership of Tibet, Demo Trulku and his supporters attempted to kill the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and to retake the regency, but his plan was unsuccessful. He and his accomplice/s were arrested. He died during his house arrest, reportedly killed by immersion in a water tub. Demo's labrang was confiscated and the institution of his reincarnation was banned for the time being.
39. See Appendix VII for the full content of the letter.
40. Nicholas II (1868-1918) was the last tsar of Russia. He was deposed during the Russian Revolution and executed by the Bolsheviks.
41. The Buddhist Temple in St. Petersburg was constructed by Agvan Dorjiev (1853-1938).
42. Agvan Dorjiev or Dorjiev (1853-1938), a lama of the Gelukpa School from the Buryat community of the Trans-Baikal region, played a prominent role in political events in Tibet and Central Asia in the early twentieth century. Trained at Ganden Monastery, he went on to become an important member of the 13th Dalai Lama's entourage. He was a study partner and close associate of the 13th Dalai Lama, so he was known as Tsenshab Dorji in Tibetan. He was also a minister of the Dalai Lama's government and a diplomatic link with the Russian Empire. He is remembered for building the Buddhist temple of St. Petersburg and signing the Tibet-Mongolia Treaty in 1913.
43. The head of Tashilhunpo Monastery. The British called him Tashi Lama on account of his being head of Tashilhunpo Monastery. The Panchen Lama is second in importance only to the Dalai Lama in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Tibet from 1642 to 1959.
44. Labrang (*bla brang*) in general sense refers to lama estate or residential palace of lama, but here refers to the Tashi Lhunpo government of the Panchen Rinpoche.
45. Sera monastery was founded in 1419 by Je Tsongkhapa's disciple Jamchen Choje Sakya Yeshe of Tse Kungthang (1355-1435) and remains one of the most important centres of the Gelukpa sect. The Sera complex has a number of colleges and temples and the famous Chora (Debating Courtyard) and Tsokchen (Assembly Hall).

46. Chinese statesman who organized the Kuomintang and led the revolution that overthrew the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and 1912 (1866-1925) Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), also known as Sun Yixian, (originally Sun Wen) was a Chinese revolutionary and political leader often referred to as the Father of Modern China. Sun played an instrumental role in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in 1911. He was the first provisional president when the Republic of China (ROC) was founded in 1912 and later co-founded the Kuomintang (KMT) where he served as its first leader. Sun was a uniting figure in post-Imperial China, and remains unique among 20th-century Chinese politicians for being widely revered in both Mainland China and Taiwan.
47. Drepung, the largest monastic complex in Tibet, is located eight kilometres northwest of Lhasa. It was founded in 1416 by Jamyang Choje Tashi Palden (1397-1449). It was one of the three main centres of Gelukpa monastic power with its abbot, the Tripa Khembo, playing a key role in the Tibetan government.
48. The monastic seat of the Panchen Lamas on the outskirts of Shigatse town. It was founded by the first Dalai Lama, Gendun Drub in 1447 and is one of the four most important Gelukpa monasteries along with Sera, Drepung and Ganden.
49. After leaving Chamdo, Chao Erh-feing became the governor of Sichuan, in 1912; he was executed by Yin Ch'ang-heng, a revolutionary leader (Tiechman, p. 431).
50. Gzong kha gcig sgril: just as chisel has only one edge, so the people should not have two divisions, but one.
51. See Appendix VIII for the full text of the edict.
52. Refers to the opera about an Indian bodhisattva prince who was ready to give everything for alms, including his eyes.
53. In Tibetan: Spyi mda' gnam gang phebs song//
spyid nyin ring po shar song//
Dri med kun ldan 'khra nas//
bzhi sde sbyin par btang song//
54. Drimey Kunden refers to the opera about an Indian Bodhisattva prince who was ready to give everything in alms, including his eyes.
55. An office at Shol for taking care of Potala Palace and responsible for judicial matters in the neighborhood of Lhasa.
56. Snga dro gser bya yin zhes//
blab rang thog khar 'gro gis//
dgong dro g.yu bya yin zhes//
yam on nang la 'gro gis//
zhabs pad rgya min bod min//
phyi lag nang 'brel byed kyis//
57. Ma byed byas pa'i ma nyan//
bstan rgyas gling gi grwa pa//

rta sha bong sha za dgos//

so sos bzos pa'i las red//

58. Bod pa'i me sgyogs lkug pa//

me sgyogs rgyag mkhan lkug pa//

bstan rgyas gling gi 'dam ra'i//

sbal pa rkang pa bcag zhag//

59. See Appendix IX for the full content of the Tibeto-Mongol treaty.

60. See note no 28.

61. According to the Tokan Tada, there were three Japanese in Lhasa at that time. They were Bunkyo Aoki, Yasujiro Yamima and Tokan himself.

62. Tokan Tada was born in Akita, Japan, in 1890. He studied Buddhism in Tibet from 1913 to 1923. During his stay there, he acted as an unofficial advisor to the Dalai Lama, with whom he became acquainted in India before he entered Tibet. He was the author of *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama*, published by the Centre of East Asian Cultural Studies, Japan.

63. Donmag ('don dmag) is a collection of men summoned for military service as a tax from a 'don unit of land for a particular mission.

64. Simla then was the capital city of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab.

65. Sir Arthur Henry McMahon (28 November 1862 - 29 December 1949) was a British diplomat and Indian Army officer who served as the High Commissioner in Egypt from 1915 to 1917. He was also an administrator in British India, and served twice as Chief Commissioner of Balochistan. McMahon is best known for the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, as well as the McMahon Line between Tibet and India.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_McMahon_\(diplomat\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_McMahon_(diplomat))

66. The Tibetan delegate was Kalon Shatra Paljor Dorji and his assistant staff was Taiji Trimon Norbu Wangyal

67. Outer Tibet refers to the present day TAR and Inner Tibet refers to Tibetan areas, mostly eastern, not included in Outer Tibet: it included most parts of Amdo and Kham.

68. See Appendix VI and X.

The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled. The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the content of the Chinese Government.

69. Also known as the Great War II or the War to End all the Wars, was fought from 1914 to 1918 between the allies (Russia, France, British Empire, Italy, United States, Japan, Rumania, Serbia, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). The Central Powers suffered defeat.

70. Tibetan: *rkang 'don brgyad sna*; the soldiers were recruited by taxing one soldier from eight men from a unit of tax.
71. Tibetan volume measure equivalent of about 1 litre or two pints; one *drey* of gold would weigh about 13 kilos.
72. Tibetan: *Ngo mtshar mtha' klas rig 'phrul gter mdzod khang*
73. Shape (spelled *szhabs pad*) is a synonymous for kalon, or minister.
74. Drungtsi (acronym for *drungyig chenmo* and *tsipon*) were the convenor and president of the session.
75. Shodrung (spelled *shod drung*) were the staff who worked in the Sho office, the office of the Regent, Administrator and Prime Minister during the period of traditional Tibetan government.
76. Sonam Wangfel Lagden was popularly called Sonam Laden La. Born in 1876 in Darjeeling, he became a police officer and right hand of Charles Bell.
77. According to Shakabpa's *Tibet: a Political History*, this man was a Tibetan named Gyalpo. He had a Nepalese wife, and they opened a liquor and tobacco shop in Lhasa without a permit. When the Lhasa magistrate ordered his arrest, he ran into the residence of the Nepalese officer, who took him to be a Nepalese.
78. Charles Suydam Cutting is widely known as the first westerner to enter the forbidden city of Lhasa in Tibet. He abandoned his engineering profession for adventure and exploration. He travelled to Tibet 1935-1937. He published a book of his travels *The Fire Ox and Other Years* published New York, Scribner, 1940. <http://ftvdb.bfi.org.uk/sift/individual/26563>
79. He was the father of Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, who headed the Tibetan negotiation team and signed the "17th Point Agreement" with the Chinese on May 23, 1951 in Peking.
80. The State Oracle of Tibet, who when possessed by Dorji Drakden predicts the future of Tibet as well as plays an integral role in deciding succession. He plays an integral role in the Monlam Chenmo (the Great Prayer festival) during the Tibetan New Year by going into trance and uttering prognostications for the future.
81. See Appendix XI
82. After the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died, he was nominated for the post of regent.

Chapter Twelve

Internal Power Struggle During the Periods of Regent Reting and Regent Taktra



1. The Period of Regent Reting

After the Thirteenth Dalai Lama passed away, everyone in the civil and military positions engaged themselves in internal conflicts, instead of working together for the sake of Tibet's religion and polity in accordance with the great testament of the Dalai Lama. As a result, Tibet's power declined within a short span of time. Prime Minister Langdun Kunga Wangchuk and the Kashag jointly took the responsibility of the government for about two months. Thereafter, the Tibetan National Assembly unanimously put forward a suggestion for an appointment of a high incarnate lama as a regent and Prime Minister Langdun as his assistant. Accordingly, Ganden throne-holder Minyag Amé Yeshe Wangden¹, Reting Hutuktu Jampal Yeshe Tenpai Gyaltsen² and Thupten Jampa Tsultrim, the reincarnation of Phurchok Yongzin³, were put forward for the post. Preceded by the prayer for truth "dentsik monlam," a dough-ball divination⁴ was performed before the image of Avalokiteshvara in the Potala Palace in the presence of the Prime Minister, the cabinet members, *drungtsi* officials and members of the Assembly to select one from among the three candidates. The divination selected the Reting Hutuktu. On January 10, 1934, he was enthroned as the Regent and Prime Minister Langdun was appointed his assistant.

Sometime later, Rimshi Kasho Chogyal Nyima made false report to the Regent that Tsipon Lungshar [1881-1944]⁵ had founded a group called Kyichog Kunthun, the "Alliance on the side of Happiness" and that he was hatching a plot to remove Kalon Lama [Jampa Tendar] and Kalon Trimon [Norbu Wangyal] in order to usurp the government. The Regent immediately appointed a four-member probe committee to investigate the matter. Lungshar was detained in Shol prison. After trial, Lungshar's both eyes were gorged out and his eight confederates were removed from their posts, banished or put under house arrest.

Concerning the case, some people said that Lungshar had a noble plan to introduce land reforms and social equality in Tibet in accordance with the modern systems for the common good, while others said that he was trying to bring

communist revolution in Tibet. Whatever it might be, he was planning to set up an association and to put forward a proposal to the government for the reform of government system by adopting good features of foreign governments. However, his own party member Rimshi Kashopa acted two-faced and created a serious fomentation by giving a false report to the Regent through Trimon, alleging that Lungshar was concocting a very evil plan. This was the main cause of Lungshar's case, as is clear from various written accounts that appeared afterwards.

Though Tsipton Lungshar was quite self-centered by nature, he only wanted to introduce the modernization of advanced countries into Tibet, as he had spent a long time in England. He had no plans to introduce communism into Tibet to topple the government. As with most of the revolutions that took place in many other countries of the world that did not succeed in the initial stages, except for some coup d'états carried out by strong armed rebels, his plan also failed.

In 1934, the Kuomintang government sent a letter to the Tibetan government through the Governor-General of Kham, asking for permission to send its emissaries to Lhasa to attend the funeral ceremony of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Fearing that the monastic section would protest if the request was not granted, the Tibetan government replied that it could send only a limited number of persons, as fixed by the Tibetan government. Accordingly, the Chinese representatives (led by Huang Musong)⁶ arrived in Lhasa. Likewise, the British-Indian government's representative Dzasak Rai Bhadur Norbu Dhondup⁷, assistant to the Political Officer in Sikkim, accompanied by his assistants, arrived in Lhasa to attend the funeral ceremony of the Dalai Lama. After the ceremony, when the Kuomintang's representatives left Lhasa, they left one Chinese radio operator with a radio set in Lhasa, saying that he would act as liaison to continue the Sino-Tibetan negotiation. The British government also, after obtaining permission, kept Rai Bhadur and later on, Richardson and his assistants with a wireless set at Dekyilingka Park in Lhasa. The Tibetan government treated both the Chinese and British representatives as ambassadors of their respective nations and allowed them to approach the Tibetan government only through the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau. Whenever there were official ceremonies, all the representatives of China, India, Nepal and Bhutan and the leaders of the Kashmir Muslim Community in Lhasa were invited equally and offered equal seats, without discrimination.

Around that time, Pomda's son Topgyal, who was appointed as a colonel of the local army of Markham by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, was on border duty in Markham. He was very close and loyal to the late Dalai Lama and Kunphel-la, the favoured attendant of the Dalai Lama. Therefore, when he heard about the arrest and banishment of Kunphel-la just after the Dalai Lama's death, he became upset and angry. Leading the local troops under his command, he made a surprise attack on the army camp of Brigadier Norgye Nangpa of the Chadang Regiment in

Markham, as a protest against the government. The brigadier at that time was not at his camp as he had been sent to Tsawa Bultok Monastery to make funeral offerings for the Dalai Lama by the Governor-General of Kham. In the attack, they killed or wounded the captain and some soldiers, and robbed them of their artillery shells and personal belongings. They kidnapped Togtsa Sho Tseprung Thupten Sangpo. Furthermore, together with his elder brother Rabga, he distributed pamphlets among the local people, inciting them to revolt against the Tibetan government. However, they did not get support from anyone, or else they would have led a strong revolt. The Governor-General of Kham immediately dispatched troops to suppress them. The two brothers, leading several troops, fled towards Batang. Through the Tibetan bureau office in Nanking, the Tibetan government asked the Chinese government to deport the two brothers. The Chinese, far from handing them over to the Tibetan government, kept them to use as an instrument to serve their purposes. This prompted the Tibetan government to send troops to arrest Topgyal's second eldest brother, Lobsang Yarphe, at his residence in Lhasa. The lamas and monks of the monasteries under his patronage appealed to the Kashag, saying that there was no conspiratorial connection between Yarphe and Topgyal and that the Pomda family would compensate the government for all the damages done by Topgyal and his men. They also pleaded the Kashag to pardon him on the ground that his father Pomda Nyima Gyalpo and his eldest brother Nyima Gyaltsen successively served in the government with great dedication, and Lobsang Yarphe himself had joined the government to continue his family's service to the government. Lobsang Yarphe's family was therefore excused provided they compensate all the losses caused to both the government and private individuals by the Pomda's sons in Markham.

In 1936, civil war broke out in China between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In addition, the Japanese invasion of China was underway. As a result, faced with a shortage of weapons and other military supplies, the Communist Chinese were in a difficult situation. Unable to hold ground, several hundred thousand troops of the Red Army made the retreat move called the "Long March of the Red Army"⁸ towards northwest China. Traveling through Litang, Batang, Nyarong, Horkhog and Derge, they attempted to cross the Dri Chu River under the pretext of seeking temporary asylum in Tibet. The Tibetan forces under the command of the Governor-General of Kham, Dzasak Lobsang Palden and Dzasak Surkang Surpa, were ordered to halt the Red Army from marching further into Tibet. Accordingly, they stopped the Red Army, who then turned towards northern China. Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji of the Gadang Regiment recalls:

The Gadang Shigatse Regiment's Brigadier Kyipugpa, Colonel Chophel-la, the second colonel Nyandrong Gongma and the third colonel Chobuk, with their troops, confronted the Red Army who were trying to cross the Dri Chu River from Mugteng

Druga and Bache Druga ferry crossings for about twenty days. Severely defeated, the Red Army retreated and moved towards Kandze by way of Horkhog Rachag.

The Chinese army at that time, as widely known, was very weak in terms of organization and military supplies, including weapons and food—ten or more soldiers had to share only one gun, and they had to sustain themselves on meat from horses, donkeys and dogs.

During the Red Army's "Long March", the Gyantse troops were on border duty in different parts of Markham. Several thousand soldiers of the Red Army arrived at the Dongdru bank of the Drichu River and the Sampa Druga ferry crossing via Batang from Yunnan, and they said that they had come to seek asylum in Tibet and that they would leave Tibet within one year. My noble father Kharsam Gyalpo, a captain of the Gadang Regiment, who was on border duty in that area, sent a messenger to the Governor-General of Kham to inform him about the same, and at the same time, told the Chinese troops that they must not cross the Drichu River until he received instruction from the Governor-General of Kham. The messenger galloped days and nights, without taking rest, and delivered the message. The Governor-General sent instruction that they must stop the Chinese at any cost. However, by the time the messenger arrived back, the Chinese troops had already headed towards northern China from the Drichu River. Later my father told me that those were the first communist troops to arrive in Tibet. From this, it is clear that had the Tibetan forces at different positions made no stiff resistance, the Chinese troops must have crossed the Drichu River by any means, peaceful or military.

At that time, the Tibetan government issued a very forceful and urgent edict to all the army units who were under the command of the Governor-General of Kham. The following edict was addressed to Brigadier Namseling Paljor Jigme of the Jadang Regiment.

Jadang Brigadier Namlingpa and all the colonels, captains, lieutenants and all soldiers of the regiment:

As the manifestation of the prediction made in his testament by His Holiness the Dalai Lama Vajradhara, the most benevolent and chief deity of the Land of Snow, the Chinese communist bandits have arrived very close to our border region Domé. They are certainly the real enemy of beings. Therefore, concerned over the extreme importance of the welfare of the Dharma and beings, here in Lhasa and all parts of the country appeals have been made to lamas and deities, and they are conducting extensive rituals continuously to avert the harm. In accordance with the reports of the Governor-General of Kham, additional troops and military equipments are being sent according to the need and strategic importance of the respective defense posts, without caring about the expenses. Therefore, if the enemy's forces remain peaceful near our

border, it is all right, but if they make even a slight offensive move towards our territory from any side, south or north, you must resist them. You do not need to envy others of their arms and ammunitions as you have a sufficient supply of them. Everything depends on the dedicated will and actions of you army officers and troops.

The Buddhadharma is the source of happiness of all beings. We the people of this country, led by monks and lay officials of the government, unlike in other kingdoms and princelings under the sky, are fortunate to enjoy ownership over our ancestral estates through inheritance by paying small tax due to the kindness of [His Holiness], as we are aware of it. Therefore, it is impossible to question whether people will protect the country at the cost of their lives. However, even during the battle of the Water-Monkey year (1932), though everything depended upon the courage and determination of our brave fighters, they lost a large precious area from our territory to the enemy, on the lame excuse of the overwhelming size of the enemy's strength and difficult terrain. At that time, it was decided to summon all the responsible officers to Lhasa to do a thorough investigation. However, as our store of merit was insufficient His Holiness Vajradhara passed into nirvana, and the matter remained unresolved. Hence, it is doubtful that some thoughtless people might again do traitorous acts out of their foolishness.

Thus, in regards to what was already said about the Communists, when you are not engaged in border duties assigned to you by the *dzasak serkya drelpo*⁹, the Governor-General of Kham, you must remain alert all the times to the enemy, forts, war and so forth, without feeling wearied. Whenever the opponents attack you, you must fight back at the cost of your lives, without moving back even one step from your positions, with the strong determination to destroy the enemy. You must accomplish your duties for the sake of your country as well as for your own name. Those who make valorous performances in battles will not be forgotten; they will be rewarded in recognition of their performance immediately in accordance with the reports arrive here. Whoever amongst officers and soldiers, on various excuses, runs away "like a fox" and cedes territories to the enemy, without concern for their own names, dignity and the law of cause and effect, he will be meted with punishment immediately in accordance with the army's law without partiality. A separate notice has also been sent to the *dzasak serkya drelpo* (the monk and lay *dzasak* officials who are jointly acting as the Governor-General of Kham). Hence, all of you, from commanders down to the ordinary soldiers, must keep this in mind and act properly from the very beginning.

Kashag

On the 12th day of the 7th month of the Fire-Rat year, 1936

Sometime before the above events, many bandits and robbers from upper and lower villages from Nangchen (which then were under the Chinese control) often attacked and plundered the villages in the 39 Hor states, including the three

states of Khyungpo Karnagsersum. The incidents escalated, creating chaos in the areas and causing tremendous sufferings to the people. Thus, the people from both the monastic and lay communities of these areas unanimously appealed to the government to protect them from the criminals and to restore peace in their areas. The government appointed Drakpa Namgyal the Governor of the Hor states and sent Colonel Luma Shar as his bodyguard. Drakpa Namgyal set up his headquarters at Tengchen and ordered his troops to chase and arrest all the bandits. He conducted thorough investigations and punished the criminals severely, such as amputating their limbs. The news spread everywhere. Soon the violent disturbances and robberies in these areas ceased completely—even a word about them was not heard—and peace was restored. He thus earned a great name in his service to the government, as everyone praised him, “What a military skill and honesty of Drakpa Namgyal, the Governor of the Hor states!”

Not long after that, news reached Lhasa that the Panchen Rinpoche was returning to Tibet from China and thousands of Chinese soldiers were accompanying him on the excuse of escorting him. The Tibetan government immediately sent a request to the British government of India to help Tibet deal with the situation. The British government sent F.W. Williamson, the Political Officer of Sikkim, along with an assistant, to Lhasa, but he died shortly after he became ill due to environmental unsuitability to his health. In his place came the new Political Officer of Sikkim, Basil Gould, accompanied by Brigadier General P. Neame, the general commander of the East Indian Army, and he was received warmly by the Tibetan government. He discussed with the Chinese government about the arrangement of the Panchen Rinpoche’s return journey to Tibet. In 1935, in accordance with the resolutions passed by the National Assembly of Tibet based on the suggestions made by the Regent and the Kashag, the Tibetan government sent a telegram to the Panchen Rinpoche through the Tibetan Bureau Office in Nanking, requesting his immediate return to Tashi Lhunpo and promising him elaborate receptions at various entry points. The Bureau Officer, Khendron, personally handed the telegram to the Panchen Rinpoche and verbally requested him to return to Tibet immediately for the common good. The Panchen Rinpoche however did not give him a reply. Some time later, the Kuomintang government announced that they had appointed the Panchen Rinpoche as “Special Cultural Commissioner for the Western Region”¹⁰ and that he would be coming to Tibet, escorted by 500 Chinese soldiers, and that his headquarters would be set up at Xining. The Kuomintang government used the Panchen Rinpoche extensively as a political instrument against the Tibetan government and made every attempt to create hostilities between the Tibetan government and the Panchen Rinpoche’s government. The Tibetan government, however, opposed every move of the Chinese. The British government also made a strong protest against the Chinese through its representative in Nanking.

In March 1937 the Tibetan Bureau Officer in Nanking and the Governor-General of Kham, informed the Tibetan government about the arrival of the Panchen Rinpoche and his retinue at Jyekundo from Xining, accompanied by Chinese soldiers, and that his servants carrying his goods were on their way to Dartsedo from Sichuan. The government sent Taiji Gashiwa, *khen-rim* (khenchung and rimshi ranks) officials and representatives of the Three Monastic Seats, with an instruction and money to arrange an official reception for the Panchen Rinpoche. The governors of Kham and the Hor states and the headman of Nagchu were instructed to clear roads that the Panchen Rinpoche would pass through and make all the necessary travel arrangements for him, including horses, pack animals and servants, in the best possible way. They were also instructed that they must not allow, except the real members of the retinue and servants of the Panchen Rinpoche, even a single Chinese army officer, soldier or civil officer, to accompany him on the excuse of being his bodyguards. The Governor-General of Kham sent *khen-rim* officials to Jyekundo to receive the Panchen Rinpoche [as well as to request him not to bring the Chinese soldiers with him]. Though requested strongly, the Panchen Rinpoche insisted, saying that he must take them to Tashi Lhunpo and they would go back after a few months. Kyabje Phabongkha also went to meet the Panchen Rinpoche at Jyekundo and requested him not to bring the Chinese, but in vain. Thereafter, the Governor-General of Kham pleaded with him vehemently for the same, but it fell on deaf ears. Therefore, in Lhasa, at the request of the Kashag, the Tibetan National Assembly met to discuss how to deal with the Panchen Rinpoche's return. At that time, the Kashag received an "arrow letter" (*mda' yig*) written on a piece of yellow brocade sent by the Panchen Rinpoche's Private Office in Jyekundo. The letter bear a command to the effect that all the districts and senior and general people along the route from Jyekundo to the great monastery Tashi Lhunpo through Nagchu and Lhasa must make a reception and arrange lodgings, food, fuel, horses, pack animals and servants at every night stop for the Panchen Rinpoche and his entourage, including both the Chinese and Tibetan civil and military personnel accompanying him, without failure or excuses. The Kashag presented the serious letter to the Assembly, and the harsh wordings and tone of the letter angered all the members of the Assembly. The Assembly then passed a unanimous resolution to the effect that, except the Tibetan retinue of the Panchen Rinpoche, not a single Chinese should be allowed to come with him under the pretext of escorting him, and Tibetan troops, in accordance with his demand, shall be sent to escort him up to Tashi Lhunpo. The resolution also said that if he still insisted on taking the Chinese troops with him, there must be a written guarantee from him that the troops would return to China within a month, without a single one of them remaining behind, with a foreign country acting as witness to this agreement; or else not a single Chinese should be allowed to enter Tibet. The proposal was submitted to the Kashag for action, and

the Kashag in turn, instructed the governors of Kham and the Hor states and the Nagchu headman to act accordingly.

Hence, Dzasak Surkhang Surpa immediately proceeded from Chamdo to Dengko where he deliberated with the chief officials of the Panchen Rinpoche about the return journey of the Panchen Rinpoche. On 13 October [1937], Khenchung Thupten Pema, with the governor of the Hor states and Brigadier Namseling Paljor Jigme of the Jadang Regiment stationed in northern Tibet galloped to meet the Panchen Rinpoche, and presented to him and his officials letters related to his return journey. Despite that the negotiation reached an impasse.

In the meantime, Japanese forces had intensified their assault on China from the eastern side, and an intense war broke out between Chinese and Japanese forces. This reason, as well as persistent protests from the Tibetan government against the entry of Chinese troops into Tibet, a Chinese commander named Ma Hotien accompanying the Panchen Rinpoche received a wireless message from Nanking that all the Chinese troops who were acting as the Panchen Rinpoche's escort must be immediately brought back to Jyekundo. When Chinese troops returned to Jyekundo from Ragshi Monastery, the Panchen Lama, with his entourage, also went with them. The extreme hardship of the journey made him ill. He stayed at Dhondupling Monastery in Jyekundo, where his health worsened and he finally breathed his last on December 1, 1937. His servants and officials hence faced great problems. They brought the body of the Panchen Rinpoche to Horkhog and stayed there. The Governor-General of Kham sent his representative there to tell them that if they returned to their monastery with the body of the Panchen Rinpoche, they would be given a reception, and any kind of assistance and resources they needed would be provided. However, the officials of the Panchen Rinpoche got into a disagreement and split themselves into two groups. One group returned to their monastery with the body of the Panchen Rinpoche. The Tibetan government sent Datsab Chogbewa to assist them, and prepared reception for them in Shigatse. After their arrival, the government made rich offerings to each stage of the Panchen Rinpoche's funeral ceremony, from beginning to the final. The other group of the Panchen's servants planned to go to China, but they had to go to Xining and reside there for China at that time was in turmoil and the Kuomintang and the Communist forces were jointly combating the Japanese invasion.

In that year, Liu Wen-hui [the governor of Dartsedo] and the Governor-General of Kham, agreed to talk about the return of the lamas and monks of Dargye Monastery [who had been exiled] to their monastery. Tsien Li-tang as the Chinese representative and Rimshi Surkhang Sé Wangchen Gelek as the Tibetan representative, along with their assistants, met at Derge Gonchen to hold negotiations. They reached an agreement that the monks of Dargye Monastery who

had fled from the monastery were allowed to return and all the previous rights and properties of the monastery would be restored provided the monks would not take revenge against Beri and Kandze. It was also decided that, as in the past, the Tibetan government would continue to appoint abbots to Dargye Monastery. Thus, with the help of the Tibetan government, the monks and lamas of Dargye Monastery who had fled to different parts of Traodo, Joda and Chamdo around the northern side of the Drichu River were able to return and develop their monastery, including its sacred objects, more than ever before.

In 1937, Dr. Sheppard of German nationality and his servants, after obtaining permission from the Tibetan government through the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Tibet, visited Lhasa for sightseeing. They were invited to various ceremonies of the Great Prayer Festival, just as other foreign dignitaries were invited. When they went into the crowd to take photos of the *torgyag* ceremony, people found them unpleasant, and shouted and threw stones at them at the instigation of the enemy. However, except that Dr. Sheppard received a small injury on his head by a stone, nothing serious happened. Having visited various places, such as Samye, Traduk and Yumbu Lakang, Sheppard and his servants returned to India.

In the same year, Regent Reting tendered his resignation to the Kashag. The Kashag requested him to continue with his regency. When asked the reasons for his resignation, he replied that he had no power to take solo decisions, without having to consult the Prime Minister, alluding to the removal of the Prime Minister [Langdun]. Following this, on February 30, 1938, the Kashag and the Master Chamberlain, with the minutes of the National Assembly's meeting, approached Prime Minister Langdun and requested him to resign from the post. The Prime Minister readily agreed and retired. The Regent Reting Rinpoche thereafter assumed complete governmental power.

In 1935, in order to search for the true reincarnation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Regent Reting, the Kashag and the Chief Official Abbot jointly examined the list of the prospective candidates and reports of examinations of their backgrounds submitted to them. In addition, the Regent, accompanied by his retinue, personally visited Lake Lhamo Latso (*lha mo'i bla mtsho*), where he saw the clear signs of the birthplace of the reincarnation. He sent Keutsang Trulku, along with some assistants to him, to Domé in Xining to find the child. He spent two years in and around Kumbum in search of the child. Finally, he found a boy in Taktse village, close to Kumbum, whom he tested several times, secretly and openly. The boy, unlike other children, correctly picked up the personal belongings of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and recognized all the members of the search party by their names. Therefore the search party was convinced that the boy was the reincarnation. Moreover, when they met the Panchen Rinpoche at Jyekundo on their way down, he said that he had great hope in the child born at Taktse.

In Lhasa, the predictions and prophecies of lamas and deities also agreed [on the same Taktse boy]. Therefore, the true reincarnation was identified without doubt. Nevertheless, since Taktse was in Xining, which was then under the rule of Ma Pu-fang, the search party faced great difficulty in taking the child to Lhasa immediately. They requested Ma Pu-fang to permit them to take all the prospective child candidates for the reincarnation to Lhasa so that traditional religious tests could be conducted in the presence of all the candidates. They tried their best to gain his goodwill through diplomatic means. He demanded 400,000 *dayang* (Chinese silver coins)¹¹, which was paid by the search party after they procured it with great efforts. Besides that, Tsedrung Lobsang Tsewang was temporarily kept in Xining as a pawn in order to take the child to Lhasa as quickly as possible. The government also conducted extensive rituals for the quick and smooth arrival of the child to Lhasa.

As soon as the search party and the child arrived safely near Nagchu, the government convened a Full National Assembly¹² in Lhasa and informed them about the good news of the discovery and confirmation of the boy named Lhamo Dhondup, born in Chija Taktse village near Kumbum, as the true reincarnation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. The people of Tibet, both monastic and laity, out of great joy, faith and happiness on hearing the news, sent letters to the government, thanking the Regent and ministers for finding the reincarnation and requesting it to conduct all the necessary traditional religious ceremonies as soon as the boy arrived safely in Lhasa.

On 10th day of the eight month (September 23), the child Dalai Lama, along with his father Chokyong Tsering and mother Sonam Tso (also Diki Tsering), accompanied by his entourage, arrived at Gashin Namoché, near Nagchukha. Kalon Bonsho presented him with *mandrel tensusum*—statue, stupa and scripture.¹³ The Regent, the Kashag and the Tibetan National Assembly presented him with an official recognition letter, and a small elite force from the Drapchi Regiment was assigned to him as his bodyguards. With pure traditional traveling procedure and official reception, the Dalai Lama and his party proceeded to Lhasa. On October 6, 1939, the party camped on the plain of Gangto Doguthang where they rested for two days. The government officials, representatives of the Three Monastic Seats, the upper and lower tantric colleges, lamas, *trulkus* and abbots of various monasteries, representatives of British-India, China, Nepal and Bhutan, and leaders of Muslim community in Lhasa arrived there to receive his visual blessing. Thereafter, the party arrived at Lhasa where the Dalai Lama was received with great pomp and ceremony, with a military parade, procession of lamas, *cham* dance and so forth. A crowd of many thousands of people thronged to get a glimpse of the child's face. Thereafter, he was led to the Lhasa temple, from where he was directly led to the Norbulingka Palace, the summer palace of the successive former Dalai Lamas.

On November 23, 1939, Regent Reting Rinpoche performed the hair-cutting ceremony for the young Dalai Lama and conferred him the new name Jetsun Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso Sisum Wangyur Tsungpa Mepa De Pal Sangpo. Thereafter, a decree dated 27th day of the 10th month of the Earth-Rabbit year [1939] to all over Tibet, bearing the seal of the Regent, announced the confirmed date of the enthronement ceremony and the duties of the monastic and lay people.

Sir Basil Gould, the Political Officer of Sikkim, had been given permission to come to Lhasa to present ceremonial gifts to the Dalai Lama on behalf of the King of England (George V)¹⁴ and the British viceroy in India. Through the British government of India, the Kuomintang government requested the Tibetan government to allow it to send Wu Chung-tsin (Wu Zhongxin)¹⁵ and his assistants to Tibet to deliver ceremonial gifts for the enthronement ceremony, but the request was rejected. Later, when the Chinese insisted, saying that they had no other purpose than to offer presents for the enthronement ceremony, the request was accepted, on the condition that they came via India after obtaining a visa to enter India. Wu's assistant Kung Ching-tsung (Gong Jingzong), was permitted to come to Tibet through Dartsedo with the ceremonial gifts, guided by a staff member from the Nanking office, accompanied by a fixed number of companions. Obtaining permission from the Governor-General of Kham and getting entry permission at each entry level, he arrived in Lhasa. From Dromo, the Tibetans received the Indian and Chinese delegates and escorted them to Lhasa, after providing them horses, pack animals and permits. On arrival in Lhasa, they were led directly to the Norbulingka Palace to report their arrival and have an audience with the young Dalai Lama.

On February 22, 1940, the enthronement ceremony of the boy Dalai Lama on the high golden throne was held in the Potala Palace. The ceremony was begun with the prayers of long-life and truthful words (*bden tshigs smon lam*), followed by a commentary on *mandala* by Regent Reting Rinpoche. After that, the Tibetan government presented its ceremonial gifts to the Dalai Lama. Then, in accordance with traditional norms, the Regent, the Prime Minister, two tutors, Hutuktu, cabinet members, Master Chamberlain, lamas, *trulkus* and civil and military officials, in line, received hand blessings from the Dalai Lama. After all the official procedures of the ceremony were over, the foreign delegates and Wu Chung-tsin, the Kuomintang delegate, presented their ceremonial gifts to the Dalai Lama.

On the 24 February, after Tashi Lhunpo, the British government's delegates Sir Basil Gould, Rai Bhadur Dzasak Norbu Dhondup and Richardson presented ceremonial gifts to the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Indian Viceroy and His Majesty's government of England. After that, the royal representative of Sikkim presented his gifts. This was followed by presentation of gifts and offerings by

the Reting Labrang, different monasteries and private Tibetan individuals. After this, the people, monastic and laity, celebrated the ceremony for many days, more elaborately than ever before, through various joyous festivities.

Later, the Chinese Kuomintang representative Wu wrote a book, writing many false things about the enthronement ceremony, such as that he presided over the enthronement ceremony, to prove his authority and to achieve his political aims. Thereafter, the Chinese Communist Party reiterated his false account in their political propaganda. However, many foreign and Tibetan dignitaries who had witnessed the enthronement ceremony have written of their own experiences that prove that Wu's claim was totally false. In his *Political History of Tibet*, Shakabpa, who was present at the enthronement ceremony, has written an honest and un-fabricated account of the event. Afterwards, at the first general body meeting of the Cultural Research Centre of Tibet, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme spoke in detail about what he witnessed during the enthronement ceremony, saying that the Kuomintang government had no hand in the organization of the enthronement ceremony at any stage, starting from the invitation of the reincarnation to Lhasa until the enthronement ceremony. To this, a Chinese man named Tan Tsi-kung told Ngabo that he should not be persistent in his views, as there were many documents stating that Wu Chung-tsin recognized the Dalai Lama. Ngabo replied, "Whatever you say, I will not withdraw my statement; I will stand firm with my point. You have the authority, but I have no right to erase it; I cannot make any change in it." Then the Panchen Rinpoche said, "the so-called advanced people are somewhat dishonest; those who are "backward" are somewhat more honest." His statement has profound meaning—it means that the Red Chinese who claim themselves as advanced people tell lies more than other people do, and the history of the so-called "backward people" is true.

2. The Period of Regent Taktra

A. Political Situation in Tibet

In 1940, Regent Reting Rinpoche told the Kashag and the Master Chamberlain that he wanted to resign from his service to stay in meditation for the time being, reasoning that he had performed divination and found that there were great obstructions to his life. Concerning this, the difficult point of the secret talk between them was as below. Both the Kashag and the Master Chamberlain pleaded with him, saying that as his age and health were in a good state, he should continue with his regency until the Dalai Lama, the real ruler, assumed the temporal and spiritual leadership of the country. They further told him that they would perform all the necessary rituals to remove all the obstructions to his life, but he insisted on

resigning. The Kashag then presented the matter to the National Assembly. The Assembly came up with the idea, "The Regent is surely not facing problems in terms of age or health; he is ruling successfully and there is peace at the borders. Therefore, he might not really be meant to resign, but might be facing difficulties in carrying out a reshuffle of the officials and political reforms due to disagreement by his subordinate officials." The Kashag and the *drungtsi* officials, the representatives of the Assembly, went to meet the Reting Rinpoche at his residence and requested him not to resign, reiterating the above same reasons. He refused and swore, saying that it was impossible for him to accept their request. He instead advised them to appoint the Taktra Rinpoche, who at that time was serving as tutor to the young Dalai Lama, in his place. Accordingly, after prior consultation with the Dalai Lama, the representatives of the National Assembly, presenting *mandrel tensum*, to the Taktra Rinpoche, requested him to become the new regent. He accepted their request. On January 1, 1941, Taktra Ngawang Sungrab assumed the regency.

Around that time, the Japanese forces had invaded China, Indonesia and Malaysia. The road, which was previously used by the USA, Britain and other Allied countries to transport military supplies through Burma to China, was under the control of the Japanese. Moreover, the Japanese forces were also attacking India from the Assam side. The British and Chinese governments thus requested the Tibetan government through the British envoy Dzasak Rai Bhadur and the Chinese Bureau Officer in Lhasa Kung Ching-tsung respectively to allow them to construct roads from India to China through Tibet. Since Tibet had adopted the policy of nonalignment and decided to remain neutral in the war, the Tibetan government refused their request, but told them they were allowed to send consumer commodities, such as clothes, threads and medicines, via Tibet through traders.

On January 10, 1942, the Dalai Lama took monastic vows from his tutor Regent Taktra before the image of Buddha Shakyamuni [at Lhasa Tsuglakhang]. In that year, two American government officials, Captain Ilia Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brooke Dolan, arrived in Lhasa and they were accorded excellent hospitality by the Tibetan government. They had an audience with the Dalai Lama. They had brought with them a letter from President Roosevelt¹⁶, dated July 24, 1942 bearing his signature, along with his photo and gifts, for the Dalai Lama. Spending two months in Tibet, they went to China through Tsinghai (Amdo). They were provided with a set of horses and pack animals and travel permits, and assigned Tibetan troops to escort them up to the borders. Through them, the Dalai Lama sent a letter dated February 24, 1943 and gifts to the US president, and thus their friendly relationship began.

In the same year, in Lhasa, a fight broke out between a Nepalese man and a Tibetan man. When the police went to arrest them, the Nepalese man took refuge in Kyitopa House, the residence of Chinese Bureau Officer Kung Ching-tsung. The

police followed him into the house. That night, Kung went to the Norbulingka and knocked on the door of the Regent's residence and lied to the Regent that the Tibetan police were doing illegal things and he wanted protection. The matter was immediately checked, but the city was found to be completely normal—there was nothing of danger to his life. Kung had knocked on the door of the Regent's residence at the Norbulingka as if he had a very urgent matter to discuss only to create hostilities between Chinese and Tibetans. Therefore, the Tibetan National Assembly instructed the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office to serve notice to Kung to return to China within 48 hours, and to withdraw all the servants, firewood and other facilities provided to him. Kung was sent back to China via Kham. The Kuomintang government apologized to the Tibetan government for his mistakes and asked permission to send a new Bureau officer to Lhasa. The request was granted and Shen Tsung-lien, with a small staff, arrived in Lhasa through India. After his arrival, he pretended to be cordial and polite to everyone outwardly, yet he inconspicuously engaged himself in political activities.

Around that time, in Chamdo, all the leaders and representatives of the Tibetan army stationed at the northern and eastern parts of Dokham held a meeting. At the meeting, they came up with a proposal to the Tibetan government, that while following the instructions of the Governor-General of Kham, Surkhang Surpa, they be allowed to launch strategic attacks on the enemy to retake the lost Tibetan territories. They also requested the government to send additional troops, arms and ammunition. After sending petitions to the government several times through Surkhang Surpa, the Kashag replied:

We appreciate and praise your courage and fearlessness to attack the enemy for the defence of the country. However, the government follows the policy of refraining from making offensive assaults on the enemies as per the tradition of the Dharma kings and not ignoring the attacks from the enemy's side as per the practice of worldly kings. As for the Tibetan areas previously ceded to China, we should try to retake them through peaceful negotiation and tactful methods. It is not the right time for us to make an offensive attack on the enemy, as it will cause troubles, which will be similar to "disturbing a sleeping dog with a stick". However, you must make every effort to ensure that not a small piece of land is lost to the opponent force.

Their plan to attack the enemy therefore remained unfulfilled. After that, the troops of the Gyantse [Gadang] and Dingri [Cadang] regiments deployed at Markham and Northern Tibet respectively were given permission to return home for rest. Some units of the Tibetan army had been deployed in Markham, Derge, Riwoche and the 39 states of Hor. Two years later, the Gyantse Regiment was again dispatched to Namru in the north and the Dingri Regiment to Northern Tibet. Thereafter, the Gyantse Regiment was replaced by the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment's Shina

soldiers from Tsang¹⁷ to defend Namru. In this way, all the various regiments of the Tibetan army were allowed to take rest on a rotation basis. I will not bother to write the full details about these, as it will consume lots of space here.

During the period of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, in order to collect grain revenue for the army's salary, all the large lands kept by the government, individual households and monastic sectors without paying taxes to the government were thoroughly surveyed and grain tax was levied on them. As a result, the government managed to procure a large quantity of grains for the army for a certain period. However, later due either to granting tax exemptions to taxpayers or receiving cash in place of grains, the tax system degenerated. In addition, the army's grains sent to Kham from U-Tsang did not arrive there timely, regardless of whether they were transported with or without a transportation charge; even arrived they were not in proper quantities. This created immense problems and losses to both the public and the government. Therefore, as per the proposal put forward by the National Assembly, the government appointed a salary officer to take sole responsibility of the collection and dispatch of the army's grain salaries, and this created great benefits to everyone.

After a few successive governors of the 39 Hor states since Khenchung Drakpa Namgyal, in order to lighten the burden of the government and people, the 39 Hor states were reorganized into six districts under the jurisdiction of the governor of Northern Tibet, and Nagchu was made their capital. The government deputed district officers to each district and a proper tax system was formulated. At that time, the governor of Northern Tibet was Phala Thupten Woden and one company of either the Drapchi Regiment or the Dingri Regiment was stationed in Northern Tibet frontier force on a rotation basis. The jurisdiction of the Governor of Northern Tibet extended from Nagchu to Tsaidam Basin in the north, Khyungpo Tengchen in the east, Reting in the south and Nagtsang in the west.

In those times, the 25 camps of Dhimchi, which were Tibetan areas, were under the administration of Xining, or the upper Chinese, as called by the Tibetans. A fighting broke out between the Tibetans of Ragshul, Shurma and Tsangyu, which were parts of the 25 Dhimchi states, and the Xining Chinese, and the Tibetans fled to Nagchu to seek Tibetan government's help. They were chased by a large Chinese cavalry up to the border of Nagchu. The Tibetan forces readied to fight, but the Governor-General of Kham skillfully negotiated and signed an agreement with the Chinese, that the Chinese would not take revenge and trouble those Tibetan refugees again when they returned homes. The trouble was thus solved without casualties.

In Hor Drachen, a man called Gagya Dramnag, who had about 300 private cavalry soldiers, often raided the nearby villages, killing and looting the people. He also made several attacks on the village of Tsashi Anam, and after facing a minor resistance, his troops massacred the entire population of the village, except a small

boy, who happened to be at another place at that time. They took away all their belongings, including livestock. After that, he murdered the father of Hor nomadic chieftain after they had a disagreement. As there was no peace and safety in these areas due to his criminal and oppressive activities, the governor of Northern Tibet informed him several times to come to Nagchu for negotiations, but he never turned out. Thereafter, the Governor visited the above nomadic areas and secretly made a plan with a trader named Palden Drakpa from Trethong, who was an old friend and a *mahjong* game partner of Gagya. Pretending to mediate for compromise, Palden Drakpa introduced the Governor to Gagya and made them friends. One day, they gathered for a party at Drachen Dzong fort and played *mahjong* together. The Governor had preplanned to ambush him and had brought with him one company (25 soldiers) of the Khadang Regiment, and hid them behind the wooden staircases of the Dzong fortress. When the party was over and all the people had left, as preplanned, the soldiers suddenly came out and captured Gagya. He was executed that very night. His gang members managed to run away. Colonel Anan of the Drapchi Regiment, who was stationed in Drachen at that time, was a close friend of Gagya. He was slightly unhappy with the incident, as he was not informed about it by the Governor. However, all the local people were very happy with the Governor for bringing peace and happiness in their land.

In June 1944, Geshe Sherab Gyatso from Drepung Monastery, an unrivalled scholar who was expert in sutra, tantra and other fields of study, went to China, after he had a disagreement with the way how the woodprint of *kanjur* were edited under the guidance of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. In China, he joined the so-called "Tibetan-Mongolian Office of the Kuomintang". Later, when he came back to Tibet, people suspected that he was sent by the Kuomintang government with a large sum of money to incite monasteries. When he arrived in Nagchu, people stopped him and sent him back to China. After the Communist Party of China established its regime in the whole of China, he was used as an instrument to implement their policy on Tibet. At one time, he served as Vice-Chairman of Tsinghai and radio announcer of Chinese propaganda in Tibetan language.

On the night of August 3, 1944, people in and around Lhasa heard the sound of an aircraft flying over Lhasa from the north to the south. Two days later, the duty men of the Nedong Fortress found a four-propelled US carrier aircraft, which had a US army emblem, crashed on the sandy shore of the Tsangpo, near Samye Donang. The five crew-members of the aircraft had safely landed in Tsethang by means of parachutes. The aircraft actually was on its way back to India, after they went to deliver military supplies to China. On the way it lost direction due to some problems in its navigational equipment. Finally, it ran out of fuel and crashed. The Tibetan government ordered the governor of Southern Tibet to provide the necessary travel facilities, including horses, pack animals and labours as well as

compensation to the crew members led by the chief pilot Lieutenant R. A. Krozi, and escort them to Lhasa. Accordingly, they were escorted to Lhasa, where they were received by both the Chinese and British representatives. The Tibetan government dispatched Tibetan troops to escort them to India via Gyantse. The Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office sent a letter through them to the US embassy in India, informing the embassy about the incident and asking them not to repeat the same thing in future. The US government sent a reply, saying that the aircraft accidentally landed in Tibet just because it lost direction and that it did not intentionally and illegally enter Tibet, and that such a thing, however, would not happen in future. When this incident took place, the World War II was in full swing.

In January 1945, two German men named Heinrich Harrer and Peter Aufschnaiter¹⁸ arrived in Lhasa, after escaping from an internment at Dehradun, India. Crossing Uttarkashi (in modern Uttaranchal state), they travelled through Tsareng, Saga and Droscho, and then entered Ngari from its north. Then, through Nagtsang, they arrived in Lhasa. The British government asked the Tibetan government, through the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office, to deport them to India. However, being a neutral nation and not belonging to any power blocks during the World War II, Tibet kept the two men as political refugees. Peter Aufschnaiter was employed in the Drapchi Electric Machine Office's project to engineer the construction of a water tunnel at Nachen Trang and a new powerhouse at Drapchi. Heinrich was assigned the engineering task for the Chakpori plantation project and water gate construction at the Kyichu River in Lhasa. As they maintained good behaviour and respected the laws, they were loved by all Tibetans, both elite and common. However, they had to leave Tibet, leaving behind their projects unfinished, when the PLA marched into Tibet. Aufschnaiter fled to Nepal and settled there. Harrer returned to Germany, and had always been supportive of the Tibetan cause. He has written a memoir titled *Seven Years in Tibet*, in which he gives a true account of his experience in Tibet.

In those times, a very few Tibetans in Tibet knew English. With the aim to develop Tibet's international relations and to introduce modern infrastructure in the country, besides many other purposes, the Tibetan government discussed with the British Bureau officer in Lhasa to set up an English school in Lhasa. Following this, two English men, Richard and Parker, arrived in Lhasa from England to become English teachers. Some Tibetan children [from amongst aristocratic families] were selected as students and the school was opened at Drungche Lingka Park. A few months later, monastic sections lodged complaints against the school and showed many protesting gestures. They voiced that if foreign cultures and systems spread in Tibet, Dharma would be harmed. The government was thus forced to close the school indefinitely. After that, both government officials and individual Tibetans started sending their children to English schools in Kalimpong, Darjeeling

and Gangtok at their own expense. The monastic people were indeed patriotic and passionate about their religion, but they opposed the school only under the influence of the Kuomintang government which wanted to prevent Tibet's progress in international relations.

In 1945, the World War II came to an end and the United Nations came into being. The Tibetan government planned to send Dzasak Thupten Samphel and Dzasak Kheme Sonam Wangdu to offer congratulations to the US, Britain and China for the grand victory of the Allied Nations in the war. Richardson, the British representative in Lhasa, told the Kashag that the Kuomintang was going to hold a national assembly the following year, and if the Tibetan government participated in the meeting, it would not only violate the Simla Convention but also severely damage Tibetan political status in future. The Kashag replied that the purpose of sending the Tibetan delegation was merely to congratulate the US, Britain and China on their victory in the World War II, and they had no other things to do besides that.

The Chinese Bureau Officer in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-lien, devolved his responsibilities to his assistant in Lhasa and himself left with the Tibetan delegates as their guide. In India, the delegation presented the congratulatory letter and gifts to the Indian Viceroy, Lord Wavel¹⁹, during an official ceremony. They left the congratulatory letter and gifts for the US president with the US ambassador to India in Delhi, instead of going to US. In Nanking, they delivered the letters and presents sent by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government to Chang Kai-shek, Xunting Yon and the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office. After that, when they were about to return, unfortunately, Dzasak Kheme's wife suddenly became ill and died. Therefore, they could not return to Lhasa immediately.

In May 1949, the Kuomintang National Assembly was held and they announced in different newspapers that the Tibetan delegates had come to attend the meeting, creating an impression that Tibet was part of China. The Tibetan government announced that the Tibetan delegation would never take part in the meeting, against the orders of the government. Later, in 1959, when the delegates of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)²⁰ came to Mussoorie, they inquired Dzasak Kheme about the matter. He replied that they went there [China] only to deliver a congratulatory message and gifts, and that they did not do anything besides this. He further explained to them, "At that time we heard some monk officials of the Tashi Lhunpo Labrang and some Khampas, pretending themselves as representatives of Tibet, were attending the meeting. So some of us went to the meeting hall as observers to see what those Tibetans would say in the meeting. The Chinese media might have taken photos of us and published false reports in their newspapers, but none of us attended the meeting nor did we put our signatures on the constitutional draft." This is the testimony about the event given by a real member of the Tibetan delegation in the presence of the members of the International Commission of Jurists.

In 1946, just after the World War II, a civil war broke out in Korea.²¹ The Chinese sent troops to help North Korea in the so-called “War to Resist America and Aid Korea” and the UN sent its troops to help South Korea. The UN troops were defeated, and the US sent its troops to help South Korea. An intense war was fought. At that time, as for India, it was an interim period because the British government was going to give independence to India after a few months. An Asian Relations Conference was about to be held in India. India sent an invitation to Tibet through the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office to attend the conference. The Tibetan government sent Taiji Sampho Tsewang Rigzin and Khenchung Lobsang Wangyal, with Rimshi Kyipug Lobsang Wangdu as translator, to attend the conference. On March 23, 1947 when the Asian Conference was held at Indraprastha Kila, a historical building in Delhi, the Tibetan national flag was hoisted among the flags of other nations on equal status and height. Taiji Sampho Tsewang Ringzin, a Tibetan delegate, delivered a speech at the conference, and the record of his speech and his photos taken during the conference are found in many books, I therefore will not bother to insert them here.

B. The Sera Violence: Its Causes and Suppression

In general, Regent Taktra Rinpoche and the ex-regent Reting Hutuktu shared a pure teacher-disciple bond and a close friendly relationship. Nevertheless, they and their monasteries, including even their followers, plunged into a bitter feud, whether they acted at the instigation of their influential servants or enemies, or it was a manifestation of a bad omen that the religious and political status of Tibet was degenerating. The real immediate cause of their conflict was as explained below. The monasteries and rich people used to charge enormous and accumulative interest on grains and money lent to poor people. At the close of every fall, debt collectors would go to each house and forcefully collect from them the original amount of the loan as well as the interest. In the case of debtors not able to return the loan and the interest, the debt collector would take away their cattle and properties. The poor people were hence suffering much. In 1944, the Tibetan National Assembly therefore submitted a proposal to the Kashag to abolish the exploitation of the poor people. The Kashag accordingly issued a decree to all the district officers and estates owners across the country, instructing them to excuse all those people who were really poor from repaying loans and interest, and to take back the loan and interest from other debtors on a reduced interest rate within ten years as per the government’s system of interest reduction. The decree instructed all the district officers to conduct investigations and act accordingly without failure. In the fall of 1945, loan collectors of Sera Je College and Ngagpa Monastery in Lhundup

district of Phenpo acted against the government's order. The people therefore lodged a complaint against them to the district officer. Before having a proper talk, the debt collectors, proud of their monasteries, beat the acting district officer to death. The government appointed a nine-member probe committee comprised by *taiji*, *khendrung* and *tsipon* officials to investigate the matter. The committee sent a notice to the main culprits to report to the investigation office, but they did not. Moreover, the monks of Sera Je and the Tantric College boycotted the Great Prayer Festival of 1946 as a mark of protest against the government. The probe committee investigated the matter and passed sentences to the main offenders and their accomplices involved in the murder of the acting district officer. Some of them were expelled from the monastery and some were banished far away, while others were given a token punishment as a warning. Abbot Ngawang Gyatso of Sera Je College immediately fled to Kham.

In the same year, when the ex-regent Reting Rinpoche came to Lhasa to perform a consecration ceremony at the renovated assembly hall of Sera Je College, he paid a visit to the Taktra Rinpoche. Afterwards, rumours circulated in Lhasa that the two had a disagreement on the issue of the government's policy on loan reform, which was opposed by the Reting Rinpoche.

After that, one evening in September that year (1946), when Tsipon Lhalu Tsewang Dorji was coming back home from Lhasa, someone near Lukang's residence, behind the Dzong, made several snipe-shots with an attempt to kill him. In another incident, in 1947, on the evening of the Butter-sculpture Ceremony of the Great Prayer Festival, the Regent and the cabinet ministers had to cancel their visit to the ceremony (sensing danger to their lives). Thereafter, many pamphlets and unsigned letters were found littered in the courtyard of Taktra's residence. One day, Khendrung Ngawang Namgyal received a parcel box with the label, "To the Regent Rinpoche through Khendrung Ngawang Namgyal, from the Governor-General of Kham." When he opened it, there was a handmade grenade, which exploded. He immediately reported the incident to the Kashag. The Kashag ordered the Security Office [at the Potala] and Lhasa mayor and magistrate of Shol [Nangtseshag] to investigate the case and keep constant surveillance. On the 23 February, Regent Taktra, cabinet members and Master Chamberlain held a high-level meeting. That evening, Kalon Surkhang and Lhalu, leading a force of around 400 officers and soldiers of the Drapchi Regiment, went to arrest Reting Rinpoche at his residence of Radreng. On the 24 February, the Kashag summoned the *drungtsi* officials to the Kashag office in the Potala Palace and explained the case and then gave the following instruction:

According to the secret-coded telegram we received from the Tibet Bureau Office in Nanking, the ex-regent Reting Rinpoche had sent his officials to Nanking to

tell Chang Kai-shek, the President of the Kuomintang government of China, that Regent Taktra was not doing justice to his subjects, and to request military support from him in the event of war against the Regent unless the Regent abdicated his post. Because of such incidents that endanger the present and future political and religious affairs of Tibet, last night two ministers, along with a force, were sent to arrest and bring Reting Rinpoche to Lhasa. You *drungtsi* officials should go and seal the Radreng Labrang as well as the residence of Yabshi Phunkhang and Sadhutsang who were under suspicion. You should summon the two former Reting Dzasak officials to the gate of Kashopa's residence.

On the 25 February, when Lobsang Tendar, the abbot of Sera Je College, was returning to his monastery after a meeting [in Lhasa], some monks of Sera Je pounced upon him and beat him up to death. The reason for this might have been because he sided with Regent Taktra against the Reting Rinpoche.

On the 27 February, Surkhang and Lhalu returned to Lhasa with the Reting Rinpoche. Tsechag, in charge of the government's treasury, had prepared a special cell at the Sharchenchog prison for Reting. Khardo Trulku was also arrested in connection with the Radreng's case. Because of such disturbing events in Lhasa in that year, even the annual Tsogcho Ceremony²² had to be cancelled.

When the arrest team with the Reting Rinpoche was on way to Lhasa, several hundred monks of Sera Je attacked them at Langchen Hill, to the east of Lhasa, in attempt to release the Reting Rinpoche. The cavalry escorting the Reting Rinpoche had to retreat to some distance. The Tibetan troops stationed in the Jerag area saw the monks and rushed towards them, firing machine-guns sideways at the rocks (just to disperse the monks). The monks immediately fled to their monastery or disappeared into nearby willow groves. Then, the Reting Rinpoche, wearing normal clothing and carrying normal horse equipment, accompanied by the arrest team, reached Lhasa. After surmounting from the horse at the Potala Palace, Brigadier Shukyupa and Colonel Shipa Kalsang of the Drapchi Regiment, holding his hands, led him to Sharchenchog prison. The prison officials, including Lungshar Ogyan Dorji, the mayor of Lhasa, and Tsedrung Meru Thupten Nyima as well as some colonels and captains of the Drapchi and Gyantse regiments, who were in their full official dress and caps, received him with great respect. He was seated on a cushion and served him tea. However, he was in melancholic mood and his face wore an expression of anxiety. Thereafter, handing over the things of Reting Rinpoche to the prison officials, the escort members dispersed.

At that time, the monks of Sera Je broke into the Sadhutsang's house and took away all the weapons and took Sadhu Chondze to their monastery. They threatened to take violent actions against the government if the Reting Rinpoche was not released. They fired on the Lhasa police force, killing several police officers. Prompted by many such unlawful actions of the monks, Kashopa and Lhalu summoned all the officials

of Sera Je College at the Drapchi Regiment's barrack and told them that it would be better for the monks to reconcile through a peaceful method, or else the government would be forced to resort to military action to suppress them. Many traders and other patrons and sponsors of Sera Monastery advised the monks that they should behave properly and peacefully reconcile with the government, but the monks remained stubborn. The government thus decided to use force to quell the riot. At that time, the troops of the regiments of the Kadang Bodyguard and Drapchi as well as the Chadang Police Force were in Lhasa. In addition, Colonel Bu Gangpa of the Shigatse Regiment and some of his soldiers had arrived in Lhasa for some other purposes. As per the government's instruction, the troops of the Gyantse Regiment travelled on a forced march and arrived in Lhasa. They were temporarily kept at Palri and Nyangra. The Bodyguard troops were placed around the left side of Sera Monastery and the Gyantse troops along the mountain side through Phabongka. The Drapchi troops were ordered to remain at the right side of the monastery and the hilltop of Sera Tseso. They were ready to suppress the monks if they resorted to violence.

Among those who were imprisoned at Sharchenchog prison on grounds of having conspired with the Reting Rinpoche were Yabshi Phunkhang Gung Tashi Dorji and his son Gonpo Tsering; Dzasak Jampal Gyaltsen and ex-Dzasak Jamyang Delek of the Reting Labrang; Khardo Trulku Kalsang Thupten; Sadhu Lo Gedun; and Chibje Jingpa Phuntsok Tseten. Khardo Trulku faced the heaviest charge.

When the Reting Rinpoche was in prison, his servants brought food and tea to him from his Labrang twice a day. When the servants came with food and tea, the prison gatekeepers would call the two security guards of the Reting Rinpoche to collect the food. The guards would then give the food to the Rinpoche, and ask him what he would like to have for the next meal. The Rinpoche had lost his appetite and could not eat as before. He complained of high blood pressure. He would use stacks of pillows while sleeping. Later, Tsedrung Meruwa, one of the two security guards, was replaced by Tsedrung Yeshe Thupten.

Two days after the Reting Rinpoche was imprisoned, when the sounds of artillery shots of the Sera War were heard, the Rinpoche worriedly said, "Many monks might have been killed or wounded!" The two guards replied that they did not know how many monks were killed or wounded, but the monastery was not destroyed." Except for the two official guards of the Rinpoche and colonels and captains of the Tibetan army with official assignments, no one was allowed to visit the prison. The officers and soldiers of the Khadang and the Ngadang regiments had pitched tents round and above the Sharchenchog prison and patrolled the prison.

A few days after that, the investigation committee began the trial of the Reting case. First of all, Khardo Trulku and Reting Dzasaks were investigated in the trial room. After that, the Reting Rinpoche was brought to the trial room by the two security guards, escorted by ten guards and the chief prison official Kalsang

Ngawang. The trial was held in the lower room of the Deyangshar in the Potala Palace. The two guards led him into the trial room, while the rest of the guards remained near the door. He was seated on a cushion on the floor in front of the members of the investigation committee. After that, the two security guards would wait near the door outside the room.

The investigation committee comprised the following members: Khendrung Talama Thupten Norsang, Khendrung Bumthangpa Thupten Chophel, Khendrung Ngawang Namgyal, Khendrung Ngawang Drakpa, Tsipon Lukangwa Tsewang Rapten, Tsipon Shakabpa Wangchuk Deden, Tsipon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Tsipon Namlingpa Paljor Jigme, Dzasak Tsarong Dasang Dradul, Dzasak Kalsang Tsultrim (monk commander-in-chief), Dzasak Dokhar Phuntsok Rabgyal (commander-in-chief), Dzasak Kheme Sonam Wangdu. There were also abbots and representatives of the three great monasteries and all the fourth ranking officers with the *rimshi* titles.

The Reting Rinpoche was summoned for three sessions of trial. Each trial session took about two hours. When the trial of the day finished, the Rinpoche was taken back to prison by the two guards. At that time, he was in poor health; he was suffering from high blood pressure and breathing problems. During a break time of the trial, he once said to the two guards with sadness, "They had really created many troubles—I did not know that!"²³ The two guards told him that he should not worry, as everything would be all right and would become clear.

During the investigations, Chibje Jingga was found to be the mastermind behind the hand grenade case. The bomb actually belonged to the Tibetan army, and he stole it during the time of a former brigadier, who was his relative. Since that parcel bomb created a major hostility between Reting and Taktra, he was convicted of a serious offense.

One day, while in prison, the Reting Rinpoche handed three packets containing letters and pairs of onyxes to the two guards to be given to the Trijang Rinpoche, Kashopa and Bumgthang. The guards handed the packets to the chief prison officer, who opened and read the letters. In the letters, the Reting Rinpoche had requested to secure his release from the prison immediately and to restore his Labrang. In the letter addressed to Kashopa, he had said that during the investigation he did not mention about the letter he had received from Kashopa through Shide Nyungne Lama. The prison officer gave the letters to the chief steward of the Regent [Taktra Rinpoche], Nedron Thupten Lekmon,²⁴ who kept them secret. The assembly seemed to be unaware of the letters at the time.

During the investigation, the committee showed the Reting Rinpoche one by one all the letters he had received from Nyungne Lama, Khardo Trulku and Kutsa Dzasak who collectively instigated him to assassinate the Regent Taktra. The committee also showed him his handwritten replies found in the letter file of Nyungne Lama, and questioned him about them. He immediately confessed and

told them that he would apologize to the Regent Rinpoche for all the mistakes he had committed and that he would prostrate to him.

Khardo Trulku admitted that he sent one of his servants to kill Tsipon Lhalu and that the servant hid near the Lukhang's residence, behind the Dzong fort, and shot arrows at Lhalu. Regarding the hand grenade, it came to light that Chibje Jingpa gave it to Nyungne Lama, who parceled it to Regent Taktra, with the label, "From the Governor-General of Kham to Regent". All the main culprits were convicted with sentences in accordance with the seriousness of their offenses, and others who were involved in the incident were punished in accordance with the law and those who were found innocent were relieved. Thus, the investigation committee decided the Reting's case with a fair trial and passed an honest verdict.

After that, the Reting Rinpoche's health deteriorated. He asked the two guards to bring from his Labrang the medicine he used to take before. His servant who brought food to him was asked to bring the medicine. When the medicine came, the chief prison officer asked the National Assembly whether he should give the medicine to the Rinpoche. He was told to first consult a doctor. The Rinpoche said that he wanted to see the doctor of the western clinic at Dekyilingka Park, but the assembly instructed that they should call the Dalai Lama's personal physician Khyenrab Norbu from Mentsikhang. The physician examined him and gave him some medicines, which aggravated his condition. His voice became hoarse. He was not able to go to the toilet and he had to pass urine and stool in a box. He was then given three pills of *agar 35*²⁵ mixed with pork soup, as prescribed by the doctor, and his condition slightly improved. In the 28th day, at around 3 o'clock in the morning, he passed away. The chief prison officer, the two guards, Jolak Jampa and army officers who were on security duty there made prayers and offerings. After daybreak, they reported his death to the Assembly, who in turn instructed them to submit a written report detailing the exact manner how he died. Dzasak Tsarong and all the officials with *khendrung* rank as representatives of the Assembly, and the representatives of Sera Je Monastery and Shide Monastery went to examine the dead body. They reported that except for a small bruise on his buttock there were no any injuries or signs of physical torture on his body. The following day, Khenchung Lobsang Namgyal, with assistants, was assigned the task of conducting the funeral ceremony for the Rinpoche. The monks of Shide Monastery took the body to their monastery where they conducted grand funeral rituals.

Taking advantage of the situation, two Kuomintang spies tried to create hostilities between people by spreading rumors that the Reting Rinpoche was assassinated by Tsedrung Yeshe Thupten and Lungshar Ogyan Dorji, the two official guards assigned to him, by strangling him, pressing his secret organ or poisoning him at the order of the Tibetan government. They further rumored that in reward for their crimes, Tsedrung Yeshe Thupten was appointed as district

officer of Drachen Dzong and Lungshar Ogyan Dorje as the mayor of Lhasa city. The Chinese circulated such rumors to destroy the unity of the Tibetan people. Unfortunately, the Reting Rinpoche's followers were completely swayed by such rumours. Taking advantage of this, the Chinese manipulated the story of the event with an attempt to stir up controversies among Tibetans to achieve their political goals. However, we have documental evidences to prove that no one killed the Reting Rinpoche.

I have written here a brief account of the Reting incident based on what I have heard from army officers, including Colonel Bumlu Khangpa and my father Gyantse Captain Kharsampa—both from the Gyantse Regiment—who were on security duty at the prison during the incident.

The actual Sera War began before the Reting Rinpoche passed away. The Sera monks launched heavy attacks on the Tibetan troops from the hilltop of Sera, main road and from inside the monastery. The troops fired back artilleries in defense. The riot was brought under control after three days. Several members of both sides were either killed or wounded during the violence. All the main perpetrators were arrested and put under investigation. Nyungne Lama of Shide Monastery, who masterminded the violence, was hiding inside the Nubma House in Lhasa; he committed suicide. Khardo Trulku Kalsang Thupten Nyendrak and Kutsa Dzasak were sent to the newly built prison near the Bodyguard Regiment for life imprisonment. Others who were found guilty of taking part in the incident were punished in accordance with the seriousness of their offenses. Yabshi Phunkhang, Sadhutsang and ex-Dzasak of the Reting Labrang were declared innocent and released. In this way, the Sera War was successfully pacified.

The cause of the Reting incident is, as explained below. The two ministers who were sent to arrest the Reting Rinpoche took with them seventeen soldiers of the Khadang Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Lobsang and kept them at Reting Monastery. Some monks from Sera Je College, who had fled from the monastery, arrived at Reting, and they exaggeratedly lied to the Reting monks that the Sera monks in Lhasa had almost captured the Drapchi, and they therefore should kill all the soldiers who were patrolling Reting Monastery. Therefore, pretending to offer a dinner party, the monks made a sudden attack on the troops under the cover of night, killing about ten of them. The squad leader Chupon Jampa Tsering had a narrow escape, as he jumped into the river near the monastery. He managed to arrive in Lhasa and immediately reported the incident to the Army Headquarters through his regiment commander. At the instruction of the government, Commanders-in-Chief Kalsang Tsultrim and Shakabpa Losel Dhondup, leading about 1,000 troops from Khadang and Ngadang regiments, under the command of Commander Shukyupa Jamyang Khedrup and Commander Tsogo Ngodup Dorje, decided to attack Reting Monastery from two different sides. The Khadang troops, marching

through Phudo road, went to Reting Monastery. The troops and the monks fought a brief skirmish, killing or wounding a few members of both sides. Finally, the monks fled over the Rili Mountain. The next day, the Ngadang troops, following the main road, marched to the Reting Monastery. At Phudo, they faced a minor resistance from the monks. The monks had constructed barricades from where they made gun attacks. The troops made counter-attacks and the monks ran away to the hill. The troops then marched straight to the monastery. At that time, when the Ngadang soldiers heard that the Khadang troops had already seized the monastery and most of the monk troops had fled to the north of the monastery, a group of soldiers pursued the monks, but the monks had already passed out of sight. The monks' revolt was finally suppressed. Reting Monastery suffered great damages. The troops ransacked the monastery and found several hundred British model guns and a large quantity of bullets. Their weapons were taken to Lhasa and issued to the troops to be used for firing practice. When fired, the bullets emitted out yellow smoke, and the troops called them Reting's bullets.

About 30 monks were arrested in connection with the Reting violence. Many other monks managed to escape. Nine monks, including Sangye Chorab, Drakpa Gyatso, Dawa Chorab, Drakpa Tenkyong and Bum Tenzin, were banished to Nagchu, Lhoka, Kongpo and other places, and the rest were given physical punishment. The record of the judgment passed on all those who were involved in the Reting case and the handwritten letters of the Reting Rinpoche as well as other letters exchanged between him and his abettors were displayed on the walls in Lhasa and Shol where many people used to gather.

After the Sera violence, the Chadang troops who had been stationed in the 39 Hor states returned home, and in their place was sent the Ngadang Regiment from Lhasa. The Cadang Regiment was dispatched to northern Tibet. The Tsang Shina reserves from the Kadang Regiment was sent to Nagtsang and Namru. The Nyadang, Tadang and Nadang regiments were posted in Markham, Drayab and Gojo respectively. The Jadang Regiment was sent to Riwoche. The second brigade of the Gadang Regiment and the Thadang Regiment were deployed in Derge. The first brigade of the Gadang Regiment was dispatched to Khyungpo Tengchen. The Drapchi Regiment was sent to Chamdo to act as bodyguards of the Governor-General of Kham. The rest of the army units remained at their barracks.

Soon after that news reached Lhasa that the British government had decided to give independence to India. The Tibetan government feared that the new Indian government would no longer adhere to the Anglo-Tibetan treaties and would not support Tibet vis-à-vis China in accordance with the treaties. However, in July 1947, the Indian government, through the British Bureau Officer in Lhasa, informed the Tibetan government that the new Indian government would follow the British policy of friendship with Tibet and that it would support Tibet on Sino-Tibetan

issues. It further said that, as discussed with the British government of India, the new Indian government would stick to all the treaties and policies maintained by the British government on Tibet, and in case of need, India would contact Tibet through the Indian ambassador to Tibet.

On August 15, 1947, on the occasion of India's Independence Day, the Tibetan government sent a congratulatory letter to the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru replied that the Indian government wanted to request Tibet to continue the existing covenants and treaties and political relationship between India and Tibet until and unless new ones were made in future, and that India would adhere to all the agreements made by the former Indian government with other countries. The British Trade Agent offices in Gyantse, Nedong and Gartog, and the British Bureau Office in Lhasa were handed over to the new Indian government in the presence of the representatives of British, Tibetan and Indian governments.

On October 25, 1947, a Tibetan Trade Delegation comprising Tsipon Shakabpa Wangchuk Deden, Rimshi Pomda Yarphel and Surkhang Dapon was sent to India, China, France and Italy on a trade mission. The members travelled to all these countries on visas given on the Tibetan passport, and they were accorded warm receptions by these countries. During their trade mission tour, they not only discussed trade matters with the above countries, but also raised Tibetan political issues alongside.

In those times, many Kuomintang's and Chinese Communist spies had entered Tibet in the disguise of traders and Buddhist scholars. They concentrated in Lhasa, the Three Monastic Seats and Tashi Lhunpo. By that time, the Communist Party of China had taken the major part of China, including Shanghai while the Kuomintang was losing ground in China. The Chinese spies sometimes quarrelled among themselves. Whether Communist or Kuomintang, all those Chinese spies had the same mission in Tibet—that is—to destroy the unity of the Tibetan people and the political entity of Tibet by any means. As the Chinese spies increasingly created rumours and hostilities among Tibetans, the Regent and the cabinet ministers discussed the issue with the Full National Assembly, and all of them reached a unanimous decision to expel the Kuomintang representatives in Lhasa, Chen Chien-jen, and his assistant, along with their wireless set and all those who were suspected of being Chinese spies. Accordingly, Chen Chien-jen and Bawa Phuntsok Wangyal, along with some other Chinese who were doubted as spies, to China via Kham, escorted by a small Tibetan force under the command of Lieutenant Kalsang Chojor and Major Japok Tashi Wangdu of the Drapchi Regiment. The rest of the Chinese were driven up to the Indian border by a Tibetan force to be diverted to China.

In the same year, the US embassy in Delhi sent a request to the Tibetan government through the Tibetan Foreign Office to allow Lowell Thomas and his son from America to make an official visit to Tibet. The request was granted. The

duo arrived in Lhasa in July 1949 and they were accorded a warm reception by the Tibetan government. They met with the Dalai Lama and the Prime Minister as well as many senior officials of the Tibetan government. Having spent seven days in Tibet, they left Lhasa for India. On the way, Lowell Thomas fell down from his horse and was injured. Some people of a village on the way carried him on a wooden doorframe on their shoulders. They arrived safely in India from where they returned to the US. They later wrote a book describing their experiences in Tibet and also produced a movie on Tibet that greatly increased the publicity of the Tibetan cause.

In the same year, the Communist Party of China established its rule over whole China and invaded Xinjiang. Douglas McKiernan, the US representative in Xinjiang, his colleague Frank Bessac and three White Russians, carrying some weapons, along with some loaded camels, fled from Xinjiang to Tibet, via the northern route. The US ambassador in India sent a telegram to the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office, requesting the Tibetan government to assist and escort them to India. The Tibetan government immediately sent a message with an order to the chieftain of the Nagtsang village and the Kadang Shina Force stationed in northern Tibet to help the aforementioned foreigners. Before the message reached its destination, when the Tibetan nomads on the border saw those foreigners entering Tibet from border, they mistook them for the Khazaks²⁶ and reported it to the Tibetan border police (*so srung*), comprising around 25 troops. The reason was that not long before that thousands of Hassak people fled from Xinjiang to Ladakh via the Tibetan area, and they plundered and looted the Tibetan nomadic camps along the way. The Tibetan troops thought that those foreigners were Hassak people. Unable to communicate each other properly, the Tibetans and the foreigners started shooting each other. The US officer and two Russian men were killed and the other two men were captured and taken to Nagtsang. On arrival at Nagtsang, they received the government's order. The Nagtsang chieftain and all the troops were shocked and filled with great remorse. They deeply apologized to the two captured foreigners and gave them a warm reception. They were given all the necessary things and escorted to Lhasa. The Tibetan government received them warmly and attended to them at its best level, and escorted them to India, with an apologetic letter. The Nagtsang chieftain and Colonel Rongpa Chaksampa and some of his lieutenants, who were on border duty, were demoted from their posts, while some other army officers and soldiers connected to this incident were sentenced with physical punishment.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. He became the 93rd throne-holder of Ganden in the year Water-Bird, 1933.
2. He was the fifth Reting Rinpoche. Reting Rinpoche is the title held by the abbots

of Reting Monastery. Born in 1911, he played a significant role in Tibetan history as the one-time regent and the discoverer of the present Dalai Lama. He was replaced in 1941 and subsequently is alleged to have organized an uprising against his replacement. He died in 1947 in the prisons of Lhasa's Potala. His jailor also allegedly reported that his testicles were bound and beaten until he died of the pain.

3. Phurchok Jampa Gyatso (91825-1894), the tutor of the Twelfth Dalai Lama.
4. A traditional religious method used to select one answer from more than two options when confronted with a dilemma. In this method, names or options are written on small slips and put inside dough-balls made of *tsampa* and shaken in a bowl until one pops out from the bowl.
5. Lungshar Dorji Tsegyl was promoted to the rank of *rimshi*, or the fourth rank, and sent to England to guide and help the Tibetan children from aristocrat families in their education in 1913. On return, the Dalai Lama made him Tsipon, or the Finance Minister.
6. After 1913, all of the Manchu leaders and soldiers were expelled from Tibet. Thereafter, the Chinese Nationalist government tried again and again to find a way to send a deputy to establish contact with Lhasa, but in vain. The death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama provided an opportunity to them to send a delegation under the pretense of making funerary offerings. The delegation led by Huang Musong arrived in Lhasa in the seventh month of 1934, with a radio transmitter and operator. Taking the opportunity, the delegates tried to restore the "priest and patron relationship" between China and Tibet. They commissioned two Chinese officers with a radio to continue the negotiation.
7. He was confidential adviser to the Political Officer of Sikkim and held a high post in the Lhasa government. He was educated in Darjeeling, India, and was associated with some of the earliest British expeditions to Tibet as interpreter. He was head clerk at the Gyantse Trade Agency in the early 1910s and subsequently assisted Sir Charles Bell during his trips to Lhasa as well others who travelled to Lhasa in the 1920s and 1930s. At the time of the British Mission to Lhasa in 1936, he had been appointed British Trade Agent at Yatung. He was made Rai Bahadur (an honorary title) by the British.
8. The Long March was a massive military retreat undertaken by the Red Armies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the forerunner of the People's Liberation Army, to evade the pursuit of the Kuomintang army. There was not one Long March, but several, as various Communist armies in the south escaped to the north and west. The most well known is the march from Jiangxi province which began in October 1934. The First Front Army of the Chinese Soviet Republic, led by an inexperienced military commission, was on the brink of complete annihilation by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's troops in their stronghold in Jiangxi province. The Communists,

under the eventual command of Mao Tse-tong and Chou Enlai, escaped in a circling retreat to the west and north, which reportedly traversed some 12,500 kilometers (8,000 miles) over 370 days. The route passed through some of the most difficult terrain of western China by traveling west, then north, to Shaanxi.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March

9. *Dzasak serkya drelpo* was a committee of two government officials of the dzasak rank, one monk and one lay.
10. Tibetan: *Nub phyogs khul gyi dmigs bsal shes yon spyi khyab*
11. 92,000 US dollars according to Shakabpa's English version of *Political History of Tibet* and around 8,000 pounds sterling according to Goldstein's *A History of Modern Tibet 1913-1951*.
12. Tibetan: *tsogdu gyezom* (tshogs 'du rgyas 'dzoms).
13. A type of religious offering consisting of three articles representing body, speech and mind: statue for body, stupa for speech and scripture for mind.
14. George V (George Frederick Ernest Albert; 3 June 1865 – 20 January 1936) was King of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions, and Emperor of India, from 1910 through World War I (1914–1918) until his death in 1936. He became King-Emperor in 1910 on the death of his father, King Edward VII.
15. The chairman of the Mongolian Tibetan Office.
16. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the 32nd president of the USA. He was born in 1882 at Hyde Park, New York (now a national historic site) and died in 1945 in Warm Springs, Georgia.
17. This unit was formed by collecting soldiers from all the armies in Tsang, four each from hundred soldiers.
18. Heinrich Harrer (1912–2006) was mountaineer, sportsman, geographer and author. From mid-1939, he took part in a German mountaineering expedition to the Himalayas, intending to climb Nanga Parbat, the ninth-highest mountain in the world. The peak was at that time within the borders of British India, and in late 1939, with the start of World War II, Harrer was detained by British colonial authorities as an enemy alien, and interned at Dehradun, along with 1,000 other enemy aliens. He escaped and was re-captured a number of times before successfully escaping for good on May 10 1944, with Peter Aufschnaiter and two Germans, Hans Kopp and Bruno Treipel. They considered heading for Goa, at that time a Portuguese colony and therefore neutral territory, but decided that it was too far away. They transited Mussoorie and Landour, forded the Aglar River at Thatyur, crossed the Nag Tibba range via Deolsari, descended to Uttarkashi and eventually passed Harsil, Bhaironghati and Nelang. On May 17 1944, they crossed the Tsang Chok-la Pass (5,896 metres or 19,350 feet) and entered Tibet.
19. Archibald Percival Wavell (5 May 1883–24 May 1950) was Viceroy of India from 1943-1947.

20. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) is an international human rights non-governmental organisation. The Commission itself is a standing group of 60 eminent jurists (judges and lawyers), including members of the senior judiciary in Australia, Canada, and South Africa and the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and President of Ireland: Mary Robinson.

The Commission is supported by an International Secretariat based in Geneva, Switzerland, and staffed by lawyers drawn from a wide range of jurisdictions and legal traditions. The Secretariat and the Commission undertake advocacy and policy work aimed at strengthening the role of lawyers and judges in protecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law. In addition, the ICJ has national sections and affiliates in over 70 countries. Given the legal focus of the ICJ's work, membership of these sections is predominantly drawn from the legal profession: lawyers, judges, legal academics and law students.

The International Commission of Jurists should not be confused with the International Court of Justice, although their initials are the same.

21. The Korean War was a military conflict begun on June 25, 1950, and ended by an armistice on July 17, 1953, between the United Nations in support of the Republic of Korea against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its allies, Russia and China. The Korean peninsula was politically divided as a legacy of the geopolitics of defeating the Japanese Empire on the peninsula in 1945. The Soviet Union forces occupied Korea north of the 38th Parallel in August 1945 to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces, while the Americans established control south of that line the next month. The failure to hold free elections throughout the Korean Peninsula in 1948 deepened the division between the two sides, and the 38th Parallel increasingly became a political border between the two Koreas. Although reunification negotiations continued in the months preceding the war, tension intensified. Cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th Parallel persisted. The situation escalated into open warfare when the North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, precipitating the Korean War. It was the first significant armed conflict of the Cold War.

The United States and the United Nations intervened on the side of the South. After a rapid UN counter-offensive that repelled North Koreans past the 38th Parallel and almost to the Yalu River, the People's Republic of China (PRC) came to the aid of the North. With the PRC's entry into the conflict, the fighting eventually ceased with an armistice that restored the original border between the Koreas at the 38th Parallel and created the Korean Demilitarized Zone, a 2.5 mile wide buffer zone between the two Koreas. North Korea unilaterally withdrew from the armistice on May 27, 2009, thus returning to a de jure state of war.

During the war, both North and South Korea were sponsored by external powers, thus facilitating the war's metamorphosis from a civil war to a proxy war between

powers involved in the larger Cold War.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War

22. The annual feast offering ceremony held on the 19th day of the 2nd Tibetan month for the Dalai Lama
23. He was referring to the senior members of his circle who were involved in the case.
24. Nedron (*sne mgron*) is the title of the chief chamberlain of the Regent
25. Agar 35 is a Tibetan medicine widely prescribed for stress-related problems, such as anxiety, hypertension, insomnia, back pain, etc.
26. The Kazakhs are a Turkic people inhabiting mainly Kazakhstan and the adjacent parts of the Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang in China.

Chapter Thirteen

The Status of Tibet on the Eve of the Chinese Communist Invasion



A. Sino-Tibetan Relations

On October 1, 1949, having pushed out the Kuomintang party to the island of Formosa (Taiwan)¹ and taken control of the whole of China, the Chinese Communist Party declared the foundation of the Communist Government of China, and China suddenly attained the status of an unprecedented great power. Concerning Tibet, as mentioned before, passing through various phases of rise and fall throughout its history since the times of the Dharma kings, it remained as an independent nation, whose people always lived peacefully and happily, governed by the combined religious and political systems, without falling under the dominance of any foreign powers. Though this is an evidentiary and unquestionable fact, prompted by their urge for expansion, by distorting and misinterpreting the “priest-patron” relationship of Tibet and China, the Chinese communists made repeated radio announcements from Peking and Xining in Tsinghai, claiming that Tibet was part of China and that the PLA troops would come to Tibet to drive out foreign imperialist forces, in order that Tibet could return to its great home of motherland China. The Tibetan government responded to this through Lhasa radio, explaining the real fact that the relations between China and Tibet was of “priest and patron” and that Tibet was an independent country and had never been part of China; and that there were no imperialist forces in Tibet.

In the wake of these events, the Regent and the Kashag jointly performed a dough-ball divination before the Speaking Goddess (*lha mo gsung byon ma*) in the Potala Palace to select the most suitable government officials as the representatives of the government to go to Peking to conduct negotiations with the Chinese. Tsechag² Khenchung Thupten Gyalpo and Tsipon Shakabpa were named by the divination. Accordingly, a negotiation team was appointed, led by Tsechag Khenchung Thupten Gyalpo and Tsipon Shakabpa, with one representative of the Three Monastic Seats and Tsedrung Lobsang Nyandrak and Shodrung Driyul Tsering Wangdu as their assistants. Jigme Sumtsen, son of Lachag Taring³, was appointed English translator and Phuntsok Tashi, son of Yabshi Takla as Chinese translator. The team

was instructed to stay at a suitable place on the Sino-Tibet border and negotiate with the Chinese, with the main aim of stalling the Chinese entry into Tibet. The Kashag gave them a letter bearing four authoritarian seals. The content of the letter reads as below:

This land of snow, Tibet, is an extraordinary land ruled by Avalokiteshvara where the Buddhadharma has spread. As all foreign countries know, throughout its history since ancient times until now, it has existed as an independent nation, governed by the religious and secular dispensation, protecting its own territory and living in accordance with the principles of the Dharma, without falling under the dominance of any foreign country. However, as the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist are engaged in war, an order must be issued to all the Tibetan civil and military officers stationed at borders to prevent the Red Army from penetrating into Tibet through the Xining side of Tsinghai and Xinjiang, which is close to the Tibetan border. Regarding the Tibetan areas that have been recently lost to the Chinese, we can talk with the Chinese after the internal strife in China comes to an end. In order to maintain peace and stability at the Sino-Tibet borders, the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office had previously sent a letter by airmail to Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, on the 12th day of the ninth month of the Earth-Ox year [1949] through India about the matter. We hope that he has received the letter, but we have not received any reply from him so far. Recently, the Chinese have been saying many things on radio from Peking and Xining, taking for granted that Tibet was part of China. Even after that, through radio broadcasts at different times, they announced that they were going to depose the Dalai Lama and emancipate Tibetan serfs from oppression. They also said many such things as, "Rise up Tibetan serfs! You must rise up against the rule of the Dalai Lama. Tibet will be liberated in 1950."

As reflected in the Tibetan and Chinese chronologies and Tibetan religious histories, for many years in the past the Manchu emperors honoured and regarded the Dalai Lamas highly by virtue of their religious relationship. Tibet and China were connected only by "priest-patron" relationship, and Tibet was not at all a part of China. Later, during the time of the Manchu Emperor Xuantong, the Lu Chun forces were dispatched to Tibet, and the troops carried out many ruthless activities in Tibet, forcing the former Dalai Lama and his ministers to flee from their own land and oppressing the people of Tibet, both monastic and lay, without restraint. In the Water-Rat year, 1912, all the troops of the Manchu emperor were therefore expelled from Tibet, and Tibet has enjoyed full independence since then. Further, as is clear to everyone, Tibetans are entirely distinct from Chinese in all aspects—race, language, faith, dress, way of life and so on. Tibetan people, both monastic and lay, have great faith in the successive Dalai Lamas, regarding them as the real Buddha. They also have great respect for the current Regent Rinpoche (Taktra Rinpoche). Both of them [the Dalai Lama and the Regent] look after the people of Tibet just as parents care for their children. Therefore, for the sake of the Dharma and

political status of Tibet, all the people of Tibet are of one mind in their determination to maintain the present status quo of Tibet.

The above announcements aired by the Chinese have greatly hurt and panicked the entire Tibetan populace. So far, Tibet has never ceded any of its territorial areas and power to any foreign country, and it has always protected its territory, and the people are engaged mainly in activities in accordance with the principles of the Dharma. Since Tibet is the most important country in Asia by virtue of its strategic location, the loss of Tibet's independence will cause grave danger to all its neighbouring countries. We do not need to tell you this, as all the senior and junior officials, led by Mao Tse-tung, know this very well.

With the mission to pursue the matter put up by our Foreign Affairs Office, to see the situation of our Buddhist monasteries and to talk on the issues of Tibet raised in the radio announcements, we are sending Tsechag Khenchung Thupten Gyalpo and Tsipon Shakabpa with their assistants, and Geshe Lharampa Lodro Gyatso from Drepung Loseling as the representative of the Three Monastic Seats, with some hope in them. The delegation should stay at a suitable place and should talk with Mao Tse-tung in detail, emphasizing mainly the need to stall the Communist Army's entry into Tibet.

Until now, we ourselves have been managing all political and religious affairs of Tibet under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, who is the true emanation of Avalokiteshvara. China and Tibet have maintained friendly relations, and they should maintain good relations in future too. Instructions should be immediately issued to all the Tibetan civil and military officials stationed at border areas to find some means to prevent encroachment and aggression at Tibet's borders by the Chinese troops and to maintain peace at the borders as before. If the Chinese government sends its fully authorized representatives to the border to discuss Sino-Tibetan issues in the proper manner, you have the authority to meet and negotiate with them, but you should be careful and make sure that your decisions will benefit the religion and polity and all the beings of Tibet, for both the present and the future. In the event of doubt and new issues, you must consult Lhasa and we will give instructions promptly for your action.

Some senseless servants of the late Panchen Rinpoche, who are wandering around there, have been creating serious rumours to harm the Sino-Tibetan relations since the time of the Kuomintang. Since such evil people might come there and try to create hostilities between China and Tibet, you delegates and the Bureau officer have been given the full power jointly to explain the facts and urge the Chinese to ignore their instigation.

Therefore, all the foreign officials at various levels are requested to extend cooperation and assistance to them.

Full Tibetan National Assembly

Dated: 15th of the 12th month of the Earth-Ox year (1949)

The travel document issued by the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office to the negotiation team bore the seal of the Tibetan Foreign Office and the signature of Foreign Minister Rampa Thupten Kunkhen. Written in Tibetan and English, it read as below:

Tsipon Shakabpa has been sent by the Tibetan government to talk with the Chinese Bureau Office about the continuation of the present status quo of Tibet's independence. Therefore, all the countries he will pass through during his journey are requested to give him visas and assist him to make his travel smooth.

The Foreign Affairs Office of Tibet

15th day of the 12th month of the Earth-Ox year [1949]

The team left Lhasa on 26th of the 12th Tibetan month of the Earth-Ox year and reached Kalimpong on the 18th day of the first Tibetan month of the Iron-Tiger year, corresponding to March 7, 1950. They immediately sent a letter to the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, asking permission to meet him. They also sent a letter to the Chinese government in Peking through Houzhou, the father in law of the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup, stating that a Tibetan plenipotentiary would be sent to a country bordering China to discuss about the Sino-Tibetan issue. In the same year, the Chinese government sent a reply dated April 8, saying that it would send its representatives to Hong Kong and the Tibetan representatives should immediately proceed there, but were not allowed to come as foreigners. They said such dictatorial things in order to incorporate Tibet into China.

Having bought air tickets and obtained visas, the Tibetan delegates went to Calcutta airport to leave for Hong Kong, but they were suddenly stopped at the airport for no specific reasons. The delegates immediately returned to Delhi and told the concerned officials of the British-Indian Foreign Ministry that they must immediately leave for Hong Kong to hold negotiations on the Sino-Tibetan problems. They were told that since Hong Kong was under British rule, the British government in England itself had withheld their visa permission, and further that since the Chinese had already decided to set up a Chinese embassy in India and that the officer would arrive soon, it would be preferable for the Tibetans to hold the negotiation in Delhi itself. The Tibetans later received a letter from the Chinese government, which stated that the negotiation would not take place in Hong Kong and that the Chinese ambassador to Delhi would arrive soon and the talks would begin as soon as possible. So the Tibetan delegates waited in Delhi for a few days, during which time they approached the US and Nepalese embassies, and requested them to support Tibet vis-à-vis Sino-Tibetan issue.

By that time, the PLA had already started encroaching at Dokham from the north-eastern borders and preparations for the invasion of Tibet were underway. The Chinese made radio announcements threatening that they were going to liberate

Tibet from foreign imperialist forces and many other baseless things. The Foreign Affairs Office of Tibet thus decided to send delegations to Nepal, Britain and the US to gain their support for the truthful cause of maintaining Tibet's independence.

It appointed different teams of delegates with translators. Before the delegation left, letters were sent to these countries informing them about the impending visit of the Tibetan delegates. The delegates stopped for a few days in Gyantse, waiting for replies from the above three nations. The replies came, but in the negative. The reply from the US government said that though it had no objection to the Tibetan delegation's visit to the US, the best way to solve the Sino-Tibetan issue was through peaceful negotiation. The US further told them that if Tibet wanted to appeal to the UN for Tibet's cause, it should appeal through its president. The Indian government suggested that instead of resorting to violent methods to prevent the Chinese invasion, Tibetans should try to solve the problem through peaceful negotiation with China, based on the provisions of the Simla Convention. The Tibetan delegates lost hope, since no foreign country was willing to offer help to Tibet when it came to an issue unrelated to their own interests.

Just before the above events unfolded, the Tibetan Full National Assembly⁴ started to buy a large quantity of different weapons from the British government, brought them through India to Tibet and distributed them among the various Tibetan army regiments for defense preparations in advance of the event of a Chinese military attack. In addition, the troops of the Drongdak Regiment and Chunyi Drugna soldiers' and local militias from U-Tsang and Kham were mobilized and new army camps were set up. Many new soldiers were recruited and were sent to the borders after they had been given a short training. The Assembly codified a 35-point Military Law, the full content of which I have quoted in the first part of this book. Edicts were issued to all military, civil, monastic and lay citizens on military affairs, and the defense of their own territorial areas. Though the Tibetan government urgently started to make extensive defense preparations for the drastic situation, it was too late. During the almost seventeen years since the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933 until the Fourteenth Dalai Lama assumed the full responsibility of the government in 1950, World War II ended, the United Nations came into being and all other countries were busy looking for their own political status. The Tibetan government however did not grasp that excellent opportunity to initiate campaigns within and outside of the country to reestablish and stabilize Tibet's independence. Moreover, the Tibetan people neglected the Water-Monkey testament cum political advice of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, in which he advised his people to keep friendly relations with India and China as they were militarily powerful, and to maintain powerful and trained troops at the borders to protect the country against the widely spreading communism, or if not, they would turn into slaves. Further, the ex-Regent Reting and the current Regent Taktra; politically

influential military, civil and monastic officials; different lama estates, local rulers and traders engrossed themselves in internal feuds and self-serving activities. In some parts of Tibet, people did not recognize their real protector and enemy, and frequently changed their loyalties to their government or China for mere short-term personal advantages, instead of thinking about the long term good. Consequently, the strength of the nation gravely deteriorated and was in a desperate condition. Taking this opportunity, just like “a big insect eats a small insect”, the Chinese communists invaded Tibet from the northeastern borders of Dokham. In such circumstances, though the Tibetan government made urgent defense preparations against the Chinese, it was very late.

However, the Tibetans sent border patrolmen continuously and enhanced espionage on the enemy. The Chinese side also continuously carried out espionage activities and propaganda campaigns in Lhasa, Chamdo and other more populated areas of Tibet.

In the meantime, the Chinese ambassador, Yuan Chung-hsien, arrived in Delhi and the Tibetan delegates went to talk with him. He told the Tibetans words to the effect that China would send its troops to Tibet only to expel the imperialist powers from Tibet and to protect Tibet, and that it was all right if Tibet was accepted as part of China. The Tibetan delegates replied that they could never accept these terms and then consulted the Kashag, who replied that the Chinese terms of condition were irrelevant and unacceptable, and instructed them to talk with the Chinese continuously, striving mainly towards preventing the Chinese troops from further marching into Tibet.

While the negotiation was still in progress, the PLA started advancing into Tibet from the Kham borders. The Indian government, on the other hand, advised the Tibetans that India would support China's suzerainty over Tibet with maximum autonomy for Tibet, and that India would urge China not to send troops to Tibet, so it was better for Tibet not to claim independence. It further told them regarding the India's mediation in the Sino-Tibet issues that India would not be able to mediate in the Sino-Tibetan crisis as it had done in the past 30 years because the situation had changed. The Tibetan delegates again approached the Indian Prime Minister and told him that the Indian government should not say such extremely upsetting things, and that if China invaded Tibet, not only Tibet but also other eastern countries would encounter many unprecedented problems, and especially India would face serious troubles at its borders, both at present and in the future. The Tibetans stressed that he should not think simply about the relationship between his and Mao's governments, but should think about the long-term future and give support to Tibet to maintain its independence. With a slightly angry expression, Nehru replied:

The Chinese never accepted the Simla Treaty, so it believes that Tibet is part of China. When China did not accept the Simla Treaty, Tibet concluded a separate treaty with the British government of India, so Tibet thinks that it is independent country, but Tibet did not take any initiative and proclaim its independence to the world when there were good opportunities. China has been able to propagandize extensively to the world, claiming Tibet as part of China. Now you have to be very careful with what you say when you begin your talks with the Chinese.

The Tibetan delegates insisted that the Indian government should treat the Tibet's issue as its own matter, if not, along with Tibet, India would also face disasters. However, the Tibetans delegates were extremely despondent about not getting any support—they realized that without military and economic power, truth alone was not enough.

B. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Assumes the Religious and Political Leadership of Tibet

By that time, the PLA troops had already begun invading Tibet from its northeastern side and gradually seized Chamdo, as will be explained below.

The religion and polity and the people of Tibet were in extreme danger. In view of the tense situation, the Full Tibetan National Assembly held a series of meetings. They finally reached the decision that, although it was uncomfortable for them to make such a request to him considering his tender age, they should appeal to the Dalai Lama to assume the state's political and religious leadership, as his leadership would be of extraordinary benefit to the country since he was the destined ruler of the land of Tibet. The Tibetan people, both monastic and laity, unanimously requested the young Dalai Lama to shoulder the political and religious leadership of the country, and he accepted their request. After ten years of service as regent, Regent Taktra resigned from the post on October 7, 1950. On 8 October, at the age of sixteen, the Dalai Lama assumed the religious and political leadership of Tibet. He immediately ordered the release of all the prisoners across the country simultaneously. The Kashag accordingly gave an order to all the parts of the country to set free all the prisoners.

Now, referring back to the end part of section A of this chapter, the Tibetan negotiation team in Delhi met the new Chinese ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien on September 16, 1950 and several times after that. When the negotiations began, the Tibetans said that Tibet was an independent country, Tibet and China should maintain their "priest-patron" relationship, that the Dalai Lama was ruling Tibet and that there were no foreign powers in Tibet, including British and the US. To

this, Yuan said, “If there were no any foreign forces in Tibet, it was very good, but it was impossible to discuss about Tibet’s independence,” and reiterated the same Chinese statements. He then gave them a pamphlet, containing the Chinese government’s policy on Tibet and explained to them with hand gestures, in a domineering manner (*ral gri gnam gyug*)⁶:

China will implement the points numbered 50 to 53 of the policy. Tibet will be given autonomous powers in accordance with its size and population; Tibet’s traditions and religious systems will not be changed; all the troops would be stationed as defense force; China would help Tibet to bring reformation in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan local government. In short, there are three main points:

- 1) Tibet must accept that it is part of China;
- 2) Tibet’s defense must be undertaken by China; and
- 3) All the political and trade matters concerning foreign countries must be done through China. If these three points were accepted, Tibet would be liberated without a war at its borders, and if not, military invasion is inevitable.

The Tibetans replied that it was impossible to accept the three points. Immediately after that, on September 19, 1950, they wired to the Kashag in Lhasa, informing them of the exact details of what they had been told by the Chinese ambassador, the Indian Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of India [Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai]⁷. At the same time, they stressed to the Kashag, “The situation has arisen at such a critical juncture; as the saying goes, ‘the mountain pass should lower its height while *dzo* should stand upright,’⁸ they must give some concessions to the Chinese, otherwise it will be very difficult to compromise with the Chinese.” The delegates at the same time gave the following suggestions to the Kashag with respect to the terms put forward by the Chinese:

1. Regarding the first point, as demanded by China, the Tibetan government should accept Tibet as part of China;
2. On the second point, China should send military help to Tibet whenever any foreign country invades Tibet;
3. The Tibetan government should have the power to conduct affairs directly with foreign countries, such as India and Nepal, on trade and education matters.

If we are allowed to negotiate with the Chinese on the above terms and if both the Chinese and Tibetan sides agreed, we would immediately leave for Peking for the final negotiation. Otherwise, China would launch military attacks at the borders; the Kashag therefore should immediately send clear instructions to us for easy action.

The copy of the telegram was sent through a mounted messenger through the governor of Dromo. They also informed the Indian Prime Minister and the Foreign

On September 28, the Kashag replied to the Tibetan delegation's letter, saying, "The terms put forward by the Chinese were so grave that we must discuss them immediately to avoid any bad consequences in future and we will inform you later. In the meantime, you delegates should stay in touch with the Chinese representative."

The Chinese repeatedly inquired from the Tibetan delegates whether they had received a reply or not. The Tibetans told him that they had sent a detailed letter to Lhasa by a special horse-messenger as well as through telegram, and since the matter was so serious and important, they would take at least a few weeks in discussions and in reaching a decision, and that they would inform him as soon as they had received the reply. At the same time, they wired to the Kashag requesting it to send a reply immediately, because the Chinese embassy was pressuring them repeatedly.

Meanwhile, the Tibetan trade delegation led by Khenchung Lobsang Tsewang and Rimshi Surkhang Sé had arrived in Delhi where they met Indian President Dr. Rajendra Prasad [1884-1963]⁹ and Prime Minister Nehru, and delivered the letters sent by Dalai Lama, the Prime Minister and the Kashag. Although initially it was planned to set up a trade office in Delhi, they later decided to set it up in Kalimpong, since it had become the main trade centre for Tibet and India. They thus went to Kalimpong.

On October 12, 1950, the Kashag telegraphed to the Tibetan negotiation team in India, saying:

The Dalai Lama, the cabinet ministers and *drungtsi* officials had concluded after deliberation that if the Chinese three points were accepted, Tibet would lose its political status forever, so its both identity and real existence. If we directly tell them that their terms were unacceptable, it is very dangerous, since China has a strong army and the army is ready to attack Tibet at its borders. It is therefore, very difficult to give you a reply immediately. Hence, for the time being, you should try your best to delay the Chinese invasion. We will send you instructions keeping in view the condition at the borders and the international situation.

The Tibetan negotiation team immediately wired to the Kashag, stating to the effect, "Though it is necessary to think broadly on the basic issues, the situation is so urgent that we have to make precautionary steps, just as "we build an embankment before the river overflow".¹⁰ It is therefore a waste of time to delay the matter by pinning hopes on the change in the international situation. Once the Chinese start military attacks on Tibet, the chance for negotiation would be closed forever; therefore, the government should reconsider the matter and give them clear instructions for easy action."

On October 17, 1950, the Kashag telegraphed back stating, "The Red Army had started military intrusion into five border areas of Dokham, and you must

immediately request and press the Chinese through the Chinese ambassador to stop military aggression at the Tibetan borders.” Accordingly, the delegation immediately approached the Chinese embassy and the External Affairs Ministry and Home Ministry of India, as well as some members of the Indian parliament, requesting them to pressure China to stop military offensives at Tibet’s borders. They told the Chinese that they had violated the international law by attacking Tibet without warning while the negotiation was still in the process, so China must withdraw its troops across the Driчу River (Yangtse River, the de facto border between Tibet and China). The Chinese ambassador, in turn, blamed the attack on Tibet’s failure to give a timely response to the Chinese proposals, saying, “We are aware of the Liberation Army’s attack on Chamdo. However, you have not given a response to our terms even though a month has passed now, so we were not wrong. Anyway, the Chinese government has already decided to liberate Taiwan (Formosa) and Tibet. Now, if Tibet accepts it part of China and your delegation goes to Peking for negotiations, there will be no further military suppression.”

At that time, various newspapers of the world carried sympathy for Tibet, and criticisms and protests against China for the PLA’s illegal and sudden invasion of Tibet from the five border regions of Kham, despite that negotiations were still going on. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru sent protest letters dated 21, 26 and 28 of October to the Chinese Government. The Indian President Dr. Rajendra Prasad made a public speech, criticizing the Chinese military intrusion in Tibet. Sardar Patel [1875-1950]¹¹, the minister for India’s Home Affairs and many parliament members, voiced strongly in the upper and lower houses of the Indian parliament against the Chinese illegal invasion of Tibet, and urged the Indian government to give military support to Tibet. Similarly, on November 6, the assistant Foreign Secretary said in the British Parliament that the British government supported the statements made by the Indian government at different times against the Chinese invasion of Tibet. He also said that the British government was saddened by the Chinese military conquest of Tibet, and initiated a debate on the issue.

On October 21, the Lhasa government wired to the Tibetan negotiation team in Delhi the following message:

Since the Chinese army had already penetrated into Kham, it was not possible to keep wireless communication with Chamdo. Therefore, having discussed days and nights, the Tibetan National Assembly have arrived at a decision that the negotiation team led by Chag-Tsi (Tsechag Khenchung Thupten Gyalpo and Tsipon Shakabpa) should immediately go to China. Regarding the terms put up by the Chinese, as for the first point—that Tibet is part of China—if the Chinese can guarantee that they will not change and harm the present status quo of the Dalai Lama’s title and power as well as Tibet’s independence and government, you can accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The second point—that all relations with foreign countries should be done through

China—must be rejected. As for the third point—that Chinese troops will take over the defense force in Tibet—this poses extreme danger to Tibet's religion and polity, both at present and in the future, so you must not accept this point. Instead you have to press them that Tibet will station its own troops as the defense force of Tibet, aiming mainly for the safety of the Dharma and polity in future. Further, you should also earnestly request the Chinese to send Ngabo, the Governor-General of Kham and other Tibetan civil and military officers who have been captured in Kham, back to their country safely. With these missions, you and your team must immediately leave for Peking.

Had the Tibetan government sent a reply to the negotiation team in India a little earlier with certain considerations also to the second and the third points of the Chinese proposal as made to the first point, there was some hope that the Chinese would have listened to their request to stall the Chinese attack. However, the Kashag's reply came too late—it was similar to “spreading dust after the donkey has passed over¹².”

The Tibetan negotiation team however decided to go to Peking at the instruction of the government. The Ambassador Yuan told them that he would like to invite them to a luncheon and discussion at the same time before they left for Peking. He informed them the luncheon was on the 23 October and the day was fixed. However, on the morning of the day when the Tibetan delegation was preparing to leave for their luncheon at the Chinese Embassy, they received a wireless message from Lhasa which read as below:

Regarding the reply to the Chinese three points, His Holiness the Dalai Lama ordered that since the matter is very important concerning the welfare of the Dharma and polity of Tibet, a dough-ball divination should be done with prayers before the true guardian Three Jewels for advice. Accordingly, we did such a dough-ball divination at the Mahakala Chapel in Norbulingka. The divination answered that if we accept Tibet as part of a foreign country it is very dangerous to the Dharma and polity of Tibet in the future. Therefore, without accepting all the three points of the Chinese, you should try to bring peaceful reconciliation with the Chinese. With this as the goal, you should leave Delhi for Peking not later than the 17th day of the ninth Tibetan month (26th of October) for peaceful negotiation.

The delegation went to the Chinese Embassy and informed them that they had just received an instruction from Lhasa and they would leave for Peking. They also went to the Indian External Ministry and informed them about the reply received from Lhasa. The External Minister exclaimed, saying it was surprising that not even a slight consideration was made to the Chinese points.

Had the three points of the Chinese been accepted with some appropriate concessions, Tibet would not have witnessed terrible misfortunes such as so-called the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” which was signed by Tibetans under duress without

the knowledge of and consultation with the Tibetan government and people. From another side, Tibet's refusal of the three points of the Chinese has turned out to be our most important weapon at present to fight for Tibet's independence. Moreover, the deity Mahakala (Yeshe Gonpo) advised the Tibetans not to accept the Chinese three points—that means it is sure that the rejection of the Chinese points will give us extraordinary advantage in future. Thereafter, the Tibetan negotiation team postponed their trip to Peking.

The above brief accounts of events that took place on the eve and after the Chinese invasion of Tibet have been adapted from various sources, including, Shakabpa's *Tibet: a Political History*.

C. Tibetan Resistance against the Initial attacks of the Chinese Advance Force

By going back a little earlier in time from the above events, I shall summarize how the advance unit of the PLA made the first intrusion into Tibet. In 1950, during the tenure of Shape Lhalu Tsewang Dorji as the Governor-General of Kham, one detachment of the Red Army advanced from Dartsedo to Derge through Kandze and Dargye Monastery, and another detachment advanced from Yunnan to Batang via Satham, Gyaltang and Litang. At that time, Gyaltang Wangchuk Tenpa, leading his troop, attempted several times to block the Chinese, but his force was outnumbered and easily defeated by the Chinese force. He was captured and sent to China. By that time, Chinese forces from Xining had already arrived in Jyekundo, 25 Dhimchi states and Nangchen.

Derge Queen, Abbot Tseprung Thutop of Dargye Monastery and other local rulers who were loyal towards their country suggested to Lhalu that since the Chinese army had just arrived at the borders and was unfamiliar with the people and land, it would be a good opportunity for the Tibetans to make strategic attacks on the Chinese. Before that Lhalu also received a few letters at different times from a General of the Xining army saying that he and his army wanted to revolt against the communist Chinese. Keeping these in view, a series of meetings were held at Chamdo to discuss the matter. Lhalu performed a dough-ball divination before the reliquary-stupa of Geshe Jampa Thaye Rinpoche. The divination answered that they would be able defeat the Chinese, and it would be best if they launched an attack on the Chinese at the beginning of the seventh Tibetan month. Accordingly, Lhalu made a secret plan with the headmen of Riwoche and Nangchen, and decided to launch an attack on the Chinese army camp in Jyekundo on the second day of the seventh Tibetan month.

The Ngadang Gyantse troops stationed between Sertsa and Hor Drachen and the local militias; the Jadang troops in Riwoche; local militias of Powo and Drayab stationed at Karma Dzong; the Gadang Shigatse troops in Dongdzong Druga ferry crossing of Derge; and the Tadang troops and local militia in Markham readied to advance from their respective positions to attack the Chinese army camp. Lhalu then wired to Lhasa informing them about his plan. The Kashag wired back with the message:

It is very good if you are able to attack the enemy and defend the borders and resist the enemy, but since you have to deploy troops at a very large territorial borders all the time, among other things, you can go ahead with your plan if only you can bear the responsibility of your action. Otherwise, you should think carefully about the pros and cons of your action in the future.

Instead of giving support and encouragement to the Tibetan border forces, the Kashag had made them responsible for their action. Therefore, Lhalu had to cancel his plan.

Soon after that, Chinese Communist government, led by Mao Tse-tung, ordered the PLA troops to march into Tibet, saying that their mission was to bring Tibet to its great motherland China, to stabilize the southern and western borders of China, to liberate the people of Tibet and to introduce unprecedented developments in Tibet. The Xining General Yuan Liu Po-cheng and Political Commissar Teng Hsiao-peng of the Southwest Bureau were given the responsibility of leading and guiding them. By that that time, the Chinese forces, including the 18th Army Corps of the PLA commanded by Commander Chang Kuo-hua had already arrived in the northeastern parts of Kham.

In the summer of that year, the PLA troops were given training and education on the policies of the Red Army, discipline, certain rules called "three great rules to follow" and "eight things to pay attention to", the Chinese Communist Party's policies on nationalities and religions, and the language and lifestyle of Tibetans. They created a road construction division and started constructing roads in Tibet to transport their troops into Tibet. The Military Campaign Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Wang Chi-mi, the vice-chairman of the Political Consultative Committee; Li Jue, the deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Tan Pao, a member of the Central Committee of the CPC. The committee drew up and constructed a detailed plan and strategy for how to invade Chamdo from the northeastern borders for the PLA troops. In this way, just as "a big insect eats a small insect," caused by the actions of some of the Chinese communist leaders, China launched its military suppression on Tibet to destroy the country and the rightful freedom and happiness and prosperous religious life of its people. It appeared that

it marked the real beginning of the prediction made by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in his Water-Monkey Testament given to the people of Tibet, as below:

...In the future, this land governed by the joint system of religion and polity will face communism from within and outside. At that time, if you are not able to defend your territory, the institution of the Dharma holders, led by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche, shall be wiped out completely. All the monasteries and monk communities, their powers to manage their own affairs and teaching traditions will be destroyed. The system of government established by the Three Dharma Kings will decline and remain only in name. The government officials shall be stripped of their ancestral estates and properties, and they shall be forced to become slaves of the enemy and wander in the land in bondage. All the beings will have to undergo extreme tortures and fear ceaselessly, day and night...

The position of the Tibetan defense forces at the borders at that time was as below. The regiments of the Nyadang, Tadang and Nadang were posted in Markham, Drayab and Gojo. They were supported by the local militias of their respective areas. The Gadang Regiment's second brigade, the Thadang Regiment as well as militias of Shotarhosum and Powo were stationed in Derge. Tengchen was guarded by the first platoon of the Gadang Regiment and its local militia. Khyungpo Sertsu and Drokshul regions were defended by the Ngadang Regiment troops with support from the local militias of the respective areas. In Chamdo, in addition to one company of the Nyadang Regiment, there were some troops of the Khadang Regiment who were serving as bodyguards of the Governor-General of Kham. In Northern Tibet, including Nagchu, one brigade of the Khadang Shina force was deployed. There were some other army units in U-Tsang also. In addition to these, the government set up new army camps, procured many new weapons and dispatched them to the Tibetan forces in Kham.

Before the Chinese invaded Tibet from the borders, they announced that they would make Tibet happier than the heaven, respect the religious freedom and culture, and protect the life and properties of the people and the monasteries. They promised that Tibet would enjoy full autonomy and the traditional government and military system of Tibet would be protected. They announced these verbally as well in writing. They deceived the Tibetans. In contrast to their promises, they humiliated and criticized all those brave patriotic and learned Tibetans by labeling them as "supporters of imperialism" or "separatists", while they praised and honoured traitorous Tibetans who sold their country to the Chinese for money and petty positions, calling them as "patriotic people". They lavishly gave *dayangs* (Chinese money) to Tibetans to lure them and tried their best to brainwash as many Tibetans as possible. However, except a few ignorant ones, all the Tibetan people were well aware of the evil motives of the Chinese, and they were united and firm

with their patriotic sense and loyalty towards their country, religion, polity and people, as is evident from the series of protests and resistance movements organized by the Tibetan people against the Chinese later on.

Regarding how the Chinese forces launched attacks on Tibet from Dengko during the time of Lhalu as the Governor-General of Kham, an advance unit of the PLA under the command of Wu Chung entered Dengko from Kandze via Derge in June 1950. Immediately the Gadang Regiment troops under the command of Major Muja were dispatched from Khyungpo Tengchen to Dengko to repel the Chinese force, but by the time the Tibetan troops arrived at the bank of the Drichu River, close to Chokhor Monastery, the Chinese had already destroyed the Tibetan wireless station set up there in a night attack. The Tibetan force launched a counter-attack on the Chinese. Some Tibetan officers and soldiers, including Colonel Bugangpa, lost their lives for the sake of their county, and many Chinese troops were killed or wounded. This fact was widely known among the local people.

At that time, the Governor-General of Kham received a letter from the commander of the Advance Unit of the PLA and the Political Consultative Committee of PRC, containing threatening and harsh wording, as below:

The Kalon Lhalu:

We understood the content of your letter dated 23rd day of the fifth Tibetan month, July 8, 1950. Our army has been ordered by the government of People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao and the Commander-in-Chief (Chu Teh) to march to border areas (of Tibet) to drive out the British and US imperialist forces, to stabilize and safeguard the borders of PRC and to liberate the people and soldiers of Kham and Tibet who have suffered miseries and exploitations for a long period. We have already made all preparations and are waiting for the instruction to go ahead. Therefore, the people and armies of Kham and Tibet should greet the Liberation Army and cooperate with them to push out the imperialist forces out from Tibet, to protect the borders and to bring freedom and happiness to the people of Tibet.

Previously, when your force advanced to Chokhor Monastery, they attacked the small unit of our army who were tracking route in Tibet, without giving any warning, which unnecessarily caused our 22 June battle. You must henceforth properly control your troops stationed at borders and take care of the government's properties. You must arrange grains and foddors as much as you can for the Liberation Army. Whenever you deploy your troops at the instruction of the government, you must first send an authorized representative to us for our approval, and you can go on with your plan only after obtaining our permission. If you do not, you will have to bear the responsibility for all the dire consequences of your unlawful and revolting actions.

We urge that you and the Tibetan government should think seriously on this matter. It is your choice whether you should do something for the benefit of your country or commit crimes by acting against the country and selling out the people.

We seized 29 yaks on 23 June during the battle, and you should inform the owners to come to us and take their yaks. You are requested to send a reply to our letter and your representative to us soon.

16 July 1950

-Sd- (chief commander)

Liberation Army of the PRC

-Sd-

Political Commissar

The same Chinese officers also sent a letter to Brigadier Muja who was in Sibda at that time. The letter read as below:

To the Brigadier Muja:

We are in receipt of your letter. We have been ordered by Chairman Mao and the Commander-in-Chief to help Tibet expel the imperialist forces and to ban the exploitations carried out in Tibet by the Kuomintang, so that the Tibetan brothers and sisters could return to their great home, the People's Republic of China, as soon as possible, and work jointly to build up a new China and Tibet and to safeguard the southwest borders. In accordance with this instruction, for a few months since then we, the troops of the PLA, have adhered to our discipline rules and never violated them. We have already fully implemented the PRC government's policy of regional autonomy; respect to the religious freedom, culture and customs of the people; protection of their lives, wealth, properties and monasteries; and keeping intact the current government and military systems. Therefore, the Tibetan brothers and sisters living along the eastern bank of the Drichu River wholeheartedly appreciated, supported and respected us.

The people of Tibet are anxiously waiting for liberation, just like a thirsty person desiring water. This has strengthened our determination and courage to help the Tibetans bring liberation in the whole of Tibet and to drive the imperialist forces out of Tibet. We hope that the commanders of the Tibetan troops stationed to the west of the Drichu River will feel confident that the Chinese government will take responsibility for the Tibetan people. You should wake up from ignorance and assure yourself that you will not come under the deceptive campaign of foreign imperialist forces that aimed to convert the Tibetan people as their slaves and to destroy the integrity of China. If you voluntarily accept the leadership of the Chinese government, your military system will remain intact, without change. The officials at various levels can retain their position and powers. The Tibetan army must join the defense force of the People's Republic of China to take greater and more glorious responsibility for safeguarding the territorial boundary of the PRC.

With prayers for the genuine respect and relationship,

Political Commissar

PLA's Advance Unit of Dengko

August 30, 1950

The above two letters, one sent to Lhalu, the Governor-General of Kham, and the other to Brigadier Muja have been published in the first issue of the *Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet (Rgyu cha bdams bsgrigs)*, the journal on Tibetan history and culture published by China. Though the above two letters mentioned that Lhalu and Brigadier Muja had written letters to the Chinese, they were not published in the said journal for political reasons. The Chinese baseless campaign that “the imperialist forces must be driven out of Tibet” and “exploitation of Tibetans by the Kuomintang must be banned” was merely an imperialist method. The fact is that there were no imperialist forces, including Kuomintang, in Tibet and Tibet was fully enjoying its independence. The Chinese falsely announced that they had received welcome and support from the Tibetan communities living on the eastern side of the Driчу River, and they would make Tibet happier than heaven. They thus held high the flag and weapon of deception. After they invaded Tibet, they killed, captured or enslaved its people, both monastic and lay, and carried out destruction, causing unbearable miseries to the people of Tibet, as can be evident from the records and documents found everywhere in the world. The Chinese cannot hide these facts.

Around that time, Ford [Robert W. Ford, 1923-],¹³ a British wireless technician working for the Tibetan government, was arrested by the Chinese, who accused him of being a spy. They also alleged that he poisoned and killed Getak Trulku of Beri Monastery, a Tibetan lama who had served the Chinese army during the so-called “Long March of the Red Army,” when the latter was sent to Chamdo by the Chinese for negotiation. The Chinese used false accusations against him for political motives. The well-known fact is that that Getak Trulku died a natural death.

The following is the report of Shangpa Raru Rinchen, a soldier of the Gadang Regiment, who was under the command of Colonel Bugangpa, during the Tibetan force’s encounter incident with the Advance Unit of PLA at Dengko. The report is being preserved amongst the documents related to the Tibetan military. Since this report is closely relevant to the Sino-Tibetan war at that time, I have quoted here the full text as below:

Not long after [the Gadang Regiment] was posted at Khyungpo Tengchen, its fourth *rushog* (a unit of 250 troops) was sent home, while the third *rushog* was retained back at Khyungpo Tengchen. After one year, in the summer of 1950, at the instruction of Lhalu, the Governor-General of Kham, under the command of Brigadier Muja and Colonel Bugangpa, our division proceeded from Tengchen to Dengko with the mission to block the Chinese forces that were advancing to Dengko. Riding through Doshu, Riwoche, Karma Yuldzong, Yuchukha, Dongdru and Derge Jedong, we arrived at Sibda. From Chamdo, the Colonel, along with his aide-de-camp, returned straight to Tengchen to receive clear instruction from Lhalu. On the day when the

Colonel arrived back at Sibda, we heard from our informers that Chinese troops were continuously arriving from the mountain behind the Drichu in Dengko, and that they might attack us anytime. So we spent two days in preparations for battle. Thereafter, we proceeded towards the Dengko.

When we arrived at Goto in the evening, our Colonel sent me to the Brigadier to deliver a letter to him. The letter stated that it would be good if we left early the next day so as to arrive at the Drichu River by the same evening. The Brigadier's reply was, "The next day is not an auspicious day; moreover, the local militia of Shotarlhosum are about to arrive at Sibda, so it would be better to leave after two days." Our Colonel exclaimed in surprise, "Why should we bother about the day whether it is auspicious or not, as if we are inviting a bride!" The next day, before the dawn arrived, led by our Colonel, we cavalry unit, comprising about fifty troops, went ahead, reaching the Seshim-la pass just before dusk, where we stopped for the night. The soldiers and horses took rest that night. At sunrise the next day, we headed towards Chokhor Monastery. When we reached a narrow mountain path to the east and close to the monastery, we had a glimpse of the Drichu River, whose water was blue like turquoise, and flowing down in a graceful manner. Beyond the Drichu River was a plain land on which Dolma Lhakang was located. All the surrounding mountains and valleys were covered with forests. There were towns and villages as well as nomadic camps. The land was amazingly beautiful.

We camped on a meadow near the Drichu, and left our horses there for grazing while we did shooting practice. At that time, we saw some mounted men coming toward us from the direction of Chokhor Monastery. As they arrived near us, we recognized that they were the manager of Dengko and his assistants. He asked our Colonel to remain alert, saying that that the previous night he saw many flashes of light in the sky. Our Colonel thanked him. Immediately, our Colonel called out all the horses, and just then, we heard two gun shots from behind. We remained watchful and prepared. Our military instructor Phusum Tenzin said that the sounds might be the gunshots of a hunter. Within a minute, from the eastern and southern sides, the Chinese troops fired machineguns and artilleries in our direction. Our Colonel ordered us to pull back some distance, so we moved back about five miles towards Chokhor Monastery. We occupied an area near a meeting point of three roads leading to Seshim-la Pass and Chokhor Monastery. The Colonel ordered us to make a temporary embankment and hide there. Five soldiers were assigned to keep the horses at a corner of the mountain.

On that day, as soon as our spies informed us that the Chinese were advancing towards our position, we remained ready to ambush them. When the Chinese arrived near us, at first our Colonel instantly fired machine guns on them, and immediately we also attacked them in full force with whatever weapons and arms we had. We had one Lewis gun, one Bren gun and some rifles.

In that incident, there were no casualties on the Tibetan side, but many Chinese soldiers were either killed or wounded. The local people know very well about this.

We remained there holding the position. During that night, the Chinese shot fire-arrows, guns and artilleries, and we retaliated by firing artilleries. The next day, Major Muja and Brigadier Tsering Drumpa of Shotarlhosum, with their troops, arrived. The officers met and discussed about war strategy. Thereafter, Major Muja, commanding about 100 troops, occupied the Tseri located to the south of the Tibetan position. Lieutenant Dongra and Pawo Tathogpa, with approximately 100 troops, held the southwest of the position. Colonel Phurbu Tsering and Lieutenant Lolo of Gadang's force, commanding 50 troops and about 200 troops of Shotarlhosum, took position at the northeast of the position. Colonel Bugangpa, commanding his cavalry plus about 100 troops of Shotarlhosum, occupied Shungru. The aim was to repel the Chinese forces beyond the Drichu River.

The following day, around one thousand Chinese troops converged on Shungru through Rili forest, between Tseri and Shungru. When they started firing on our position, several hundred local militias of Gojo and Drakyab arrived there to support us. On the northeastern bank of the Phuchu River that flowed down from Goto, the Tibetan and the Chinese forces fought for two days and nights. Tashi, Singpa and Migdor of the Gadang Regiment and about 30 officers and soldiers of the local army of Shotarlhosum lost their lives. Some soldiers, including our Colonel's relative Migmar and Sopa Tamdin were wounded. On the other hand, many hundreds of Chinese soldiers were either killed or wounded. This was widely known in that area.

Our Colonel captured two Chinese soldiers alive. When they did not reply honestly when questioned, one Tibetan soldier shot them on the spot. The next day, during firings, our Colonel (Bugangpa) took the extreme risk of approaching too close to the enemy. Moreover, he was wearing a white coat with a folded collar, too conspicuous to the enemy. So the Chinese fired their Bren gun on him and seriously wounded the right part of his body. It seemed that about ten bullets had hit the same spot on his body. We tried our best to treat him and took him on a horse to Seshim-la pass. Though seriously wounded, his intensity of anger and valour to fight against the enemy was still strong. Before he died, he advised and encouraged his soldiers. The soldiers were gravely disheartened and shed tears of sadness. He breathed his last on the way in the night of the seventh day of the fifth Tibetan month of the Iron-Tiger year (1950) at aged fifty-four in a graceful manner, for the sake of his country.

This Colonel (Bugangpa), from the time he joined the Army as a soldier, did remarkable performances in various battles for his country. During the war between the Tibetans and Xining Chinese in the Water-Monkey year (1930), he killed the famous Chinese commander called Lan-krang rgya'u. He himself was seriously injured during the war. After that, he was promoted to the rank of colonel. He was respected and liked by majority of the soldiers. He was an exceptionally intrepid man who did not hesitate to face enemies and dangers, and he was extremely skillful in drawing up military plans and strategies. There were many such accounts

about him. Everyone called him “Shitse Rupon Bugangpa” meaning the “Colonel Bugangpa of the Shigatse Regiment”. He was known to be the bravest of the brave. His name was on everyone’s lips. Later on, even the Chinese exclaimed, “If there were several men like Colonel Bugangpa posted at Tibet’s different borders, we would not have been able to enter Tibet.” This is true. After his death, the Tibetan government granted the To Dzelung estate to his surviving family, led by his wife Yangzom, with permanent ownership and right of inheritance over the land as their source of livelihood, under special consideration of his good service.

On the same day as the Colonel died, Potog Kaldor of the Gadang Regiment was seriously wounded in the battle. My right leg was hit by two bullets while my left leg was severely injured by a piece of an exploded shell (The scars are still visible on my legs). I was nearly dying of pain. There were two other soldiers beside me who had also been badly injured. Since the war was at its peak, three of us were taken to a corner of the forest and hidden there. We suffered great pain and extreme difficulties for several days. One day a kind elderly man from Dengko came and took us to his home. He treated our wounds and nurtured us for more than a month. When we became completely fit and well, he took us to Sibda Monastery, where our unit was based.

Brigadier Muja, with his force, occupied Tseri and fought the Chinese for three days and nights. The Tibetan forces had a strategic position, they managed to defend their area and did not suffer any casualties; instead, they killed or wounded many Chinese soldiers. However, when they heard about the loss of the Colonel at Shungru, they all were overcome with deep sadness.

At the southwest face of Tseri, the troops under the command of Lieutenant Dongrag fought the Chinese for three days and nights. Although they managed to defend Tseri, Lieutenant Dongrag, Tathogpa and some soldiers of Shotarlhosum were killed or wounded during the battle.

At the northeastern border at Tseri, the troops of Captain Phurbu Tsering of the Gadang Regiment and Lieutenant Lolo and local militias of Shotarlhosum battled with a Chinese force for three days and nights. Though they managed to defend Tseri, about 30 officers and soldiers of Shotarlhosum were either killed or wounded.

After that, as if both the Tibetan and Chinese sides had reached a ceasefire, the Chinese troops withdrew from various battle sites to the east of the Drichu River and remained inactive. The Tibetan troops also pulled back from Seshim-la pass and remained at Sibda Monastery of Derge, as the location was strategically advantageous for them. They constructed a watch-house to check the arrival of Chinese forces. In the same year, from Shigatse the fourth company of the Gadang Regiment, traveled days and nights on a forced march, and arrived at Sibda Monastery to help the Tibetan force already there. The Tibetan force at Sibda now was composed of

Gadang troops commanded by Major Muja, the fourth colonel, Captain Phurbu Tsering and Captain Bondrong Chopel and 500 troops of Shotarlhosum regions commanded by Brigadier Tseprung Drumpa and Brigadier Dragto Bulag, as well as some 100 local militias of Gojo and Drakyab. In Derge Joda, there were 500 troops of the Gadang Regiment commanded by the second Brigadier Karchung, the first colonel Chosur, the second colonel Nyandrong Gongma and four captains.

In the night of the 1st day of the seventh month of the Iron-Tiger year (1950), as a bad omen, loud noises of guns and artilleries were heard all over Tibet, lasting for several hours, as if armies of gods were fighting a great war. It was followed immediately by an earthquake, which took thousands of lives, both human and livestock, and caused tremendous destruction of the properties of the people in southern Tibet. At that time, we were at Sibda Monastery.

Up to this point is a military history of Tibet during the time of Lhalu as the Governor-General of Kham. Soon after that, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme arrived in Chamdo, to take the place of Lhalu.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Formosa is a former name of modern day Taiwan. In 1949, during the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated from Mainland China and moved the ROC government from Nanjing (Nanking) to Taipei, Taiwan's largest city, while continuing to claim sovereignty over all of China, which the ROC defines to include mainland China, Taiwan, Outer Mongolia as well as other areas. In mainland China, the victorious Communists established the PRC, claiming to be the sole representative of China including Taiwan and portraying the ROC government on Taiwan as an illegitimate entity.
2. Tsechag (correct spelling: *rtse phyag*) is the title of the fourth rank officer in the traditional Tibetan government who heads the supply office of the Dalai Lama's personal needs.
3. Lachag (correct spelling: *bla phyag*) is the title of the officer who heads the treasury office of the traditional Tibetan government.
4. The Full National Assembly or *bod ljong tshogs 'du rgyas pa*, also called *bod ljong spyi tshogs rgyas pa*, was made up of four kalons, four drungying chenmos, four tsipons, all the officials above the rank of dzasak and taiji, as well as abbots, Ganden throne-holder, chandzos and other representatives of the Three Monastic Seats.
5. Chuni Drugna was a temporary army unit formed by collecting six soldiers from each of the twelve regiment of Tsang.
6. *Ral gri gnam g.yug*, which literal meaning is "brandishing sword in the air", means deciding things unilaterally in a domineering or autocratic way.

7. Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai (1891-1954) was the first Secretary General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in pre-independence India. Following the independence of India from the British Raj in 1947, Prime Minister Nehru retained Bajpai for some time as his principal foreign affairs adviser, appointing him the first Minister of External Affairs. Afterwards, Bajpai served as the Governor of Maharashtra from 1952 until his death in 1954.
8. *La nyag mdzo zengs* literally means, “the mountain pass should lower and the *dzo* should walk upright,” which means that there should be compromise from both sides.
9. Dr. Rajendra Prasad (December 3, 1884 – February 28, 1963) was the first President of the Republic of India. He was an independence activist and, as a leader of the Congress Party, played a prominent role in the Indian Independence Movement. He served as President of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution of the Republic from 1948 to 1950. He also served as a Cabinet Minister briefly in the first Government of Independent India.
10. Tibetan: *chu kha rag gtug*
12. Tibetan: *Bong rjes thal ba*, or sometimes *bong ba sngon dang thal ba rjes*. Literally, it means spreading dust after a donkey has crossed [a muddy road so as not to slip]. This refers to taking action too late.
13. Robert Ford was born in England in March 27, 1923. He was a radio technician in the Royal Air Force during World War II and worked in England and India. In 1945, he joined the British Mission in Lhasa, as a Radio officer and had an audience with the 14-year-old 14th Dalai Lama in Lhasa. The same year he was transferred to Gangtok, Sikkim, where he worked for British India relations with Tibet. When India became independent in 1947, Robert Ford returned to Lhasa and was appointed by the Tibetan government as the first foreigner to be given an official rank in Tibet. Following one year in Lhasa, he was requested to go to Chamdo, the capital of eastern Tibet (Dokham), to establish a radio link between Lhasa and Chamdo, which he realized successfully. In 1949 Robert Ford and three wireless operator students were sent to Chamdo. They helped the Governor-General of Kham, Lhalu Tsewang Dorjeý, improving defense in Chamdo and around. In addition, a direct link was established for the first time between Lhasa and Chamdo.

He was arrested in 1950 by the invading Chinese army, along with the Governor-General of Kham, Ngabo, and other Tibetan officials. The People’s Republic of China accused him of espionage, spreading anti-communist propaganda and causing the death of Getak Trulku. He spent nearly 5 years in jail, in constant fear of being executed, and was subjected to interrogation and thought reform. Only in 1954 was he allowed to send a letter to his parents. At the end of 1954, his trial was held and he was sentenced to ten years jail. He was eventually released and expelled in 1955.

In 1990, he published a book "Captured in Tibet" about his experience in Tibet.

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Chapter Fourteen

The Chinese Communists Invade Tibet



A. Tibetan War of Resistance Against the Chinese Communists at Northeastern Borders

On October 1, 1949 in Peking, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese thereafter started using the reincarnation of the ninth Panchen Rinpoche [Chokyi Gyaltzen]¹, a boy born in Amdo, as a political instrument. They coerced him to send telegrams to Mao Tse-tung and Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh, requesting them to liberate Tibet. Although he was only ten years old, his influence extended widely in Dotö and Domé regions. China announced on radio that it was soon going to "liberate" Tibet and Formosa. Although the term "liberation" sounds impressive, deep inside Mao was hatching an evil plot to control the people and natural resources of Tibet, a nation that had existed independently since ancient times and where people lived happily and peacefully in accordance with the principles of the Dharma.

After that, the PLA troops intensified their attacks on the northeastern borders of Dotö and Domé. In the wake of this, the Tibetan government appointed Tsipon [Ngabo] Ngawang Jigme as a minister and sent him to Chamdo to replace Lhalu Tsewang Dorji as the Governor-General of Kham. Lhalu was instructed to remain for a while in Chamdo to assist Ngabo. However, he sent a petition to Lhasa, saying that he had already handed over the charge to the new incumbent and hurriedly left for Lhasa, giving the impression that he avoided the drastic situation of the time. Just after leaving Chamdo, he received an instruction from Lhasa to remain in Lho Dzong, and he accordingly stayed there for a while. At that time, Kalon Dokharwa, the senior Commander-in-Chief and Dzasak Lama Kalsang Tsultrim, the Commander-in-Chief, were sent to Nagchu and 39 states of Hor respectively to collect new recruits and organize military survey and preparations. From Lhasa, a detachment of the Chadang Artillery Regiment, under the command of the colonel Rupon Rigzin Paljor, was dispatched to deliver machineguns, loaded on mules, to the Tibetan forces in Chamdo.

On November 23, 1949, Mao Tse-tung telegraphed General Feng Te-huai, the Chairman of the Northwest Bureau, with the following instruction:

The Northwest Bureau, taking sole responsibility, with the help of the Southwest Bureau, has to first carefully deal with the Panchen Rinpoche's communities in Tsinghai (Qinghai) and should employ them skillfully in political campaigning. You should first march quickly to Xikang (Tibetan areas to the east of the Drichu) and conquer them. Only after that, you should conquer the Tibetan areas along the west of the Drichu.

The PLA had been divided into three Army Corps, each consisting of 20,000 to 30,000 troops. Fearing that the invasion of Tibet militarily would attract international attention, Mao Tse-tung hesitated to go ahead with his plan. He flew to Russia to seek its support. After gaining Russia's support, he sent a telegram through the chief of the Northwest Bureau, General Feng Te-huai, to Teng Hsiao-peng, Liu Bocheng and He Long [of the Southwest Bureau] on January 2, 1950, telling them to lead the military expedition into Tibet as soon as possible, without any further delay. Mao's wireless message read:

Though Tibet does not have a large population and strong army, it is large in area and important in international position. We must invade it. You have to first invade Dartsedo and the Tibetan areas to the east of the Drichu². After that, you have to dispatch troops to Tibet in divisions with the plan to reach the northeastern Tibet within three and a half months.

Regarding how the PLA's marched into Tibet, a Chinese named Chen Yizi has said in the first issue of the Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet (Rgu cha bdams sgrigs)³:

On 15 September, the advance unit of the Army Corps convened a meeting on the mobilization. The Army Corps leader told us that a few British imperialist spies and splittists⁴ in the local government of Tibet had poisoned Getak Trulku, so they had closed the big gate of peaceful negotiation on the issue of Tibet.

This is a distortion of fact carried out for political motives. [Chen Yizi] maliciously called the Tibetan government "local government," and [Tibetans] as a few "splittists" despite that the Tibetan nation and people were separate [from China] since the beginning. He alleged that Getak Trulku was poisoned, although he died of illness in Chamdo. He further lied about [Tibet] having "closed the big door" for peaceful negotiation to solve the Tibet's issue, despite the fact that negotiations were in process at that time. He thus shamelessly made false accusations against others, without considering the laws and the consequences of his statements, in order to use this as a pretext to invade Tibet.

Chen goes on to say:

Moreover, [the Tibetan government] expanded its army as much as possible, increasing the number of dapon from 14 to 17 (dapon is similar to taun, it has 500 to 1,000 troops). Ammunitions and shells were bought or procured. Local recruits were enlisted and given training. Further, two third of the total army (7 full brigades and some units of 3 other brigades) and local militias, totaling more than 8,000 troops, were deployed at Chamdo borders and the western plain of the Drichu River. Those troops strongly defended Chamdo, an important town, and tried to prevent the passage of our army into Tibet by cutting the main road that lead to Tibet.

The entire Nyadang Regiment and majority of the troops of the Jadang Regiment plus some troops from the regiments of Khadang, Ngadang, Chadang and Bodyguard were stationed in Chamdo. One platoon of the Jadang Regiment was posted in Riwoche. The Gadang Regiment and Brigadier Drakto Bulak's troops were placed at Yayu Sumdo, Goto, Khadum Druga boat crossing and Yicho. Sibda was their main base. The Thadang Regiment was dispatched to Karthog, Dungphu and Joda. The Dadang Regiment (author: Tadang Regiment) was posted in Markham. The local recruits were divided amongst the different Tibetan army regiments stationed at various locations. This entire Tibetan force was under the command of the Governor-General of Kham, appointed by the Tibetan government. In accordance with this situation, the Central Government of China ordered us to cross the Drichu River and destroy the defense forces of Chamdo as quickly as possible so as to open the gate for our march to Lhasa.

At the meeting, the leader of the Army Corps mobilized six regiments to create a force to invade Chamdo. It was decided to make attacks from two sides, the north and south, just as a pair of pincer grasps an object, gradually advancing inward, applying more force on the northern side. The third regiment of our division, and the Artillery Battalion of Army Corpse which was temporarily under the command of our division, Espionage Battalion, Engineering Battalion and the Artillery Company of the 54th Division and the Cavalry Army of Jyekundo were assigned the task to attack from the northern side. Our northern force was divided into three groups: the Right Army Group was composed by the 154th Regiment, Tsinghai Cavalry Force, Espionage Company and Artillery Company. This force was to work under the direction of the Deputy Political Commissar Yin Fatang, Commander Chang Li-min and the commanders of the 154th Regiment and Tsinghai Cavalry Force. The 154th Regiment and Artillery Company of the northern group were ordered to cross the River from the side of Dengko, to join the Cavalry Force of Tsinghai as fast as possible. Then, after taking the Langchen road, it was to march straight to Nyenda to block the road to Lhasa, in order to cut the escape route for the enemy's troops as well to prevent the arrival of the enemy's additional troops.

The Central Army Group was composed of the 155th and 156th regiments and Artillery Battalion of the Army Corps. Its task was to march with the Advance Force to

attack Chamdo. From Dengko, it was to cross the River, then to march through Yayu Sumdo, the Changshi Bridge and Goto up to Sibda, crushing the enemy's force at each position. Then, following the shortcut route, it was to advance to Chamdo, where all the groups were to make a combined attack on the enemy's main military base.

The Left Army Group was made up of the Intelligence Battalion, Engineering Battalion and Artillery Company of the 54th Division. It was under the command of Hsu Long-hsuen (So Dung-ching), the commander of Intelligence Battalion and Wang Daxuang, the direct Political Commissar the Army Corps. Its mission was to confuse the enemy's forces and to give support to the Central Army Group. It was to move on land under the protection of artillery, cross the Yangtse River (Drichu) and destroy the enemy's positions at Dungfu and Joda as quickly as possible, and then to march towards Chamdo. When they were about to reach Chamdo after a three-day march, one group of troops should follow the upper route to surround Chamdo from the southern side and wipe out all the enemy's troops there, and whoever tried to escape from that side.

The Left Division of our Army Corps comprised of the 157th Regiment of the 53rd Army Corps, Artillery Company and Engineering Company of the Army Corps. According to the plan, under the command of Mao Pio, the Deputy Political Commissar of the 53rd Army Corps, it was to cross the Yangtse River at Drupa Lung from the northern side of Batang, and destroy the defense force of Markham first. Thereafter, the attack unit was to leave Pomda and Pasho, and had to block the road for the enemy's troops who tried to escape from Chamdo towards the south.

From Yunnan, one battalion each from the 125th and 126th regiments of the 42th Army Corps had already arrived at Dechen, and they were planning to crush the local militias of Yincing, Mankung and Tu'u li, and thereupon, to march into Tibet from the northwest border. At that time, the Northwest Army Division was also about to advance to Tibet. In this way, enhancing the strength of our army division, we planned to make a combined attack to destroy the defense force of Chamdo and liberate the whole of Tibet.

After the meeting, we utilized the short time we had in the mobilization of our troops before we embarked upon our mission. First of all our Front Army, that is, 154th Regiment, studied the implementation of the policy of minority nationality, how to deal with the people, war strategy on the high plateau and acquaint ourselves with the new lifestyle. At the same time, we made military preparations, helped the local people in their work at our best level and learned to live on the sustenance of barley flour (tsampa), butter and cheese, and to adapt ourselves to the new environment. We arranged yaks and she-yaks, which are called "Ships of the Highland" for our means of transportation and trained ourselves in employing them. We managed to transport some heavy loads and necessary supplies to Chamdo. We made all preparations in order that our forces would be able to fight the Chamdo battle with great ease.

On Jan 10, 1950, Mao Tse-tung wired to Liu Bocheng, Teng Hsiao-ping and He Long, and the message, as quoted in Mao Tse-tung's Notes on the Founding of the New China, read as below:

Your plan about how to lead the military campaign into Tibet is excellent. I agree with you and permit you to go ahead with your plan. Britain, India and Pakistan's acceptance of China's suzerainty over Tibet had greatly benefitted China enabling it to invade Tibet.

By that time, the PLA had already started penetrating into Tibet from the eastern borders and nearly invaded the Tibetan area to the west of the Driчу River. As a warning, they circulated a ten-point document and made a series of radio announcements, stating completely irrelevant things such as that they were going to expel the foreign imperialist forces from Tibet, and then liberate Tibet.

In response to these, the Tibetan government announced that Tibet was not part of China, that the relations between Tibet and China were of "priest and patron" and that there were no foreign powers in Tibet. It also announced on Lhasa radio in three languages—Tibetan, Chinese and English—that if China invaded Tibet, just as a big insect eat a small insect, Tibetans would fight back, even if the entire male population were annihilated, leaving only female members. The radio announcements were made twice daily, in the morning and evening; Ford made it in English, Takla Phuntsok Tashi in Chinese and Rimshi Rasa Gyagan in Tibetan.

As mentioned above, in October 1950, though the negotiation between the Chinese and Tibet was still going on in Delhi, in complete violation of the international law, the PLA began invading Tibet from six directions: Nangchen, Dengko and Derge Kamtog Druga ferry crossing from Jyekundo; Markham from Batang; Tsame from Yunnan; and Ngari from Xinjiang. The Tibetan defense forces at respective positions put up marvelous resistance. However, due to inferiority in number and poor military supplies, the Tibetan forces at different positions suffered defeats one after another, and lost their areas to the Chinese, as will be briefly described below.

1. The Southwest Military Commission, the Engineering Battalion of the 6th Regiment of the 18th Army Corps, the Artillery Company of the 54th Division and the 154th Regiment joined the Tsinghai Cavalry Army led by the Deputy Political Commissar Yin Fatang and Chang Li-min. Their plan was to cross the Driчу River from the north of Dengko, whence they would penetrate Nangchen and Riwoche through Jyekundo and then march to Chamdo from its north, to block the road of the Tibetan troops to Chamdo. In accordance with their plan, when they left Nangchen and reached the Chaksam Bridge, the Jadang Regiment under the command of Brigadier Phulungwa and Colonel

Drugyal's troops encountered them. Their fighting lasted for a few days. After they ran out of shells and bullets, Lieutenant Kalsang Wangdu and Captain of the Jadang Regiment, along with some brave soldiers, resorted to swords. In the process, Lieutenant Kalsang fell into the hands of the Chinese. He was not only severely tortured but was killed in a horrible manner by tying his four limbs to four dzos (a cross breed of yak and cow) and dragging him to his death. During that battle, many members of both the Chinese and Tibetan forces were either killed or wounded. The Tibetan force, unable to resist the Chinese attack, ran away to Riwoche.

2. Around the same time as above, the 155th and 156th Regiments and Artillery Battalion of the Army Corps, under the command of So'u Yang and others, through Dengko, crossed the Drichu, and attacked Yayu Sumdo, Goto and Sibda. During that time, on the 2nd day of the 7th Tibetan month, a loud sound was heard from the sky in whole Tibet, followed by earthquakes and other bad omens. The Gadang Regiment under the command brigadier Muja and Captain Lagsho made strong counter attacks. Captain Rongpa Migmar, leading his force, fought the Chinese at Dzimo Gon and Tson Sumdo for several consecutive days, during which both Chinese and Tibetan sides suffered high casualties. The Tibetan forces from all battle zones finally pulled back and regrouped at Yutso, where they remained for a while.

The Tibetans had captured two Chinese spies who told them that the Chinese were planning to launch an intense attack on the Tibetan positions soon. The two Chinese spies were executed at Sangsing. Soon the Chinese escalated their attack in Yutso. Unable to defend their ground, the Tibetan forces pulled back to Sumdo, a border area of Lhathog, where local militias of Shotarlhosum, Lhoka, Drayab and Gojo arrived to support the Tibetan forces. Immediately, the Tibetan forces reorganized themselves, and took positions on embankments of the two mountains, divided by the road, to ambush the Chinese troops. A few days later, about one hundred Chinese cavalry troops came along that road incautiously. The Tibetans troops ambushed them, killing all of them on the spot, except for a few who managed to escape.

The following day, there was a continuous flow of Chinese infantry troops through the bank of Yuchu Kha. The Tibetan troops encountered them for several days and nights, so that the Chinese lost patience and retreated to a distance of one day's march. No fighting took place for a few days after that. In this battle, many Chinese officers and soldiers were killed, and their dead bodies made a huge heap. The Tibetan soldiers and the local people threw them into the Phuchu River. Since there were many dead bodies, they formed a stack in the water, causing a blockage in the river. This was widely known among the local people.

The Tibetan side also suffered casualties. They lost about 50 officers and soldiers and many more of them received injuries. The weapons seized from the Chinese were handed over to the Governor-General of Kham by Lieutenant Sotrey (Sonam Tashi)⁵ of the Kadang Regiment when he returned to Chamdo. Regarding this battle, we find the following passage in the first issue of the Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet:

One evening, when we were marching through a narrow mountain pass, our comrades of the Front Army suddenly stopped on the way. Our Reconnaissance Platoon had met with a group of enemy troops on the mountainside at a height of 5,000 meters. Despite the enemy's force being stronger, our comrades fearlessly and courageously fought back the enemy's force, with great effort. Unfortunately, Chang Chi-lin (a soldier of Reconnaissance Platoon) and Tsondu Namgyal, a staff of the Political Commission, lost their lives, and a platoon leader Wo Shun and others were wounded one after another. So only three soldiers in the platoon were left there. As soon as our Front Army (advance troops) arrived, they started taking part in the battle, and the enemy's troops were firing at us from their barricades. We immediately ordered our artillery company to take up position at a nearby small hill and help the infantry troops to destroy the enemy's forces.

Just after this battle, from Lhasa a group of military instructors was sent to Kham. Soon after their arrival in Chamdo, Lieutenant Instructor Sonam Tashi of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment was sent to Dengko to repair damaged guns and give training to the soldiers. He fought the above battles and recalls the following, in a transcribed version of his interview, which has been archived at the Department of Security of the CTA, Dharamsala:

After we finished repairing the machineguns and Bren guns and giving training to the Gadang troops, we returned to Chamdo. Soon Brigadier Muja of the Gadang Regiment sent to our camp a messenger with a request to send Nyaljor and me over [to his camp] to repair their damaged Lewis guns. We both rode off to Yutso lakeside to meet him. He received us warmly and gave us food and drink, and arranged a tent for us. The next day, he sent the damaged machineguns to us. We checked them and found their rewind springs had been damaged, so we put in new ones and made them workable. After that, we requested him to permit us to return to Chamdo immediately, but he told us that since we had already arrived there, we could take rest there for two or three days. One day, not long after that, news came that the Chinese forces had arrived at Sibda and Yutso-kha shore. He immediately began to make defense preparations. At that time, we three lieutenants—Lhawang-la, Monlam-la and I—voluntarily took one hundred cavalry troops and proceeded to Sibda. We arrived there just before the dawn. We

immediately attacked the Chinese position and fought them for the whole day, pushing them backward. The Chinese were badly defeated and they finally fled. The next day, with the help of the local people, we dumped their dead bodies into the river. People said that there were about 200 dead bodies. We got around 37 guns from them. In those times, only some Chinese troops had guns. The local people were happy with us and thanked us for saving their lives. Then, we made our way back to Yutso lakeside.

At the same time of the Dengko battle, the Tibetan force defending Goto lost ground and retreated to the lakeside of Yutso, where they joined the Tibetan force deployed in that area. Thereafter they positioned themselves at the mountaintop of Sumdo and the mountain pass, and lay in wait to attack the Chinese. At first, a detachment of 100 Chinese cavalry troops came following that road. Our forces fired on them fiercely, killing all of them on the spot. Many infantry troops continually came through that road. The Gadang Regiment troops and local militias attacked them. Having suffered a bad defeat, the Chinese fled back to a distance of one day's march. Ten Tibetan officers and soldiers were either killed or wounded in that fight. No fighting took place for a few days after that, as if the two sides had agreed on a ceasefire. The Chinese dead bodies were dumped into the river. The weapons seized from the Chinese during the previous battle were dispatched to the Governor-General of Kham under the escort of the lieutenant and the section leader of the Gadang Regiment with their soldiers. At that time, we requested the Gadang Brigadier to allow us to return to Chamdo.

In Chamdo, the new Governor-General had arrived and had already taken charge. We spent several days there arranging parties for them. At that time, messengers came to us one after another from different parts of Kham. Lhalu and his aides-de-camp hurriedly left Chamdo.

In his report on the above events, preserved among the military history archive at the Department of Security of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Rinchen, a former member of the Gadang Regiment, recalls:

During the Tibetan force's resistance against the Chinese attacks on the Tibetan positions at northeastern mountain of the Sibda Monastery, under the command of Captain Ogma-la of the Gadang Regiment, Namgyal Phuntsok and Khabong Migmar Dhondup lost their lives. They were said to have killed many Chinese troops. However, overwhelmed by the large Chinese force, the Tibetan force retreated to the lakeside of Yutso, where they joined the Shigatse force and the local militias, and again made a combined resistance fight against the Chinese for several days. I do not remember how many Chinese and Tibetan soldiers were killed or wounded in that battle. However, due to a shortage of shells and ammunitions, and no arrival of army supplies from Chamdo in time, we were

put in a tremendously difficult position and were compelled to pull back up to a distance of two days' march. Then we arrived at a valley of Dola Mountain, with 30 yaks carrying loads of shells and bullets arrived from Chamdo. We again set up embankments at Sumdo Mountain and made defense preparations to take control of the area. During the next morning, more than 100 Chinese cavalry troops with loaded horses appeared from the eastern side. As soon as they arrived just below our position, at once all of us fired on them from different sides, killing all of them instantly, except for a few of them who managed to escape. The next day, just after midday, through that same road, a large detachment of Chinese infantry converged on our position and attacked us with machine guns and artilleries. We retaliated, applying all our force, and the incident lasted for almost two days. Some of our troops and officers, including Badungwa Lobsang, Sherab Yeshe and Sa Nyenpa were killed or wounded. Because we had good defense position and embankments, we did not suffer many casualties. Many of our horses were killed or wounded as they were hit with the shells or bullets. It was widely known that many Chinese soldiers were either killed or wounded. As every one of us witnessed, a dead body of a very high Chinese commander was given a special honour, unlike other Chinese commanders. The soldiers placed the dead body on a throne and carried it on their shoulders. All the weapons seized from the Chinese were loaded on horses and dispatched to the Governor-General, escorted by Nyugshi Anan of the Gadang Regiment and Rupa Tsingdor. Most of the dead bodies of the Chinese soldiers were thrown into the river and the rest were covered under leaves of pine trees.

While we remained there with the hope that we would be able to defend the area, one afternoon, a messenger from Chamdo came and told us that the Chinese force had followed another route and was almost across the Dzasam Bridge, close to Chamdo. He further informed us that the Governor-General had ordered that the Silthog Thang armoury in Chamdo be burnt so that the weapons would not fall into the Chinese hands, and that he was going to shift his headquarters to Drugu Monastery. Hearing such unpleasant news, all our troops, both commanders and soldiers, lost their determination and courage to fight. We left our embankments for Chamdo, fearing being surrounded by the enemy if we did not move. When we arrived at Dzasam Bridge, it was intact, but when we arrived near Chamdo we saw clouds of smoke coming out from the armory at Chamdo which was on fire, and very loud noises of bursting shells could be heard, as if an intense firing was raging. Since it was no use for us to proceed to Chamdo, we went back through Namtso-la pass.

3. From Horkhog, under the command of the Battalion Commander Hsu Longhsuen and Wa Taxun, the Political Commissar directly under the Army Corps, a large Chinese force along with the artillery company of the 54th Regiment

attacked the Tibetan positions at the Kamthog Druga ferry crossing of Derge and the upper and lower Wangpo. The Thadang Regiment under the command of Brigadier Shagjang Ngawang Gyaltsen retaliated. During this battle, the 1st captain of the Gadang Regiment and Tsasho Nyer Karma lost their lives. Many Chinese troops and officers were killed or wounded. When the Chinese troops crossed the river (Yangtse) in hide coracles, some of them were drowned and died as their boats were pierced by gunshots from the Tibetan force.

The following is a short excerpt from the first issue of the *Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet*:

Our left Army Division crossed the Yangtse from Kamthog Druga ferry crossing on the 7th day of the tenth month. Our enemy's defense forces in Dungfu and Kartok strongly defended the areas and thwarted us from crossing the river. However, we fought determinedly without losing our courage, and we crossed the river by boats without caring about the enemy's attack. One of our coracles was hit by gunshot, and four of our soldiers were drowned in the water, and lost their lives in a graceful manner.

He has written a brief account of the event by concealing the major part. Actually, many Chinese boats were sunk and the battle was intense and lasted for several days and nights. Many Chinese troops were killed or wounded. Severely defeated, they retreated a certain distance.

After a few days, again a large number of Chinese troops came and attacked the Tibetan position. The Tibetan force put up strong defense with great courage and force, but due to their small size, they lost ground and pulled back to Dzoda. In the hope that they would be able to defend the area of Dzoda and Kyorshung, they constructed embankments and lay in wait to counter the Chinese. Nevertheless, with the help of some traitorous Tibetans, the Chinese launched a night attack on the army camp of Brigadier Karchung of the Gadang Regiment, killing or wounding many Tibetan officers and soldiers. As a result, the Tibetan troops were dispersed in disorder from their position. The Tibetans again encountered the Chinese forces with the hope they could defeat them. In the process, Lieutenant Chagiang Ngodup of the Gadang Regiment and other members of the Tibetan force were either killed or wounded. The Tibetan force included the troops of the Gadang and Thadang regiments and the local militia, and they fled to Chamdo where they met the 1st brigade of the Gadang Regiment. They together went to Drugu Monastery through Nantso-la pass.

4. While the above battles took place, the 157th Regiment of the 53th Army Corps and Engineering Army Group, under the command of Deputy Political Commissar Ma Poi, crossed the Drichu from Batang, and launched heavy

attacks on the Tibetan positions at Chidzong Gang and Drupa Rongchok in Markham. The Tibetan force, comprising the troops of the Tadang Regiment under the command of Captain Kunga Tsenje, monk volunteers from Gungkar Labrang and the local militia, retaliated. In this battle, Captain Bagdro of the Tadang Regiment and some of his troops lost their lives. Having been badly defeated, the rest of the Tibetan troops fled from their position. At that time, disagreement arose between Brigadier Derge Sé Kalsang Wangdu of the Tadang Regiment and Taiji Majawa of Markham. Majawa fled to Chamdo. Derge Sé, though not unpatriotic, but due to heavy casualties on the Tibetan side, and prompted by a secret letter he had received from his minister Jago Topten, he summoned Colonel Gompo Garthog and proposed to surrender to the Chinese. He and the Colonel, taking some of their soldiers, went to the Political Commissar of the 157th Regiment. Thereafter he went back to Gartog and ordered all his troops to hand over their weapons to the Chinese. One group of soldiers returned to their homes. The majority of the troops went with Derge Sé in 1951 to Chamdo. They stayed at Thangkar and joined the PLA troops.

After that, Chang Ko-hua, the commander of 18th Army Corps; Tan Kan-suan; Zhou Renlin Zhengou, the director of the Political Committee; Chang Din Minyi, Chief of Staff; Vice-chief of Staff, Lui Juiquin and other senior Chinese officers arrived in Chamdo. Panchen Lama's official Jigme, Jago Topten, Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal⁶, Kalsang Yeshe and others who were in favor of the Chinese complemented Derge Sé, both verbally and in writing, saying that he had made a wise decision in surrendering to the Chinese. On the other hand, the Tibetan people called him "shameless brigadier of Tadang Regiment" and he became an object of derision among the Tibetan people, as is clear from the following satirical songs which became popular in Lhasa:

Ngabo went courageously,
Returned after delivering Chamdo [to China];
From amongst one-hundred good men,
Dapon Muja was the most capable.⁷

Led by two-faced Derge Sé,
Then silly Dapon Karchung,
Carried the bad smell of crap
From the military camps in Kham.⁸

Amongst the aristocrats of early times,
There were men like tigers, leopards and bears;
Now there are pharas and wolves,
Who destroyed the government.⁹

5. From Yunnan, the 125th and 126th Regiments of the 42nd Army Corps marched into Kungshen and Dechen respectively and attacked Tsame. The Tibetan force defending the area made their best efforts to defend their position, but they were overwhelmed by the Chinese force, both in terms of number and equipment. The Tibetans gradually pulled back up to Chamdo.
6. From Xinjiang, in the fall of 1950, Zhou Shangli commanding the first Cavalry Army, marching through Shunlun Hran Mountain, penetrated Ngari Gyertse. Drungyig Tseten Phungyal, the acting Governor of Ngari, and senior members of the region protested against their invasion and warned that if the Chinese did not turn away, they would deploy their army and expel them by force. However, many Chinese troops Xinjiang continuously arrived in the region and remained there.

B. The Fall of Chamdo

As mentioned above, the former and the new Governor-General of Kham differed in their military and secular policy vis-à-vis China. Therefore, after Lhalu left Chamdo, Ngabo stressed mainly on initiating negotiations with the Chinese for peace, and ignored making military preparations. He removed all the fortifications constructed on mountaintops in and around Chamdo. With the view to opening communication with the Chinese and to discourage their offensives on Tibetan borders, he sent Yeshe Dargye and Pomda Rabga from Markham and Yuga from Dengko to [Tachienlu] to talk with the Chinese. However, since the Chinese had already started attacking on the borders and Tibetan forces had suffered heavy defeats and lost large areas to the Chinese, it was impossible to open a dialogue with the Chinese. Before the arrival of the Liberation Army in Chamdo, Ngabo decided to shift his headquarter temporarily to Lho Dzong. On the 9th day of the 8th month of the Iron-Tiger year [1950], he, along with his aides-de-camp, hurriedly left Chamdo.

At Lamda, he heard that the Chinese troops from Pasho and Riwoche had arrived in Lagong Nyenda and cut all the routes for the Tibetans. He and his team therefore spent the night at Drugu Monastery. During that night, Ngabo and his assistant staff discussed about negotiating with the Chinese. As instructed by Ngabo, Khenchung Samkhar Thupten Donyo and Tsedron Tsatul Tsang Lobsang Gyaltzen went to Chamdo to talk with Chinese. When they arrived at Dramdo, they met spies of the PLA based in Lamda. They took the Tibetans to Lamda and introduced them to a young commander named Xingung, who was thin, tall and calm in nature. He was the commander of the PLA unit that came from Xining

through Jyekundo. He asked the two Tibetans the reason for their coming there. They replied,

The Governor-General of Kham sent two of us to Chamdo to talk with the PLA, but on the way, we met these PLA spies who brought us here. We have deployed a very small number of defense troops at various borders in the hope of reconciliation with the Chinese over Sino-Tibet's crisis through peaceful negotiation. However, the Chinese suddenly started massive attacks on Tibetan border areas, scaring the Governor-General and his aides-de-camp, who had to shift their headquarters to Lagong Nyamda. Though he decided to talk with the commanders of the nearest PLA camp, since it was nighttime, he could not do so. The Governor-General is staying at Drugu Monastery. Actually, he wishes to hold a peaceful negotiation with the Chinese in order to protect the Sino-Tibetan relationship, so if you promise that PLA troops will not move further into Tibet from Chamdo, we will inform our government.

The commander replied,

The Governor-General and your staff are staying at Drugu Monastery and planning to negotiate with us; This is much better than having a hundred thousand defense troops. So for the time being it is difficult for us to advance further into Tibet from Chamdo. I will guarantee that both the life and properties of the Governor-General and his officials will not be harmed. Tonight, you two along with some officers and troops of the PLA should go to Drugu Monastery. If you meet Tibetan troops on the way, you two have to stop them shooting, or if they do, then we will make a tit for tat response. We have already decided to launch a night attack on the camp of the Governor-General at Drugu Monastery and all of our regiments have been ordered to remain ready. However, since you two have come here and told us details about your plan, we will inform our troops to halt their advance for the time being. After that, we can meet and talk at ease.

The Tibetans replied,

The Governor-General must be thinking that we two have gone straight to Chamdo, and he does not know what has happened on our way. So, send your two men immediately to Drugu Monastery to inform our Governor-General about our discussion. Also give us a letter so that we can show it to the PLA troops on the way to avoid any harm. We want to leave early in the morning tomorrow for Drugu Monastery.

He consented to their request. Tsedron wrote down the statements of the Chinese commander, which were to be submitted to the Governor-General.

Thereafter, in an inner room of the Lamda Drikhang, there were three Chinese commanders and a translator. They asked the Tibetans about the discussion they had had with Commander Xingun. At the end, they told the Tibetans that both the

Chinese and Tibetan sides must stick to the conclusion of the discussion. The Chinese officers introduced themselves to the two Tibetans as an army general, political officer and salary officer; it was not sure whether their names were mentioned.

Further, in the morning of the 11th Tibetan day, the two Tibetan staff of Ngabo and the Chinese troops left the Chinese army camp for Drugu Monastery. They met Ngabo, along with some Chinese troops who came from Chamdo, coming down from the monastery. The two groups of the Chinese troops had a quarrel, with both sides claiming that they were the first to come to terms with the Tibetans. Thereafter, Ngabo and his all aides-de-camp were taken back to Drugu Monastery. The Tibetans were made to surrender all their weapons to the Chinese and put signatures and seal on a document written in Chinese. Thereafter, the Chinese made all the Tibetan members sit in surrendering posture in front of the monastery, and took many photos of them.

Then, the Chinese took Ngabo and his aides-de-camp to Chamdo, escorted by Chinese cavalry. The General Wang Chi-mi of the 18th Army Corps had already arrived in Chamdo and had placed troops everywhere on the mountains and valleys. Upon arrival at Chamdo, Ngabo, Samkhar Khenchung and Tsogo were put in an army kitchen, and the rest of the Tibetans were put in a house. They were questioned for many days.

One day, around that same time, accusing the Tibetan government's radio operator R. Ford of poisoning Getak Trulku to death, the Chinese paraded him to and fro many times in a crowd, with his neck chained, to humiliate him. The Chinese forcibly summoned a public meeting. At the meeting, General Wang Chi-mi said, "We have come here to liberate the Tibetan people. The PLA will serve the people and will not take even a needle and thread from them. You have the right to express your views. You can say whatever you want to say about the assassination of Getak Trulku." He spoke at length to stir up and deceive the people. However, no one among the crowd spoke. Then a Tibetan man named Gonpo Banlok Rinchen Dhondup said,

We thank the PLA troops that they have not caused trouble to us so far and we have not heard about their oppressing other people. In future, you should not change from good to bad. Please do something through peaceful negotiation so that there is no change in the Dharma and the government of the Dalai Lama. Getak Trulku died of illness. This foreigner radio operator can never kill Getak Trulku nor have we heard, seen or suspected that he killed Getak Trulku.

In the night, the Wang Chi-mi summoned Gonpo Banlok and gave him warnings. The Chinese tortured Ford tremendously on political grounds and then took him to China. They questioned Lieutenant Tashi Norbu, one of the Ngabo's security guards, about why he had burned the Chamdo armoury, saying that it was a very serious act.

He boldly replied that he did so at the instruction of the Governor-General of Kham so that the weapons would not fall into the Chinese hands.

The Chinese ordered Ngabo to command all his troops in Chamdo and Drugu Monastery to surrender and hand over all their weapons to the Chinese. Most of the Tibetan troops surrendered, and each of them were given a letter of pardon and 5 dayang coins and sent home. Some troops, instead of surrendering to the Chinese, fled across Rili Mountain and arrived at Shotarhosum and Khyungpo, where they joined the Tibetan army stationed there in the hope that they would be able defend the area against the Chinese invasion. On October 19, 1950, Chamdo was seized by the Chinese.

During the time of Lhalu as the Governor-General of Kham, when the advance unit of the PLA marched into Chamdo from Dengko after crossing the Drichu, the Gadang Regiment troops stationed there encountered them. Later, during the time of Ngabo, a great number of PLA troops launched an incursion into five north-eastern regions of Kham. The Tibetan defense forces put up a remarkable defense, but gradually lost grounds and ceded all the areas one after another to the Chinese.

There were many factors that contributed to the fall of Kham to the PLA. One thing was that Lhalu and Ngabo, the former and new Governors-General of Kham, did not agree on military policy vis-à-vis China. Moreover, the Tibetan army had poor organizational systems, logistic support and military supplies. There was lack of cooperation and unity between the Tibetan army and the local people. Previously, the Tibetan government had ruled out the Lhalu's plan to launch an attack on the Chinese. In addition, the Chinese campaigned, announcing impressive and deceptive promises such as that they would bring unprecedented happiness to Tibet, and distributed money lavishly among local leaders and people. They used the method of "divide and rule" by creating hostilities between the Government and the Labrang, the seat of Panchen Rinpoche.

The most important cause was that the successive Governor-General of Kham and his staff, district officers and army leaders did not look after the local people with kindness and love, as they should have done in accordance with the tradition of the land of Dharma. As a result, out of a vengeful feeling, some thoughtless local people sided with the Communist Chinese, and destroyed the unity of the people. Consequently, the Chinese conquered the whole country gradually, just as a drop of oil spreads on a paper, and ultimately destroyed the religion and government and the people's freedom and happiness. The Tibetan people lost ownership of their own bodies and became slaves of the Chinese, and started undergoing tremendous miseries. This is the result of the negligence of the common affairs of the country, the mistake attributed to every one of us (Tibetans); we cannot blame one another. The following chapters will discuss the lessons we should learn from our past experience.

The PLA troops had arrived close to Lhasa. The affairs of religion and politics of Tibet were in a critical condition. As discussed in chapter 13 above, appealed to by the people of Tibet, both monastic and lay, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama assumed the temporal and spiritual leadership of Tibet at the age of sixteen. The below street song became popular in Lhasa at that time:

Taklung Drak [Taktra], the Regent
Has spoilt the government;
The Dalai Lama was offered
The government that has been paralysed.¹⁰

The Dalai Lama, in order to safeguard the Dharma, government and people of Tibet, tried his best to initiate a peaceful negotiation with the Chinese. He sent a series of letters to the Chinese officials in Chamdo, requesting them to release the Tibetan civil and military officials arrested in Kham and to withdraw Chinese troops from Lhasa. At the advice of Chinese General Wang Chi-mi, Ngabo—who was in Chinese prison—sent Tsedron Gyalten Phuntsok and Kadron Samling Shonpa Phuntsok Dorji to Lhasa to talk about the power of the negotiation team to hold negotiations with the Chinese.

At that time, the Tibetan delegation headed by Khentsi (Khenchung Thupten Gyalpo and Tsipon Shakabpa) officials was in Kalimpong with the mission to seek international help. The Tibetan government also sent Takla Sé Phuntsok Tashi and Driyul Tsering Wangdu to Gangtok with the task to receive wireless messages directly from the Tibetan government and to deliver them to the Tibetan delegation in Kalimpong who would in turn submit it to the UN. The Tibetan case was tabled in the UN and a resolution was passed on November 7, 1950, and again in 1961. Initiated by El Salvador, a country in South America, the member countries of the UN strongly criticized and protested the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Britain however told the UN general assembly that the case of Tibet's independence was doubtful. As a result, the Tibetan case failed to win support in the UN assembly. By so doing, Britain ignored the treaties concluded with Tibet on equal footing, and threw Tibet into the clutches of China for its own political interest. On the other hand, before the arrival of the PLA troops in Tibet, the Indian government considered Tibet to be an independent country. Moreover, Nehru told Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, in Delhi that the Chinese military invasion of Tibet must be prevented through the best suitable method, military or peaceful, and the Indian government would help Tibet in every possible way. However, later the Indian Government suddenly changed its policy on Tibet and urged the Tibetans to put efforts into gaining autonomy rather than independence, and to withdraw the case of Tibet's independence from the UN assembly. This greatly upset the Tibetan people.

In October 1950, after capturing Chamdo, the PLA troops headed to Central Tibet. At that time Lhalu was in Lho Dzong with the Drapchi Regiment as his bodyguard. Lhalu immediately went to Shopando and then to Tar Dzong where he stayed for a few days. The Gyantse Regiment was in Khyungpo Karnagsersum along with the local recruits and some Tibetan national troops scattered from various parts of Chamdo. Lhalu entrusted the defense of Khyungpo to the Phadang Regiment, along with local militias and the Tibetan troops who had fled from Chamdo. Then he ordered all the troops of the Gyantse Regiment to report to Shotarlhosum to defend important roads and areas. Accordingly, the troops of the Gyantse Regiment from all directions met at Tengchen, from where they headed to Shopando, via the Gyamo Ngulchu. There they were joined by some Tibetan troops of different regiments who had arrived from Chamdo. From Shopando, they sent spies to Chamdo to check out the situation. Through secret contact with the local people and the monasteries, they called local leaders and representatives for a meeting to discuss war strategy, and how to make a combined resistance fight against the Chinese. The local leaders suggested that Lhatse and Bari would be good sites to ambush the Chinese, and if war were fought in Shopando, the monasteries of the area would be destroyed. So the Tibetan troops shifted their position to Lhatse and occupied Bari Mountain. Constructing embankments, they lay in wait.

When Lhalu arrived at Lharigo on his way to Kongpo Gyamda from Tar Dzong, he sent a fake arrow letter to Chamdo. The letter said, "The Government has dispatched five regiments and 5,000 monk volunteers along with arms and ammunitions, and they must have arrived near Chamdo. Therefore, all the villages and monasteries along their way must extend help to them." The letter seemed to have gone straight to Lho Dzong and came into the hands of the Chinese.

Around that time, as soon as the Tibetan troops heard from their spies that many Chinese troops were advancing towards Shopando following the main road, they immediately took positions at different important locations with barricades in the forests of Dzimo Gungli Mountain of Bari to ambush the Chinese troops. One morning, the Chinese advance cavalry and infantry troops came straight towards Gungli following the main road. On their way, they attacked the barricade of Tibetan spies in Bari, killing the section leader Kharkha Wangdu and Dungpa Thangpe Bagdro's son. They captured the remaining eight spy soldiers along with their weapons. In the wake of this incidence, Colonel Phuntsok Yugyal, Colonel Kala Migmar Phuntsok, Captain Kharsam Gyalpo and Captain Taktse Penpa Wangdu—all from the Gyantse Regiment—along with their troops, pledging that they would never allow the Chinese troops to pass through them, remained ready to repel the Chinese troops. No sooner had the Chinese troops arrived below their embankments, than Colonel Phuntsok Yugyal fired at them, and immediately his troops attacked the Chinese troops from all sides with showers of bullets, shells

and any kinds of weapons they had. The Chinese attacked back, and the battle went on for the whole day. The Chinese suffered high casualties. Many of their soldiers fled and disappeared into a nearby forest. The Tibetans emerged victorious in that battle. By around 5 pm that evening, all the Chinese troops had disappeared from sight and there was no firing. They had fled to Lho Dzong and remained inactive for the time being either because they were unable to overcome the Tibetan forces or because they were panicked by the fake arrow letter sent by Ngabo, stating that the Tibetan government had sent a large force to support the Tibetan force in Chamdo. Following is a short excerpt from the memoir of Lieutenant Khetsun of the Ngadang Regiment about this battle:

At the time when Chamdo fell, our regiment was in Khyungpo. Then, at the instruction of the ex-Governor-General, we went to defend Shopando. Our soldiers were deployed over the mountaintops in four directions, and waited there to ambush the Chinese troops. The people and monks of Shopando requested us to shift our position to somewhere else, which was tough, because fighting a battle in Shopando would destroy all their monasteries. Accordingly, we shifted our position to Bari, where we remained ready to ambush the Chinese. In the morning of the 15th Day of the 10th Tibetan month, more than 300 Chinese troops advancing from Lho Dzong and Shopando arrived near us, and we immediately fired at them. The fighting lasted until midday. In the battle, ten of our soldiers were captured, and amongst them ten escaped and returned to our camp in the night. On the Chinese side, more than fifty soldiers were killed or wounded. They immediately fled from Bari.

In the battle, we did not suffer any casualties. We, taking the same weapons and armours, remained at Sating Dzong and then in Nagsho Diru. After that, as per the instruction of the Governor-General of Kham, we went to Kongpo Gyamda where we stayed a few months as his bodyguards. On 27th day of the 4th Tibetan month of the Iron-Rabbit year, at the order of the Government, our regiment returned to Lhasa and remained there until the time changed (the invasion of Tibet.)

It was widely known that during the battle of Bari, many Chinese soldiers were either killed or wounded. The dead bodies of the Chinese troops remained unattended; they were eaten by dogs and birds, or infested with worms. On the Tibetan side, two soldiers died and some soldiers were wounded.

According to the article titled "One-Thousand Kilometer March by the PLA Advance Troops" published in the first volume of the *Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet*, the author Chen Zeyi recounts the following:

... We continued our march. Overtaking the troops of the Ngadang Regiment at Bari village, we severely assaulted them. Then we headed for Palbar where we crushed the remaining troops of the enemy. . .

He has written such a false story. The Chinese Advance Corps (Nyagla Malag) arrived at Palbar the first time on August 8, 1951 after the 17-Point Sino-Tibetan Agreement¹¹ was signed. Later, many Chinese veterans wrote their accounts full of false stories that completely eclipse the truth. It is therefore very important to examine these and reveal the truth, in order to make the history true and correct.

When the battle of Bari took place, Lhalu was in Kongpo Gyamda. From Lhatse, a capable lieutenant and a section leader were sent to Lhalu to inform him about the above battle, the situation of the enemy and to receive further instruction. They did not shift their camp. Thereafter, they moved to Gyetson Sating Dzong fortress. The regiment's troops at Khyungpo Sertsa were called back through Tsapung Gang and Chamdo, and regrouped at Palbar and Shar Gunli where they put all their efforts towards the defense of that area for several months. During that time, there was no advance move from either the Chinese or Tibetan troops through the area. At that time, the Padang Drongdak Regiment was on defense duty at Lhari Go and Diru in Nagsho.

Since the Tibetan people realized the uncertainty of the Chinese communists' behaviour and aim, they unanimously pleaded to the Dalai Lama to flee to Yabung for the safety of his life. He accepted their request. All the government officials wanted to go with the Dalai Lama, but it was decided that except for the two tutors¹¹ and his chief attendants, the officials who would go with the Dalai Lama would be selected by means of dough-ball divination. A small elite force was selected to accompany him as his bodyguard. Amongst the officials who would stay back at Lhasa, Khenchen Lobsang Tashi and Tsipon Lukhangwa Tsewang Rapten were appointed acting-prime ministers and they were entrusted with the decision-making powers in all the political and military matters, except for very important matters. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on December 9, 1950 for Dromo.

The Dalai Lama's elder brother Taktse Rinpoche was at Kumbum Monastery in Amdo. General Feng Te-hui suddenly flew to Kumbum and sent the Rinpoche to Lhasa, escorted by a Chinese force of six thousand soldiers, to change the Dalai Lama's mind. Taktse Rinpoche managed to leave the Chinese bodyguard behind and went on with some lamas and trulkus (incarnated lamas) following the northern route. In Nagchu, Thupten Sangpo the governor of Northern Tibet arrived at Shachu Kha bank to receive him. On being asked the reason for his coming there, the Rinpoche told him honestly all the instructions given to him by the Chinese. Thupten sent a mounted messenger to Lhasa to inform the government about the same thing. The messenger came back with the message that the Rinpoche could come to Lhasa. Thupten sent a small force to escort the Taktse Rinpoche to Lhasa. The Rinpoche reached there on the eve of the Dalai Lama's flight to Dromo. At that time, Colonel Drongsar Wangdu Gyalpo and his troops, members of the defense force of the Northern Tibet, at the instruction of the government, examined

all travellers to check if there were any Chinese spies among them. He discovered a Chinese couple spying on Tibetans for the Chinese, and arrested them along with their wireless equipment. Some other Chinese who were connected to them were also arrested, and they were all sent to Lhasa with a small Tibetan force.

C. Forceful implementation of the 17-Point Agreement signed on an unequal footing

From Chamdo, Ngabo sent two of his staff to Lhasa to inform the government that he himself would guarantee that PLA troops would not march into Central Tibet and the Dalai Lama's rule and the lives of the government's civil and military officials would not be harmed as long as China and Tibet made a final agreement through peaceful negotiations. At the same time, he asked the government to send its representatives immediately to China for negotiations. Accordingly, the two acting-prime ministers granted Ngabo the power to negotiate with China, but instructed him that he must hold the negotiation in Chamdo itself, and that he should press the Chinese not to send PLA troops further into Tibet from their present base. From Lhasa, Thupten Lekmon and Sampo Sé Tenzin Dhondup were sent to him as his assistant staff.

Since Tibet's issue was extremely urgent, as it failed to gain support in the UN assembly due to British refusal to support it, Dzasak Surkhang Surpa Wangchen Tseten and Khendrung Chophel Thupten were sent from Dromo to Delhi to talk to the Chinese ambassador. The ambassador told them that Peking would be the best venue for the negotiations. Therefore, though the Tibetans intended to hold negotiations in Chamdo, Ngabo and his assistant staff were asked to proceed from Chamdo to Peking via Dartsedo. From Dromo, Dzasak Khemepa Sonam Wangdu and Khendrung Lhautara Thupten Tendar, with Takla Sé Phuntsok Tashi and Sadhu Rinchen as assistant staff, were sent to Peking to assist Ngabo (via India). They were given an official edict that they must not commit any mistakes on the main issue, and they must consult the government in the event of any doubtful and important matters. The Dalai Lama gave them a letter to give to the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, requesting him to give his opinion and advice on the Tibetan issue. They left for Delhi via Calcutta.

As soon as they arrived in Delhi, they went to meet Nehru and told him that Kalon Ngabo and his assistants would leave for Peking from Chamdo to negotiate with the Chinese, and the Dzasak and the Khendrung and their colleagues would soon leave India for Peking via Hong Kong. They requested him to give advice for the benefit of Tibet's future. Nehru replied:

It is very good that Tibetans have decided to negotiate with the Chinese. If Tibet does not accept China's suzerainty, China will never listen to it. So you should pressure mainly to prevent the Chinese troops permanently staying in Tibet. If they permanently stay in Tibet, it would cause great problems to both Tibet and India. You should put efforts into gaining Tibet's self governance.

The Tibetans reiterated the earlier request made by the Tsechag Khenchung and Tsipon Shakabpa to act as a mediator in the Sino-Tibetan negotiations. Regretfully, Nehru refused by saying that the Indian government's policy had changed after the World War II; since Communist China was militarily very powerful India would not be able to mediate on the issue, but India would put pressure on China through foreign relations.

Nehru placed Tibet in the mouth of China merely to protect India and to appease China. His policy on Tibet, far from strengthening the Sino-Indian relationship, led to China's invasion of India from the eastern borders in 1962 and the eruption of the McMahon line controversy that endangered the peaceful co-existence between China and India. Now the Indian government has to spend an exorbitant amount of money on border defense. It is clear that his policy proved more harmful than beneficial to India.

In India, as the *ex officio* acting Commander-in-Chief of Tibet, Dzasak Khemepa was invited to a luncheon by an Army General. A Major-General with a jeep arrived to receive him and his team. Escorted by two motorbike-mounted guards, as a military honour, they were taken in a jeep to the army headquarters of the northern division. As they disembarked from the jeep, they were ushered in by a senior commander and were introduced to all the army officers and then they all sat together for the luncheon.

Dzasak Khemepa and Khendrung, along with their colleagues, after getting a visa from the Chinese embassy, flew to Hong Kong whence they proceeded to Peking. They arrived in Peking on April 26, 1951 and they were accommodated in a guesthouse. Ngabo and his colleagues had already arrived there three weeks earlier. A few days later, a meeting was held, during which Ngabo, keeping in view the grave situation in Tibet, initially put up a five-point proposal to restore peace in Tibet. Later, when the actual negotiations started, he put a ten-point term of negotiations, which was responded negatively by the Chinese. Heated debates took place between the two sides over the terms of negotiations for several days, after which the Chinese tried to coerce the Tibetans to modify their points. The Tibetans however remained adamant, saying that the terms were the main issue concerning their country. Thus, the negotiation process reached an impasse and the meeting was adjourned for several days.

The meeting was resumed after several days. The Chinese representatives gave a seventeen-point document to the Tibetan members and asked them to put their

signatures on it, and threatened them that if they did not sign it, they would have no option other than to resort to military action to liberate the whole of Tibet within a minute, by just sending a wireless message [to Chamdo]. The Tibetan delegation argued through verbal explanations and documented proof in a series of meetings that the entire Tibetan area to the west of Dartsedo, including their inhabitants, had been fully independent. However, let alone accepting the Tibetan terms, they even refused to talk about the Tibetan government.

At the end, Ngabo refused to put the seal of Governor-General of Kham on the document of the “17-Point Agreement”, but the Chinese made a duplicate seal of the Tibetan government and put it on the document on May 23, 1951 and forced the Tibetan representatives to sign the document. However, the Tibetans managed at least to make a separate agreement with the Chinese, on the promise that China would not send more than one division of PLA troops to Tibet.

The 17-Point Agreement,¹² which was completely devoid of equality, freedom and truth, was drafted by the Chinese, without consultation with the Tibetan government. For example, the preamble of the agreement says that by expelling the foreign imperialist forces from Tibet, the Tibetan people should return to their ancient mother country. However, since 1912 when Manchu troops were expelled from Tibet, there were no foreign forces in Tibet in any form. Tibetans had only one ancestral motherland—a new ancestral motherland could not be created.

Regarding the statement in the Agreement that Tibetan is one of the Chinese races, the Tibetan nation and its people and social systems have existed as absolutely distinct and independent from the Chinese since the period of the Tibetan Dharma kings throughout the times of the successive Dalai Lamas. This factual history cannot be erased by any means. Notwithstanding this fact, the Chinese shamelessly distorted the history and invaded Tibet. Since then the Chinese have been trying hard to amalgamate Tibet into China. However, though the truth can be concealed for a short time, it is a natural phenomenon that truth cannot be covered for ever—it will ultimately come to light. It is therefore a birth responsibility of all the Tibetan people to struggle hard until and unless the truth of the Tibetan cause is re-established.

After declaring the 17-Point Agreement, which was drafted by the Chinese unilaterally at their own discretion, without the participation of Tibetans, the Chinese themselves violated the terms mentioned in the agreement. Further, the agreement itself was not based on equality. These facts have been written in the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's autobiography *My Land and My People*, Shakabpa's *Tibet: a Political History* and the memoirs of Sampho Tenzin Dhondup's and Takla Phuntsok Tashi. Since the detail of the agreement is found in these sources, I will not bother to give here the details to avoid consumption of space, but I shall refer it later wherever it is necessary and relevant in the context.

Thereafter, Ngabo wired to the Kashag stating that if the Panchen Rinpoche, who was born in Amdo, was not recognized by the government, the Sino-Tibetan relationship would be strained. The Tashi Lhunpo administration also requested that the government recognize the Panchen Rinpoche. The Dalai Lama thus sanctioned a recognition letter to the Panchen Rinpoche. This is also mentioned in the *My Land and My People*.

After that, with no option left, the Tibetan government announced to its people that the Chinese had come to Tibet only to develop Tibet, rather than to conquer it, and asked all the border forces to return to Lhasa via the southern or northern routes, whichever was convenient. The government did this to appease China. Accordingly, all the Tibetan troops stationed at various Tibetan border areas returned to Lhasa. When the Gyantse troops were returning from Gyaton via Diru, they were kept at Kongpo Gyamda by Lhalu, the former Governor-General of Kham, as his bodyguards for several months. After that, they returned to Lhasa with Lhalu. The Phadang Regiment returned from Khyungpo region, the Drongdak Regiment from Lhari Go and Nagsho Diru and the Cadang Regiment from Nagchu through the northern route. One company of the regiment of Cadang Regiment remained as the bodyguards of the Governor of Northern Tibet.

The soldiers of the Shigatse Regiment stationed at various defense positions and the local militia of Shigatse returned to their homes. The Tadang Derge Regiment went to Chamdo and joined the PLA. The remaining of the Drugna reserves¹² and Drongdak Regiment troops returned home. The Gadang Regiment was restored. The Cadang Dingri Regiment was sent home. The regiments of Kadang, Khadang, Ngadang, Chadang and Dadang were kept in Lhasa for the security of the Dalai Lama and to guard various important government offices and premises.

D. The PLA troops escalate oppression in Lhasa and other parts of the country

Thereafter, the Tibetan delegation led by Kalon Ngabo arrived back in Lhasa from Peking via Chamdo, and Dzadrung's team with the Chinese representative Chang Ching-wu from Peking via Hong Kong and India. The above-mentioned 17-Point Agreement, which was signed by the Tibetans under duress, caused major worry within the Tibetan government as well as the general Tibetan public, because it was uncertain what kind of harm and destruction the PLA would cause to Tibetan religion and the political status of Tibet in the future.

In the meantime, at Dromo, the officials accompanying the Dalai Lama had different opinions as to the question of whether he should return to Lhasa or seek asylum in India. One group of officials argued that the Dalai Lama should

go to India for his own safety and for the temporary and long-term benefit of Tibet's religion and polity, while the other group suggested that he must return to Lhasa and try to solve the Sino-Tibetan crisis by means of a tactful approach and peaceful negotiations with the Chinese. Undecided, the Dalai Lama decided to wait for Dzadrung and the Chinese representatives who were about to arrive at Dromo from India, and then to act in accordance with their report.

A few days later, Dzadrung and his team, with Chang Ching-wu, arrived. Chang explained the points of the 17-Point Agreement which went so far as to make false promises stating that Chinese would cooperatively work with Tibetans to build up modern infrastructures in Tibet, and that the PLA troops would come to Tibet only to help Tibet, not to conquer it. Impressed by his false promises, the Dalai Lama and his entourage decided to return to Lhasa.

On the July 21, 1951, the Dalai Lama and his entourage left Dromo for Lhasa. En route, the local peoples of Phari, Gyantse, Shigatse and other areas along the road came to greet and receive visual blessings of the Dalai Lama. On 17 August, the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhasa amidst a grand official reception ceremony arranged by the Tibetan government, with military parades by different Tibetan regiments. Thereafter, Chang Ching-wu left Dromo on 23 August and reached Lhasa on 8 August. To please him, the Tibetan government offered him a warm reception at Luding Park and a military parade by the Tibetan army. The Tibetan government borrowed Trimon's residence to accommodate him. The two acting prime ministers and other senior officials went to meet him. He pleased everyone by his polite and amicable manner.

Soon after that, Chang asked the two acting prime ministers to make radio announcements that they were happy with the 17-Point Agreement and that they would respect them. Lukhangwa, one of the two acting prime ministers, boldly replied to the effect, "First of all there were discrepancies between the 17-Point Agreement and the points to be announced on the radio. Further, Ngabo was authorized only to hold negotiations with China for peace, not to make any agreements with China on military affairs. Therefore, the matter would be discussed only after the arrival of Ngabo, and after knowing the details of the agreement." Chang's facial expression changed, but he pretended to be unflurried and said that the agreement was drafted by the Tibetan representatives after due discussions.

At that time, a rumor widely circulated in Lhasa that the Chinese troops from Dokham, northeastern Tsinghai and Xinjiang were advancing towards central Tibet. On September 9, 1951, under the command of General Wang Chi-mi, several hundred troops of the 18th Army Corps of PLA arrived in Lhasa. The Tibetan negotiation team headed by Ngabo also arrived in Lhasa around that time. The Tibetan public showed a mood of dissatisfaction to him, calling him as "the one who gave away Chamdo." The Tibetan government started arranging lodging facilities and food supplies for the Chinese army.

Thereafter, a large number of Chinese troops arrived in Lhasa from Chamdo led by Chang Ko-hua, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Corpse of PLA, and Tan Kaun-sen, the Political Commissar. In order to please them, the Tibetan government gave them a warm reception, with military honours, with an empty hope of the improvement to the tense situation of Tibet. Thereafter, there was continuous arrival of PLA troops in Lhasa, batch after batch, and they were sent to Shigatse, Phari, Tsang, Ngari as well as Tibetan areas bordering India, Sikkim and Bhutan. Soon after that, leading a large force, General Fan Ming arrived in Lhasa. As a result, all the sensible Tibetans started fearing and worrying about the fate of Tibet.

With the arrival of a large number of PLA troops in Lhasa, the Tibetan government had to vacate the Tibetan barracks of the regiments of Gadang, Cadang and the Jadang to give space to the Chinese troops. The areas of Stone Lion (Do Senge) and Linga Park were also provided to the Chinese. The Tibetan government found its grain stores insufficient to meet the demand of the Chinese army—it had to borrow grains from monasteries, labrang (lama estates) and rich private estate owners. Soon the supply of grains in the whole country decreased and the price of grains unprecedentedly increased to the extent that there was a real danger of famine in the country. All the empty areas in and around Lhasa were occupied by the Chinese army. The normal life of the Tibetan people was shattered. Day by day, people's anger and hatred towards the Chinese increased. They started singing satirical songs and pasted posters on walls in protest against the Chinese. Representatives of the people approached the Kashag and complained about the Chinese, but the Kashag was helpless. Chinese civil officers, laborers and traders poured into Lhasa and other big cities in large numbers.

The two acting prime ministers and the regent fearlessly asked the Chinese leaders, including Chang Ko-hua, to send all their troops to border places instead of keeping them in Lhasa, saying that the bigger country should not bully the smaller country, and some points of the 17-Point Agreement should be discussed further. The Chinese did not give any reply immediately. A few days later, General Chang Ching-wu, acting at the order of Mao Tse-tung, asked the Tibetan government to send a wireless message to the Chinese government before the founding anniversary of PRC (October 1, 1951), regarding the gift offering ceremony for the Dalai Lama, permission to celebrate the founding anniversary of the PRC in Tibet and acceptance of the 17-point Agreement. The two acting prime ministers in a polite manner, urged him that there must be further discussion on some points of the 17-point Agreement.

Back in Lhasa, Ngabo briefed the Dalai Lama, the two acting prime ministers, the Regent and the Kashag about the 17-Point Agreement. Thereafter, the Full National Assembly was held at the hall of Shabten Lhakhang at Norbulingka. At the meeting, Ngabo spoke in details, in a slightly exaggerated tone, about how

the Chinese invaded Kham and how the 17-Point Agreement was concluded. The assembly said that what Ngabo did was right, as there was no other option for the Tibetan government in accordance with the reality of the situation. The Assembly referred to the following points:

The points no 4, 9 and 12 of the Agreement were acceptable. However, only a small number of PLA troops were needed in Tibet, the rest must be sent to border areas such as Dromo, instead of keeping them in Lhasa. The Tibetans must have the right to voice, in the event of discrepancies in the implementation of the agreement. The functions and powers of the Chinese Military Administrative Committee must be confined only to the maintenance of discipline of the PLA. The development of Tibet and border security must be done in accordance with the need of the situation. The Tibetan government must have the right to interfere directly if the Chinese transgressed any terms of the Agreement. The Chinese should bring reforms appropriate to the practical livelihood of the Tibetan people. Regarding the development of education, they must make sure that no negative influence was brought in. As a simple gesture of accepting the agreement, a wireless message should be sent to Peking before the founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China (1 October). As the negotiating team had done their best, the assembly would like to thank all of them for their good work.

The minutes of the meeting were submitted to the Kashag. Thereafter, Chang Ching-wu repeatedly persuaded the Kashag to wire to Peking to say that the Tibetan government had accepted the 17-Point Agreement. The Kashag handed Chang a three-point term, along with the resolution of the National Assembly, and said that if the Chinese gave a clear and satisfying reply to these terms, the Tibetan government would wire to China informing them that the Tibetan government accepted the Agreement. The three points were:

1. The powers and responsibilities of the Chinese Military Administrative Committee in Tibet;
2. All the regions of Tibet should be united as Tibet, and
3. Chamdo should be immediately returned to the Tibetan government

Chang's reply to the Kashag, as quoted in Ji Youquan's *An Account of Putting Down the Rebellion in Tibet* was as follow:

The Chinese Military Administrative Committee is an office of the Central Government of China with a responsibility to look after the military activities of the PLA. The PLA has about 20,000 troops and they will be sent to Gyantse, Ngari, Kongpo and Nyingtri, and about 4,000 troops will be kept in Lhasa. All the food supplies will be brought from China, and Tibet does not have to provide food for them. The Tibetan army should join the PLA and its soldiers will enjoy the same rights and privileges

as the PLA soldiers. With regard to the unification of the whole of Tibet, the people residing in Sichuan, Kansu, Yunnan and Tsinghai should make their choice through referendum. However, it is impossible to unite under Tibet the areas that had been already liberated and are in the process of development. Concerning Chamdo, if the Central Government of China grants permission, it will be returned to Tibet. The rights and powers of the Dalai Lama will not change. The Central Government will appoint him as the vice chairperson of the Military Administrative Committee.

Thereafter, Chang Ching-wu repeatedly prodded the Tibet government to give its reply to the above proposal, and to wire to the Chinese government regarding the acceptance of the 17-Point Agreement. In response, the Kashag showed him a draft letter to be sent to Peking. Chang modified the letter and forced the Kashag to send it to Peking on September 30, 1951. The Kashag did it accordingly only to appease the Chinese, without consulting the Tibetan National Assembly. Since it was difficult to accept all the terms and proposals of the Chinese, the Kashag said in the letter that the Dalai Lama must put efforts into his monastic education until he completed his examination. At the same time, the Kashag stressed the improvements of the governance, economic and education systems of Tibet and the unification of all the people of the whole of Tibet. This was also mentioned in the memorandum submitted by Ngabo to the Prime Minister Chou En-lai in 1951, after signing the 17-Point Agreement. The Kashag reiterated this to persuade the Chinese to take action. However, the Chinese, far from taking action on it, tried their best to avoid it. The matter subsequently silently vanished as if "a stone was thrown into a lake". Further, the Chinese accused the two acting prime ministers of inciting the people, saying "though people are blamed for all the recent incidences and issues between the Chinese and Tibetans, there must be someone behind them." From that point on, the real face of their imperialism came to the surface.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

1. The ninth Panchen Rinpoche was born in 1938 in today's Xunhua Salar Autonomous County of Qinghai, to Gonpo Tseten and Sonam Dolma, and was given the name Gonpo Tseten. On June 3, 1949, officials of the Ninth Panchen Lama recognized Gonpo Tseten as the tenth incarnation of the Panchen Lama. He was enthroned on June 11, 1949 in Amdo (Qinghai) under the auspice of Chinese officials, after the Kuomintang administration approved the selection. In 1951, he was invited to Beijing at the time of the arrival a Tibetan delegation that was finally forced to sign the 17-Point Agreement, and was forced to send a telegram requesting the Dalai Lama to implement the Agreement. He was recognized by the 14th Dalai Lama, when they met in 1952.

After a tour through Tibet, in May 1962, he met Chou Enlai (Zhou Enlai) to discuss a petition he had written, criticizing the situation in Tibet. The petition was a 70,000-character document that dealt with the brutal suppression of the Tibetan people during and after the Chinese invasion of Tibet.

The initial reaction was positive, but in October 1962, the PRC authorities dealing with the population criticized the petition. Chairman Mao called the petition... "a poisoned arrow shot at the Party by reactionary feudal overlords." In 1964, he was imprisoned. The Panchen's situation worsened when the Cultural Revolution began.

In October 1977, he was released but held under house arrest in Beijing until 1982. After his release, he was considered by the PRC authorities to be politically rehabilitated and he then rose to important positions. He served as Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress. In 1979, he married a Han Chinese woman and in 1983 they had a daughter, Yabshi Pan Rinzin Wangmo. In 1989, the 10th Panchen Lama died "under mysterious circumstances" from an alleged heart attack in Shigatse at the age of 51.

2. Full Tibetan title: Bod kyi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad gzhi'i rgyu cha bsdams bsgrigs published by Tibet Xinhua Publishing House.
3. Drichu is called Yangtse by Chinese. It was a defacto border between Tibet and China at that time.
4. The Chinese coined English term to refer to those who speak or act against the Chinese government's policy of national integrity.
5. Author's note: He is currently based in Dharamsala, India, and popularly called Kusung Rupon Sotrey-la, or the Colonel Sotrey-la of the Bodyguard Regiment.
6. See, *A Tibetan Revolutionary - The Political Life and Times of Baba Phuntsok Wangyal* by Melvyn Goldstein, Dawai Sherap and William R. Siebensschuh
7. Nga phod ngar nas thegs song//
Chab mdo bskyal nas slebs song//
Mi bzang brgya yi nang nas//
go chod mu bya' mda' dpon//
8. Sde sras va rus gtso byas//
'Jab chung skar chung mda' dpon//
Khams phyogs dmag sgar nang nas//
Btsog pa'i dri ngan 'khyer byung//
Sngar song snga mo'i sku drag//
Stag gzig dom dred yog red//
Da cha pha ra spyang kis//
Chab srid rlung la bskur song//
9. Sngar song snga mo'i sku drag//
Stag gzig dom dred yog red//

- Da cha pha ra spyang kis//
Chab srid rlung la bskur song//
10. Tag tag rgyal pos bzos song//
Stag lung brag gis bzos song//
Phul song la dang phul song//
Rtsab ral phyag la phul song//
Rgyal srid cha min ya do//
Sku mdun phyag la phul song//
11. See appendix no. 13
12. A collection of troops from all the regiments, 1 each from 6 soldiers.

Chapter Fifteen

Tibetan Resistance Movements



A. Series of Resistance Movements

The Tibetan government provided food grains, accommodation, transportation and other facilities to the Chinese in the best possible ways, charging just nominal charges, fully expecting the Chinese to stick to their words. Despite that, Chinese General Chang Ching-wu and Chang Ko-hua repeatedly pestered the two acting prime ministers and the Kashag, constantly demanding more supply of food grains. Lukhangwa, one of the two acting prime ministers, told them that the Tibetan government was not able to supply more grains to the Chinese, since its own people were facing an acute shortage of grains, and said sarcastically, “It is more painful to remain hungry than to suffer defeat in a battle!” Afterwards, at a Sino-Tibetan meeting (*rgya bod lhan tshogs*), the Chinese said that they were going to gather all the Tibetan soldiers who had scattered in various parts of Kham and those who had returned to their homes, and that the Chinese themselves would give training and food to the soldiers. Lukhangwa objected, saying, “There is a Tibetan proverb: ‘If a gold image hurts your head, it is no blessing; if your close relatives humiliate you, there is nothing to feel joy about.’¹ Since our wounds have not yet been healed, how can we receive training from you? Instead of that, you should first return Chamdo to us.”

The Chinese responded, “During the liberation of Chamdo, both the Chinese and Tibetans were either killed or wounded—we won’t talk about it. We can discuss later whether or not we should return Chamdo to Tibet, after consulting the wishes of its people.”

Following this, the two acting ministers and the cabinet ministers held a meeting, at which Lhalu said, “Previously, during the Sino-Tibetan meeting, the two acting prime ministers spoke very harshly. We did not know what to say at that time. So in future, it is important that we must be careful and we should have proper discussions before we express our views to the Chinese.” A few days later, the Tibetan and the Chinese officials met for a meeting during which the Chinese insisted the Kashag appoint two Tibetan officers to the PLA. As per the instruction of the Dalai Lama, the Kashag deputised Kalon Ngabo and Dokhar Phuntsok Rabga to the PLA, in the hope of improving the Sino-Tibetan relations.

Just before the founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China (1 October), the two Chinese officials [Chang Ching-wu and Chang Ko-hua] told the Kashag that the Tibetan army must carry the Chinese flag during the military parade on the ceremony day. The Kashag immediately reported this to the two acting prime ministers, who objected, saying, "The Tibetan army must carry the Tibetan national flag; there is no reason for us to carry the Chinese flag." The ministers again met to discuss the matter, and they took the unanimous view that if the Chinese flag was not carried on the ceremony day, it would harm the Sino-Tibetan relations. They went to the two acting prime ministers and told them their views, and discussed the matter with them. Finally, the Kashag asked the Tibetan army to carry both the Chinese and Tibetan flags at equal height during the ceremony, just to avoid hurting the Chinese. However, the Tibetan soldiers, who were reluctant to carry the Chinese flag, deliberately used a crooked staff for the Chinese flag, carried an incomplete flag or carried the flag upside down during the ceremony. Therefore, Chinese and Tibetan officials met and summoned the army leaders and rebuked them harshly, saying that they were not allowed to do such things in future that would cause more harm than benefit.

For several years after that, the Tibetan and Chinese armies held military sports at every festival as a gesture of friendship between the Chinese and Tibetans. During the sport competitions, the Tibetan spectators used to cheer in support of the Tibetan soldiers and shout bad words to the Chinese soldiers, showing their dislike of them. The Chinese officials were much offended. Later, due to political reasons, the sports events were called off.

The Chinese in Tibet soon escalated their aggression, and disregarded and disrespected the laws and customs of Tibet. This greatly angered the Tibetan people in all parts of Tibet, including Lhasa, so much so that they started to have petty confrontations with the Chinese. The Chinese, without any reason, opened fire, killing several people, and arrested many innocent people as they wished. Moreover, due to their large presence, the supply of grains and domestic commodities fell in short supply in the country, and their prices increased terribly, causing great difficulty to the people.

In February 1952, people founded an anti-communist association called the People's Association at Shide in Lhasa. Its main members were Chandzo Damcho Sonam, Chagdrung Lodro Phuntsok and Dzopa Ngawang Tenpa of Sera Me College; Drubthob-la of Drepung Gomang; Guge Jamyang Dawa of Drepung Loseling; Chondze Phuntsok Tashi of Karmekhang; Tsarong lady Kunsang-la²; Ngon Lungpa's brother Godzo Nyerpa; Jarig Jolag Jigme Namgyal; and Tongsum Jolag. The Tibetan army's representatives in this association included Captain Kalsang Dradul and Major Japhok of the Drapchi Regiment and Lieutenant Lhakpa Gokey and Lieutenant Kharsam Namgyal Wangdu of the Gyantse Regiment. There

were many lay and monk members in it. I shall explain briefly how the People's Association was founded. Considering the Chinese actions, behaviour and words, there was a grave danger that they would soon launch military attacks on Tibetans. Therefore, some patriotic Tibetans, after making contact and holding discussions amongst themselves informally, decided to assemble at the park of Jaraglingka in Lhasa on the first day of the second Tibetan month. On the appointed day, led by the above main members of the People's Association, also called the Anti-Communist Association, more than one hundred Tibetans gathered at the park.

Preceded by a simple ceremony in the traditional way in front of the Jarag statue, they began their meeting. The main resolution of the meeting was "The presence of the Chinese forces in Tibet is very harmful to Tibet, both at present and in the future, so if they do not leave Tibet immediately, the People's Association must appeal repeatedly to the Sino-Tibetan committee." They also discussed how to organize resistance movements in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet. Dre Guge Jamyang Dawa-la volunteered to lend his monastic building at Shide Monastery to make an office, where the regular members of the Association could meet. Some of the capable members amongst them were selected as regular members and assistant staff, all of whom volunteered to meet and work at Shide at their own expense. The members met at Shide on several days and drafted documents and letters to be submitted to the Sino-Tibetan committee. The Association had also many patriotic *dobdob* (rough monks)³ and monk volunteers from the Three Monastic Seats, including Dodbod Wangdu Chungchung, a popular *dobdob* in Lhasa; Margo from Sera Lhopa House; Serngag Neuli; Serngag Khyung; and Dre Garshing Samdup, Dre Khugang Wangdu, Dre Nyangoi Dragyagdo, Dre Gomang Shamthab Ngongpo, Dre Lubum Kalsang and Dre Gungru Dechok from Drepung Monastery.

When the Association was formed, traders, people and monks from Lhasa and many monastic estates and monasteries led by the Three Monastic Seats started giving support and material contributions regularly. At that time, a rumour spread widely that the Association had decided to fight the Chinese continuously if no action was taken about the petition they submitted to the Sino-Tibetan committee. Many volunteer monks from the Three Monastic Seats and other nearby monasteries rushed to Lhasa. The number of volunteer people in Lhasa increased greatly, and they secretly procured and amassed weapons. From the situation, it appeared that war was impending. Both the Chinese and Tibetan armies were busy preparing for war; they constructed fortifications and mobilized troops. All the regiments of the Tibetan army were instructed through their leaders to remain fully alert and ready for the possibility of war, and the troops accordingly remained prepared.

On March 6, 1952, the People's Association submitted a six-point memorandum to the Sino-Tibetan committee at the former residence of Sadhutsang in Lhasa, stating things such as if the Chinese troops lived in Tibet permanently it would

create more harm than benefit to Tibet, and that except for a few Chinese officials, all the Chinese, civilians and troops must go back to China. Chang Ching-wu asked Kalon Lhalu to read the letter. The Chinese took photographs of the members who came to submit the letter. Chang then asked them to return to their homes, telling them that he would give them a reply after the matter was discussed at the meeting. The members returned and waited for a positive reply.

To get international support through their counterpart Tibetan group in Kalimpong, the Association secretly sent Chondze Phuntsok Tashi of Karmekhang and Wangchuk with letters to India, on the pretext of going to Shigatse. Unfortunately the secret leaked out, and they were arrested by the Chinese at Tanag Rinchen Tse before they reached Shigatse. They were imprisoned in Shigatse for more than forty days, and then taken to Lhasa where they were detained at Yabshi Langdun residence for a short time.

In Lhasa, people pasted on the walls of Barkor and streets posters bearing slogans such as “Chinese troops go back to China” and “We do not accept the forced Seventeen-Point Agreement.” Curfew was imposed in the city and only the Tibetan police force, soldiers and civilian-dressed volunteer monks, who were patrolling the city, were seen moving around in Lhasa. The next day, the Sino-Tibetan committee met at the old residence of Sadhutsang and discussed the letter submitted by the People’s Association. The Chinese and Tibetan members had heated arguments about the petition during the meeting, which took the whole day. The Chinese blamed the Tibetan government for having a hand in it. After the meeting, the Chinese officials out of great fear started to mobilize troops within Lhasa. Chang called Kalon Ngabo and Lhalu to his residence for his protection, saying that there were many people dressed in army uniforms around his residence. The Chinese accused the two acting prime ministers of masterminding the actions of the People’s Association and threatened the Kashag that if the members of the Association were not arrested and their activities stopped, the Kashag would bear the responsibility for any dire consequences resulting out of that.

Therefore, to avoid disruption of the Sino-Tibetan relations and any trouble, the Kashag arrested the five main leaders of the People’s Association and detained them at Lhasa Police Station at Tromsig Khang for a few days. The Kashag also issued an order through the Lhasa mayor and police headquarters that all the Tibetans who had come to Lhasa from different parts of Tibet must immediately return to their homes. Everyone obeyed the order and the situation calmed down. Kalon Surkhang and Tekhang Khenchung were instructed to investigate the five leaders of the Association. The two did not pass any particular judgment on the five leaders, but asked the Kashag to order them not to organize such meetings in the future.

Sometime after that, a large number of Chinese labors arrived in Tibet to work on the construction of motor roads joining Qinghai and Lhasa through Dartsedo

and Lanchou, and Lhasa through Qinghai, and an airport at Dram. Under Chinese pressure, the Tibetan government had to order all the Tibetan districts to send a fixed number of people from each district to work on the Chinese road and airport construction projects. The Chinese gave the Tibetan workers only meager wages and the respective districts had to give each Tibetan worker 6 or 7 *dotsey* (a monetary unit) per month. Many Tibetan soldiers from the Drapchi and the Gyantse Regiments were employed at construction of roads from Lhadong Shengkha boat crossing to Samchen bridge for several months, but they were given only nominal wages.

The Chinese increased intervention in the internal affairs of the Tibetan government and worsened their rude behaviours. Whenever the Chinese officials approached the Dalai Lama for important matters, they showed unhappiness at the presence of the two acting prime ministers around the Dalai Lama. During the series of meetings of the Sino-Tibetan committee, the Chinese strongly urged that as per the "17-Point Agreement", the time had come to absorb the Tibetan army into the PLA, and that the young Tibetan soldiers should be sent to the Chinese army camps for training. They further demanded that the Chinese flag must be flown at the Tibetan Army Headquarters and camps. Lukhangwa, without fear or hesitation, objected to this, saying that their demands were unacceptable because such things would destroy the Tibetan national identity and contradict the wishes of the Tibetan people. The Chinese shouted back loudly. A Chinese official named Pan Siling angrily stated, "We will hoist our flag at any cost." Lukhangwa retorted, "Even if you fly your flag a hundred times, Tibetans will pull it down a hundred times. Moreover, in the 17-Point Agreement, you have said that you have come here from China to develop Tibet, and you have not come to rule us against the wishes of the Tibetan people. Tibet is an independent country. Now we have no more need of the Chinese military and civil officers, you must all go back." In reply, the Chinese said, "You two acting prime ministers are causing hostilities between the Tibetan and Chinese. You two must resign from your posts. If not, we will request the Dalai Lama to remove you from your office."

Lukhangwa answered, "If the Chinese tell us to resign, we will never do it. If the Dalai Lama finds us wrong and tells us to jump down from a cliff or to jump into a river, we will obey him without hesitation."

At that point, Chang Ching-wu pretended to mediate in the altercation and said, "What Pan Siling said just now was slightly wrong and you should not be affected by it."

This was the last Sino-Tibetan committee meeting participated in by the two acting prime ministers. As a matter of great sadness, at all the ensuing series of Sino-Tibetan meetings, the other Tibetan ministers were very cautious, and they either dared not argue with the Chinese, or to support Lukhangwa. The Chinese did not find any faults in the two acting prime ministers to remove them, except to

criticize them as very patriotic and standing firm with their stand for their nation. They therefore made trivial accusations against them and circulated various baseless rumours about them, saying things such as that the two were in collaboration with the foreign imperialist forces. They pressured the Kashag to impeach the two. Chang Ching-wu submitted a strong worded petition to the Dalai Lama to this effect. The Kashag also suggested that the Dalai Lama should ask the two acting prime ministers to resign. Therefore, with a view to improve the Sino-Tibetan relations, the Dalai Lama, with a heavy heart, advised the two prime ministers to resign. These two courageous and wise acting prime ministers, who were respected and praised by all their people, resigned from their offices and duties on April 27, 1952.

Before his resignation, during a meeting of the Chinese and Tibetan officials, Lukhangwa said, "There were no foreign imperialists in Tibet except the Chinese themselves, who threatened our frontiers first and then invaded our country. Tibet is an independent nation from many centuries back. Though the Chinese claim that they have come to Tibet to develop Tibet, they have so far done nothing for the benefit of Tibet, except doing harm. Our people are increasingly angry about the Chinese behaviour." Angered, Chang Ching-wu rushed to the Kashag office and reiterating Lukhangwa's statement, spoke very harshly with threatening words to the members of the Kashag. In his autobiography *My Land and My People*, the Dalai Lama states,

Those who have experienced foreign invasion will understand how these tragic events took place. Invaders come under the pretext of coming to help you, but it is difficult to understand their goal.

On April 29 of the same year [1952], when Panchen Rinpoche Chokyi Gyaltsen, accompanied by his retinue and escorted by a large Chinese force, arrived at Nagchu from Qinghai on his way to Tashi Lhunpo, the Tibetan government sent representatives to arrange an official reception for him. A cavalry of 100 soldiers of the Cadang Dingri Regiment, under the command of Captain Tamdin, was dispatched from Nagchu to escort him. Upon arrival in Lhasa, he was greeted with a grand official reception by the Tibetan government, with a military parade by the Tibetan army, lines of devout people and processions by lamas of various monasteries. He was then ushered into the upper chamber of the Potala Palace. Having finished his activities in Lhasa, he left for Shigatse. The Tibetan government sent its representatives to see him off, and a detachment of Dingri Regiment escorted him to his monastery. The government sent a special envoy Kalon Lama Rampa Thupten Kunkhen, along with some assistants, to Tashi Lhunpo to present ceremonial gifts for the enthronement ceremony of the Panchen Rinpoche.

The Chinese, around that time, under false pretenses took many government officials, elite people and monks from Lhasa and other districts and monasteries, and many youths to China for adventure or education in order to brainwash and

indoctrinate them with communist ideology. Notwithstanding the hard attempts of the Chinese, most of them remained uninfluenced, but instead emerged as anti-communists, the exact opposite to what the Chinese wanted.

In accordance with the wishes of the Dalai Lama, a Full National Assembly was held at the Evam Hall on the upper floor of the Potala Palace to discuss the reform plans of the Dalai Lama. After thorough deliberation, the meeting set up a reform committee. A five-point decree was issued on the 17th day of the first Tibetan month of the Wood-Horse year [1954] to be followed by all the people of Tibet, high and low, old and young, monks and lay. The full body of the edict has been quoted in the Shakabpa's *Political History of Tibet*. The Dalai Lama had other farsighted plans to introduce land reforms in a gradual and smooth manner for the benefit of the common people. However, due to obstructions created by the Chinese civil and military officials in Tibet, who did not want to let the Dalai Lama implement his reform plans, hence the farsighted plans of the Dalai Lama remained unaccomplished.

At that time, the Dadang Regiment, after serving as police force in Lhasa, returned to Lhanam Phunsom, and in their place came the troops of the Ngadang Regiment from Gyantse. After one year, they were replaced by the Chadang Simchung Regiment.

In 1954, India and China signed the Panch Sheel in China, a five-point treaty on trade and intercourse between Tibet and India. In accordance with this agreement, the trade mart at Gartog, and India-Lhasa telegraphic lines and telephones that were previously handed over to the Tibetan and Indian governments by the British government after India won its independence, were then handed over commonly to China, Tibet and India in the presence of their representatives. In that year, the British troops who had been kept at Gyantse Changlo, Dromo and Nadong as bodyguards for the British trade agents were withdrawn and the hospitals which had remained there even after Indian independence were closed.

On May 11, 1954, at the invitation of the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche left for China. They first proceeded from Lhasa up to Kongpo Gyamda in a jeep and then on horseback up to Powo Tramo. From there, they again travelled in a jeep up to Xian town, whence they journeyed by train by way of Kham, arriving in Peking on July 7. They were received warmly by Chu Teh, Prime Minister Chou Enlai and some other senior Chinese leaders.

On May 16, 1954, a bad omen occurred: Tari Lake at Nyingru in the upper Gyantse burst, causing the overflow of the Nyangchu River, destroying thousands of houses and lives of people and livestock of the villages located along the bank of the river, including the upper and lower Nyingru, Goshi, Gyantse, Panam and Shigatse. The office of the Indian Trade Agent and its garrison at Gyantse Changlo was swayed, and all the civil and military personnel who had not returned to India were killed by flood, except a few of them who managed to escape.

In 1955, while in China, the Dalai Lama met Chinese President Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders and foreign dignitaries. En route back to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama gave advice to the local Tibetan people of both lay and monastic communities. On June 30, 1956, he reached Lhasa. On October 20 that year, the first mechanized units of the Red Army arrived in Lhasa by way of Kham. This caused major concerns among the people and nobody was happy with the successful operation of the motor roads in the country. The Chinese created many new route names, such as Tsinghai-Tibet Road and Kham-Tibet Road in order to destroy the integrity of Tibet and its population. This further angered the people.

In the same year, the Tibetan officials who had accompanied the Dalai Lama to China called a meeting at Tsedrunlingka Park in Lhasa, which was attended by all the civil and military officials of the government, officials and representatives from the Three Monastic Seats and representatives of people. They announced a report on their tour to China and recounted what had transpired in China with regard to the relationship between the government and the Panchen Rinpoche's monastic estate and what matters had remained pending. They announced that 500 bodyguard soldiers and an elite force of 500 troops would be kept in Lhasa as police force, and the rest of the Tibetan soldiers would be sent home, unless there was need of them. They further said that it was decided to set up a Preparatory Committee for Tibetan Autonomous Region (PCTAR) in place of the Chinese Military Administrative Committee.

The announcement raised serious concerns among the officers and soldiers of the Tibetan army based in Lhasa over the safety of the Dalai Lama, and the political and religious status of Tibet. A committee of Tibetan army commanders made strong appeal to the Kashag through both written and verbal communication through the Army's Headquarters, saying:

Although it is difficult for the government to expand and maintain the Tibetan army, it is a pathetic and bad step to withdraw the present Tibetan army under the influence of Chinese communist deception. Though the concerned authorities have the power to do so, we the army members who are returning home are not at all happy to go. Even if the government does not provide us with salary and uniforms, at such a time as this, when the political and religious affairs of the Ganden Phodrang Government in general and the life of His Holiness is in extreme danger, we feel that it is our one and only duty to protect them by responding tit for tat with the enemy. Therefore, we ask the government to allow the present army regiments to continue their service and we ourselves will arrange our own food and expenses, instead of receiving them from the government.

However, under the pressure of the Chinese, the Kashag did not accept their request and told them, harshly and gently, that they had already decided to dissolve the

Tibetan army. Desperate army leaders again met to discuss the best solutions, and decided to consult a divination. One day about ten colonels and captains as the representatives of the army went to consult an oracle at Tsangral near and east of Drapchi. The oracle performed a trance, and told them that they should not turn away from initiating important tasks for the benefit of the Dharma and polity, and they would surely accomplish their big task. Therefore, the army leaders again met at Drapchi and agreed to appeal to the Dalai Lama personally, and follow his advice. They prepared a petition, reiterating their past actions, and saying, "Since the welfare of religion and polity of Tibet, especially the life of His Holiness, is in extreme danger, although it is difficult to expand and develop the army, kindly allow the present army regiments to continue their service at their own expense." The petition bore the names of the officers and seals of all the respective army regiments.

A few days later, the Dalai Lama was invited to Tsurpu Labrang in Tolung. Taking that opportunity, Lieutenant Tashi Dhondup of the Khadang Regiment, Lieutenant Pema Gyalpo of the Ngadang Regiment and Lieutenant Sonam Wangdu of the Chadang Regiment as the army representatives made a direct approach to the Dalai Lama at Tsurpu Monastery, and submitted the petition. The Dalai Lama took the petition and told them that he would give them a reply as soon as possible. The three representatives returned to their camps. Less than a month later, the government conducted a special examination of the matter. At the end, it issued an order, allowing the army regiments to remain as before and ordering the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to take responsibility for the expansion and development of the army. Moreover, the soldiers were paid their salaries of the past six months that had been pending since the Dalai Lama went to China. Khenchung Lokal was appointed the new Commander-in-Chief. All the vacancies left by sick, dead and discharged soldiers of all the regiments were filled by recruiting new soldiers, and the required strength of the army was restored. Modes of military training were improved. Weapons and army salaries were procured and improved. The Shigatse and the Dingri regiments were reestablished and made ready to be deployed for war, anytime and anywhere. Those soldiers who were at their homes were also instructed to remain ready for deployment in the event of necessity. Anyhow, the above incidence (the government's announcement to dissolve the Tibetan Army) turned out to be a blessing in disguise to the Tibetan army and the Army revived successfully.

After that, the representatives of the People's Association, including Bumthang Drungyig Gyaltzen Lobsang, Alo Chondze Tsering Dorji and Shigatse Lhabchug Drakpa Trinle met in Lhasa and submitted a six-point memorandum to the Kashag and the Sino-Tibetan committee:

1. The Chinese Communists are forcefully employing tens of thousands of Tibetans in the construction of the motor road from Dartsedo to Tsinghai and construction of an airport in northern Tibet.
2. Due to the extreme number of Chinese civil and military officials and troops in Tibet, the price of domestic commodities has increased, creating tremendous difficulties to the poor.
3. It is impossible for the Tibetan people to accept that the Tibetan Army will be absorbed into the People's Liberation Army, the Tibetan currency will be withdrawn and Tibetan coins and paper currency will no longer be printed.
4. If the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) were to be established, not only would it factionalize Tibet, but the traditional offices of the cabinet, the secretariat, the treasurer and so forth would gradually decline.
5. Reforms have been forcibly instituted in Kham and Amdo in eastern Tibet, and the farmers had to escape into the mountains and forests, like flies from a fire.
6. There were a variety of accounts that the Chinese, according to their own wishes, did not abide by the agreement which they forcibly enacted against us.

It is therefore important that we should not do such things as, "feeling proud of swimming when we are being carried away by water."⁴

The Chinese were greatly disturbed by this petition. In 1956, during the Great Prayer Festival, the whole city of Lhasa was filled with leaflets, and walls were pasted with posters in protest of the Chinese. Following this, in fear of the Chinese reaction, the Kashag arrested the three leaders of the People's Association on the false charge of having had connection with the foreign imperialist countries, and imprisoned them in the Tibetan police station at Tromsig Khang. Shigatse Lhabchug Drakpa, one of the arrested members, died in prison. The Chinese strongly demanded that the Tibetan government prosecute the other two. However, at the request of the Three Monastic Seats—Sera, Drepung and Ganden—the government released the two prisoners and at the same time issued an order bearing the seal of the Dalai Lama that they were not allowed to organize the People's Association in future. In this respect, in his autobiography *My Land and My People*, the Dalai Lama said,

Though they [members of the People's Association] were doing those things out of concern for their religion and polity, it was in fact similar to suicide from their side. So there was no option but to prevent them from doing such things.

After this, the Chinese intensified their ruthless actions.

From the past and present actions and behaviour of the Chinese, there was a great danger that they were going to seize Tibet's right for independence militarily. Therefore, with the hope of getting international support, the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup, Khenchung Lobsang Gyaltzen and Tsipon Shakabpa who

were at that time at Kalimpong in Sikkim, appealed to the United Nations. After that, three tseprung officials—Thupten Nyinje, Jampa Wangdu and Jampa Tsondu—voluntarily went to Kalimpong secretly to assist the above Tibetan representatives.

In that year (1956), the Chinese created the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) with the Dalai Lama as the Chairman, the Panchen Rinpoche and Chang Ching-wu as the vice-chairmen, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme headquarters as the secretary and about 51 representatives from villages and monasteries from Shigatse, Chamdo and other districts of Tibet. On March 12, 1956, led by Vice-Premier Chen Yi, many Chinese officials arrived in Lhasa to ceremonially inaugurate the committee (PCTAR).

The PCTAR had merely superficial administrative responsibilities of religion, education, economy, trade, transportation and the army; the actual power of the appointment of members of the committee lay in the hands of the Chinese government, in contrast to any rules and other systems of the world. Moreover, for important matters, PCTAR had no power to make decisions; it had to refer to the [Chinese] Tibet Work Committee⁵. The main purpose of creating a separate PCTAR was to strip the powers of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. The disguised evil inherent in this Chinese policy became apparent later from their actions. The Chinese also followed the policy of “divide and rule” by creating different administrative offices in Tibet such as Tibet-Sichuan Committee, Tsinghai-Tibet Committee and Shigatse-Nanjing Committee, Chamdo Liberation Committee, Tsinghai Autonomous Region and so on, intended to destroy the unity and integrity of Tibet and the Tibetan people, so as to prevent the growth of the unified power of Tibet in the future.

The Chinese soon started forced reforms in Dotö and Domé, and they said that they had postponed democratic reforms in TAR temporarily, because the Dalai Lama had told them it was not the right time. The Chinese actions further added to the Tibetan peoples’ anger and hatred towards the Chinese. Initially, the Tibetans in Dotö and Domé revolted against the Chinese, and some of them even engaged in guerilla warfare on the Chinese. As a result, the regions were full of violence and disturbances that many people were forced to flee to U-Tsang in the hope of better situation.

In that year, at the time when the Dalai Lama granted the great initiation of the Avalokiteshvara at Norbulingka, he gave very meaningful and courageous advice to the Tibetan government officials in general and the public, both lay and monastic, a short excerpt of which is as below:

The Chinese have come to help the Tibetans, not to become our leaders. If we are able to work efficiently, they will go back to their country. We can send them back if they are autocratic and treat us badly. The Tibetan and Chinese people are equal—Chinese are not our lords and we are not their servants. All the Tibetan people, both lay and monastic, must work together and put concentrated efforts towards our common goal...

After that [in 1956], the Dalai Lama was planning to attend the Buddha Jayanti, an extraordinary occasion of the 2,500th *parinirvana* of the Buddha, in India jointly organized by the Indian government and the Mahabodhi Society of India, as he had already accepted the invitation for this event the previous year. The Chinese government tried to prevent the Dalai Lama's trip, by telling him that he had many important works in the PCTAR and he should send someone else as his representative to attend the ceremony. However, many monasteries of different Buddhist schools and people pleaded to the Dalai Lama to attend the ceremony. Besides, the Indian government directly requested the Chinese government for permission. Therefore, the Chinese felt unable to prevent the Dalai Lama's trip. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche then decided to attend the ceremony. Chang Ching-wu emphatically instructed the Tibetan officials who were accompanying the Dalai Lama that when they met foreign media persons in India they should tell them that the Chinese had helped and made developments in Tibet, and that Tibetans were happy to return to the great motherland of China, but not to speak about the revolts and violence that had taken place in eastern Tibet. He further told them that they must not meet any foreign dignitaries and reactionary people (Tibetans) in India, and that they must be cautious of them all the time. He instructed them thus, harshly nor gently.

The Dalai Lama was accompanied by his retinue, including his two tutors⁶ and cabinet ministers Kalon Surkhang, Dokharwa and Ngabo. He was joined by the Panchen Rinpoche and his retinue from Shigatse. At Nathu-la pass, the party was received by Indian representatives, who ushered him into the royal palace of Sikkim. On November 24, 1956, they proceeded to Siliguri from where they flew to Delhi. They were received warmly by the Indian Vice-President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan [1888-1975]⁷, Prime Minister Nehru and many other senior Indian leaders, as well as foreign diplomats and heads of various Buddhist organizations of the world. After that, he [along with the Vice-President] went to meet the Indian President Dr. Rajendra Prasad [1884-1963]⁸ at his residence (Rashtrapati Bhavan). Then, he proceeded to the Hyderabad House where his accommodation had been arranged. The Panchen Rinpoche and his entourage arrived in Delhi on the next plane, and they were accorded the same reception and then were led Kota House, where they were to stay.

The next day, the Dalai Lama and his entourage went to offer garlands and scarves at the monument for Mahatma Gandhi [at Rajghat], the father of India, followed by a meeting with the Indian Vice-President and Prime Minister Nehru at their residences. After that, both the President and Vice-President, and the Prime Minister visited the Dalai Lama at his residence and they had a very cordial and frank conversation. Thereafter, the Dalai Lama daily attended the seminar attended by representatives of various Buddhist groups and countries, scholars

and members of the United Nation's UNESCO organization⁹. On November 29, instead of reading the speech prepared for him by the Chinese, he gave his own speech at the conference.

At that time, members of the Tibetan Welfare Association submitted a petition dated first day of the eleventh Tibetan month of the Fire-Monkey year [1956] addressed to the Dalai Lama and his ministers. The petition said to the effect, "For best, kindly stay in India until all the Chinese civil and military officers leave Tibet. If not, efforts should be made to amend the articles of the 17-Point Agreement by Chinese and Tibetan on equal footing. Besides, negotiation with the Chinese to stop all kinds of reforms in Tibet, which were against the wishes of the people and to stop military suppression in Dotö and Domé should be done in India, and as long as the Chinese do not make guaranteed moves, the Dalai Lama should stay in India." Fearing that the Dalai Lama would remain in India, the Chinese Prime Minister Chou Enlai immediately flew from Beijing to Delhi. The Dalai Lama told Chou Enlai details of the Tibetan issue. The Kashag also talked with him on the Tibetan issue. Mao Tse-tung suddenly announced that reforms in Tibet had been postponed for six years, and it could be delayed further for ten or fifteen years depending on the wishes of the Tibetan people, and that the reforms could even be cancelled if the Tibetans were not willing to proceed. He also promised to call back all the Chinese civil and military officials from Tibet. Chou Enlai and other Chinese leaders assured the Kashag members who were with the Dalai Lama that they would keep their word. The Chinese did all this merely because they feared Tibet would become an international issue if the Dalai Lama stayed in India, and practically they did not keep their words, as will be explained below.

In India, hoping that the Chinese would stick to their promises, the Dalai Lama and his retinue decided to return to Lhasa. The ministers accompanying the Dalai Lama told the Tibetan Welfare Association [in Kalimpong] that it was not the right situation for the Dalai Lama to stay in India, and that they would directly talk with the Chinese government on Tibet's issues. The ministers told them further that everyone should work together without hesitation for the benefit of the Tibetan cause and that they should consult the Tibetan government directly in the event of need for suggestions and advice. The Association submitted a four-point suggestion to the Kashag for action concerning future policies on Tibet's issues. The Kashag replied that they would continue the negotiation that was initiated in India, when they arrived back in Lhasa. The Association published and circulated a document, recounting everything they had told the Kashag in India, and asking the people in Lhasa and all the districts of Tibet to emphasize and reiterate the points to the Kashag. In his autobiography *My Land and My People*, the Dalai Lama has stated clearly about what he had in his mind at that time, what discussions he had with Indian Prime Minister Nehru on the Tibetan issue, what promises Chou Enlai made

to him and what conversations took place between Chou Enlai and the Dalai Lama's two elder brothers Thupten Jigme Norbu and Gyalo Thondup at the banquet hosted by Chou Enlai.

The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche, along with their entourages, made pilgrimages to various holy places and visited many different cities of India. Thereafter, as invited by the Tibetan communities of Kalimpong and Darjeeling, the Dalai Lama visited these places and stayed at Phodrang Migyur Ngonga for a week as a special guest of Rani Choying Wangmo. He bestowed the initiation of the Avalokiteshvara to the people. The Panchen Rinpoche and Kalon Ngabo flew back to Tibet.

In Kalimpong, the acting minister Yuthok Tashi Dhondup, the acting Khendrung Ngawang Dhondup and the former acting-Prime Minister Lukhangwa sought an audience with the Dalai Lama and urged him to see that it would be beneficial for Tibet's future if he stayed in India, until and unless there was lasting peace and stability in Tibet. However, the Dalai Lama believed that if he pursued the discussions he had with Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Chou Enlai, he could bring greater benefits to the country and its people, and he left Gangtok on February 14, 1957 for Lhasa.

The government, private and monastic officials and the public of Nathu-la pass, Dromo, Phari, Gyantse and Shigatse along the route greeted the Dalai Lama with an elaborate reception. He granted religious teachings and political advice to the local people. On the first day of the second Tibetan month of the Fire-Monkey year [1957], he arrived in Lhasa and on the same day, he proceeded to his palace at Norbulingka with all the grand travel arrangements and ceremony traditionally accorded to the Dalai Lama.

At that time, in the name of democratic reform, the Chinese carried out repressions and massacres in Dotö and Dome. The Chinese attacked the villages along the eastern bank of the Driчу from both land and sky, forcing many thousands of people to flee towards Central Tibet, and the number of refugees in Central Tibet increased greatly. In Lhasa, Tan Kuan-sen, a Chinese official, convened a women's meeting at which he satirically remarked, "Wherever there is a rotten meat, there are flies. So if we remove the rotten meat, the flies will go away themselves." By "rotten meat" he alluded to the Dalai Lama, and by "flies" he referred to the Tibetan people. He also criticized the nine members of the Tibetan Welfare Association in Kalimpong: the former acting-prime minister Lukhangwa, Thupten Norbu, Gyalo Thondup, Khenchung Lobsang Gyaltzen, Tsipon Shakabpa, Tsedrung Thupten Nyinje, Tsedrung Jampa Wangdu, Tsedrung Jampa Tsondu and Alo Chondze, calling them "reactionaries" who created hostilities between Tibetans and the Chinese. He announced these names at Lhasa and Shol and ordered that the above Tibetans be ostracized from the Tibetan people, and that no one was

allowed to make contact with them. In this crude way, the Chinese acted in contrast to their previous promises and intensified their brutal suppression. The Tibetan people however appreciated and praised those Tibetans for their patriotic and dedicated activities against the invaders, and they considered them as a source of encouragement; no one regarded those Tibetans as reactionaries. Moreover, more and more people started to contact and give support to them.

In that year, the Gadang troops commanded by Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji who were on border duty at Dromo and Chumbi gate were sent home and the Gyantse troops under the command of Lieutenant Dawa Tsering were dispatched to take their place.

B. Formation of the Tibetan Volunteer Army

When the Chinese carried out their forceful and repressive democratic reforms in Dotö and Dome, people of the regions lost patience and took to guerilla warfare against the Chinese. After a strong resistance put up by the people for about three years, the Chinese then launched modern warfare, using modern sophisticated weapons and bombing from the sky, causing destructions in many areas and killing many thousands of people in Golok, Dau and Meutsang. The dead bodies remained there unattended for many months, spreading such a terrible smell in the entire regions that people and animals were unable to live there. In Arig Ragya, Drakar Drelzong, Golok, Achok and the banks of the Machu River (Yellow River), the Chinese troops chased thousands of farmers and nomads who, like a flock of sheep, having no way to escape, committed suicide by jumping into the Machu River, praying to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche. This is a real tragic story.

The Chinese arrested, imprisoned or executed many lamas, local leaders and elite people of the Tibetan communities living along the eastern bank of the Drichu and nearby villages of the Machu, including Golok. They destroyed many famous monasteries, by raiding them from the land and the sky. Many innocent people were killed, and those who were not killed were put under forced labor and extreme torture, as if Hell itself had appeared on the earth. Countless numbers of people were secretly killed or starved to death. Many people fled to the mountains and launched guerilla warfare against the Chinese. They ambushed Chinese civil and military officials and destroyed vehicles, armories and ration stores. Leaving behind their families, houses and properties, those guerillas then fled towards U-Tsang, following whatever routes they chanced upon. The Chinese blocked their way and killed a great number of them along the way. When the remainder of them managed to escape to Lhasa, the Chinese told the Kashag that if those Khampa reactionaries who lately had arrived in U-Tsang were not sent back, they would send troops to

expel them. The Chinese checked every house in Lhasa where the Khampa and Amdo refugees lived, and recorded all their names.

In the past, the Tibetan traders had not faced any problems with monetary exchange in India, but now the Chinese began to restrict the exchange of money with the Tibetan traders. Unless the Tibetan traders imported goods demanded by the Chinese, the Chinese would not exchange their money. Gradually the Chinese imposed taxes on trades. Previously, in Lhasa, people were allowed to keep pistols, with a license issued by the Tibetan government, but the Chinese banned this, and no one was allowed to keep pistols without a license from the Chinese government. In such ways, the Chinese gradually escalated their brutal actions year by year, clearly showing their systematic plan to rule Tibet.

After that, in the name of Chushi Gangdruk, some rich traders met and under the guidance of Master Chamberlain Thupten Woden planned to make a throne, ornamented with gold and copper designs, for the Dalai Lama. The traders donated a quite large sum. It was therefore decided to create a set of throne and table, decorated with pure gold ornaments in unique style and design, including a pattern of eight lions on the four sides of the throne in the posture of lifting the throne. It was also planned to make a golden butter-lamp cup for the Buddha Shakyamuni image and a golden alms-bowl for the Five Self Manifested Retinue of Avalokiteshvara¹⁰. At that time, the Commander-in-Chief Lokal informed all the army regiments through their brigadiers to make reasonable contributions towards the above purpose. Accordingly, the regiments and individual soldiers contributed rich donations. The Three Monastic Seats, monasteries, lama estates, aristocrats, people and monks from all the three provinces of Tibet, Muslim community, Nepalese and Bhutanese offered large sums of donations. In 1957 during the three-day Kalachakra initiation conducted at Norbulingka, the throne was presented to the Dalai Lama, accompanied by a grand ceremony and prayers for his long life and successful deeds.

In 1958, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru made a visit to Bhutan through Dromo. In the previous year, the Dalai Lama had requested him to make a short visit to Lhasa en route, and Nehru had accepted. The Chinese initially consented to this visit. However, in that year, fearing that Nehru would come to know the real situation of Tibet, the Chinese cancelled Nehru's visit to Tibet, arguing that they were not able to take security responsibility for him. Both the Tibetans and Nehru were extremely disappointed. When Nehru was passing via Dromo, the Tibetan government sent Kalon Surkhang to accord him a reception. Chang Ching-wu also arrived there to represent the Chinese government. Visiting Bhutan, Nehru declared that Bhutan was an independent country, and that India would protect Bhutan against any foreign forces.

In that year, during the Great Prayer Festival, a Chinese man was caught by the security guards near the staircases at the main gate of Norbulingka Palace, carrying a

hand grenade. He was from the Chinese army cantonment at the park of Nortolingka and was sent to assassinate the Dalai Lama. He was kept in custody at Bodyguard Regiment barrack, but was released under the order of the Kashag, who claimed to have given the order after having negotiated with the Chinese.

Claiming all the areas of Dotö and Domé between Dartsedo and the [eastern bank of] Drichu River as Chinese areas, the Chinese forcefully carried out democratic reforms and exploitation in these areas. This prompted the local people to rise in revolt. The Chinese then pretended that all the areas of Dotö to the west of the Drichu River and U-Tsang were parts of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), and acted as if asking the people whether they were willing for reform or not, but practically, they started “democratic reforms” in these areas too. The result was that revolts broke out in the regions lying to both the east and west of the Drichu River.

The Chinese realized that all the people of the three provinces of Tibet, extending from Dartsedo in the east to Ladakh in the west, were the same people. They thus thought that if they asked the Tibetan government to tell the people to stop their revolts, they would listen. They discussed this with the TAR committee, and sent the Karmapa Rinpoche¹¹, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and Pomda Togyal to ask the people to stop their revolt. However, they were authorized only to ask the people to surrender their weapons and return to their homes, and they had no power to convince and guarantee the people that the Chinese would stop repression, would give religious freedom and respect the culture and traditions of Tibet. They therefore returned after making a short visit to Chamdo, and 25 villages of Dhimchi and Derge areas, without any concrete results.

Soon after that, the Chinese force in Ü-Tsang expanded greatly and escalated their dominating behaviours and brutal repression upon the people. They ordered a ban on Tibetan paper money and coins, and postage stamps. They opened fire without any reason, killing some Tibetan troops and civilians. Accusing Gyantse Palgon Chokdup of physically assaulting his relative Phunwang, the Chinese exaggerated and made the matter serious. They published a report of this in newspapers, and staged dramas about the same to incite the public. They lured some disloyal Tibetans, by giving them money, to create rumours and hostilities among the public. They arrested patriotic people, such as Shingso Lhago. They summoned a meeting at which they sarcastically said, “The root of the carrot has been infested with three worms, so it cannot grow.” They referred by the “three worms” to either the Three Monastic Seats—Drepung, Sera and Ganden—, or the government, private elite and monasteries. On 22 November 1958, they published newspapers in Kandze in which they even blasphemed the pure and exalted Buddha, saying,

Buddha Shakyamuni, the founder of Buddhism, was the son of the Indian king Shudhodana. Since he was very atrocious and oppressive towards everyone, the

neighboring kingdom and the people revolted against him. He fled to a forest where he entered into an equiposed meditation and founded Buddhist religion. He brought laziness and sadness to the hearts of masses in order to rule over them once again.

On the pretext of building roads, they destroyed countless number of shrines of *tsatsa*, stupas, *manthang* (shrine with *mani* wheels), statues of deities and other religious objects. They labelled the lamas as “yellow robbers” and monks as “red thieves”, without any concern whatsoever for the 17-Point Agreement. They set up [Chinese] schools in Lhasa and forcibly took many Tibetan children to China against their wishes, to indoctrinate them with a communist ideology.

At that time, the government had assigned the security responsibility of the northern areas outside Lhasa to the Drapchi Regiment and that of southern Tibet to the Gyantse Regiment. A new system was created in which the Chinese and Tibetan soldiers in groups, with ten soldiers from each side, jointly carried out a patrol in the areas in daytime and night with the Tibetan and Chinese soldiers in groups. The system continued for about a year.

The Chinese ordered that all those Chinese who wore blue gowns and did private business in Lhasa and Shigatse, and all the Tibetans in Ü and Tsang who came from eastern Tibet must go back to their homes immediately; if they did not, troops would be sent to arrest and send them to their native places under force. After a few months, they arrested many Chinese who dressed in blue gowns, put them into trucks and sent them to China. This created fear among the Tibetans who were from Dotö and Domé that the Chinese would do the same thing to them. The Chinese sent troops to every house and tent where Khampas and Amdo people lived, and registered their names. This prompted the people to resolve that it was the only opportunity to fight against the Chinese for the sake of Tibet’s religious and political freedom. Therefore, on February 18, 1958, some prominent personalities, such as leaders and representatives of People’s Association led by Adruk Gonpo Tashi met at Adruk Kagyue Temple in Lhasa and took a big vow. They created a Tibetan volunteer army for the protection of the Dharma under the name of Chushi Gangdruk¹³, based at the plain of Chaktsa Drigu in Lhokha. Volunteer peoples from the three provinces of Tibet were recruited. Rules, policies and systems of organization were formulated, and the Volunteer Army was created. Following is an excerpt from the interview given by Phala Thupten Woden published in the *Oral History, Series No 2*, (Dharamsala: Library of the Tibetan Works and Archives) recounting the real story how the members of the Volunteer Army acquired weapons from the Tibetan government’s armory:

Due to the Chinese excessive maltreatment and exploitation practised in all areas of Dokham, the people launched a series of resistance movements at their best level. However, since they did not prove effective, many of them fled towards Central Tibet. Adruk Gonpo Tashi told me that he was planning to organize all the Khampas

who had come to Central Tibet. In reply, I said, "That would be better. Otherwise, since all of you have come here in a desperate situation, if some kinds of violence occurs in Lhasa, it will be dangerous to the life of the Dalai Lama, and make trouble for everyone. So, don't do this. First, it would be good if you could occupy a tough location and create an organization. This is my suggestion. But, you should discuss this properly amongst yourselves and if you come to an agreement, then you can make plans gradually."

A few days later, Adruk said to me, "We have already discussed and decided to do as you advised me. However, it is not enough for us just go empty-handed—we will need weapons. We therefore request the Tibetan government to give us weapons."

I replied, "If the government openly issues weapons to you, it will not look good in the eyes of the Chinese, and it will create unnecessary problems. First, isn't it good if you could go to a tough place and try to resist those Chinese who are entering [Tibet] from different borders? However, you people alone cannot do this. The government is also in a difficult position about giving you weapons openly. It will be better if you take the weapons from the government armoury at Shang Ganden Chokhor in Tsang, and use them as you need."

He said, "Will it not create problems later if we go directly to Shang and take the government's weapons at our own discretion? Kindly give us a letter to take and use them."

I responded, "The government cannot directly give those weapons to you. Because if we do so, later if the Chinese complain to the local staff of Shang that they had given government weapons to Chushi Gangdruk, the staff will say that they did so at the instruction of the government. This would create a great problem. Therefore, you should go to Shang and take them straight away. Since the situation is urgent, it is better to do it like this. If the Chinese say that Tibetan government has not taken care of the weapons and given them to Chushi Gangdruk, we can say that the government was helpless because Chushi Gangdruk robbed the armoury and took away the weapons. So the Chinese cannot say anything to us. By doing it like this, the Chinese will not suspect us and practically those weapons will be useful to you."

In response, he said, "This is very good. But aren't all the weapons kept in the Shang armoury old and useless?" I replied, "I don't think so. If that is so, it will [not] be of use. So we have to make sure about this. I will inquire about them." When I inquired about the weapons, I found a record of the exact quantities of guns, artillery and ammunitions there, which were all in good condition. I told Adruk, "If you people have the capability, there is no problem with the weapons. Use them." He said, "It is good; we will do that." Their courage to fight the Chinese increased greatly.

After that, they went to Shang Ganden Chokhor and took the weapons. We then pretentiously asked the staff of the Shang armoury why they had given weapons to the Chushi Gangdruk, and they replied that they had not given the weapons to Chushi

Gangdruk; they had broken into the armory and taken the weapons away. These are the facts about how the Chushi Gangdruk got their weapons.

Adruk and his men planned to join the main base of Chushi Gangduk at Drigu in Lhoka. However, due to the Chinese obstruction, Adruk and his group went to Dotö Palbar via Drigung, and there they engaged in resistance fighting against the Chinese for some time. Though Chushi Gangdruk based at Drigu fought a war with the Chinese forces based in Lhokha Tsethang, due to lack of unity among the leaders, they did not succeed. At that time, I sent a messenger to tell them that they should not do such things and they must have a leader to guide and instruct them. I told them to send a message to Palbar to ask Adruk Gonpo Tashi to come to Lhasa immediately. I also sent a letter to them to be delivered to Adruk, telling him if he did not come to Lhasa, the Chushi Gangdruk would soon dissolve.

From this situation, we find that although the Tibetan government did not dare overtly to help the Volunteer Army (Chushi Gangdruk) due to the severity of the situation, internally, Master Chamberlain and Adruk Jindag (Adruk Gonpo Tashi), jointly and secretly consulting each other, encouraged and helped the Volunteer Army in procuring military supplies, drafting plans and helping with the formation of the organization in a very skillful way. This made the Chinese unable to accuse the Tibetan government.

Adar and Lotse, who had been sent through Tibetan Welfare Association in Kalimpong to the US for training in telegraphy, arrived back in Lhasa. They approached Master Chamberlain and requested him to arrange an audience with the Dalai Lama before they started the telegraphy project. Since they had to work under great secrecy, Master Chamberlain found it difficult to arrange for them an audience with the Dalai Lama. He therefore told them that it was not appropriate to arrange an audience with the Dalai Lama since the situation was not good, and instead he gave them protective cords (*srung sdus*), blessing pills (*jin rten*), handmade *tsatsa* (*chagsa*) and blessed pieces of food (*rmug thung*), pretending that they had been given to them by the Dalai Lama, in order to encourage them and to represent the government's support. He kept the two in Gephel U-tse where they diligently worked on making secret telegraphic communication with the US government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working for Tibet.

Sometime later, the acting Minister Shankhawa told Master Chamberlain that the Chinese had heard wireless messages were being sent from Gephel U-tse and Drakla Lubuk. Master Chamberlain had to act as shocked as if he did not know about this, and exclaimed, "Amazing! They [Chinese] might have seen miraculous acts of the Dharma protectors. It cannot be true. It must be miraculous performances of the Nechung deity!" After that, he immediately asked Adar and his colleagues to move to Nyangral, to escape danger. One day, Adruk came to Master Chamberlain with some records of telegrams, and Master Chamberlain emphasized the dangers and advised him to be secretive and cautious.

Through Brigadier Trepal of the Drapchi Regiment, the Master Chamberlain asked the Chushi Gangdruk and the Tibetan army to be careful and secretive in making contact with each other. The officers of different army regiments met and discussed how to organize a unified war of resistance against the Chinese. Colonel Wangden Tashi and Captain Kalsang Dradul from the Khadang Drapchi; Colonel Lhochi Phuntsok Yugyal, Captain Tagtse of Penpa Wangdu and Captain Kharsam Gyalpo of the Ngadang Regiment; and Captain Tsering Lhagyal of Chadang Regiment were appointed as dealing officers. Among them, Colonel Wangden Tashi and Captain Kalsang Dradul kept continued contact with Adruk to coordinate the activities of the organization jointly with them. Some high government officials, abbots and representatives of Three Monastic Seats and some important personalities also took part in the patriotic resistance movement against the invaders, by giving moral support and suggestions to the Volunteer Army, overtly, internally or secretly.

In his report preserved among the archives of military record at the Department of Security of the Tibetan government in exile, Drapchi Captain Kaldram (Kalsang Dradul) recounts the following:

Adruk Jindag and I came in contact before the golden throne of His Holiness was created. I used to visit Adruk at his house frequently in connection with the works of the organization. Sometimes he used to call me to his house, and whenever he called me to his house, I would go to visit him. One day, I met Drayab Atruk Lama, Tsawarong Dampa Lodro, Gapa Wangchen Gelek and Amdo Tramo-la and others at Adrug's house. Adruk introduced the Colonel [Kalsang Wangden] and me to them, telling them we were representatives of the Tibetan Army.

I worked as a secretary to Adruk, and helped him in copying some secret messages, most of which were sent to Gyalo Thondup, Tsipon Shakabpa and Khenchung Lobsang Gyaltzen in Kalimpong and Litang Sogru Khetson, Deu Adin, Markham Phurpa Pon, Khyungpo Karu Pon, among others, in Kham. The contents of these messages were mainly about the resistance movement.

Regarding how the members of the Chushi Gangdruk met and took a great oath in Adruk's Kagyur Temple, around thirty elite members of the Chushi Gangdruk led by Adruk, and we two colonel and captain, assembled at the Kagyur Temple of Adruk. We had tea and *dresil* (rice mixed with butter and sweet) to begin the auspicious occasion, after which Adruk said, "We created this organization of Chushi Gangdruk to fight the Chinese, the enemy of the Dharma and to protect the Dharma and polity of Tibet. In order to make this resistance movement successful, we all must unite and make a combined effort as much as we can. Further, instead of engaging in divulging internal secrets to outsiders and being self-seeking, we should take a great oath: "We shall eat the grasses of mountaintops together when we are happy, and drink the water of Blue Lake together when we are in sorrow!"¹⁴ After that, we two representatives of the Tibetan army said to the effect, "As we have said before, all the army divisions are determined to take part in this movement, without hesitation." We also said, "Due to

the current situation, the government's overt participation in the movement would cause more troubles than benefits. Therefore, in view of this situation, the Tibetan troops will mainly take the responsibility of the security of the offices and important buildings of the government in Lhasa, but cannot openly involve the government in the movement. Nevertheless, we will inconspicuously give full support and help to this movement, directly or indirectly." After speaking our views freely, all the members present took a great oath together.

Around the time, Cheng Ho-ching¹⁵, a vice-commander of the Chinese Artillery Regiment camp at Dongkar Shorkha came to the Drapchi Regiment camp to seek asylum. His background story was as follows: The Chinese guarding the Koru bridge of the Kichu River killed the Norbulingka's horse-keeper Kunsang at the bridge when they arbitrarily opened fire, and afterwards, fearing the Tibetans would attack them, the Chinese artillery regiment camp shifted to the new park (*gling ka gzar pa*), direct opposite to Sera Monastery and the Drapchi Regiment camp. Many days later, Cheng Ho-ching and the daughter of a soldier guarding the park developed a love affair, and they started to live together as husband and wife in a customary way, after he got permission from his army headquarters. One day, the Chinese officers held a secret meeting at which they accused Cheng of being pro-Tibetan and demanded his execution. Sensing danger to his life, one night Cheng fled from Nortolingka park on his horse, carrying his guns, pretending that he was going to watch a movie at Lhasa. Someone must have seen him and phoned [to his army camp]. Anyway, when he arrived behind Potala, he was chased by three Chinese vehicles. He, along with his horse, hid in the river beneath the bridge that led to Lhalu's residence for a while. The Chinese pursuers in the jeeps did not see him. As he had discussed briefly beforehand with his wife, from behind the Potala he came straight to the Drapchi Regiment camp on the fifth night of the fourth Tibetan month. Our gatekeeper informed us about his coming. The colonels and captains of the regiment immediately discussed him. He and his horse were kept at the barracks. On inquiry, he told us the above story and of how he had come to us, to seek asylum. He said, "If you do not believe me, you can kill me, but please don't hand me back to the Chinese. Please tell this to my wife. This horse is good; if you release it, it will return to his place." During that night, he was kept at the barracks, and this was kept secret and the security guards were asked not to tell others about it. The next day, the horse was released from Palri. The colonels and captains met and performed a divination to decide what to do with him; the divination answered in the positive. Therefore, they kept him.

His wife and her brother Lobsang Yonten, a soldier of the Drapchi Regiment, were summoned. They told us that their story was true. After that, we reported this to Brigadier Trepel of the Drapchi Regiment, who agreed with us. Later, when Adruk went to Lhoka, we suggested to him that he should take Cheng Ho-ching with him, as he would be useful in military matters. He gladly agreed to take him. On the 7th

Tibetan day, four men led by Radrug Ngawang came to the Drapchi monastery to receive Cheng. With a complete set of Tibetan dress, and two rifles of different sizes along with ammunition, we handed him to them. The next morning, that is, the eighth Tibetan day, when they were leaving for Lhoka, I, along with about fifty officers and soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes, escorted them to Rama Druga ferry point inconspicuously in different groups.

Cheng Ho-ching was expert in Chinese military strategy and arms operations, as well as in map reading. He thus became the confidential assistant of Adruk. He was given the Tibetan name Lobsang Tashi. He bravely fought in the series of Tibetan resistance warfare at Nyemo, Dugag Sumdo, Karkhang, Damshung, Marshung and Lhoka Tsethang. He was hit by a broken piece of shell during skirmishes with the Chinese at Marshung and Tsethang, but he was not hurt, as he was wearing a protective amulet. The following is an excerpt from the statement made by Cheng Ho-ching during an investigation:

After the Chinese troops shot dead the Tibetan horse keeper at Koru bridge, they planned to launch a military attack in Lhasa. It was planned to attack Sera Monastery from the Chinese army camps at Palding, Gaotang and Drapchi Linga's vegetable garden; the Tibetan Police Station and Tse-shol offices from the Chinese army camp at Dib and the Army Headquarters; and Drepung Monastery and Bodyguard Regiment at Norbulingka from the army camps at Nortolingka Park, Gyangdralingka Park and Dongkar Shorka. There were twelve large artilleries at the Drib camp. Each of the above three battalions were assigned four artilleries, and they have placed them within the range of their target, ready for attack. It was felt to be important to take Drib and Donkhar Shorkha first...

We reported all that Cheng Ho-ching told us at the hall of Drapchi Regiment to the Tibetan Army Headquarters. One day, at Shongkhalingka Park in Lhasa, the leaders of Chushi Gangdruk and other relevant persons held a meeting in the disguise of a picnic, at which they inconspicuously discussed about their resistance activities. At that time, the Drapchi troops under Captain Kalsang Chojor were about to leave to replace the Dingri troops as bodyguards of the governor of northern Tibet. Adruk instructed the Captain that as soon as he reached Nagchu, he should spy on the situation of the Chinese forces there and send him a report immediately. He invented a code language to be used in communication, so that they could send reports quickly.

On the birthday of the Dalai Lama, Adruk's family organized an incense-offering ceremony. Many members of the Chushi Gangdruk mounted on horses stood in line and performed deity invocation prayers (*lha gsol*) and held a firing competition. Many colonels and captains of the Tibetan Army also participated, representing the Tibetan Army. The Chinese therefore told the Kashag that the Tibetan army had joined the Khampa reactionaries, and it must stop them immediately. The Kashag ordered the Commander-in-Chief to instruct the Tibetan troops of different regiments to be more careful and less overt in their activities.

Adruk requested the Tibetan army to contribute enough money to him to facilitate sending Lithang Jinpa to India, and the Tibetan army gave him 500 *tamdo*. Later, again the Tibetan army gave him 200 *tams* to help him send Markham Phurpa Pon's son Yeshe Wangyal to India. After that, when Adruk went to Lhoka, he asked the Tibetan army to give him some brass trumpets, and he was given four. After that, from Lhoka Raduk Ngawang-la wrote to the Tibetan army, requesting it to send tea in as much quantity as possible. Ten boxes of tea were sent to Lhoka.

Thereafter, at Marshung the Chinese ambushed the Tibetan force, in which battle Adruk was wounded and all the Tibetan troops disappeared. Radruk Ngawang-la and Lithang Kyalutsang Tsephel-la arrived at Phenpo Nyung Nya. There, they collected many local recruits and secretly made short visits to Sera and Litang Kyalutsang in Lhasa, the representatives of the Tibetan army received them and had detailed discussion about their resistance movement. The Tibetan army printed and copied many pamphlets and posters at Lhasa and Shol, writing about the wars fought by the Volunteer Army with the Chinese at Nyemo, Karkhang, Damshung and Marshung and the casualties suffered by both the Chinese and Tibetan sides. They pasted them onto the walls of Kaling Goshi, Dongchensur, Sabogang, Shasasur and Shol Doring pillar, to boost the morale of the Tibetans and to discourage their opponents. The army provided the two with short-nozzle British rifles and rounds of ammunition for stenguns, as much as they could.

Around that time, the Tibetans came to know that on a confirmed day many trucks full of Chinese troops along with weapons were heading towards Lhoka Tsethang. The two representatives of the army sent a secret message to Radruk Ngawang and his men informing them about this, and suggesting that they should lie in wait at any strategic point and attack them. Accordingly, they without fear went straight away, and waited near the river behind Gongkar Dzong in Lhoka. They ambushed the Chinese trucks, killing the Chinese soldiers and looting their weapons. They had a great victory in this incident, and news of this incident spread widely.

As the tension between the Chinese and Tibetans in Lhasa increased, the Tibetan army sent several units of ten soldiers, one after another, to give messages about the developments in Lhasa to the Tibetan Volunteer Army in Lhoka.

As written above, he has mentioned how he took an active part in the patriotic war of resistance in both Central Tibet and southern Tibet.

I shall now continue here the story of how the Volunteer Army made secret preparations in Lhasa and then moved to Lhoka gradually. Adruk Jindag, along with his troops, started to leave Lhasa for Lhoka on April 16, 1958. They declared publicly several times that if the Chinese stopped repression and forced reforms in Dotö and Dome, and if they went back to their country, they would peacefully return to their homes. If the Chinese continued to live in Tibet, they would fight

them from all sides. They also submitted a memorandum to Chinese officials in Lhasa and the Kashag, containing the above declaration.

The Tibetan Volunteer Army had no military strength or proper military supplies to launch a big war to challenge the Chinese military power and resources. However they had the weapons of great courage and dedication, like a burning fire, to fight the Chinese through guerrilla warfare, at the cost of their lives, for the protection of the Dharma and the government of Ganden Phodrang. Not only did the Tibetan people love them and give full support to them, directly or indirectly, but also a large number of people from U-Tsang and Tibetan troops started to go to Lhoka to join them.

In May (1958), under the pressure of the Chinese, the Tibetan government sent the governor of Tsang, Dzasak Monlingpa Jamyang Gyaltzen, and representatives from the Three Great Seats to Tsona to ask the Khampas who had left Lhasa to stop their violent activities. However, they returned empty handed. The Chinese then asked the Tibetan government to give a clear answer about whether or not it was connected to the Volunteer Army outside Lhasa. The Kashag replied that all those members of the Volunteer Army had fled to Lhasa from Kham as they were unable to live in Kham, and had left Lhasa at their own will, so the government had no connection with them.

Advised by the Master Chamberlain, Adruk Jindag, leading several hundred voluntary soldiers, went to take weapons from the Tibetan government's armoury at Ganden Chokhor. The armoury had the entire arms of one regiment of the Tibetan Army, including rifles, artilleries of various sizes, Bren guns and hand grenades. The Chinese officials in Lhasa ordered the 155th and 159th regiments of the PLA to ambush the Tibetans at the upper end of Nyemo Shu and Karkhung. When the Chinese forces attacked the Tibetan voluntary troops on the way, and the Tibetans valiantly fought back with full force. Both the Tibetan and Chinese sides suffered many casualties. At that time, Lobsang Tashi (Cheng Ho-ching) killed the Chinese commander Yang Lenping in a face-to-face encounter. Then the Tibetans pulled back to Yangpachen and the Chinese returned to Lhasa.

In the ninth month, the Tibetan volunteer force went straight to Shang Ganden Chokhor to take weapons from the government's armoury. When they arrived at the monastery, they immediately arrested the guards of the armoury and took all the arms and ammunitions from the armoury, and headed towards Lhoka via Chushul. The Chinese force, comprising three regiments and an artillery regiment which had been waiting at Nyemo Karkhang ambushed them. Some prominent members of the Tibetan volunteer force, including Chatreng Simgag, were killed and some were wounded in a fierce encounter between the two sides. Many Chinese troops were also killed or wounded. The volunteer force sensed that the Chinese were again planning to attack them from different sides, so they fled towards northern Tibet.

From Drigung, they proceeded towards Lhoka, but they encountered two Chinese army trucks at Damshung, which they attacked and destroyed. After that, travelling through the northern route, they again encountered the Chinese force at Drigung Phowa Dzagag, during which Adruk Jindag was seriously wounded. There were high casualties on both the Chinese and Tibetan sides. The Tibetan troops fled in disorder in different directions thereafter.

Adruk Jindag and some troops went through the middle northern route to Khyungpo Tengchen, Tsawa Pasho and Palbar, where they incited people and collected militias. After that, they went to Kongpo and stopped there for a while. Radruk Ngawang and Litang Kyalutsang Tsephel, with other voluntary soldiers, went to Lhasa via Phenpo. As mentioned above, they stayed at Sera and Kyalutsang for a short time, and decided to go to Tsethang. At that time, the representatives of the Tibetan Army in Lhasa came to know that a few Chinese trucks carrying weapons and some troops were going to Tsethang via Chushul, so they immediately informed the Volunteer Army about this and suggested that they should ambush the Chinese troops on the road at a narrow corner. Accordingly, the volunteer troops lay in wait near Gongkar Dzong and made surprise attack on the Chinese trucks, destroying some trucks and killing many soldiers. The Chinese in turn killed Litang Kyalutsang Tsephel and wounded some members of the volunteer force. Then volunteer force turned back via Yamdrok and engaged in resistance fighting against the Chinese force based in Tsethang.

Around that time, the Chinese shot dead a chariot driver Chibyog Kunsang at the Kuro bridge when he was fetching slates. Thereafter, the Chinese also shot dead Drapchi Regiment's soldiers Kunsang and Penpa who were on duty to collect firewood. Then again, they fired on Phurbu Tsering, a soldier of the Gyantse Regiment, in the street in front of Dekyi Wonang cinema hall of Lhasa. On September 14, 1958, they captured the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment's salary officer near Tsangchulingka Park of Lhoka and imprisoned him, accusing them of being reactionaries. Thereafter, when four Drapchi soldiers were returning from the Army Headquarters at Tse-shol to their homes, they met a Chinese soldier at Yutok bridge and had an altercation with him. Immediately some Chinese soldiers suddenly appeared from nearby sides and fired on the Tibetans, killing Wangchuk and wounding Tashi Topgyal seriously. They arrested the two Tibetan soldiers and imprisoned them. In this way, the Chinese escalated their brutal actions and rudeness, and disrespect towards the Tibetan government and people.

At that time, the Volunteer Army in Lhoka were engaged with resistance warfare against the Chinese in Tsethang, Rong, Gongkar and other areas, and annihilated all the Chinese army camps except the Chinese cantonment at Gampo in Tsethang. Similarly, the Volunteer Army fought the Chinese in Powo and Kongpo continuously. In all these series of battles, the Tibetan volunteer forces killed or

wounded many Chinese troops, and the volunteer forces also lost many of its brave members, who gave their lives for the sake of their country and people. That year witnessed a lot of active fighting.

In Lhasa, fearing that the Chinese would launch a sudden attack on the Tibetan government's offices and buildings, especially those of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan army based in Lhasa guarded them day and night. The Chinese also became cautious and started increasing their military strength, by fortifying their camps with new embankments, digging underground tunnels, distributing weapons to their civil officers and bringing more troops into Lhasa.

The Tibetan army leaders in Lhasa and the leaders of the Volunteer Army were making contact with each other through verbal communications or written messages, discussing with each other how to expand and organize the resistance movement, and informing each other about the situation of the enemy, among other matters. The Shigatse and the Dingri regiments at their respective bases were secretly contacted. In Lhasa, some prominent members of the secret anti-communist group, including Drapchi Brigadier Trepal, Brigadier Dokhar Se Sonam Topgyal of the Ngadang Gyantse Regiment, Tsedron Barshi Ngawang Tenkyong, Tsedron Jampa Tendar, Letsen Lobsang Yeshi, among others, with Master Chamberlain and Commander-in-Chief Lokal-la as the main leader, organized the resistance movement, directly, indirectly or secretly. Thus the situation grew increasingly tense day by day.

Around that time, all the areas around Lubuk Do Senge had a large concentration of Chinese troops. The Ngadang Gyantse Regiment was located at Yamen close to the Chinese army camp. Both the Chinese and Tibetan armies were therefore very suspicious and cautious with each other, and some minor fighting and confrontations often occurred between the Tibetan and Chinese troops, indicating that war was inevitable. The Tibetan government therefore posted the Ngadang troops at the Potala and the Ngadang camp was shifted to Shol Dopal.

The Chinese repeatedly annoyed the Tibetan government by accusing it of stirring up the resistance movements that were spreading in various parts of Tibet, and threatened that if the people did not surrender their weapons, they would take action in the same way. Diplomatically the Tibetan government sent Khenchung Ngoshi Thupten Samchok and Tsipon Namseling Paljor Jigme to Drigu and Tsona and Chisurpa Dzasak Monkyiling Jamyang Gyaltzen and Khenchung Thupten Sangpo to upper and northern Tibet with an edict to ask the Volunteer Army to stop their resistance movement. Since the Tibetan government and the Volunteer Army were aligned in their goal, the sending of delegates to urge the volunteer people to stop their resistance movement was merely a diplomatic move, and so the delegates did not achieve any concrete result from their mission. Further, the two *khentsi* officials (Khenchung and Tsipon) inconspicuously recruited additional militias to the Volunteer Army based in Lhoka, and helped it in procuring army

salaries as much as they could. Led by the people of Lhoka especially, where the Volunteer Army was based and through which people traveled, people of other parts of Tibet and the government, private estate holders and monastic sections, led by Lha Gyari, donated food supplies, fodder, accommodation, fuel and firewood, transportation, etc. to the Volunteer Army, in the hope of achieving a good result.

The Chinese repeatedly asked the Tibetan government to send Tibetan troops to suppress the reactionary people outside Lhasa and the Chinese would provide all kinds of military resources. The Tibetan government refused, saying that it was important to keep the Tibetan army at Lhasa for the security of the area, and it was too great a risk to send them to border places as they might join the people in the resistance movement. The Chinese therefore did not pressure the Tibetan government further about this.

At that time, there was great chaos and turmoil in U-Tsang. Taking advantage of that situation, many robbers and fake Khampas were looting and killing people, so the district officers requested the Tibetan government to send troops to protect the people from the robbers and criminals. Many troops of the Khadang, Gadang and Ngadang regiments were deployed in northern Tibet, Drigung, Yamdrok, Nyiru, Khangmar and Samto and Me.

In the eighth month of that year, at Bodyguard Regiment camp at Norbulingka, aides-de-camp of the Commander-in-Chief, brigadiers, colonels and captains of all the Tibetan army regiments met for a special meeting. They discussed the protection of the Dalai Lama, and how to protect the government premises and offices without causing violence in Lhasa. If the Chinese were to suddenly attack, all must sacrifice their lives to resist them, was said in a speech by the Lokal, and all agreed.

After that, a member of the People's Association, Letsen Lobsang Yeshi, who was also known as Ngawang Senge, collected many militias from Lhokha and Tsang and gave them training and taught them political stands, and organized them. When there were enough recruits, he planned to distribute weapons secretly to them and to unite all the volunteer troops to make a combined force, and then to carry out his strategy of guerilla warfare against the Chinese. Lobsang Yeshi secretly informed the Lieutenant Nyamgyal Wangdu Gyantse Regiment through Druptob-la of Drepung Gomang Monastery, to gather monk soldiers, without the knowledge of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and every other army camp, and proceed together. After that, Lobsang Yeshi and his companion Amdo Thupten, Amdo Samdup, Gyantse Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu, Gyantse Lieutenant Pema Gyalpo, Army secretary Namgyal Tsewang, Ge Kathog Wangdu Tsering and Ge Chuter Butruk, with about thirty equipped army instructors and troops and carrying two Bren guns, left for southern Tibet during the night of 14 October 1958, following the long route, via Rama Druga boat crossing. They planned to meet at Lubuk Norzin. At that time, Junpa Paten, Samdup and Dhondup from

Lhasa also joined them. To prevent the Chinese from accusing the Tibetan army, they sent a petition to the Army Headquarter to a senior military instructor Troga Wangyal, saying that they were going to southern Tibet at their own discretion to defend the borders, and they had not informed their superiors because they did not want the Chinese to bother the Tibetan army.

The Gyantse army camp was shifted from Yamen to Shol Dopal. Planned to meet at Lubuk Norzin Gyaltzen, they traveled during the night, having crossed the Rama Druga. After two days, as soon as they arrived at Gongkar, they met volunteer army leaders Kunga Samten and Chamdo Jangri Lhagyal to discuss the situation and their plans. At that time, Adruk had not arrived back from Kham. They then planned to go to Yarlung and Lhagyari to meet leaders of the Volunteer Army, such as Amdo Jinpa Gyatso, Jangtsa Chondze and Tsangthu Pelsur Dorji Norbu. But the leaders of the Volunteer Army in Gongkar requested them to stay at Gongkar for the time being to give military training to their members, because the area of Gongkar was important strategically. They therefore remained there for a few months. They occupied the Chaksam Chuwori and stationed security forces there. They hoisted the Tibetan national flag on the balcony of Gongkar Dzong. During that time they organized daily training twice, morning and evening, but most men of the volunteer force were not interested in military training, so it was stopped.

Through Gyantse Delangpa Pasang Gyalpo, one of the first volunteer troops arrived in Lhodrak, Kashi Kalnor and Trochak from an anti-communist group of Gyantse, the Tibetan army troops made contact with Shigatse Volunteer Army, Nyethang Dhamseng, Chushul Barme Kunsang, Kyishong Anan and some nationalists, and organized a united front and expanded the resistance movement. Thereafter, Kashi Kalnor from Tsang, Tarshi Awala, Tara Se, several monks of Gyantse Gurpa Monastery, totaling about one hundred men, mounted or on foot, arrived at Gongkar. Dondup Gyaltzen, the training instructor of the Bodyguard Regiment, Major Tsering Dhondup of the Khadang Regiment, Badhung Drapchi Ngawang Choden from Chadang Regiment, Chusul Trendong Gendun and Wandu also arrived at Gongkar.

Around that time, they received a message arrived from Tsethang, saying that resistance fighting was going on in Gamphu, and requested sending Gyantse troops, being trained and better equipped, to help them. Gyantse Lieutenant Pema Gyalpo with his ten troops, and several local soldiers were dispatched. There they met Wangdu, the military instructor of the Chadang Simchung Regiment, Gyaltzen, Kalsang, Topgyal and section leader Nyima Dhondup who were fighting the Chinese forces there.

After that, Loye (Lobsang Yeshe) and I, Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu (the author of this book), after discussion, suggested to the Jangri Lhagyal, a leader of the Volunteer Army, that we call Adruk to seek his help in drawing plans up

for how to launch guerilla wars from different directions, and other activities. He agreed and Loye's assistant Amdo Thupten, along with three men from Chushi Gangdruk, was sent with a letter to Adruk. Amdo Thupten met Adruk at Powo, and they came back with the message that he would come soon.

C. Combined revolt by the people of the three provinces of Tibet

In 1958, the Chinese intensified military preparations in Lhasa. They started making secret tunnels, and installing barracks and sand bags in front of windows, doors and roofs of buildings at their cantonments, offices and residences. They built tall and strong barracks to position machine guns. Many types of artillery were installed at Drib, Magar Sarpa, Norbulingka, Draothang and Kyangthang Nakha, targeting directly Potala Palace, Norbulingka, Tsuklagkhang temple, Tibetan army camps and monasteries. Army trucks carrying soldiers frequently moved in and around the town. The situation in Lhasa was so highly volatile that it confirmed that the Chinese would launch a military attack on the city.

Under the threat of such a dreaded situation, while carrying the responsibilities of the political and spiritual leadership of Tibet, the Dalai Lama successfully finished his exams in the five great treatises at the three great monasteries.

In 1959 during the Monlam Festival Lhasa, in the presence of thousands of learned monks, the Dalai Lama took exams for the Geshe Lharampa degree¹⁶. After his exam was over, at the instruction of the Chinese commander Tan Kaun-sen, two Chinese junior officials directly approached the Dalai Lama and presented him with an invitation to a theatrical show organized at a Chinese army camp. It was mandatory that all letters were forwarded to the Dalai Lama only through the Master Chamberlain or through the Kashag. This direct approach by the Chinese to the Dalai Lama was therefore seen as contemptuous and disrespectful to the Dalai Lama. All the Tibetan officials were shocked by this act. Four days later, when the Great Prayer Festival was over, the Dalai Lama arrived back at Norbulingka. Three days later, the Chinese in Lhasa again sent a request to the Dalai Lama, to tell them when he was going to attend the show. The Dalai Lama replied that he would go there on March 10.

Normally, the Dalai Lama was always accompanied by his attendants and bodyguards. At that time, the commander Cheng Ru and Brigadier Fu hurriedly sent staff to summon Kusung Dapon Takla. When he went there, they told him that the Dalai Lama would come there to attend a theatrical show and his bodyguards and others were not allowed to accompany him beyond the Stone Bridge. They also told him that the Dalai Lama's chief attendants were not invited. The ministers were only allowed to take one assistant. There should be no bodyguards. Their weapons

were not allowed to be taken along with them, and they should be kept at the gate of the Chinese army camp. Bodyguard Dapon Taklha reported this to the Chief Abbot Official Gadrang and Master Chamberlain. The three went to the Dalai Lama and told him about the unusual way of the Chinese sending the invitation. The Dalai Lama told them that there would be no danger, and he must attend the show the next day. The three reiterated their request to cancel his visit, saying that the Chinese had asked not to bring bodyguards or carry any weapons. The Dalai Lama replied that it would be okay and there would be no danger if he went there. He asked the Chief Abbot Official to talk with the Chinese about his visit. The Dalai Lama decided to attend the show. Immediately security arrangements were made along the road up to the Stone Bridge. It was decided that the Dalai Lama must be accompanied by some bodyguards to the Chinese army camp.

Khenchung Tarawa Dongag Tharchin, Tsedron Yeshe Lhundup and Tsedron Barshi Ngawang Tenkyong and Tsechak Gyaltzen went to Master Chamberlain and told him that considering the manner of the sending of the invitation to the Dalai Lama to a theatrical show at the Chinese army camp, they feared the visit was posing a great risk to the life of the Dalai Lama. They argued that previously the Chinese had invited the reincarnation of Jamyang Shepa and Shar Kalden Gyatso in Kham and Amdo to cultural shows and banquets, but they had disappeared afterwards. They further said that the Chinese had sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama to come to Peking for a meeting, but it was a great danger for him to go and attend the meeting. Master Chamberlain suggested that they should speak to the Chief Abbot Official about the same matters. They went to the Chief Abbot Official and told them their opinion. The Chief Abbot Official told them that if it was so serious, he would appeal to the Dalai Lama on the matter. The Chief Abbot Official, Master Chamberlain and Bodyguard Dapon appealed to the Dalai Lama on the grounds of the advice they had received from the others. The Dalai Lama replied that since he had already decided to attend the show the next day, it would be difficult to change the plan, so he had better to go there, and he did not see any danger in it. He told them to ask the people not to worry.

The Chief Abbot Official told Tsechag and others what they had been told by the Dalai Lama. However, on that very day, the rumors spread widely in Lhasa and Shol that the Dalai Lama had been invited to a theatrical show at a Chinese army camp and people were all worried about the safety of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese announced through the Lhasa Mayor that the next day when the Dalai Lama visited the Chinese army camp for the cultural show, people were not allowed to pass beyond the Stone Bridge. This panicked the people further, and increased their concerns. The next day, at around 10 am, many people of Lhasa, both monks and lays, suddenly gathered around the gate of Norbulingka to stop the Dalai Lama from going to the Chinese camp, at their own initiative.

During the day, the brigadiers of different Tibetan army regiments stationed in Lhasa met at the Bodyguard Regiment barrack and discussed about what best should be done in case a large number of people went en masse to request the Dalai Lama to cancel his visit, and the Dalai Lama would thus cancel his visit. Early the next morning Kalon Shenkha Gyurme Sonam Topgyal and Neushar Thupten Tharpa arrived at Norbulingka. After that, Kalon Sampho Tsewang Rigzin arrived at the main gate in a jeep driven by a Chinese driver and escorted by some Chinese soldiers with weapons. Sampho was a Chinese Vice-Commander, so as soon as he arrived there, the public threw stones at him. This was one reason given. Others said that people mistook him for Ngabo, so that was why they threw stones at him. Whatever the reason, his head was hurt. Some Tibetan officials took him into a jeep and took him to the Chinese office at Dekyilingka Park. In the evening, he was taken to a Chinese dispensary. Because of this, he was not able to accompany the Dalai Lama to India.

After that when Kalon Surkhang arrived at Norbulingka, he cleverly parked his jeep at Chabgo Bridge, and walked to Norbulingka, in a polite manner. The people shouted at him, calling him “two faced” and saying, “Don’t invite His Holiness to the Chinese army camp! Don’t exchange His Holiness for Chinese dollars!” They shouted many bad things at him. Some women cried. Everyone, both male and female, was simmering with anger. With the help of some *tsedrung* officials and some security guards from Norbulingka, Surkhang managed to make his way through the crowd into Norbulingka.

No sooner did the Dalai Lama hear of these incidents than he went upstairs feeling slightly sad, and said, “Today the weather is not bad. It would be okay,” while looking up at the sky.

Just before midday, Khenchung Sonam Gyatso (Gyaltsen?), the older brother of Chamdo Phakpa Lha, returned to Lhasa from the morning tea ceremony he attended at Norbulingka. He wore casual dress and came back to Norbulingka on a bicycle. When he arrived at the main gate of Norbulingka, people were irritated by the sight and they shouted at him and went to capture him, so he took out a pistol and fired a warning shot into the air. The people then stoned him to death, and they took his body to a place near the Stone Lion.

Just after that, people appointed their representatives, numbering about sixty, including Yabshi Sopa Lhakyab, Phalha Dzopa Pelgong, Kopon Nyerpa, Chamdo Manang Bu, Shol Tatongpa. They immediately went and urged, politely or harshly, to the Kashag that the impending visit of the Dalai Lama to the Chinese army camp to attend a show was very risky for his life, so the visit must be cancelled. They also requested that volunteer people be allowed to stay at the gate of Norbulingka to protect it, and the Chinese must go back to China, as they were not willing to live under Chinese, and Tibet belonged to Tibetans. The Kashag told them that they would report the same to the Dalai Lama, and

the people should keep the peace and refrain from all kinds of violent activities. On that day, the Dalai Lama and the ministers met and discussed the issue, and finally the Dalai Lama's visit to the Chinese camp was cancelled. The cabinet members decided to go to the Chinese army camp to inform them of the Dalai Lama's inability to visit, and the same was to be announced to the people.

Immediately after that, a group of ministers went to the upper stage of the gate of Norbulingka. First, the Kalon Surkang announced that the Dalai Lama had cancelled his planned visit to the Chinese army camp for the cultural show, and told them that all the people should return to their homes peacefully, as the government had arranged Tibetan troops at Norbulingka for security. He further told them that the cabinet members would immediately go to the Chinese army camp to explain the reasons why the Dalai Lama was not able to attend the Chinese theatrical show. The government would talk with the Chinese regarding Tibet's issue and the people should thus maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Chinese to avoid disturbances to the negotiation process. When the cabinet members came out of the gate in jeeps, the people checked the jeeps to see if they had hidden the Dalai Lama inside one of them.

Kalon Surkang, Katha Neushar and acting minister Shankhawa were the cabinet members who went to the Chinese army camp to inform them about the Dalai Lama's inability to go there. Ngabo had already been there among the Chinese officials, and he did not sit with the other Tibetan ministers. The General Tan Kuan-sen was the chief official at that time, as both Chang Ching-wu and Chang Ko-hua had left for Peking. There were around fifteen Chinese officials. The Tibetan ministers introduced themselves to the Chinese.

Tan Kuan-sen was in angry mood and did not respond to the Tibetans' greetings. He stood up and walked to and fro. Then he sat down violently. He looked at the Tibetans angrily. Kalon Surkang spoke up to explain the matter. After narrating the incident that had occurred that morning, he said, "Because of that unfortunate incidence, His Holiness was not able to attend the cultural show." Tan Kaun-sen stood up, and banking the table, he angrily said, "You reactionaries are doing rebellious works against China in the name of the people. We have been patient so far. We are not able to be patient anymore." He said many harsh and threatening things. Then he said, "You reactionaries have done an extreme thing. We can destroy you within a moment by military attack." This made the ministers feel that they would be arrested at any time. Kalon Shenkhawa stood up and politely said, "Though the Chinese are helping Tibet, the Tibetans are not aware of it. The Dalai Lama has just finished his religious exams and he was not willing to cause any harms to the relationship between the Chinese and Tibetans." Commander Cheng Zhotung said, "You are relying on a small number of Khampas you have in Lhoka. Now it is the time to send PLA troops and destroy them." Then Commander Fu

said that there must be peace and non-violence in the country. With a serious face, Tan Kaun-sen said, "Do you know that we Chinese have been patient? There must be a limit to this patience." To this, Kalon Shenkhawa said, "There is no limit to patience. If one perfects in patience, it is called perfection in patience." All the Chinese laughed, and their mood improved.

Then, finally, the Chinese said that the safety of the Dalai Lama relied on three of the ministers. The three replied that this was their main responsibility and the Chinese should also know this. They dispersed. At the same time, the ministers went to see Kalon Sampho, who had been hospitalized. The ministers returned to Norbulingka.

The people who had gathered at the gate of Norbulingka, carrying the dead body of the Phagpa Lha, marched through Barkor street shouting slogans such as "Chinese go back to China", "Tibet belongs to Tibetans," "Tibet is an independent country," and so on. They pasted posters everywhere and distributed pamphlets. They submitted memorandum to the Chinese. Some leaders made announcements in the city. Without fearing military attack by the Chinese, the people organized an unprecedented uprising against them.

On that day, again about thirty members of the People's Association went en masse to meet the Kashag and the Chief Abbot Official at Norbulingka, from whom they requested permission to allow the volunteer people to surround the Norbulingka boundary walls, to protect the Dalai Lama, in addition to the regular security guards. Upon obtaining this permission, they positioned volunteer people around Norbulingka. Soon after that, all the senior government officials, military officers, representatives of the monasteries and People's Association assembled at Shabten Lhakhang temple at Norbulingka. Though their stance and goal were the same, they did not agree on their approaches. Finally, it was decided to fight for Tibet's independence, through peaceful or violent method; to sever relations with those Tibetan officials who were in favor of the Chinese; to allow the volunteer people to guard Norbulingka for the security of the Dalai Lama; and to request the Nepalese and Indian ambassadors to mediate in the Sino-Tibetan issue, as witnesses.

That evening, General Tan Kaun-sen sent a letter to the Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Lama gave reply to his letter, and the accounts to this effect are found in *My Land My People*, the autobiography of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, so I will not write about them here.

The next day, 11 March, the government officials, abbots and representatives of the Three Great Seats and army leaders held an urgent meeting at Shabten Lhakhang temple at Norbulingka. At the meeting, they took a great vow that all of them would unite and sacrifice their lives and wealth for the sake of Tibet's religion and polity. An office called the Chikyab Kago Lekung, or the Superintendent Office was set up

with former minister Lhalu, Kundeling Dzasak, Khenchung Tarawa, Khenchung Kalsang Ngawang, Tsechak Khenchung Gyaltzen, Lachak Khenchung Tenpa-la, Lachag Lhading Se and Rimshi Shakabpa as the chief superintendents. The People's Association did not accept Lhalu as their leader, so Lhalu could not attend the meeting. According to the edict sent by the Dalai Lama from Kyishong Rame, they appointed the retired prime minister Lobsang Tashi and Khenche Thupten Gyalpo as acting prime ministers, but the two could not assume posts. The meeting also decided to make Kagyur Printing House at Shol as the venue of their meeting and to wire regularly to the Tibetan Welfare Association at Kalimpong informing them about the events taking place in Lhasa to be publicized.

On the morning of the 12th March, at the Drepu Yulkha ground in front of the Potala, under the leadership of Gurteng Kunsang-la and Galing Sharcho-la, more than a hundred thousand women had gathered and conducted incense offerings and installed prayer flags. After that, they marched through Barkor shouting slogans, such as "Free Tibet," "Chinese imperialists, go out of Tibet," and so on. They burned the Chinese flags and photos and effigies of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, Chou Enlai. Some women members went to the Indian and Nepali Embassies where they submitted memoranda containing all the evil plans and actions of the Chinese, and requesting their help. In short, the Tibetan woman organized a large scale uprising against the Chinese, without fear of the Chinese military power!

(Later, during the Chinese military suppression, Gurteng Kunsang-la was arrested. Later her fellow members during this uprising Lhokha Tamdin Tsomo and Nyemo Ani-la were executed. They all deserve our honor and commemoration.)

On that day, Tibetan army leaders above the rank of captain held an urgent meeting, and then all the regiments were assigned responsibilities and locations at the Norbulingka, Potala, Dorjiling armory, Chakopri, Lhasa Tsuglakhang and other important places. The police force was given the task of the safety and security of Lhasa city. A curfew was imposed in Lhasa and Shol during the night. Norbulingka was surrounded by security guards and volunteer people, selecting the most capable representatives from the people.

Thousands of people from Lhasa and Shol, with or without weapons, and taking their own food, had gathered voluntarily to protect the life of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan political and religious affairs. At the instruction of the Army Headquarters, all the army leaders above the rank of Lieutenant discarded all their titles and any uniforms given by the Chinese that they had worn during parade for the sake of making friendly gesture towards the Chinese. The Bodyguard Regiment soldiers and leaders also discarded all the Chinese uniform, and they wore only Tibetan army dress.

Peace was not restored and tensions prevailed. Different Tibetan army regiments were deployed at various areas. The troops of the Drapchi Regiment were

deployed at Drapchi, the Potala Palace, Army Headquarters, armory and Chakpori. The Ngadang Gyantse Regiment troops were deployed at Gyatso, to the north of Norbulingka; Jaraglingka to the northeast of Norbulingka; and Shol. The Chadang Artillery Regiment was assigned the responsibilities of the Police force of Lhasa city, as well as the security responsibility of Lhasa and Tsuglakhang temple. The Kadang Bodyguard Regiment was serving as internal security guards and gatekeepers of Norbulingka, and also patrolling the Jakyag Karpo hill.

After that, the Tibetans brought cannons of different sizes and machine guns from army camps and positioned them at different locations according to their strategic importance and readied to fire. Phones, mirror signals, trumpets and torches were arranged to be used for giving secret signals among themselves in the war.

At that time, though the Tibetan army had its own military system and training, the volunteer people had no experience in military skills and discipline, so government officials and the most capable members among the people were selected as leaders. Under their leadership, the volunteer people were distributed and deployed at Norbulingka, Potala, Lhasa and the monasteries by the Chief Superintendent Office.

Most of the volunteer people were without weapons, so the government's weapons such as machine guns and other arms were brought in trucks from Tsheshol to Norbulingka and Lhasa, and they were distributed among the volunteer people through their leaders. Since the people did not know how to use, operate and maintain them, some instructors were sent to guide them about how to use and maintain them. At Norbulingka, an office was set up for the purpose of the distribution of weapons and training on their use.

A meeting was held to discuss issues regarding the collection of food supplies for the army. It was decided that the government, private estate holders and monasteries in all parts of Tibet would voluntarily contribute all their reserve grains for the sake of Tibet's religion and polity. Chandzo Khenche Lhading of Tsemonling set an example by donating all that belonged to the monastery to the army. Kundeling Labrang declared that he would donate anything necessary, even the broom behind the door of his monastery, to the Chief Superintendent Office.

The Kashag and National Assembly met to discuss issues regarding the expansion of their army and the Chinese military preparations. They came to the agreement that they should strive to have peaceful reconciliation with the Chinese instead of fighting them, and they followed this policy. The Chinese were also making war preparations. They brought trucks full of Chinese soldiers and arms to Lhasa from Yangpachen in northern Tibet and Tolung. They were readying to launch military attacks in Lhasa. Hence the situation was so tense.

D. The Dalai Lama leaves Norbulingka Palace for India

From Nyethang, a small Tibetan cavalry led by Damseng Tseten Wangchuk¹⁷ and Chushul Barme Kunsang-la, who were on their way to Lhoka to inform about the volatile situation of Lhasa, arrived at Chaksam Druga ferry crossing on the morning of the 12 March. They met Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu,¹⁸ who along with his troops, was patrolling the area, and informed him about all the events that took place in Lhasa. Namgyal Wangdu immediately met Lobsang Yeshe and leaders of the Chushi Gangdruk who were in Gongkar, and blew the trumpet for a meeting of the leaders and senior members. At that meeting, he told them all the news about Lhasa that he had heard from the two Tibetans from Nyethang. The members discussed what they should do. There was no consensus at the meeting as to whether they should send a mounted messenger to Lhokha, to ask the leaders of the Volunteer Army to move the volunteer troops at Gongkar to Nyethang, close to Lhasa. They thus agreed to consult the Lhamo deity at the Gongkar monastery, by means of dough-ball divination, and the deity answered in the positive.

After that, some members of the Volunteer Army led by Jangri Lhagyal were dispatched to Gongkar and Chaksam to defend them, and the rest of the members walked on days and nights to Nyethang, arriving there during the night of the 13 March. On the 14 March, Lobsang Yeshe, Litang Kunga Samten, Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu, Derge Chudobu, Tenpa Dargye from Dargye Monastery, Chatreng Tenpa Rabgye and other leaders of the Volunteer Army met for a meeting. After discussion at the meeting, they sent Lhakpa Ngodup, a soldier of the Gyantse Regiment, secretly to Brigadier Dokhar Se of the Gyantse Regiment to inform the Kashag at Norbulingka that they [volunteer members] had arrived at Nyethang from Gongkar and were waiting for an immediate instruction from the government. The Kashag told them that they should send one capable man among them to the Kashag the next day to do an important task. The next day, at around midday, Captain Kalsang Dradul of the Drapchi Regiment and Major Cholung Nangkar sent from Norbulingka arrived at Nyethang to instruct the leaders of the Volunteer Army to deploy troops at the southern area of the Kyichu River and Tolung for security. They also told them that the Kashag had asked Loye-la and a capable representative to go to Norbulingka with them. During that night, Loye-la and Kunga Samten, travelling through the southern bank of the Kyichu, went to Norbulingka, arriving there in the night. Gyantse soldier Kasho Wangdu was instructed to gallop to Samye to ask Alo Dawa and the Volunteer Army to arrange security along Drib immediately.

Namgyal Wangdu and Derge Chudobu deployed volunteer troops at Nyethang Lhachenmo and the southern bank of Kyichu River, and the two made regular rounds to these two areas. On the 16 March, former brigadier Surkang and his

wife Yutok Lhacham arrived at Nyethang on their way to Lhoka to seek asylum. The volunteer troops received them well and helped them to cross the river. In that night, Chogteng Ta Lama and Tadrak Dzasak also arrived at Nyethang, and they were received well by Namgyal Wangdu and Chatreng Tenpa Rabgye. They had brought a secret letter from Master Chamberlain Phala from Norbulingka, saying that an important person would be visiting there and they must secretly deploy security forces at Rama Druga ferry crossing, near the Kyichu River, and that they must patrol the areas tirelessly. Ta Lama and Tadrak Dzasak gave Namgyal Wangdu and Tenpa Rabgye images of Vajrabhairava as protective gifts. The two officers helped them cross the river.

On that day, by the statement "Someone important will pass through it" in the Chamberlain's letter, the two officers wondered whether the Dalai Lama or someone else was coming there. For two days, that is, 16-17 March, they positioned equipped men along the roads up to the Kyichu. The Gyantse Regiment troops, having better equipment, were placed along the narrow path of Neudzong, which was on the direct opposite of Nortolingka, up to Rama Druga ferry crossing. Frequent rounds were carried out to make sure that there were no signs of danger. That day, Loyela and Kunga Samten returned [from Norbulingka] to the southern bank of the Kyichu. Drapchi Major Japhok Tashi Wangdu also arrived there from Norbulingka, carrying with him about 50 British rifles and some Bren guns and ammunition, which the two officers issued to the leaders of the Volunteer Army.

At about 4 pm of the 14 March, the Chinese fired two artillery shots from the direction of Kyangthang Nakha, a meadow ground where vehicles were parked, at Norbulingka. The shells fell into the pond, in the northern compound of the Norbulingka Palace. People suspected that the Chinese were performing artillery tests. Since it further endangered the life of the Dalai Lama, it turned out to be another warning to the Dalai Lama that he must think about leaving the palace. The Dalai Lama thus made up his mind to go to southern Tibet or a foreign country to seek asylum for the time being. The members of the People's Association also vehemently requested that the government move the Dalai Lama to a safe place. The cabinet ministers, the Chief Abbot Official and Master Chamberlain immediately held a meeting. After much deliberation, they came to an agreement that they must with great secrecy and in a tactful manner first move the Dalai Lama from Norbulingka to southern Tibet, and then to decide whether or not they should take the Dalai Lama to India, in consideration of the time and the situation. With regard to the journey route, it was agreed that they should follow Shundong Kar by way of Chushul or to pass through the Rama Druga ferry crossing at the Kyichu River.

Not long before that, Kalon Ngabo, who had remained mostly with the Chinese, handed a letter to the Dalai Lama, asking him to tell the exact location of

his residence. After that, the Chinese performed more artillery tests. Considering these things, it was confirmed that the Chinese would launch military attacks on Tibetans. The Dalai Lama therefore moved to southern Tibet to escape from danger. Details to this effect are found in the autobiography of the Dalai Lama, *My Land and My people*.

The Kashag entrusted to Master Chamberlain Phala the responsibility of making the arrangement for the Dalai Lama's journey, his security and other necessary preparations. Accordingly, he decided to include the Dalai Lama's three chief servants--chief cook, chief bedroom servant and the chief in charge of the prayer room--and the two tutors as well as his family members and the cabinet ministers in his retinue. Kusung Dapon, brigadier of the Bodyguard Regiment, was instructed to accompany the Dalai Lama as his main bodyguard and to take the responsibility for his security. Phala entrusted to Kundeling Dzasak and Brigadier Trepal of the Drapchi Regiment with instructions regarding the responsibility of organizing security arrangement in advance along the route of the Dalai Lama's journey. Ngawang Lekden, ex-abbot of Lower Tantric College, and Abbot Ngawang Drakpa of Sera Me College, with some assistants, were sent in advance to keep an eye on the Chinese spies and the Chinese situation in Lhoka.

Kundeling Labrang was instructed to take saddled mules and horses as many as possible, and wait first at Tsagurshi and then at Rama Druga bank. Drapchi Brigadier Trepal was asked to patrol the Rama Druga bank in an inconspicuous way. Major Japhok was dispatched to check if there were any Chinese troops on the Jakyag Karpo hilly range, since that area was very risky. He returned and reported that the areas were peaceful. Jakyag Karpo hill is located to the opposite of the Potala Palace and to the south of the Kyichu River, touching Rama Druga bank by its foot. Traditionally, it is the site where Tibetans used to fire *sinmo* cannon of different sizes, and later British made Howzat cannons every year during the Great Prayer Festival.

Thereafter, in order to discuss about the security arrangements along the road the Dalai Lama would pass through, Kundeling Dzasak and Brigadier Trepal, Colonel Wangden Tashi and Captain Kalsang Dradul—all from the Drapchi Regiment—went to Dekyilingka, the residence of Kundeling. After taking vows that no one would leak out the secret, they discussed and made a detailed plan about how to deploy troops at Rama Druga ferry, and how to act as rearguards and front guards of the Dalai Lama throughout the journey by accompanying him with his retinue.

At around 5 pm, led by Kundeling Dzasak and an elite armed force made up of some top members of two units of the Drapchi Regiment, including Brigadier Trepal, Colonel Wangden Tashi, Colonel Sonam, Captain Kalsang Dradul, lieutenants, majors and military instructors were deployed along the Jakyag Karpo hilly range, to the north of Drib. They patrolled all around Rama Druga ferry

and Neudzong areas, opposite the Chinese army cantonment at Nortolingka. The Volunteer Army was also guarding the areas.

At that time, those who were guarding the areas from Gongkar through Nyethang to Rama Druga including Volunteer Army's leader Lobsang Yeshe, Kunga Samten, Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu of Gyantse, Derge Chudobu, Tenpa Dargye from Dargye Monastery, Amdo Sonam Tsering and Choden met at Rama Druga ferry crossing. They reported the situation of the areas and security arrangement they had made along the road of the Dalai Lama's journey to the Kundeling Dzasak. At that time, only the the Volunteer Army from Gongkar arrived at Rama Druga ferry crossing, and the members of the Volunteer Army from Lhoka came to provide security to the Dalai Lama only after the Dalai Lama left Bandza Druga ferry crossing, because they were too far away from the Druga and could not reach there in time.

Regarding the Dalai Lama's journey, Master Chamberlain Thupten Woden, who masterminded and organized the Dalai Lama's escape journey, recounts the following events in his interview given to the Oral History Department of the Library of Tibetan Works and Achieves and published in the *Oral History, Series No 2*:

By that time, the relations between the Chinese and us had already been badly torn. Under such circumstances, it was not only extremely risky [for the Dalai Lama] to remain there but also clearly unlikely to achieve any results. After much deliberation on what was the best thing to do, we finally agreed that it was better to prepare in advance since [the Dalai Lama] would have to leave [his palace] quite suddenly. Since it was impossible to undertake the journey openly, we had to organize the journey in a very secret manner, with proper planning. If many people took part in the preparations for the [Dalai Lama's] journey, it would create problems. As the saying goes, "Instead of catching a deer, the valley is filled with the barking of dogs"¹⁹. So, in order to "take the eggs without frightening the hen,"²⁰ we had to organize the journey very cautiously. Therefore, only one person was to be entrusted with a sole responsibility for the arrangement and organization of the journey. The Kashag entrusted this task to me.

I made a plan at my own discretion for the organization of the journey. Our government had around 200 riding horses and mules, but if we used even one of them, people would suspect and our secret would leak out. Since Kundeling Labrang had an estate across the river [Kyichu], I asked him to take all his horses and mules to Rama Gang [the bank of the Kyichu River] and wait there, so that he could provide as many horses and mules as we needed when the Dalai Lama started his journey from Norbulingka, and he agreed.

It was not possible to go in a cavalcade from Norbulingka to the bank of the river [Kyichu]. In those days, the government was fetching weapons from the Tse-shol Armory to Norbulingka in trucks during the night-time and distributed them secretly

amongst the people. Taking that opportunity, I made a plan to bring the two tutors of the Dalai Lama, cabinet members and the family and three chief attendants of the Dalai Lama in that truck from Norbulingka to the residence of Kundeling Dzasak at Dekyilingka park on the night when the Dalai Lama was to leave his palace.

I planned that when the Dalai Lama, Master Chamberlain, Kusung Dapon and I started the journey from Norbulingka's southern gate, we would all walk some distance on foot, and then take the Dalai Lama on horseback up to Rama Gang ferry crossing. I appointed Captain Kalsang Dradul of the Drapchi Regiment as the horse servant of the Dalai Lama, and gave him detailed instructions on his duties. I asked the cabinet members to wear casual clothes instead of their official yellow costumes and be ready to leave whenever I informed them come to the Dalai Lama's palace. I explained my above-mentioned plan to the cabinet members and others, in advance.

Around that time, for the protection of Norbulingka, many monks and lay officials of the government, soldiers and volunteer people had been divided into groups and deployed at the outer and inner gates of Norbulingka, even around water gutters, and security checks with body searches were carried out on all those who passed in or out through the gate. The Kashag and I discussed and agreed that if the gatekeepers asked us about our identification or directed torchlight at our faces when we went out in night-times for daily rounds, there was a great danger of leaking out the secret journey of the Dalai Lama when he started his actual journey. Therefore, before the appointed day of the Dalai Lama's flight, I summoned all the gatekeepers to Shabten Lhakang [at Norbulingka] and instructed them that from that night on they were not allowed to ask us who we were, or put torchlight on our faces whenever we went out for security rounds during the nighttime, because it was dangerous as there were many Chinese spies everywhere. I further told them that the next day I would send a truck to fetch weapons from Tseshol Armory and they should let it pass through the gate, without checking inside it. I told them this because the truck would be actually carrying the two tutors of the Dalai Lama and the cabinet ministers, among others. If they knew this, our secret plan would leak out.

Since it was risky to serve strange food to the Dalai Lama [along the way], I asked the chief steward of the Dalai Lama to pack all the necessary food materials and carry them ahead to Rama Drug ferry and wait there. I told him that though it was not sure whether the Dalai Lama would journey or not, he had to accompany the Dalai Lama in the event that the Dalai Lama did make his journey. I also told him that he must keep this secret. I placed a photo of the Dalai Lama on his head and asked him to take an oath that he would not reveal the secret to others. He said, "If I go like this, I am afraid that I will be rebuked for my absence. So please inform the head cook about this." I said, "In such a circumstance, no one will inquire about you. You must go straight to Ramagang Druga ferry carrying with you all the necessary food materials. I will send someone to help you carry the stuff.

At that time, we had about ten confidant monks of Sera Me who had been sent by Abbot Ngawang Drakpa. I had kept them in a tent in the compound of Norbulingka, pretending that they were reciting Tara mantras for me. I sent them in civil dress to help the Dalai Lama's attendant. I asked the Dalai Lama's chief room attendant to send to me whatever he had to carry with him during the journey. He sent me a wrapped piece of luggage, which I gave to the monks to carry to Rama Druga ferry.

Taktra Dzasak asked me if there were any works for him to do at Norbulingka. I said, "What is the use of staying here? You should go down to Taktra hermitage and see the situation there. The situation is uncertain. There are stories that previously when the former Dalai Lama suddenly fled via Nagchu, the Nagchu Drubkhang Labrang offered him service, such as providing him with felt clothes to change from his religious robes. We might also have to make flight for a moment. If you help the Dalai Lama at that time, it will be good." Saying this, I sent Dzasak back to his residence. I did this in the hope of getting help from Taktra Monastery, because it was wealthy.

We decided to leave on the 8th day of the second Tibetan month of the Earth-Pig year, corresponding to March 17, 1959. At 10 pm of the said day, when we started our actual journey, I sent a government staff member to invite the two tutors of the Dalai Lama to Norbulingka Palace. They came and stayed for a while at the palace. I sent Tsechag Gyaltzen to call the cabinet ministers together. When they arrived, I kept them at U-yab Tago. Thereafter, as we had already arranged some trucks, I sent the cabinet ministers, the two tutors, the three chief servants and family of the Dalai Lama in trucks to the residence of Kundeling Dzasak at Dekyilingka Park. From there, they walked for some distance, and then they rode on horses through Rama Gang Druga ferry. After that, when the Dalai Lama left, the Chief Abbot Official Gadrang, bodyguard Kusung Dapon Takla and I were with him...

In this way, the team who took the responsibility for the Dalai Lama's flight organized the journey in a secret and very clever way. Regarding how the team sent the members of the retinue of the Dalai Lama in different batches to Rama Druga ferry: first, the Dalai Lama's family who had been brought to the Bodyguard Regiment's barrack was sent directly to Rama Druga ferry, followed by the Dalai Lama and some members of his entourage proceeded with him. Then from the residence of Kundeling Dzasak, the two tutors of the Dalai Lama, cabinet members and the three chief attendants of the Dalai Lama left for Rama Druga ferry crossing. A gap of about half an hour was kept between each departure.

A few days before that night, the noise of a machinegun firing was heard from Jakyag Karpo Hill, which panicked everyone. In some sources, it was mentioned that when the noise was checked, it was found that the sound was from a gunshot fired by a Tibetan defense soldier who had mistakenly triggered his gun, so everyone was relieved from concern. However, the actual fact was that during that night, a group of about ten Chinese soldiers from Drib were spotted passing near the Druga ferry

through the river on patrol. Major Dhondup Namgyal immediately fired about 20 shots from his Bren gun, and all the Chinese soldiers ran away. Brigadier Trepal sent Major Japok to the area to see the situation. Arriving back, Major Japok reported the same thing to the brigadier. He also told him that Major Cholung Nangkar had found a white cloth of about an arm-span length with Chinese letters in red ink on it, which might have been dropped either by those Chinese soldiers or someone else, and he gave it to Kundeling Dzasak.

The Tibetan soldiers from Nyethang and members of the Volunteer Army from Gongkar marched days and nights to Rama Druga ferry crossing, along the Kyichu River from south, and troops were deployed at it. The Chinese troops residing at Nortolingka camp and others must have known about these preparations, but they might have thought that the Tibetans were tightening security in that area, and none of them had any idea that the Dalai Lama was traveling.

The actual journey was started at about 10 pm of that night (17 March). The Dalai Lama wore civil clothes and sat on the throne. Opening the text of the Buddha's teachings *Eight Thousand Verses (Brgyad stong pa)*, he read it up to the line, "Just as the great bodhisattvas have accomplished the Perfection of Wisdom, you should also feel confident...",²¹ and then he recited some prayers. Thereafter, he came out from his chamber, while his bodyguard Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu and Section Leader Yeshe Gelek waited at the roofed balcony. He was disguised as an ordinary soldier and wore Lieutenant Wangdu's short British rifle around his left shoulder. He then walked down, accompanied by Captain Lobsang Tashi and others.

At that time, there were no security guards around the gates of the garden and the Yellow Walls as they had been already been removed by the Kusung Dapon [Takla]. He went to the library of the Potala and the chapel of Mahakala and recited a prayer with both of them. After that, he walked to the southern gate of the exterior wall. The Chief Abbot, Master Chamberlain and Kusung Dapon walked before him, and Captain Lobsang Tashi, Lieutenant Desang, Lieutenant Wangdu and Section Leader Yeshe were behind him. Master Chamberlain told the gatekeepers that they were going for their daily rounds. The gatekeepers opened the gate and saluted them. They did not notice the Dalai Lama. Then, when the Dalai Lama and his retinue walked through the sandy valley near the Kyichu, amidst security troops patrolling the area, except for those few involved ones, none of them recognized the Dalai Lama.

After covering a little distance, the Dalai Lama saw a man standing with a horse on a small ravine near the bank and immediately asked someone to go and see who that man was. Lieutenant Khangdu (Wangdu) quickly ran to see the man and returning, he reported that Kundeling Dzasak was waiting there with a saddled horse. However, the Dalai Lama, instead of riding a horse, walked on throughout the Rama Druga bank. From that point, the travel servants and bodyguards of the Dalai Lama dispersed

and walked in separate groups, with some distance between each other. Just below the Rama Druga ferry, leather coracles had been arranged to cross the river [Kyichu]. The Dalai Lama, Chief Abbot Official, Master Chamberlain and Kusung Dapon sat in the same boat, and when the coracle reached near the other side, the oarsman threw ropes to the Gyantse Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu and Gyantse army secretary Namgyal Tsewang who were on the other side, pulled the rope. Lobsang Yeshi, Litang Kunga Samten, Derge Chudobu Wangchuk Tsering and Sadu Tenpa Dargye, who were waiting there, greeted the Dalai Lama with scarves. Lobsang Yeshi introduced to him all the leaders who were with him. The Dalai Lama praised Tenpa Dargye, "Your name gives auspicious meaning!" After that, the bodyguards and attendants of the Dalai Lama crossed the river by coracles and boats, group by group.

Kundeling Dzasak had been waiting at a corner of the Druga bank with some riding horses. The Dalai Lama, accompanied by Chief Official Abbot, Master Chamberlain, Kusung Dapon, bodyguards and some leaders of the Volunteer Army, rode on horseback. Drapchi Brigadier [Trepal] and Major Japhok with about twenty mounted soldiers were going ahead about 1km before the Dalai Lama's party, to check the roads. After that, the two tutors, the three chief attendants and the family members of the Dalai Lama left, followed by the cabinet ministers.

As soon as the Dalai Lama and his party passed Neu Dzung, all the officers and soldiers of the Drapchi Regiment who had acted as frontal guards now moved back to serve as rear guards. All the members of the Volunteer Army who came from Gongkar with the Dalai Lama returned to their previous positions. During that night, from Rama Druga ferry, Lobsang Yeshi and Amdo Choten, who were leaders of the Volunteer Army, went back to Norbulingka to fetch weapons and to do some other things.

During that night, while the Dalai Lama and his entourage travelled silently, except for the trotting sounds of the horses, through the bank of the Kyichu River, the electric lights of the Chinese cantonment at Nortolingka, located on the slope bank of the Kyichu, were clearly visible, and even the noise of the Chinese soldiers' talking could be faintly heard. In those days, some Chinese trucks used to come to the bank to fetch sand and boulders, so it was a very risky to pass through it. The sky was sparsely clouded, the moon was dim and there was a slight breeze.

The travelling party gradually speeded up its journey. After crossing Neu Lachung pass, Sangda and Thangto, as the dangerous areas were passed, the party rested at Namgyal Gang for a short time. Early the next morning, on the 18th March, the party left Namgyal Gang. After covering a short distance, Master Chamberlain ordered all those who arranged boats at Bendza ferry of the Yarlung Tsangpo, and the members of the Volunteer Army who came from Rama Gang, to return to defend their previous positions, and that the two leaders must return with them to organize them. Therefore, Tenpa Dargye left for Bendza boat crossing. Gyantse

Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu and army secretary Namgyal Tsewang returned to Gyantse to lead their troops for the defense of the area.

On the way, they met the Drapchi troops who were the Dalai Lama's rear guards, continuing after the party. They also met at Thangto at around noonday Brigadier Dokhar Sé Sonam Topgyal of the Gyantse Regiment and Kusung Rupon Sonam Tashi of the Bodyguard Regiment, leading more than one hundred troops, taking along with them a saddled riding mule (for the Dalai Lama). They conversed for a while about the situation. After that, Namgyal Wangdu deployed some security troops at Rama Druga boat crossing. From Norbulingka Lobsang Yeshi sent Amdo Choten to request Namgyal Wangdu to come to Norbulingka to help him. Namgyal Wangdu went to Norbulingka with some troops. They decided to take a quantity of weapons two days later to Rama Druga, from where they were to load them on mules and set off [after the Dalai Lama].

On the morning when the Dalai Lama and his party arrived at the foot of Jela Mountain, Taktra Dzasak, who had been waiting there, received the Dalai Lama and his retinue and served a meal to them. After that, the party arrived at Sheldrong, where the Dalai Lama's former horse keeper, Tashi Norbu, offered him a saddled horse. After eating breakfast, they arduously climbed Jela Mountain the whole day. In the evening, they arrived at Bendza ferry crossing of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, where the coracles had been well prepared.

First, the Dalai Lama with a few members of his retinue went to the ferry crossing, where Kyishong Anan, the leader of the local militias, received him and told him the details of the situation in that area. The Dalai Lama and his retinue started to cross the river by coracles. When they were a few yards (*rgyugs dom*) into the river, the Dalai Lama noticed that his chief cook had been left behind, and exclaimed, "Our chief cook has been left behind!" The chief cook hurriedly ran after the coracle, walking through the water. When he nearly drowned in the water, Major Japok, a bodyguard of the Dalai Lama, and Nyethang Chodze pulled him by his hands into the boat safely. The party crossed the river.

On the bank were waiting some members of the Volunteer Army and many local people, who greeted the Dalai Lama and to receive his audience. The party then headed for Kyishong Rame, where they stopped for rest.

The following is a short excerpt from the interview with Kasur Kundeling Woser Gyaltzen, a minister in the traditional Tibetan government, published in the *Oral History, Series No II* (Dharamsala: Library of the Tibetan Works and Archives):

In this way, as pre-planned that the soldiers would leave after all the others [the Dalai Lama and his retinue] left, the soldiers were summoned through a secret call to assemble. Only about ten immediate rearguards of the Dalai Lama rode on horseback, and the rest of the bodyguards who followed the Dalai Lama marched on foot. Really,

what we call a well-trained army must be like that and it should be like that! During that night, I was stunned by the soldiers. Whether it was a platoon or a squad, the soldiers came together in lines, and put the boxes and bigger guns on their shoulders. Carrying all their required equipments, they immediately marched forward. Really, they did not have time to even to carry their tea mugs!

They marched on during the whole night without breaking the line until their leader ordered them to halt; they had no chance to loiter or linger along the way. Therefore, when people say that soldiers are exploiting people, I wonder whether they really exploit people at all. During wartime also, they have to move straight forward and are not allowed to do anything else. During that night, I was quite amazed at the soldiers—I almost envied them. When they started their march, I, along with my assistants, followed them. At that time, Rama Gang Druga ferry crossing was empty, as everyone had already left and no one had remained behind.

When the Dalai Lama and his retinue arrived at Kyishong Rame, his bodyguards were organized into three divisions as inner, middle and outer security guards. The regent and ministers, after due deliberation among themselves, sent an emissary to the Panchen Rinpoche [at Tashi Lhunpo] with an official letter informing him about the Dalai Lama's flight to southern Tibet, and 5,000 *dotsey* (a monetary unit) as a gift to his community. An edict in the Kashag's name was sent to Kalon Ngabo and Sampho in Lhasa, instructing them to make their best efforts to help the people, and the political and religious affairs of Tibet.

When the party was to head to Chongye, the members discussed which way to follow, and decided to journey through Tsona to enter India. Previously, from Norbulingka when the journey had started, Master Chamberlain sent Khenchung Changkyim Thupten Tsepal secretly to the Indian ambassador in Lhasa, to request him to make an arrangement so that in the event that Dalai Lama was to enter India, they would not face any problems at the Indo-Tibetan borders. The Indian ambassador's reply was that he wanted to know in advance the exact date and places the Dalai Lama would pass. Master Chamberlain responded that it was not possible to tell in advance when the Dalai Lama would leave and which route he would follow to enter India, as everything depended on the time and situation. The Indian ambassador granted permission.

On their arrival at Chongye, the Kashag sent a messenger with an order to the Cadang Regiment to report immediately to Gyantse to defend the area. The Kashag also sent a messenger to the Governor of northern Tibet, instructing him to mobilize local militias from the four northern districts and 39 states of Hor, and to destroy the northern route, phone lines and the airport of Damshung. However, as the situation turned more chaotic and also as the local troops were unable to reach the destination, these instructions could not be carried out.

To ensure a smooth journey and the least hardship to the Dalai Lama, it was decided to travel in the daytime. From Chongye, the travelling party proceeded to Rame Monastery. From amongst the bodyguards of the Dalai Lama, Colonel Sotre of the Bodyguard Regiment and Brigadier Dokhar Sé of the Gyantse Regiment, each commanding elite force of thirty soldiers, were sent ahead to defend Drag Dorji Druga ferry crossing and Dranang Dayan Druga ferry crossing respectively.

Dzasak Kundeling was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the southwest division of Tibet with the responsibility to ensure proper arrangement of the rearguards during the journey of the Dalai Lama and to command the defense forces in Lhoka. The troops of the Kadang and Khadang regiments, members of the Volunteer Army and local militias were reorganized and divided into three groups as inner, centre and outer security guards of the Dalai Lama, and they were assigned different areas to defend. Proceeding from Rame Monastery, they arrived at Drophu Monastery in Chide Shol. The next day, travelling through Drathung Monastery of Dranang, they arrived at Gyango Gyalsang, a small village at the foot of the Saphu-la pass, where they spent the night. The next day, crossing the Saphu-la pass, they arrived at Chenye Monastery just before dusk, and stayed the night there.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Tibetan: Mgo gser skus bcags na sbyin rlabs med/ spun nyes dma' na, dga' snang med/
2. Author's note: She was also known as Gurteng Kunsang-la because she went to the Gurteng family as a bride.
3. A dob-dob (*ldob ldob* or in some sources *ldab ldob*) are generally less academic monks who had interest in sports, fighting and other 'worldly' matters, and often act as the policemen and labors of their respective monasteries.
4. Tibetan proverb "*chus khyer rkyal rloms*," literally means, a person thinks he is swimming, although he is actually being carried away by a river.
5. Chinese: Xizang gongwei: Tibet Work Committee was the main Chinese administrative office in Tibet in the 1950s.
6. The two tutors were Yongzin Kyabje Ling Rinpoche and Yongzin Kyabje Trijang Rinpoche. Kyabje Ling Rinpoche was a senior tutor of the XIV Dalai Lama. He was born in 1903 at Yaphu, one day's walk to the north of Lhasa. His father's name was Kunga Tsering and mother's was Sonam Dekyi. He enrolled himself at Drepung Monastery, one of the three great geluk monasteries, in the Water-Mouse year (1912) when he ten years old, and obtained the geshe *lharampa* degree in 1922. He was appointed the Junior Tutor and then Senior Tutor to the Dalai Lama in the Iron-Snake year (1941) and the Water-Snake year (1953) respectively. At the age

of 63, he was appointed the 97th Ganden Throne Holder by the Dalai Lama. He passed away at the age of 80. (*The Tibet Journal*, vol.8, no.3, 1983:45-61)

Kyabje Trijang Rinpoche was born in 1901 to his father Tsering Dhondup, a staff of Gungthang Rinpoche's residence, and mother Tsering Dolma in Gungthang. His full name was Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso Palsangpo. He obtained the Geshe Lharampa degree in 1919. He became the junior tutor of the XIV Dalai Lama in 1941. He accompanied the Dalai Lama to India in 1956. He passed away at the age of 80 in 1981. (*Tibet Journal*, vol.7, no.1&2 1982, Spring-Summer:6-40).

7. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (5 September 1888 – 17 April 1975) was the first Vice-President of India (1952-1962), and its second President (1962-1967). Among the many honours he received were a knighthood (1931) and the Bharat Ratna (1954). His birthday is celebrated in India as Teacher's Day on 5 September.
8. Dr. Rajendra Prasad (December 3, 1884 – February 28, 1963) was the first President of the Republic of India. He was born in Jiradei village of Siwan Bihar to his father, Mahadev Sahai and his mother, Kamleshwari Devi. He served thrice as the President of the Congress (1934, 1939 and 1947) and played a prominent role in the Indian Independence Movement. He served as President of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution of the Republic from 1948 to 1950. He also served as a Cabinet Minister briefly in the first Government of Independent India.
9. Acronym for the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization—an agency of the UN that promotes education and communication and the arts.
10. Tib: Thugs rje chen po rang byung Inga ldan
11. The sixteenth Gyalwa Karmapa, Karmapa Rangjung Rigpe Dorji, was born on the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the male wood rat year (August 14, 1924) at Dengko on the banks of the Drichu river, near Derge, Eastern Tibet. His father's name was Tsewang Paljor and his mother was called Kalzang Chodun. In February of 1959, Karmapa left Tibet with 150 with portable spiritual treasures and relics and 150 tulkus, monks and lay people. He settled in Rumtek, Sikkim, India. Tashi Namgyal, the King of Sikkim, offered land to the Karmapa near the site where the 14th Karmapa had established a monastery. It was here that his new seat, Rumtek Monastery was built in 1966. The traditional seat of the Karmapa, Tsurphu Monastery, still exists, but the number of monks is restricted.

In 1974, Rangjung Rigpe Dorji set out on his first world tour. He took a second tour in 1977. As did the previous Karmapas, Rangjung Rigpe Dorji performed startling miracles. Numerous times he left footprints in rocks. He once tied sword blades in knots. During a visit to the Hopi reservation in north-eastern Arizona, he made rain for the drought-stricken area. He died on November 5, 1981 in Zion, Illinois, north of Chicago. (adapted from the Karma Kagyue website)
12. Tib: "la phug dmar po'i rtsa ba 'bu gsum gyis bzos."

13. Chushi Gangdruk (spelled *chu bzhi sgang drug*, lit. Four Rivers, Six Ranges) was a name of a Tibetan resistance group when the PLA invaded Tibet.
14. Tibetan: *skyid la kha'i rtsa la mnyam za dang/ sdug sngon mo'i chu la mnyam 'thung*, which means sharing happy time and sorrow.
15. Cheng Ho-ching's Tibetan name is Lobsang Tashi, and he was popularly known as Gya Lobsang Tashi.
16. Geshe Lharampa is the highest of the four grades of *geshe* degrees: *tsokrampa*, *manrampa*, *dorampa* and *lingseypa*. The candidates for geshe degree who stood first division are awarded the Lharampa degree.
17. Note by the author: he was arrested by the Chinese and suffered extreme torture , but he remained loyal with his courage and patriotic sense intact, so he was eventually executed after a few years.
18. He is the author of this book. After arrival in India, he served in the Tibetan Est. 22, or the Special Frontier Force (SFF), based in Chakrata, Dehradun.
19. Tibetan: *Sha ba zin rgyu med par lung chung khyi sgrags brgyangs*
20. Tibetan: *bya de ma drogs par sgong nga len thabs byed pa*
21. Tibetan: *ji ltar byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po rnam shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la nges par 'byung ba 'gyur ba de bzhin du khyod spobs par byos shig//*

Chapter Sixteen

Chinese Military Suppression



A. Chinese military suppression in Lhasa

In Lhasa, the PLA troops constructed fortifications and dug trenches, and emplaced many artilleries and automatic guns of different sizes inside them, targeting the Potala Palace, government offices, monasteries, Tibetan army camps and other important government buildings. They mobilized all their troops to launch a concerted attack.

Tibetans made defense preparations in the event of Chinese attack. The soldiers of the Bodyguard Regiment were deployed in the compound of Norbulingka and one unit of the Gyantse Regiment were spread over Jarag grove and upper and lower areas of Gyatso. The volunteer people from Lhasa and volunteer monks from the Three Monastic Seats surrounded Norbulingka for its protection. A detachment of the Drapchi Regiment, Sera monks and volunteer people from Lhasa were assigned to defend Dekyilingka Park, Senge Nanyag, Bachok Hill, Barma Hill and residential areas of Barshi and Kundeling. Another unit of the Drapchi Regiment, some soldiers from the Gyantse Regiment, volunteer monks from Namgyal Monastery and volunteer people from Shol were placed around Chakpori Hill, the government armoury and Potala. One unit of the Drapchi Regiment was placed at the Headquarters of the Tibetan Army for its protection. The volunteer people from Shol were assigned to the defense of Namgyal Monastery. The protection of Tsuglakhang temple (Jokhang), the Kashag office, Ramoche temple, the Upper and Lower Tantric Colleges and Mentsikhang were entrusted to the troops of the Chadang Regiment, volunteer people from Lhasa and monks and monastic officials of the Upper and Lower Tantric Colleges. Some soldiers of the Drapchi Regiment and some monks from Sera Monastery guarded the Draothang area. The responsibility to guard the Rama Druga ferry crossing and Neu Dzong fortress, located opposite to Nortolingka, was given to the volunteer force based in Gongkar.

Some senior government officials, representatives and abbots of the Three Monastic Seats, representatives and leaders of the volunteer people and senior army officers held series of meetings in the Kagyur Printing House at Shol. The Chief Superintendent Office at Norbulingka issued weapons to the volunteer people and made war plans. The Tibetans, in this way, made preparations to defend themselves

against the Chinese in case of war, but their preparations lacked good planning and logistics. They did not have good strongholds and means of communication. The supply of food and military equipment was not sufficient or timely. Weapons were not distributed systematically. The volunteer people had no training in using weapons; they had to use them in urgent situations. Despite this, both the Tibetan public and Army had a strong sense of unity and the determination to sacrifice their lives and resources for the sake of their country and religion.

During the meetings held at the Kagyur Printing House at Shol, Tsarong, Manang Apho-la and others who had some military experience suggested that since the Dalai Lama and the Kashag had already left Lhasa, efforts should be made to bring about a peaceful reconciliation with the Chinese. They said, "For the time being, only a small Tibetan force should be kept in Lhasa, and the rest of the Tibetan troops and volunteer people should be deployed along the motor roads of northern Tibet, important mountains and valleys around Lhasa and other strategic areas, with garrisons. By so doing, we would be able to make a combined resistance fight from all sides whenever the Chinese attack us. It is important to obstruct the roads for the Chinese backup troops and military supplies." On the other hand, Shol Tatongpa Jolag [Tseten Wangchuk], a monastic representative Ganden Abrola and some other members at the meeting objected, saying that if all the Tibetan troops and people left Lhasa it would be tantamount to surrendering Lhasa to the Chinese. They boastfully voiced that they should go ahead with their preparation to fight, whether it brought them victory or defeat. Therefore, due to disagreement among the members during the meetings concerning their policies and goals, the volunteer people's association failed to draw up any particular strategy and common goals for their resistance movement.

At that time, led by brave patriotic women such as Kunsang-la, many Tibetan men and women in Lhasa staged demonstrations against the Chinese. The Chinese on the other hand installed loudspeakers at various places and continued with their propaganda campaign, announcing wild and alluring promises to the Tibetans. All the Tibetan people, including even the children, however, devoted all their resources towards the patriotic and resistance movement against the Chinese. Every day people recited prayers, burnt incense and offered *serkyem*¹ to evoke all kinds of Dharma protectors, including the goddess Palden Lhamo, for their support. While clouds of smoke from burning incense filled the sky, they cheerfully shouted "Lha Gyalo!", meaning "May the gods triumph!"

Many people, old and young, ordained and lay, from different parts of the three provinces of Tibet, rushed to give food and daily necessities to the volunteer people at Norbulingka and other areas of Lhasa, and the roads appeared to be filled with the heavy traffic of people. This marked an unprecedented unity of the Tibetan people of the whole of Tibet.

At around 2 am on March 20, 1959, the Chinese at first fired artillery from the western side of Magar Sarpa, the new "New Regimental Headquarters", followed immediately by Kyangthang Nakha (the meadow near Norbulingka) and Tsedrunlingka Park. They finally started firing from within Lhasa. The Tibetan forces at Lhasa and Norbulingka made counter-attacks. Amidst the intense exchange of firing between them, we could see the bright signal-lights of white, red and green colors fired into the sky from various sides. The whole area of Lhasa was filled with the intense noise of artillery and gunshots. The Tibetan forces at different positions gave signals to each other by trumpet to remain alert and ready to charge at the Chinese forces. Sparks of bullets and shells soared high into the sky from everywhere. Sometimes bullets and shells passed near us, with whistling sounds. Since it was dark and there were only a few electric lights at the Chinese army camps, both the Chinese and Tibetan forces fired artillery and guns at their enemy's positions, by guessing their distance and locations. The Tibetans set fire to the Chinese cantonments and the houses near Lhadong Shenkha (near Tsangpo River to the east of Lhasa), Kyire and Phodrang Sarpa², the 14th Dalai Lama's new palace at Norbulingka and others that had been occupied by the Chinese. They also set fire to the wooden bridge near Damra pond and Jerag bridge, and the flames were visible from the Potala Palace and Chakpori Hill.

The next day when the dawn arrived, we saw some Chinese small military trucks moving near Nortolingka, behind the Potala Palace and in front of Senge Nanyak. The Chinese soldiers were nowhere to be seen, as they were hiding inside their trenches and other fortifications, but they kept firing, with increasing attack mode.

While the noises of guns and artillery intensified, smokes of *sang* offerings and the burning Chinese army cantonments engulfed the sky, obscuring the sun completely. From Tsuglakhang temple and the balconies of Tibetan buildings, the Tibetan forces fired continuously and shouted "*kyi kyi so so lha gyal lo!*" The same was also happening at Norbulingka, as seen from the Potala Palace. The Potala had remained as intact and as graceful as before, without damage. At sunrise, considering the situation at various battle sites, it seemed that the Tibetans were on the victorious side. The Tibetan army and volunteer forces attacked the Chinese camps and residences.

Soon after that, the Chinese at Magar Sarpa and Drib Mountain started firing from inside their barricades and trenches at the Tibetan positions. They first shelled the temple of Mentsikhang on Chakpori Hill for about an hour. At the same time, from Shugtrilingka Park, near Norbulingka, many Chinese troops suddenly rushed the Chakpori Hill. One wall of the temple collapsed, creating a large cloud of dust. Some Tibetan army officers and troops, including Lieutenant Tsewang and some monk volunteers who were defending the Chakpori Medical College, lost their lives. As a result, the rest of the Tibetan troops and volunteer

monks fled, and Chakpori Hill was seized by the Chinese. Trasang, a soldier of the Drapchi Regiment, who fought this battle, recollects:

They [the Chinese troops] attacked the Chakpori Medical College, with showers of shells. Though we made counter attacks at our best level, Lieutenant Tsewang and his son, as well as our section leader Dhonden Karpo, Katog Rigzin and Pogey Wangdu, [who were with me,] lost their lives right in front my eyes. Many other soldiers from my group also died or were wounded. At around 12 am that day, the temple of the Chakpori Medical College fell down, and a huge cloud of dust and pieces of rubble billowed up into the sky. We lost ground due to the overwhelming size of the Chinese army. We moved from Chakpori Hill to the back gate of the Potala Palace, from where we fired artilleries rapidly onto the Chinese position at Chakpori and their army camps. Many Chinese soldiers might have been killed or wounded, but we did not see any of their dead bodies.

In Potala, we found many of our soldiers lying wounded; they did not have even water to drink, let alone medical treatment. On the evening of the 12th day [of the second month, March 21], I met Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu of Gyantse and Lieutenant Thonpa. They told us that the Dalai Lama had already left Lhasa and that we must fight the Chinese in a clever and surreptitious way. After that, a rumour spread widely that if we did not surrender, the Chinese would bombard the Potala Palace. During that night, except for those who did not want to leave, most of us fled from Potala. Travelling through Lukhang river crossing and Jerag sand bank, we went to Nyangral, from where we made our way to India.

As soon as the Chinese took Chakpori Hill, they shot a flare into the sky as a warning sign. They immediately shelled Norbulingka from different sides for several hours, leaving countless numbers of people and horses dead. There was blood everywhere. Thick clouds of dusts and the smoke of explosions filled the sky. The Tibetans lost courage and determination to fight.

A large number of people, riding horses or walking, fled towards the Kyichu River in the south or towards Damra pond in the north. Many of them, including Letsen Lobsang Yeshe, a leader of the volunteers from Gonkar and government official Tsedrung Gyaltzen Tashi were shot dead by the Chinese on the bank of the Kyichu River. There was a great commotion and the stampede of a large number of people at and around Norbulingka, running here and there for their lives. Some amongst them died under Chinese fire. From the western gate of Norbulingka, the troops of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment fired artilleries and machineguns at the Chinese army cantonment at Nortolingka. This not only slowed down the Chinese attack, but also destroyed many houses occupied by the Chinese. Lieutenant Khetsun-la of the Ngadang Gyantse Regiment recounts the following in his report:

When the battle started in the night of the 11th Tibetan day [20 March], we, about fifty troops and officers, fought the Chinese at the bridge to the east of Gyatso and the vehicle station at Kyangthang Nakha, with great intensity and courage. Our Section Leader Langtong Sithar, as well as the governor of southern Tibet Pasang Tsering and Penpa, were killed by the Chinese artillery shots. Section Leader Nyingto Migmar Tsering, Shonteng Buchung, Tago Wangdu, among others, were wounded. Many members of the volunteer force, including monks, were also killed or wounded.

Unable to resist the Chinese rapid artillery firings on us, we fled to Shabten Temple at Norbulingka. There were a large number of our people, including volunteer people, army officers and soldiers. Some of them suggested that since it was impossible to resist the Chinese attacks coming from different directions, we should surrender to them, or else, we might face unforeseen consequences. At around 5 pm that night, a Chinese detachment rushed the main gate of the Norbulingka and surrounded it. We, about 20 troops, immediately escaped from the northern gate of Norbulingka and ran to Khachelingka Park, from where we fled to Nyangral via Damra pond.

Following is the report of Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji of the Gadang Regiment on this battle:

At that time, I went to Lhasa from Shigatse on an official visit to our regimental camp. With our two soldiers Nyima Dhondup and Migmar Gyalpo, I then went to Norbulingka, where I was appointed leader of 75 volunteer soldiers, which included monks also. Our task was to defend Senge Nanyak area at the south of Chakpori Hill and Masang Dopung on the bank of the Kyichu River. They had no long-range guns. We had 112 short rifles and 10 bags of ammunition granted to our Shigatse Regiment by the Army Headquarters. We got permission to give them to the volunteer people. We gave 65 guns to them [who were under me] and the rest to Markham Tsong Samphel and Dzigya Chandzo, to be distributed amongst the volunteer people who were under their leadership.

We blocked the motorway at Masang Dopung by digging holes in the roads. We broke the wiring posts. We made embankments and dug trenches to ambush the Chinese. On the 11th day [20 March], at around midnight, the Chinese first fired flares of different colours into the sky, as a warning sign, and then started firing at our position. At sunrise the next day, we saw three armoured Chinese vehicles with weapons attached coming from the Chinese army camp at Magar Sarpa towards us. On the way, seven Chinese soldiers got out of the tanks and hid in a trench. We immediately opened fire on them, killing four of them on the spot and wounding the other three. A jeep came, took the wounded Chinese soldiers into it and drove away hurriedly.

At about 4 pm, the Chinese again launched rapid artillery shots on us, killing twelve members of our force, and wounding our Bren gun man Nyima Dhondup. Therefore, unable to hold the ground, we fled to Norbulingka, and from there we

headed towards Rama Druga ferry crossing. We were carrying four complete sets of Bren guns and six boxes of ammunition, loaded onto three government mules. Along with us were many soldiers and officers, including Letsen Lobsang Yeshi, as well as civilians who were on their way to seek asylum. However, on the way, the Chinese fired on us heavily. We had no option, so we returned to Norbulingka.

Just after dusk on that day, while we were trying to escape through the northern gate of Norbulingka and then Damra garden, the Chinese attacked us with artillery shots, killing five members and wounding two members of our group. Our one Bren gun fell into Damra pond. While taking the two wounded persons along with us, we travelled on. Through Nyangral, Phenpo and then crossing the Kyichu River, we finally reached Gyama.

The Chinese slowed down their artillery attacks on Norbulingka and started shelling Potala, the Tibetan Military Head Quarters and the Printing House at Shol, from midday until the evening. After each shell hit the Potala, it created a large dusty cloud mixed with the red paint of the Potala walls, giving us the impression that the building was destroyed. However, each time the dust settled, we felt very happy to see the Potala intact and as bright as before. That night, we soldiers went to look closely at the Potala Palace, and we found a countless number of broken pieces of used shells and many logs of wood had fallen down onto the front ground from the Potala Palace. We did not find any space to walk on. Except its eastern face, which was slightly damaged, the Potala Palace remained intact and as graceful as before. We were amazed at the strong structure and the traditional Tibetan architecture of Desi Sangye Gyatso³, and felt that his work was worthy of commemoration.

The Tibetan Military Headquarters and the campus of the Shol Printing House had been lightly damaged on that day. Some members of the Tibetan Army, including army secretary Nyamon and Menpal, as well as some women and children at Shol were killed or wounded by the Chinese artillery shots. The Chinese fired continuously, without break. Just after midday, about one thousand monks of Sera Monastery fearlessly rushed to the Potala through the sandy area of Jerag to get weapons. From the direction of the Civil Hospital, the Chinese fired upon them. To protect the monks from the Chinese attack, Captain Phuntsok Dorji of the Drapchi Regiment and Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu of the Gyantse Regiment, along with some other officers and troops, at the Talam Gormo tract behind the Potala Palace, fired on the Chinese. The monks arrived at the Palace safely. With the help of the soldiers who were at the Palace, they took about one thousand British model shotguns from the lower storehouse of the Potala Palace and about 50 boxes of bullets from the armoury at Sharchen Chok. While the monks were collecting weapons, the Chinese fired artillery onto the Palace. Some of the monks were killed or wounded, but rest of the monks got guns. We taught them quickly how to use and clean the guns. The monks then returned to their monastery through Jerag,

while the Tibetan troops fired on the Chinese to distract their attention in order to protect the monks. Before the monks arrived at their monastery, the Chinese had started shelling the monastery, causing great damage and many deaths.

Regarding the manner of the resistance put up by the Tibetan troops at different positions with cannons and other automatic weapons against the Chinese, Captain Lhundup Kalsang of the Drapchi Regiment's artillery unit bombarded the Chinese army position at Draotang, inflicting severe casualties on the Chinese side. From the western gate of Norbulingka, the Tibetan troops fired artilleries onto the Chinese cantonment at Nortolingka, causing great damages. From the side of the Potala Palace, Captain Phuntsok Dorji of the Drapchi Regiment and others fired artilleries onto the Chinese army cantonments at Magar Sarpa, Drib, Kyangthang Nakha and other areas occupied by the Chinese troops for many hours. From the Potala's western hill, the Drapchi Regiment fired at the Chinese positions at Magar Sarpa and Drib, killing or wounding many of their soldiers and causing severe damage to their fortifications. The Tibetan side lost some officers and troops, including the artillery master in the battle at the hillside. The Tibetans immediately shifted their artilleries to the Talam Gormo track.

In every part of Lhasa, the Tibetans, including women, engaged in the resistance fight. Out of great anger and courage, they broke down the electric poles and wires, and sacked the houses occupied by the Chinese. Under the command of Colonel Guru Rigzin Paljor of the Chadang Regiment, the Tibetan troops moved artilleries from Artillery Training Ground to some strategic locations around Lhasa and fired on the Chinese army camps continuously for a whole day, destroying the hall at Mimang Thangchen and the Chinese cantonments, and killing or wounding a large number of Chinese soldiers. This event was well known to Lhasa people. Colonel Guru's courage and military skill amazed and inspired everyone, and became worthy for praise and commemoration. Later on, the Chinese composed a theatrical drama entitled "The mischievous actions of Colonel Guru" and showed it in Lhasa.

The Chadang Regiment's Captain Tsering Lhagyal, with his troops, fought the Chinese, using all kinds of firing weapons they had with them, from the directions of Ramoche temple, upper and lower Tantric colleges, the Civil Hospital and Simphu. This was the longest battle the Tibetans fought with the Chinese wherein the Tibetans inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese side. Finally, several Tibetan officers and soldier, including the Captain himself, lost their lives during that night, while fighting in this battle.

When the Chinese troops went to the residence of former minister Lhalu, he and his younger wife hid inside a felt-tent (*ching gur*) and fired Bren guns onto them until the bullets were finished. They then threw hand grenades at the Chinese. This incident lasted for several hours, and they were said to have killed

or wounded many Chinese troops. The Chinese dared not come near that area for several days. According to some soldiers of the Drapchi Regiment, who once served as bodyguards of Lhalu when he was the Governor-General of Kham, his wife learnt how to fire a Bren gun and use hand grenades in Chamdo, and she became skilled in firing them.

A group of monks of Sera Monastery destroyed the Tibetan government's electric machine house at Dogde which had been seized by the Chinese, and killed or wounded several Chinese officials. They also attempted to attack the Chinese camps at Drauthang, but failed and returned. In Barkor, when many Chinese troops, entering through the Old Labrang, attacked the Tibetan positions, Tonpa Jedrung and his force retaliated with artillery shots, causing great casualties on the Chinese side. Thereafter, a large contingent of Chinese soldiers charged at them from the side of the Phodrang Sarpa, the new palace at Norbulingka. Gojo Chosur's son Gojo Topgyal and others fired artillery on them continuously for several hours, killing or wounding many of their troops. Lhagyari Trichen Namgyal Gyatso, who spent 23 years in Chinese prison after he was arrested during the event of the Tibetan [March 10] uprising in Lhasa, recounts:

On the day when the actual Lhasa uprising started, we, a group of Tibetans led by our leader Tapon Tsewang Jorden, entering through the fence of Yabshi Taktse's residence, attacked the Chinese army camp located near the Civil Hospital. Though we killed several Chinese troops, we failed to seize their position, and returned.

At Banak Shol, a group of voluntary soldiers, led by the Litang Jangtsa Chondze's nephew, attacked the Chinese troops who were hiding inside the Tethong's residence. At the end of the fight, both the Chinese and Tibetan sides suffered great casualties. At the same time, a group of volunteer people led by the leader, (whose name I do not remember), who was a relative of Lachag Chagdrung, the treasurer of Shatrom Trigang Labrang, attacked the Chinese troops hiding inside the residence of Trimön. The fighting lasted for a whole day, leaving many Chinese dead. The above-mentioned leader lost his life in that fight for the sake of the country.

At Gyabum Gang, when a contingent of Chinese soldiers arrived, a group of volunteer people led by the brother, of the ex-abbot of Gyabum Gang (whose name I cannot recollect) put up a strong resistance for many hours, and both sides suffered great casualties. The leader of the volunteer people also lost his life during the night while fighting for the sake of the country, in a dignified manner.

Lieutenant Sonam Wangdu of the Chadang Simchung Artillery Regiment recalls the following events in his report:

At around dawn of the 11th Tibetan day [of March], our late Colonel Rigzin Paljor fired a trench mortar continuously for many hours onto the Chinese army camps at

Yutok, the office of the TAR (Tibetan Autonomous Region), Samdup Phodrang and other concentrated Chinese areas. From the front side of Tromsigkhang, we fired a 3-inch mortar artillery until 12 pm that day, targeting the houses of Surkhang, Pomda and Kashopa and the New Army Camp and office of the TAR that had been occupied by the Chinese troops. From 1 pm until 7 pm that night, from the side of Ramoche Tsepak Chapel, we fired artillery onto the Chinese army camps at Simphu, Civil Hospital and Bonsho. On the morning of the twelfth day [21 March], we again placed the artillery behind Tsemonling and shelled the above Chinese army camps. On that day, from the Ramoche hall, we, about 50 officers and soldiers, using all the kinds of weapons we had with us, fought the Chinese with great courage and force. Captain Tsering Lhagyal, a very brave and efficient officer, was killed by the Chinese artillery shots. Except for two of us who managed to escape, the rest of the members of our group were either killed or wounded. We fled to Tsuglakhang temple where we joined the other Tibetan troops. At around 8 pm that night, led by our Brigadier Junpa and Colonel Rigzin Paljor, we, 42 soldiers, travelling through Mondrol bridge and Rigya, crossed the Kyichu River, and then passed through Gyama and Samye, and we finally arrived at Tsethang.

All the Tibetan army members and volunteer people indeed put up strong resistance against the enemy for the sake of their country and people, but as mentioned above, they suffered defeat in every fight due to their small number and inferior logistics and military supplies, as compared to the enemy's forces. Consequently, Lhasa fell to the enemy.

The Tibetan voluntary forces held positions at various areas between Rama Druga ferry crossing and Neu Dzong and fired guns and mortars on the Chinese army cantonment at Nortolingka. However, they were defeated and fled from their positions. All the Tibetan forces from their respective positions fought the enemy with great determination regardless of duration. Gravely fed up with the Chinese invaders, all the Tibetans had a very strong concerted will power to protect their country against them. Though they had the ability to drive out the Chinese, they lacked good military organization and logistics. Moreover the Chinese forces fired mortars and automatic weapons repressively, causing tremendous casualties and destruction on the Tibetan side. Thousands of Chinese troops converged on the Tibetan positions from different sides. The Tibetans therefore lost Chakpori, Norbulingka, Potala and Lhasa to the Chinese one after another in a short time, and their troops fled from each position. When Lhasa fell to the Chinese, the majority of Tibetans decided to go to a foreign country to seek asylum. Without any plan or aim, they proceeded to Lhoka, through Nyangral, Dogde, Neuchung, Nachen Trang and Drepung U-tse, in the hope that they could reinforce themselves and launch a resistance fight from outside Lhasa to retake it. Most of them crossed the Kyichu River and arrived in Lhoka, where they regrouped and

reinforced themselves, and remained there with the same strong determination and courage to fight back the Chinese.

In Lhasa, before the violence broke out, the Chinese forcefully kept Kalon Ngabo and Sampho, among other government officials, at their military camp. After the war, they arrested and tortured many famous personalities, such as acting Prime Minister Lama Lobsang Tashi, Commander-in-Chief Lokal (Lobsang Kalsang), Khendrung Lhabu Tara, ex-Kalon Lhalu, ex-Kalon Tsarong and Tibetan women's leaders, including Kunsang and Galing Sharcho. Many other Tibetan brave and patriotic volunteer people, monks, officers and soldiers were arrested and subjected to very harsh torture for many years.

It is difficult to tell exactly how many civilians, leaders, troops and army officers were killed or wounded during the war. The area around Norbulingka was filled with thousands of dead bodies. The Norbulingka Palace and the temples around it were destroyed. Many government mules kept at Norbulingka staple were killed or wounded. Most of the government buildings and private houses in Lhasa were destroyed. A large number of civilians and monks, including children, were killed. Tsuglakhang's ornamental top was damaged. Many temples nearby it were destroyed. The Potala's eastern and western walls were damaged. The government school, the main gate, the buildings of the Tibetan Military Head Quarters, offices of Potala and Shol and the barracks of the Drapchi and the Gyantse regiment were destroyed. The Chakpori Medical College was smashed. Ramoche temple's top was badly damaged. The government's offices located on the Shingra and many houses nearby were burned to ashes. Many private houses and buildings in Lhasa were either damaged or completely demolished.

When the Chinese troops entered Norbulingka, they immediately searched for the Dalai Lama, shouting, "Where is the Dalai Lama?" They checked each dead body with a shaved head lying in the compound of Norbulingka, showing clearly that they did not know that the Dalai Lama had already left the palace a few days before. When they learned that the Dalai Lama had already left, they ordered the Kalon Sampho to announce on PA that the Dalai Lama had secretly left his palace, and the Chinese had seized the Norbulingka, Chakpori Hill and Potala, and that all the Tibetan troops and people should submit themselves to the Chinese. At that time, however, the violence had not been calmed down completely in the city. All the Tibetan people had one common wish—that was the escape of the Dalai Lama from the Chinese hands and his safe arrival in India. The attendants and concerned officials of the Dalai Lama, through various means, arranged the escape journey of the Dalai Lama successfully. Mainly due to the prayers of the Dalai Lama, protection by the Dharma protectors and collective merits of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama escaped safely to India, although this was almost impossible, as if it was the

work of some miraculous power. In India, he was received warmly by the people of India, like a child returning to its parents.

Due to the kindness of the government and people of India, and under the benevolent leadership of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan refugees in India set up an exile government, settlements, handicraft centers, schools and monasteries of various Buddhist sects extensively in India. They are enjoying freedom without lacking food, clothes or religious practice, as they do in their own country. In recognition of such great achievements, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (in 1989) and his fame has reached the summit of the world, and the truth of the Tibetan cause is almost completely established. Considering these things, we must be happy and contented, and revere the Dalai Lama from the core of our hearts.

Had the Dalai Lama been entrapped in the violence at Norbulingka or had not escaped to India, the Chinese would have already engulfed Tibet, making the Tibetan struggle for the reestablishment of Tibet's independence impossible, and the life of the Dalai Lama would certainly have been harmed.

The Tibetan people's unified resistance movement against the Chinese invaders started in Dotö and Domé, and the mass uprising in Lhasa for their country and government was absolutely legal and reasonable. The Chinese invaders had therefore no right even to create negative terms to classify and label Tibetans as "serious offenders" or "mild offenders". Disregarding moral ethics, sense of shame, honesty and the laws, the Chinese seized the ownership of all the bases, treasures, offices and properties of the government, monasteries and the private individual Tibetans. Moreover, they arrested and imprisoned many leaders, government officials, monks and lay people, and categorized them into minor, medium and major criminals. On the other hand, they praised those Tibetans who flattered and showed inclination towards the Chinese, by calling them "advanced and patriotic people", while those Tibetans who struggled for their own country were labelled as "reactionary", thus reversing the meaning of "bad" and "good". They tortured Tibetan prisoners who were patriotic and loyal to their country, and worked them harder than animals. Many of them were killed by various forms of extreme tortures or by starvation. Many of them took to suicide.

From that time on the Chinese destroyed all the most important buildings, structures and institutions of the happy Land of the Dharma. They burned all religious texts, whenever they were found. They forcefully converted many lamas and monks into lay people and destroyed all the monasteries. All the Tibetan people felt that Hell had appeared on earth, in reality. The Chinese called the Tibetan society the "old society" and criticized it as a "source of all evils". They humiliated the people and forced them to recount the "sufferings" they had experienced in the "old society". Such an unimaginably bad period had come.

The Chinese propagandized to the world many distorted and false things about Tibet, through every possible means, verbal and written, such as saying that the main leaders of the “reactionary group”, such as Surkhang Wangchen Gelek and Phala Thupten Woden had kidnapped the Dalai Lama, and that the uprising was suppressed by the people. They exaggerated many negative points of the history of declining Tibet and publicized them to the world, verbally or in writing. However, people were convinced fully that the Chinese, who were wearing a mask that covered their real ugly face of imperialism, were making these deceptive, boastful and cunning political moves to amalgamate Tibet into China.

As mentioned in the above chapters, during the time of the Chinese emperors, Tibet and China had developed a “priest and patron” relationship, and by virtue of this relationship, both sides helped each other in military and political spheres. China cannot claim that Tibet a part of China just because of this relationship. Most of the independent countries of the world had such histories, and it is not the exceptional case with China and Tibet alone, whereby China can incorporate Tibet into its country. Furthermore, at no point of time in the past did the Tibetan government or the Tibetan people formally or legally accept Tibet as being part of China, nor is it possible in the future. This is the decision made by history.

In fact, as a simple example of why it is impossible to integrate the land and people of Tibet into China, there are old records, histories and folklores in which we find that China, Tibet and Mongolia existed as separate countries in the past. This historical fact cannot be erased from the world history. This is the main reason why the people of the three provinces of Tibet revolted and led resistance movements against the Chinese invaders throughout this period with the aim to reestablish Tibet’s independence for the sake of their country, religion and freedom. As long as the Chinese do not give back the rights and freedom to the Tibetan people, it is the unavoidable and biggest responsibility of all the Tibetan people to struggle against the Chinese, for their rights and freedom, from both within and outside Tibet, by any means, peaceful or violent.

The former and present Chinese governments, with evil plans and without consulting the Tibetan government and Tibetan people, wrote in their Constitution that Tibetan is one of the Chinese nationalities, and secretly signed several treaties and agreements with foreign countries regarding Tibet. They have been militarily suppressing the people and doing many activities in violation of the laws and traditions of the country. Everyone in the world who loves truth and honesty knows this fact clearly. However, nowadays, everyone vociferously talks about human rights, democracy, self-rule, non-discrimination, peace and truth: the reality is that the governments of all the countries of the world, driven by their foreign policies and trade interests, act over-cautiously and often discard the “truth” just as they “spit saliva from their mouths⁴”. In such a pathetic period, the displeased lord of

gods will cause a terrible disaster in this world in the future, as a manifestation of his wrath, to punish them. Nevertheless, I believe that the truth will ultimately emerge victorious, as it is a universal law.

I shall now sum up the history of the Tibetan uprising movement. The Chinese had a strategy that they should invade Tibet through peaceful and deceptive methods, as far as possible, and if this did not work, they should resort to force. They prepared for many consecutive years to achieve that goal. On the other hand, the Tibetans strove mainly for compromise with the Chinese, hoping that Chinese would keep their promise to protect the Tibetan religion and polity and welfare of the Tibetan people, rather than resorting to military resistance. After nine years of co-existence and reconciliation with the Chinese through the peaceful approach followed by the Tibetans to resolve the Sino-Tibetan issue, the Chinese started aggressions on Tibetans, and even attempted to harm the Dalai Lama's life. As if inculcated by the deities and Dharma protectors of Tibet, when all the evil plans of the Chinese came up to the surface, the people of Lhasa, Shol and other parts of the three traditional provinces of Tibet, out of great frustration, immediately rose up against the Chinese, demanding that they leave Tibet in a proper way, and they resolved fully to resort to violence if the Chinese did not meet their demand. The Tibetan government and people urgently made extensive preparations for military resistance against the Chinese, within a short time. However, though the people had strong courage and determination to fight the enemy, they not only lacked good military strategy, plan, training, logistic and food and military supplies, but also did not even have inkling of the enemy's military strategies, strength and different types of mortars and automatic weapons, and their emplacement.

The Chinese communists had already planned to launch an military attack on Tibet for a long time. They mobilized enormous number of troops and stationed them in and around Lhasa. They put in place various kinds of weapons, facing towards Potala, Norbulingka, Lhasa, Shol and others, with the readiness to fire upon them at any time. Their troops also remained ready to charge upon the people.

The Tibetans lost the war and country. Led by the Dalai Lama and his officials, many Tibetans were forced to leave their country, dividing the Tibetan people into the Tibetans in the homeland and the Tibetans in exile. The Chinese on the other hand announced, verbally and in writing, that they had suppressed the rebellions and expelled the "reactionaries" and "separatists". By making such wild hard-to-believe announcements, the Chinese attempted to assimilate Tibet into China and to make an impression that Tibetans loved Chinese, by fooling the people inside and outside their country. This was their new method to achieve their political purposes.

Though the so-called "democratic reform", "class struggle" and "Cultural Revolution", which were designed and implemented by the Chinese themselves, to the world they falsely declared that the Tibetan people themselves voluntarily

initiated the movements and destroyed the four “old systems”.⁵ Internally they tried to establish communism in Tibet through the introduction and implementation of Mao’s ideology and practice, but communism failed to hold ground after the death of Mao, and China had to adopt a more liberal policy and free economic system. In order to stabilize their own powers, many new Chinese leaders later on adopted a socialist democracy, in which the people have no rights and powers.

The Chinese always criticized “imperialism” and “western capitalism”. However, at present, communism has lost ground and China is forced to turn towards capitalism. Therefore, these are just some examples to explain that the Chinese actions are never lawful or trust worthy.

B. The Dalai Lama and his ministers arrive in India

Leaving Chenye Monastery the Dalai Lama and his party reached Chongye Riwo Dechen on the evening of March 23, where he intended to stay for the night. Tsipton Namseling Paljor Jigme and Khenchung Ngoshi Thupten Samchok, who had been posted as bureau officers at Tsethang (in Lhoka) the previous year and Jorgye, the governor of Southern Tibet, arrived there to receive the Dalai Lama. They briefed him about the clashes between Tibetans and Chinese in Lhasa, and the heavy casualties suffered by the Tibetans. The news gravely saddened the Dalai Lama. At that time, a mounted messenger from Kyishong sent by Khenchung Tarawa Dongag Tharchin arrived there with a message giving the details about the violence in Lhasa. The Voice of America also announced the news about the bad situation in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama being missing. After hearing the news, the Dalai Lama did not stay at Chongye and left for Nyal on March 24. On that day, Dzasak Kundeling, leading a force comprising of some Tibetan troops, some members of the Volunteer Army and local militias, went to Yamdrok Phu Majang Thang, while Khenchung Ngoshiwa and Tsipton Namseling and with a small force occupied the bank of Tsangpo from Chaksam Dru to Nyang for defense purposes, in case of any sudden arrival of Chinese from the Lhoka side. The Dalai Lama and his party stopped at Yarto Dargyeling, where they were received warmly by Yongzin Ling Rinpoche’s monastic estate. During that night, Khenchung Ngoshiwa Changkyim’s estate arranged food, dress, bedclothes, horses and other necessary supplies for the Dalai Lama and his retinue.

On March 25, the party headed to Achu Dogyang, a small and simple village in Yarto Drakla, and spent the night there. All the villages and monasteries along the route accorded him a warm reception and farewell, and a large crowd of people, including monks, lay people, volunteers and local militias came to receive a visual blessing from the Dalai Lama. However, many of them did not recognize him, as he

was in civil dress and travelling with an elite cavalry retinue. On the way, the Dalai Lama and his ministers talked about their future course of action. They decided to set up a temporary exile government at Lhuntse Dzong, which was close to the Tibet-Bhutan border, because it would be easier from there to send instructions to the civil and military leaders and public in Lhasa and Shol, and to make contact with the Chinese for peaceful negotiations. With this aim, the Dalai Lama and his party painstakingly rode on. Before leaving Chongye Riwo Dechen, speaking to the leaders of the members of the Volunteer Army, the Dalai Lama complimented them for their courage and dedication towards the protection of their religion, government and freedom. He told them that previously the Tibetan government had called the members of the Volunteer Army “reactionaries” and “robbers” in its edicts only under the pressure of the Chinese, so they should not feel hurt. He advised them to refrain from violent activities, even though there were no options left for them other than to fight continuously, except at mountainous sites when they had to use force for the defense of territorial areas.

After the seven-day journey from Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and his party arrived at Achu Dogyang. At that point, various newspapers on their front pages carried sympathetic messages from friends of Tibet, expressing their concerns over the Lhasa violence and desire to know the whereabouts of the Dalai Lama. Many Asian and European countries and the US, out of great sympathy and concern to the Tibetans, strongly criticized the Chinese actions through newspapers.

Though the Red Chinese had no right at all over Tibet's land, they first illegally invaded the country and then through extreme military actions took over the government, doubling their faults. They further declared that they had annihilated even the name of the Tibetan government, boasting of their evil actions. Therefore, the Dalai Lama and all the members of his retinue unanimously agreed to set up an exile government at Nyal Lhuntse Dzong immediately upon arrival there, in order to quell the doubts of foreign people and to continue to struggle for the Tibetan cause.

Travelling further via Tak-la pass, they arrived at Shopo Nub. On the same day, mounted messengers came one after another, who said that a Chinese force was pursuing them. The next day, March 27, the Dalai Lama and his party arrived at Lhuntse Dzong, where he was received by the district officer Tsedrung Gomang Ngawang Chosang and Shodrung Chokpe Tseten Jorgye as well as the Trulku of Nyal Dreulhe Monastery, among others. He was greeted with much *éclat* by many local people, both monks and lay, from the nearby villages of Yulgyal Lhunpotse Palace, standing in line on the road and holding in their hands different kinds of religious articles. There was also a procession by lamas, the sounds of religious musical instruments, and song and dance performances by people, among other performances. The Dalai Lama was led to the upper chamber of the palace called Kunga Wonang, where he took a short rest. Thereafter, he was invited to

the community hall of the district, where the inaugural ceremony of the exile government had been prepared. In the presence of all the members of the Dalai Lama's retinue, local people, district officials, Tibetan national soldiers and members of the Volunteer Army, the Dalai Lama announced words to the effect that due to the Chinese military repression, he and his officials had been forced to leave Lhasa, and that the exile government was being inaugurated at Nyal Lhuntse Dzong in order to restore the political and religious independence of Tibet and the happiness of all the people of Tibet. At the function, a long-life prayer was made for the longevity of the Dalai Lama and the success of his activities. The Dalai Lama's senior tutor Yongzin Ling Rinpoche offered him the seven royal emblems⁶ and the eight articles of auspiciousness⁷, among other things. After the ceremony, the Dalai Lama issued a letter sealed with his official seal to be given to the Panchen Rinpoche. Prime Minister Surkhang Wangchen Gelek told the public the details of the Chinese military suppression in Lhasa and that the Tibetan government had been shifted to Lhuntse Dzong. He read the edict regarding the people's responsibilities and duties, and copies of the edict were sent to all the districts. The Volunteer Army organized a ceremony and fired three cannon shots in honour of the Dalai Lama, and at the same time, there was a loud thunder. Everyone regarded it as an auspicious sign, because it was said to be the first thunder in that area. At the end, all the members of the Volunteer Army cheered with one voice, "Tibet will be free soon!" and "May the gods be victorious!"

Thereafter, the Dalai Lama was invited to Dreulhe Labrang, where he spent the day. Sometime before Khendrung Ta Lama Thupten Norsang had suggested that the Dalai Lama should travel through Bhutan, but due to increasing tension in Tibet, the Dalai Lama and his ministers again discussed this, and decided to travel through Tsona from Jora. Rimshi Phala Sé Wangchuk and Changkyim Shabdo Kalsang Thupten were instructed to go ahead to Mon to request to the Indian government, through the Indian border security force, to allow the Dalai Lama and his entourage to enter India for asylum. The two were ordered to gallop both days and nights.

At that time, since there was a great danger of the sudden arrival of the Chinese force, the Dalai Lama and his party left the monastery at dawn. Crossing Lago-la pass, making an arduous journey facing snowfall and storms, they arrived at Jora village. The leaders and the people of nearby villages, greeted him with a warm reception. Before leaving Nyal, among the 300 elite cavalrymen bodyguards of the Dalai Lama, comprising both the national troops and members of the Volunteer Army, Brigadier Trepal of the Drapchi Regiment and his troops were dispatched ahead to Tsona, to stop the Chinese troops in the event of their sudden arrival. When the party left Jora before dawn the next day, the weather was good. However, all the mountains and valleys were covered with thick snow. Enduring the extreme

cold wind and low air temperature, when they reached the top of the Karpo-la pass, a pale blue helicopter coming from the southwest direction flew over them. Since the chopper did not have any sign or number on it, they suspected it was a Chinese helicopter and quickly dismounted from the horses and hid among the rocks, trees, bushes and any kinds of hiding places they could find. The bodyguards of the Dalai Lama aimed their guns at the helicopter, but the Dalai Lama asked the Master Chamberlain to tell them not to fire, and to remain silent. The helicopter went straight on, without hovering over them, in the eastern direction. After that, having eaten lunch, the Dalai Lama and his retinue proceeded towards Tsona via Thangchen, which was covered with snow. Though the weather was fine, many people suffered from snow blindness and faced great difficulties. After that, while journeying through the Gopo-la pass, the Dalai Lama and his party was accorded a very warm reception on the snowy mountain by the officials and leaders of the Tsona district and local communities. He, along with his retinue, was invited to the palace of Tsona Gonpa Tse. Most of the troops and members of the Volunteer Army among his bodyguards remained at Yama Rong to patrol the area. Khenchung Tarawa, Dzasak Kundeling, Brigadier Dokhar Sé of the Ngadang Regiment, among others from Lhasa who had followed the Dalai Lama, arrived there and had an audience with the Dalai Lama. That night, the ministers held a meeting to discuss and choose the best route to follow to reach Tawang, and about the arrangement of security forces at Tsona and other important locations. They agreed to follow the Mangmang route from Tsona for the convenience of the journey. Except for a group of selected soldiers from the Kadang and Khadang regiments as bodyguards of the Dalai Lama, the rest of the soldiers and members of the Volunteer Army were deployed at various important and tough locations, to prevent a sudden arrival of Chinese forces.

The next day, when the Dalai Lama and his party proceeded from Tsona, the people of the villages along the route of the Dalai Lama's journey voluntary removed the snow and cleaned the road. Travelling through the cleaned road, the party headed to Mangmang, escorted by some of the bodyguards, including brigadiers, colonels, captains and lieutenants of the Kadang and the Khadang regiments. Phala Sé Wangchuk and Changkyim Kalsang Thupten—the two who had been sent from Nyal Dreulhe to the Mon border to seek permission from the Indian government to enter India—were waiting there. The two gave the Dalai Lama the good news that the Indian government had given permission for him and his retinue to enter India, and told him that the Indian border security force had arranged a reception for him at Chudangmo. Everyone became extremely relaxed and happy. This was due to the religious relationship which existed between India and Tibet, dating back two centuries, and their friendly coexistence as neighbours. The Indian government without hesitation welcomed and accepted the Dalai Lama and

his people as refugees; for this every Tibetan is obliged to remember the kindness of the Indian government.

At Mangmang, the Dalai Lama slept in a tent. The weather was cold, so he suffered from severe diarrhoea. He was then shifted to a one-storeyed wooden house. The house was filthy and the base room was a cowshed and poultry house. In the night, the cattle and chickens made much noise, and they sometimes ran around his bed, greatly disturbing his sleep. However, the medicine benefited him and with the blessing of the Three Jewels, his health recovered.

Some troops who had accompanied the Dalai Lama up to Mangmang, including Brigadier Trepal, Colonel Wangden Tashi, Captain Kalsang Dradul and Captain Lobsang Tashi—all from the Khadang Regiment—Captain Bapa Chandzo Tashi; and Markham Tenpal of the Volunteer Army, were sent back to Tsona and Nyal to defend these areas. Before they left, the Dalai Lama gave them an audience and protective articles. Praising their patriotic courage for the sake of their religion and polity and welfare of their own people, he advised them on their duties and responsibilities.

At that time, the All India Radio (Delhi) reported that the Dalai Lama had fallen down from a horse and was injured. The news worried everyone. Actually, the Dalai Lama had not fallen from the horse or received any injury; he was suffering from diarrhoea and he had not quite recovered that time. To ease his riding, a *dzo*⁸ was arranged for him. Moving slowly ahead, the party arrived at Kanzemane, on the Indian border, on March 31. A chief Indian official in Mon Tawang, Murti Sahib, and his assistant staff Babu Lama, and Lobsang, a man of Tibetan origin, who was stationed at Chudangmo for border duty, accompanied by about 20 soldiers, received the Dalai Lama with scarves and special military salutes. They told him that the Indian government and people were happy with the arrival of the Dalai Lama and his retinue into India. They had pitched a tent for the Dalai Lama, where he rested for a few hours. After that, he was invited to a tent at Chudangmo that night. His health recovered completely after that, and all the members of his retinue felt happy and relieved.

In this way, to escape from the brutal suppression of the PLA, the Dalai Lama, along with his entourage, fled from his Norbulingka Palace. Crossing Rama Druga ferry crossing and travelling through Lhoka, the party arrived in India, as if their escape journey was arranged miraculously. In India, the Dalai Lama laboured tirelessly for the welfare of his people and reestablishment of the truth of the Tibetan cause. Following is a short excerpt from the interview given by the former minister Kasur Kundeling Woser Gyaltzen, one of the members of the team who masterminded the Dalai Lama's flight, on the Dalai Lama's trip, published in the *Oral History*, No.2 by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala:

As mentioned in the autobiography of the Dalai Lama, it is true that Tenpa Dargye, Chu Dobu and another man from Chushi Gangdruk came to Rama Druga ferry crossing [when the Dalai Lama fled to India]. With them, Litang Kunga Samten and some other people came there and offered scarves to the Dalai Lama, who asked them to send some members of Chushi Gangdruk with him as his bodyguards. Therefore, Tenpa Dargye and some men from amongst his group who followed the Dalai Lama as his rearguards and those who knew the road patrolled the road for the safety of the Dalai Lama. As we travelled on, we saw many groups of soldiers positioned on hills and rocks along our route. In this way, only after that, those leaders and members of Chushi Gangdruk served as security guards of the Dalai Lama. They did not come to Norbulingka and elsewhere, in contrast to many new stories about this we hear nowadays.

Some people exclaim, "Who else brought the Dalai Lama to India if we did not!" They say, "We did this and that." All this talk is totally false. Neither Chushi Gangdruk came to [Norbulingka] to bring the Dalai Lama, nor was it heard that they were moving the Dalai Lama. Lobsang Yeshe and some people who were said to be Amdowas arrived there [Norbulingka] one or two days before the Dalai Lama left his palace. I heard that they were residing somewhere in Gongkar. According to the discussion done with them the previous day, Master Chamberlain gave some weapons to them. When the Dalai Lama and his party crossed the river (Kyichu), those men were waiting there on the bank, and offered scarves to the Dalai Lama. After that, they joined the retinue of the Dalai Lama. Since we were heading to Lhoka, they were allowed to come along with us as a source of courage to us. Regarding the rumour that they went to Lhasa and did something [to move the Dalai Lama], if I speak truly, they were not there [at Norbulingka] at that time. If I tell the truth, this is fact. Details about how the Dalai Lama journeyed from Rama Druga ferry crossing and so forth have been recounted by Master Chamberlain and Kusung Dapon in their respective memoirs; whatever they said is true. The Chinese announced on radio from Beijing and Lhasa, as well as in the newspapers, that Surkhang Wangchen Gelek, Phala Thupten Woden and some "reactionary people" had kidnapped the Dalai Lama from Norbulingka. They [Chinese] groaned painfully just like a lame dog.

From Chudangmo, the party travelled on, crossing Shagde, Lung-la pass and Tonglek, arriving safely at Mon Tawang on April 5. From the Tibetan area Mangmang, they took five days and nights to reach Mon Tawang. The people of the Mon villages along the road received the Dalai Lama with a warm reception and arranged accommodation and other necessary facilities out of their love and sense of being the same people and their profound faith in the Dalai Lama. The people hoisted new prayer flags upon their houses. They cleaned the road, decorated the roads with auspicious symbols and designs, and burnt incense and put flowers along the roadside. They prostrated and circumambulated around the area where

the Dalai Lama resided, and recited prayers. The Dalai Lama fulfilled their wishes, by offering them audiences, religious teachings and blessings.

On the day when the party arrived at Lung-la pass, the Political Officer of Mon, Harmandar Singh, came to meet the Dalai Lama and offer his greetings. He joined the retinue of the Dalai Lama. On their arrival at Mon Tawang, the monks of the Tawang monastery greeted the Dalai Lama with a lama procession and musical sounds of different religious trumpets. The Indian military and civil officers and local leaders came to receive him with scarves. A platoon of Indian guards of honour offered him a parade and salute. After that, the Dalai Lama returned to his tent for rest. He spent three days at Mon, during which he was invited to the Tawang monastery. Led by monks carrying religious articles and playing religious music, he was ushered to the upper chamber of the monastery. Spending a few minutes there, he was then invited to the assembly hall of the monastery, where he was seated on the throne. To an assembly of monk officials and monks, he granted teachings and rich offerings. Then he returned to his residence. He offered audience to some local leaders and officials of the area at his residence.

On the 8 April, the party proceeded from Tawang, stopping for one day each at Senge Dzong, Derang and Rabong. The Dalai Lama gave religious teachings to the people of the villages he passed through. On the 10 April, near Bomdila, the Indian foreign minister Mr. Menon and his assistant staff Darpal, along with an interpreter named Rinag Yapa Sonam Topgyal and the chief security officer Adruk Tsering, came to meet the Dalai Lama. A huge special gate had been made for the reception of the Dalai Lama, and many Indian government officials and local dignitaries were standing in line near the gate to receive him. He was ushered to a small platform that had been purposely prepared for him. As he stood on the platform, around fifty soldiers of the border force performed an honourary salute and parade. Many people of Mon were standing in line, holding flowers, scarves, burning incense and other religious articles in their hands, waiting to have a glimpse of the Dalai Lama out of their great reverence to him.

After that, Harmandar Singh invited the Dalai Lama to a newly built house, where he accorded him an excellent reception, including tea and snacks. Mr. Menon came there to meet the Dalai Lama and presented him with a telegram sent by Prime Minister Nehru. Menon was formerly an Indian ambassador to Lhasa. In 1956 when the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Rinpoche visited India, he accompanied them from Lhasa to India, and served as their guide. In this way, he had a close connection with the Dalai Lama. The telegram said that the Indian government and people of India were happy about the arrival of the Dalai Lama into India. In his autobiography *My Land and My People*, the Dalai Lama recounts:

At that time, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru affectionately sent to me a telegram, which read: "My assistants and I extend a joyous welcome to you. We congratulate

you for being able to escape to freedom in India. We will satisfy whatever necessities you and your retinue require to stay in India; there are no doubts nor any questions about this.

Since that day, the Dalai Lama received telegrams from various organizations of the world and the Congress Party, the then ruling party of Indian politics, among others, through the chief of the fifth division of the North Eastern Frontier Agency [NEFA], congratulating him for his safe arrival in India. They also said in their letters that they would protest to the Chinese and give support for the Tibetan cause. The next day, the Kashag members and other Tibetan officials, Harmandar Singh and Menon held a meeting. At the meeting, the Tibetans spoke in detail about how the Chinese had breached the 17-Point Agreement; how the Sino-Tibetan relations were strained after the Chinese had sent an invitation to the Dalai Lama to a theatrical show at the Chinese army camp; how the Chinese had killed, wounded or imprisoned thousands of Tibetans; and how they had damaged Potala Palace, Norbulingka, Tsuglakhang temple and other official buildings and nearby monasteries, with countless artillery shots. At the same time they requested that the Indians report these things to the Indian government immediately.

During that night, Harmandar Singh hosted a banquet for the Dalai Lama and his retinue. The Dalai Lama spent five days at Bomdila, during which he gave audiences and Dharma teachings to a gathering of thousands of people, satisfying their desire. He visited the local vocational training centers, hospitals and offices. Harmandar Singh's wife enthusiastically prepared daily meals for the Dalai Lama for all those days voluntarily.

Thereafter was the 16 April, which coincided with the Tibetan religious ceremony called Eighth Day Torma Feasting (*brgyad gtor chen mo*)⁹, a ceremonial function was held. On that occasion Prime Minister Surkhang Wangchen Gelek offered the Dalai Lama a scarf on behalf of the government. Harmandar Singh and Menon offered scarves to the Dalai Lama, and received his hand-blessings during the ceremonial function. After that, tea was served to all the members. In this way, the ceremony was organized in a perfect traditional way. Traditionally, every year on this occasion, the Tibetan government used to offer elaborate *torma* to the Dharma protectors, mainly the Mahakala, and the officials would take off their winter official costumes and wear their summer costumes.

On 17th April, the Dalai Lama and his party left Bomdila. Just before that, at the request of the leaders and people of the local communities, the Dalai Lama planted a sapling of *bodhi* tree, with a label on it. The party thereafter left in jeeps. The road was rough, so after crossing the mountain path, the party stopped that night at a place called Putiras, and they stayed at an army guesthouse. The Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup came to see him. The next morning, at the breakfast venue, many media people from around the world came to have interviews with the Dalai

Lama, but he preferred not to speak, as he saw it was not the right time for him to say anything to the media.

After that, the Dalai Lama and his entourage were taken in a special vehicle, especially arranged by the Indian government, to a guesthouse in the town of Tezpur. Congratulatory messages came from all over world to the Dalai Lama for his safe arrival in India. Former Tibetan Prime Minister Dekharwa, who was in Kalimpong, deputy minister Yutok Tashi Dhondup, the royal guest attendant of Sikkim, and the secretary of the political officer in Sikkim, among others, came to see him at the guesthouse. Many news reporters from different countries of the world came, and a press conference was held. Instead of answering each question from the media representatives, the Dalai Lama gave an overview of the general situation of Tibet, including the Sino-Tibetan issues, Tibetans' efforts to compromise with the Chinese, the violence in Lhasa and Tibetans' objection to the 17-Point Agreement, which is not legal and which does not represent equality between China and Tibet, since the Chinese themselves violated it. The full text of this speech is found among the collected speeches of the Dalai Lama.

From Tezpur, the Dalai Lama and his entourage left for Siliguri (in West Bengal) by a train arranged by the Indian government. A large crowd of thousands of people, including Tibetans from Kalimpong, Darjeeling and Sikkim, representatives of the Tibetan Welfare Association of Kalimpong, and Indian and Nepalese people, gathered at the railway station to greet the Dalai Lama. A small platform had been prepared outside the railway station. Standing on the platform, the Dalai Lama bestowed his visual blessing and waved his hands to the crowd. The Tibetans felt emotional conflict: happiness about the safe arrival of the Dalai Lama into India and sorrow because of China's brutal repression of the Tibetan people in Tibet.

Mr. Apa Pant, the Governor of Sikkim, the state secretary of West Bengal, the king and the prince of Sikkim, Rani Choying Wangmo, as well as the district officers of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri and many other important dignitaries came to meet the Dalai Lama. Thereafter, journeying by train through Varanasi, Lucknow, Dehradun and other cities, many thousands of local people greeted him with respect. They shouted slogans like "Dalai Lama Zindabad!"¹⁰, "Long live India-Tibet friendship", "Stop Chinese oppression in Tibet" and so on. On April 20, the Dalai Lama and his party arrived in Mussoorie where they were led to the Birla House residence, which had been arranged for their accommodation by the Indian government. Four days later, Nehru arrived in Mussoorie to meet with the Dalai Lama; they had a long and amiable conversation about Tibet's issues and their urgent solutions. Later the members of the Tibetan Welfare Association in Kalimpong, prior to discussion amongst themselves, went to Mussoorie and spoke to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag, and told them they would like to wind up their

organization as there was no need for a separate organization and that they would work under the Kashag led by the Dalai Lama.

C. Tibetans flee from southern Tibet to India for exile, after their failed resistance movement

Those national troops, members of the Volunteer Army and volunteer monks who had arrived in Lhoka from Lhasa after the Chinese started military attacks in Lhasa decided to launch a counterattack with the aim to retake Lhasa gradually. They reorganized themselves into different detachments and deployed along the bank of the Yarlung Tsangpo.

At the end of April 1959, a large Chinese detachment, coming from Tsang via Ralung and Phuma Jangthang, invaded Yamdrok and Lhodrak. Another Chinese detachment came from Central Tibet via Gongkar, Kyishong and Tsethang, and captured Lhoka. How the Tibetan defense forces at various positions put up a resistance and how they fled to India shall be told below.

1. After the Chinese launched military attacks in Lhasa, a large group of Chinese troops turned to Chushul and Sé, whence they crossed the Tsangpo from Kyinag and Chaksam, and started attacking Lhoka. At that time, the Tibetan resistance force in Lhoka had several thousand men, comprising the Tibetan national troops at Gongkar, members of the Chushi Gangdruk, Amdo volunteers, volunteer people, monk volunteers and local militias, with or without weapons. Among them, the Gyantse Regiment troops, militias of Amdo and Derge and monk volunteers with better equipment were deployed at Gampa Jangthang and Chaksam Chuwori Mountain to encounter the Chinese forces. One morning the Tibetan troops at the mountaintop spotted a group of Chinese soldiers dressed in Tibetan garb, marching towards Chaksam Bridge and Jangthang. Immediately the Gyantse military instructor Dumbu Dawa Tsering and his troops fired their Bren guns and handguns on the Chinese, killing or wounding some of them. The Chinese troops quickly ran back from Sé to Chushul and remained silent. The next day, from the side of Dokhar Shika estate, the Chinese fired artilleries onto the Tibetan position at Chaksam Chuwori. The Tibetan force retaliated, and the battle lasted for about five days, during which several Tibetan soldiers were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, they did not lose courage and defended the area with great determination.

Similarly, when several Chinese detachments advanced to Kyinag, Gongkar and Kyishong valley, the Tibetan force, comprising members of Chushi

Gangdruk, volunteer troops and monk volunteers defending the area fought the Chinese for several days. At around midnight on April 30, from the confluence of the Kyichu River in Lhasa and the Tsangpo River, the Chinese travelled along the river to Kyinag and Gongkar by coracles. At the same time, one Chinese detachment fiercely attacked the Tibetan position at Chaksam. The Tibetans fought back with great courage, using their every weapon at the cost of their lives. The next morning before dawn, the Chinese fired artilleries and machine guns rapidly on the Tibetan force. Several numbers of Chinese and Tibetan troops were killed or wounded in that fight. During that night, the Tibetans again fought the Chinese at Kyinag and Gongkar. By early the next morning, the Tibetans were defeated and Kyinag and Gongkar were lost to the Chinese. Kunga Samten, a leader of Chushi Gangdruk, leading some of his men, fled to Jangthang. Immediately Derge Chudowo and Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu at Gongkar and other leaders who came from Lhodrak, such as Amdo Lekshe and Karkhang Phuntsok Tashi, discussed amongst themselves their plan. All of them had the same view that it was useless to defend Chaksam Mountain and Jangthang areas, since Kyinag and Gongkar were already lost to the Chinese, and moreover they would be in an extremely difficult position if the Chinese surrounded them. They thus decided to go to Yamdrok by way of the Jangthang Phu to defend the area. They immediately gave a trumpet signal to all their troops, who were defending Chaksam Mountain, to return. The troops arrived back just before dawn. They then travelled through Jangthang Phu. From behind, the Chinese attacked them with artilleries. Escaping the Chinese attack, they climbed the mountain and reached Yamdrok. Regarding this incident, Lieutenant Khetsun of the Ngadang Regiment recounts:

We, around 20 officers and soldiers, left Norbulingka and headed to Chushul via Tolung Trisam, with hopes on Chushi Gangdruk. On the way, we met around 100 voluntary soldiers. We together patrolled Chushul and Sé, and were joined by about 50 national troops who arrived from Lhasa on the 24th day of the second Tibetan month (2nd April) of 1959. During that night, a large number of Chinese soldiers converged on Chushul. In order to set up a good defense position, our force, which was composed of Tibetan national troops, members of Chushi Gangdruk and about fifty monk volunteers from Drepung Nyagra, occupied Chaksam Mountain, because of its strategic location. Before dawn the next day, firing started between the Chinese and us. At about sunrise the next morning, I saw some Chinese soldiers lying dead or wounded, and the remaining Chinese troops had pulled back to Chushul.

We remained at Gampa Jangthang and Semo until the 28th day of the same month (6 April), defending the area. During that time, again a large Chinese

detachment from Chushul started invading Sé. We fought them for many hours daily. On the 29th day, we received a message that Chinese troops had arrived by coracles at Kyinag and Gongkar, and that we must go to Yamdrok by way of the upper Gampa Jangthang. Accordingly, we troops, along with around 500 voluntary force members and volunteer monks, immediately headed to Yamdrok from our respective positions.

2. A few months before the Lhasa war broke out, about 200 volunteer monks from Ganden Monastery, including Nyagri Tridul and Dokhang Khentrul, with or without weapons, went to Lhoka Ön and Lukhang Druga ferry crossing, where they joined Chushi Gangdruk force and remained with them, united in their goal to protect their Dharma and country. Those Ganden monks had brought with them the spear of the Dharma protector Damchen Chogyal that was offered to the monastery by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama when he had visited it in 1954. The Ganden volunteer monks were therefore called Tensung Dralhai Magar, or the Dharma Protecting Army, and they were deployed at Ön, El Lhagyari, El Drakar and Tsethang for defense purposes.

After launching military attacks in Lhasa, the Chinese force moved toward Ön. They faced strong resistance from the Tibetan defense force, comprising some officers and troops of the Khadang, Ngadang and Chadang regiments; Ganden Jangtse Phara Genbude; the army's salary officer; a few monks such as Gashar Chaksur Pema, Gashar Lhopa Geko Elag, Gadri Shadak Jangtse Lobsang Thardo; some volunteer people from Samye, including Alo Dawa; and some volunteer people from Dechen. In the battle, both the Chinese and Tibetan sides suffered heavy casualties. However, since the Chinese had a large supply of troops and better weapons such as artillery, they overwhelmed the Tibetans, who fled to Orong Lukhang ferry and Tsethang.

Regarding this battle, Tasang, a soldier of the Drapchi Regiment, narrates the following in his report:

After we reached Ön, we resisted the Chinese attack until midday. We killed seven troops of the Chinese cavalry near Shika bridge at the Ön side. Our section leader Chupon Samyepa Palbar and Chadang Simchung's solider Yeshi lost their lives during this skirmish. When we pulled back [to Orong Lukhang and Tsethang], all the Chushi Gangdruk men had already fled from the spot. Some of our members might have been arrested by the Chinese at that time. We then left Lukhang ferry and went to Yarlung Halogang, where we met Captain Dorji of the Drapchi Regiment. We gave him all the extra handguns we were carrying. During that night, the Chinese again arrived near our position. We climbed up the mountain in the darkness, relying on the light emitted by the flame of Karchung Dapon's house (he had sided with the enemy), which had been torched.

3. At Tsethang Gamphu, some troops of the Volunteer Army led by Ratruk Ngawang, local militias and volunteer monks who had arrived there were fighting continuously with the Chinese forces who had occupied Gamphu. From Gongkar, Lieutenant Pema Gyalpo of the Gyantse Regiment, leading some troops of his regiment, and military instructor Wangdu with some troops from the Drapchi and Chadang regiments, arrived at Gamphu to help the Tibetan forces. Though they had been engaged in combat with the Chinese forces based at Gampu since before the Lhasa war broke out, they had failed to defeat the Chinese because the Chinese had strong fortifications and hiding places, and were secretly helped by Brigadier Karchung and Tsenyer Nyingla, traitors who deceived their people and country. Engineered by Cheng Hoching, whose new name was Lobsang Tashi, the Tibetans planned to construct trenches to explode the Chinese army camp at Gamphu. With the help of the local militia of Chongye, they dug underground tunnels, labouring for many days and nights. Just before their plan was executed, the Chinese in Lhasa launched military attacks first in Lhasa, then in southern Tibet. Hence, the Tibetans failed to put their plan into practice.
4. When a large Chinese detachment attacked the Tibetan positions at Tsethang and Gamphu hillside, the Tibetan force, comprising the troops of the Drapchi Regiment who had returned from the Indian border after escorting the Dalai Lama, Chushi Gangdruk troops, Amdowas, volunteer people and monk volunteers, defended their positions for a long time. Many Chinese troops were killed or wounded. The Chinese in turn killed or wounded more than one hundred Tibetan officers and soldiers, including extremely brave officer Lieutenant Pema Gyalpo. He was shot dead on the hillside of Gamphu when he was firing a Bren gun until all rounds of ammunition were finished, and then the handgun of one of his soldiers. Unable to resist the artillery attacks and large strength of the Chinese force, the Tibetan forces fled from the area.

In his report on the above battle, Konchok Sherab, a soldier of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment, recalls the following brief account:

We the officers and soldiers of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment, who had been sent back from the Indian border after escorting the Dalai Lama, arrived at Tsethang via Tsona. When the Chinese converged through the mountainside of Gamphu on to us, we, the troops and a group of volunteer monks from Sera and Ganden monasteries, jointly fought them with full force, but due to the overwhelming size of the Chinese force and their high quality weapons, we lost ground and fled from the area.

5. In tandem with the above skirmishes, when a huge Chinese force came and attacked the Tibetan outpost at Traduk, the Tibetan force, including Drayab Atruk Lama, artilleryman Chatreng Kowa Tenpa of the Khadang Regiment, and about fifteen officers and soldiers of the Chadang Regiments, including Colonel Rigzin Paljor, Lieutenant Sonam Wangdu and Tashi Gyalpo, fought the Chinese in combat, with great courage and determination. At that time, a gray Chinese twin-engined chopper, dropped seven or eight bombs and fired machine guns rapidly upon the Tibetan position. The Tibetans continuously fired on the Chinese for a long time, and both the Chinese and Tibetan sides suffered heavy casualties. Unable to defeat the Chinese forces who had a large number of troops and sophisticated weapons, the Tibetans finally left their position. Tsering Norbu, a soldier of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment, narrates briefly about this battle in his report:

On our way back [to Tsethang], we encountered a Chinese force at Traduk. We exchanged fire for two days and nights, and finally, unable to hold the ground, we withdrew ourselves from our position through upper and lower ends of Chode.

6. When the Chinese forces crossed Erong Lukang ferry crossing and penetrated into Yarlung Halogang, Phodrang place and upper Chode, the Tibetan force, composed by Dargon Droma Gyau of Chushi Gangdruk, Yeshe Thupten of Sera Mé, several volunteer monks from Ganden Monastery, Ogyan Dorji of the Gadang Shigatse Regiment, some troops of the Drapchi Regiment, including Migmar Tsering, Ngawang, Phuntsok Dhondup, Dorji, Kalsang, Chodar, Tashi Wangdu and a small cavalry led by Amdo volunteers' leader Jinpa Gyatso, attempted several times to push back the Chinese. However, being no match for the extremely large size of the Chinese force and their sophisticated weapons, the Tibetan force had to flee from the battlefield. Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji of the Gadang Regiment recounted the following in his report on the battle:

When we were coming via Öñ, Darchen Monastery gave us food that could last for three days and a recommendation letter to help us travel from Lukang ferry crossing to Tsethang. From Tsethang, we proceeded to Tradruk, where Drayab Atruk Lama and other salary staff gave us grain salary for five days and advised us to go to Shitse Palsur in Yarlung. Accordingly, as we headed towards it, we encountered a strong Chinese force. We fought several sequences of skirmishes. One of my company mates named Konchok lost his life during that battle. Unable to withstand the overwhelming strength and weapons of the Chinese force, we ran away in the direction of the upper Chode and Nyal. On the way, we met Brigadier Junpa of the Chadang Regiment and Mensur Kungo along with

his three servants, without horses and weapons. They were coming from Lhasa. I immediately dismounted from my horse and asked them about their horses and belongings. They told me they had been looted on the way by the local militias of Chongye. I was greatly shocked and saddened, and tears rolled down from my eyes, as I wondered how our own people turned out to be our enemy. I arranged horses for the two officials. Together we travelled through Jora. When we arrived at Tsona, there were no Chinese. At around 8 pm, a Chinese detachment came. We were about 70 men, comprising some troops of the Bodyguard Regiment and a group of volunteer Amdos. We exchanged fire with the Chinese until dawn the next day, but failed to defend Tsona, so we fled to India.

7. When the Chinese attacked the Tibetan garrison at Achu Dogyang, the Tibetan force, composed by troops from various regiments, including Lieutenant Dhondup Gyaltzen of the Bodyguard Regiment, supported by members of Chushi Gangdruk and monk volunteers who had arrived there, counterattacked with great force. The battle left many members of both the Chinese and Tibetan sides either dead or wounded. The Tibetans, however, suffered defeat at the end and fled to Nyal Lhuntse Dzong.
8. From Gyantse a large Chinese detachment advanced via Ralung and Kharo-la pass and started invading Taklung, Yamdrok Puma Jangthang and Lhodrak. In defense, the Tibetan force comprised by Chushi Gangdruk troops and local militias encountered them at Lungmar, close to Ralung. They fought courageously, killing or wounding many Chinese troops. The Tibetans also lost several men including Lekdup Kalden, a monk from Gyantse; Litangpa Pagyal Rinpoche; and Gyatso, a monk from Lhari Simpuk. Some Tibetans were wounded. Thereafter, the Tibetans suffered defeat and fled to Yamdrok.
9. When the Tibetan force defending Drogdak Tsadrong heard that many Chinese troops from Padé and Gongkar were coming to Yamdrok in pursuit of the Tibetan forces who had fled from Gongkar and Chaksam Chuwori Mountain after suffering a defeat, their commanders immediately discussed the situation and decided to fight the Chinese. Amdo Lekshe, some volunteer troops from Derge and Litang and a unit of the Gyantse Regiment at Tsadrong moved back some distance towards Yamdrok. During that night, they took different defense positions from the bottom to the top of the mountain, close to one side of the lake (Yamdrok) to ambush the Chinese. The next morning, at around sunrise, a group of Chinese soldiers appeared from the west of the lake and when they were about to reach the corner of the lake, the Tibetan force, as preplanned, attacked them at once, using every type of weapons they had. Many Chinese were either killed or wounded on the road and roadsides, and some of them even committed suicide by jumping

into the lake. The battle lasted until 4 pm that day. The Tibetan side lost one local militia and one man named Dergewa Khyiga was wounded in his left leg. After a while, many Chinese soldiers converged on the Tibetan position through the mountainous valley, firing rapidly at the same time, forcing the Tibetan force to leave their position. During that night, most of the Tibetan troops became scattered, as they fled in different directions leading to Drigu, Tsona and Lhodrak. The majority of them fled through Drigu to Nyal, where they had heard that some Tibetan government's important military and civil personnel, as well as leaders and important members of Chushi Gangdruk, including Adruk Gonpo Tashi, who had fled to Lhüntse Dzong via Kongpo, were reorganizing their forces aiming to fight the Chinese. Encouraged by this, they headed to Lhüntse Dzong. Adruk and other leaders of Chushi Gangdruk, some government officials and Brigadier Trépal as well as some colonels and captains of the Drapchi Regiment, who had returned from the Indian border after seeing off the Dalai Lama, held a meeting at Nyal Drakor Monastery to set up defense forces at different roads. Their troops were divided into different groups and assigned different locations, and an instruction was given to them in writing. The majority of them respected the instruction and went straightaway to occupy the locations assigned to them. However, the next evening, it was heard that the leaders and important members of Nyal had already fled through Jora to Khatag and Tsona and that some officers and troops of the Drapchi Regiment were at Lhüntse. After that, the Tibetan force completely lost their morale to fight; so they went to Jora. By that time, the Chinese forces had already invaded Tsona. Therefore, those who fled Nyal and headed to Tsona via Jora were unable to find escape routes and most of them turned back to Jora.

At that time Jora was temporarily filled with thousands of horses and people who were rushing here and there in search of an escape route. They were unable to see through the clouds of dust created by their rush. After that, they travelled through a valley to the south of Jora and climbed a mountain. They then travelled to Khatag. After that, via Margo-la pass, they headed to India. After that, all the members of the Tibetan army, Chushi Gangdruk, volunteer monks and local militias fled to India, in various groups.

10. When the Chinese force took Tsona, Captain Lobsang Tashi of the Bodyguard Regiment, Lieutenant Wangdü and others who returned to Tsona after escorting the Dalai Lama to the Indian border and several volunteer troops put up a valiant defense. However, due to their poor logistics, they failed to hold their ground and fled to India. Regarding this fight, Jamyang Wangchuk, a soldier of the Kadang Regiment, recounts the following in his report:

In 1959 during the Tibetan people's uprising against the Chinese in Lhasa, I was on security duty at the Palace at Norbulingka. When the Dalai Lama decided to go to southern Tibet, I was selected to accompany him in his retinue. Beginning from Norbulingka, we did our best to carry out the responsibilities and tasks entailing the security along the road and all the resting places of the Dalai Lama during the journey. After the Dalai Lama entered India, we (all the bodyguards who accompanied the Dalai Lama) were divided into three groups; one group was sent to Lhodrak Dowa Dzong fort, another group to Tsona Drekhang and third, my group, to Tsona Dzong for defense purposes. After the Dalai Lama crossed the Indian border safely, we took rest for a few days, without any worry, and we even had sound sleep. We used to climb up the mountain every day to check if the Chinese were coming.

One day we met many mounted Tibetan men. They told us that they were members of the Volunteer Army and needed weapons. We told them that if they really wanted to fight the Chinese, they could stay with us and share our weapons, but we would not give them weapons. They were in fact not willing to fight the Chinese; they just wanted to go straight to India.

We had three monks of Ganden Monastery and three or four new local recruits with us. At about 7 pm one night, some Volunteer Army members descended to the upper end of Tsona from the snowy mountain in the north of Nyal. At around 2 am the next morning, from the upper side of the mountain, the Chinese fired many signal lights. Two local recruits from our group ran to us and told us that the Chinese force was advancing towards our position. Our major Gyau Palden Chodrak had a Bren gun and soldier Tenzin a Sten gun. Section Leader Chupon Gyaltzen Lobsang and I had a small artillery gun, which could be mounted on horseback. We each had a Sten gun and a pistol. We first took positions on the roof of the Dzong fort. Major Gyau, Tenzin and the local militias hid at a corner of the eastern mountain, while Chupon, three volunteer monks, two local militias and I hid inside our embankment, ready to fire.

After a short while, the Chinese shot many fire-arrows into the air to find ways, and ran towards our position at the same time, depending on the light emitted by the fire-arrows. Estimating their distance from us by judging their fire-arrows, we fired three or four artillery shots upon them. Then we left our embankment and climbed up the mountain.

We shot fire-arrows into the air to brighten the darkness, and we saw a flock of Chinese troops rushing towards us on the mountainside. Our Section Leader fired many rounds of artillery shots rapidly, while I fired Sten guns rapidly in the direction of the Chinese. They remained silent for a while.

After that, we fired many rounds of artillery and gunshots back on the Chinese continuously, as we climbed up the mountain. The Chinese again were

pursuing us closely and their firings passed quite near us. We two, one above the other with some distance between us, fired artillery and guns on the Chinese, while we climbed up the mountain. We finally reached the top of the mountain. In that battle, we killed more than fifty Chinese soldiers. When the Chinese troops were chasing us on the mountainside, Major Gyau entered the Dzong fort from the eastern side and fired the Bren gun on them. At that time, we two were alone, without support. After nine hours of fighting, a large Chinese detachment attacked us from both the back and front of the mountain. We two quickly descended down cautiously without being seen by the Chinese. Our Section Leader's left hand had been wounded. We climbed down from the southern side and fired back on the Chinese. We rested at by a small stream at the foot of the mountain for a short while. At that time, we did not have even a bowl with us, let alone food. We met a monk, who gave us two spoonfuls of barley flour. We had no bowls, so we used our cases of glasses to make *pag* by mixing barley flour and water together.¹¹ Walking further, we reached Mangmang, where we met Migyur-la, who had accompanied the Dalai Lama up to the Indian border as one of his bodyguards. He gave each of us a lump of raw sugar (*bu ram*) and we were very happy to have them. That night, we went to Pangchel, where we met our Captain Lobsang Tashi, Lieutenant Namgyal Wangde and Lieutenant Dhondup Gyalpo, all of whom had served as bodyguards of the Dalai Lama up to the Indian border, and some government officials.

Mingur, a member of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment, recollects the following events in his report:

I accompanied the Dalai Lama up to the border as one of his bodyguards. After that, as per the instruction, I returned to Tsona to defend the area. There, when a Chinese force arrived, with my fellow troops I combated them with full force for about five hours. Many Chinese troops continuously converged on the area. Our ammunition and other military supplies were exhausted. We therefore failed to withstand the Chinese attacks, and fled to Tawang.

Tsering Wandgu, a member of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment, recounts the following in his report:

During the Lhasa violence, as the Chinese launched heavy artillery bombardments against us, we lost our defense position at Norbulingka and fled to Sera via Damra garden. Kungo Taring was with us at that time, and he took many photos. From Sera, we crossed the Kyichu River and reached Samye where we joined the Chushi Gangdruk force, which was led by Alo Dawa. We fought the Chinese at Ön Choding Labrang. Thereafter, we travelled through Erong and Yarlung to Tsona, where we met officers and troops who served as the bodyguards of the

Dalai Lama up to the Indian border. Some of them angrily rebuked us, "You have given Lhasa to the Chinese!" They even spat at us. However, we remained silent, just like cuckoos in winter. After a few days, when a large Chinese detachment converged on Tsona, I along with my fellow troops encountered them with our full strength. However, due to poor logistics and military supplies, we lost Tsona to the Chinese. Through Taktsang Domtsang, we fled to Mon Tawang.

11. As mentioned before, when a Chinese detachment from Tsang converged on Lhodrak Dowa Dzong fortress by way of Phuma Jangthang, some Tibetan troops under the command of Colonel Sonam Tashi of the Bodyguard Regiment were dispatched to Yamdrok from along the way to fight the Chinese force. There were already troops of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment, the Gyantse Regiment's Menpel Tashi and Sampa Tsering, Gadang Regiment's Lhawang, volunteer monks from Dargye Monastery led by Pachen, volunteer people and volunteer monks from Shang Ganden Chokhor at Yamdrok. All of them jointly put up strong resistance against the Chinese for several days and nights, killing or wounding many Chinese soldiers. Several Tibetan brave warriors were also killed or wounded in that battle. Among the many battles fought between the Chinese and Tibetans in southern Tibet since the Chinese launched military attacks in Lhasa, the one that was fought in Lhodrak was the most intense and the longest battle. Due to poor logistics and military supplies, the Tibetan force became unable to withstand the might of the Chinese force and weapons, and they ultimately lost ground to the Chinese, and fled into Bhutan.

Concerning this battle, Colonel Sotrey (Rupon Sonam Tashi), who commanded the battle, recalls the following events in his autobiography *A Life Account of a Tibetan Soldier*:

When the Dalai Lama was proceeding to Chide Shol, we heard that a large number of Chinese troops from Tsang were chasing him. We were instructed to go and help the Tibetan force at Chide Shol to encounter the Chinese. Accordingly, we travelled through upper Chide Shol for some days and nights. We stopped at Monda for a night. The next day, we went to Phuma Jangthang to check if the Chinese had arrived there and there was no sign of any Chinese presence. We returned and stayed for seven days at Monda. Dapön Ragshak of the Gyantse Regiment, along with 16 soldiers, arrived there. We became 32 in number then. After that, several Tibetan soldiers arrived there from Lhasa, thus our strength increased to 52. At that time, we received a letter from the Volunteer Army, saying that about 300 soldiers would be coming to Dowo Dzong fort, but none came actually.

After that, Pachen of Dargye Monastery came to us, carrying a letter sent jointly by Natse Dzong and the Volunteer Army, calling us immediately to come

to Nakartse. When we went there along with Pachen, there were seven captains and many members of the Volunteer Army gathered at the house of Aser at Taglung. Their main leader was Gapa Bu Trayak.

When we first arrived there, we saw the head of man hanging on the door of the house. After we met them, the head disappeared. I was told it was the head of a Chinese spy. The seven captains and I held a meeting. During the meeting, they boastfully said, "We must kill around 200 Chinese (in Khampa's ascent)!" I said, "You don't need to kill 100 or 200 Chinese before you see them. Rather than this, we must discuss and decide the best way to organize our defense." We then decided that the Volunteer Army was to defend the Taklung and Nakartse, and we to defend the Phuma Jangthang. After that, when we arrived back to our previous position at Möndo, we heard a sound of two artillery shots, but we ignored them. When we climbed up a mountain, some Khampa men were coming after us. When asked, they told us that they had fled from Taklung because a Chinese force had arrived at Nakartse and fired a few cannon shots on their position at Taklung. After that, on the way we met a poor village man riding on a weak horse. He said, "Dowo Dzong has become empty now; please move your military post there." Promptly, I sent Shelngo Kalsang Loyak and another 15 soldiers with him to defend the Dzong fort. At that time, district officers were Thonsur Shabdo and Tsedrung Ngawang Namgyal. They were nowhere to be seen. The majority of the people had fled to the mountains, abandoning their houses.

We reached Dowo Dzong fort during that night. We were just over sixty officers and soldiers, and we resided at the Dzong fort to defend it. More than forty volunteer monks from Dargye Monastery and Shang Ganden Chokhor resided at Dönyiling Monastery. Around that time, about 400 members of the Volunteer Army who fled from Taklung resided at the community hall below the Dzong fort. They sent some men to us, saying that they wanted salary. I said, "We can give you salaries, but what is your plan? If you do similar things like Taklung and Nakartse, it is not right." They then returned.

The next day, we constructed thirteen defense structures at the Dzong fort and along the mountaintop near the monastery. During that evening, when we regrouped the troops and assigned each of them with a defense structure, the Volunteer Army soldiers residing at the lower Dzong suddenly ran away, suspecting that the Chinese force was approaching. The next day, along with two brave monks from Dargye Monastery, I went down to the houses where they had resided to collect pickaxes and spades for digging underground tunnels and constructing defense walls. We found that they ran away so hurriedly that they had left cooked meat and even plates filled with fresh food. We summoned the local people and asked them to stay alert in their homes. That night, forty

soldiers who had accompanied the Dalai Lama as his bodyguards arrived at the Dzong to help us. They said that we would struggle together for the sake of our religion and polity, and we were as happy to meet each other as if we had met our family members. They had brought a letter to us from the Kashag at Dong Pangchalgang. The letter said, "You must work carefully and cautiously, without losing courage. Whoever will make extraordinary performance will be rewarded at the right time, according to your performance." Along with the letter, there was 150 *srang* and a protective-thread for each of us 125 officers and soldiers.

That night, I dreamt that the Chinese were coming. The next morning, magpies were chirping a lot. I told my fellow troops that it seemed to me that the Chinese were coming. That day, starting from about 10 am, the Chinese forces surrounded the Dzong fort from four sides—one group advanced through the Karpo-la pass behind the Dowo Dzong, one via Dingsum Mala, one via Mōnda and another from Menthang. At first, about ten Chinese soldiers from amongst the Chinese soldiers who came through Karpo-la pass attempted to cross a bridge to approach the Dzong fort. We fired machine guns on them, killing all of them on the spot. We got one Bren gun and one machine gun from them. Then, we saw a group of Chinese soldiers marching along the valley. We fired Bren guns at them, killing about six of them. The rest of them turned back and hid at a corner in the back of the mountain.

There were a few ruined *stupas* on the slope of the mountain. I commanded one of my soldiers to fire artillery on the mountain, making the *stupas* the approximate target. The first shot was out of reach. Then I again asked him to fire two shots together by increasing the level of the artillery. When he did so, the shells landed exactly onto the narrow valley where the Chinese troops were hiding. Except for a few, all of them, totaling around thirty, were either killed or wounded.

The second group of Chinese troops appeared from Dingsum Mala and they marched as a group in a loose line. They gathered in a field and stood in line. The commander gave instructions to his troops, as I judged from his hand gestures. I instructed my soldiers that I would fire machine guns on the Chinese and they should fire their guns on whoever among them ran away. Targeting the Chinese commander, I fired five shots, and he collapsed right there. The rest of the Chinese troops ran amok. I then fired my machinegun for about 100 rounds of ammunition rapidly, killing about 60 of them. The rest of them, unable to determine the direction of our position due to the echoes of the gunshots, ran towards the village, close to our position. I again fired my machine gun at them, killing about 10 of them. About 50 of them managed to escape.

The third Chinese detachment with about 100 troops appeared from Monda. They assembled at the lower end the Dingdrug village and rested there for a few

minutes. I fired around 100 rounds of shots from my machine gun, killing or wounding around thirty of them. The rest of them ran away. Some of them had secretly walked along the foot of the mountain and had arrived at the corner of the field called Shika Nub. Watching from the watch-house that was located near the horse stable of the Dzong fort, we saw that their captain was giving instruction to them. I fired my machinegun and around 100 rounds of ammunition rapidly, killing about fifty of them, including the captain, and the rest of them ran away.

The fourth Chinese detachment with around 10 troops came through Menthang. Below the Dzong fort, our horsekeeper Samdup of the Bodyguard Regiment, Yundrung of Dargye Monastery and Drago Wenchung Gendun were taking care of our mules kept at Trokhang house. The Chinese fired and killed Yundrung and one mule. Samdup and Wenchung fired back in retaliation, but I did not know how many Chinese they killed or wounded, as it was night. In the morning, Samdup came to us to report the incidence. We immediately took all our horses and mules to the Dzong fort. We had a barricade installed on the mountain to the left side of Donyiling, where he had stationed two soldiers of the Bodyguard Regiment and two monks of Dargye Monastery. In that morning, we found the two soldiers lying dead inside the barricade as a result of the Chinese attack from behind the mountain. The two monks had jumped down from a cliff and acted as if dead, and then came back to us during that night. The Chinese captured the barricade and we exchanged fire with them for sometime on that day, but there were no casualties on both sides.

Just after dusk that evening, the Chinese had secretly arrived at a small ground near the Duchung house, below the horse-path of the Dzong. They threw petrol bombs on the Dzong fort and destroyed its main gate. Immediately, a Chinese commander, carrying a bomb and a pistol, leading about 37 soldiers in three lines, advanced through the horse-path towards the fort. Targeting the commander, I threw on them a hand grenade, which exploded and killed the commander on the spot, and two soldiers were thrown away. We immediately fired on the rest of the Chinese troops. At the same time, as we had prepared previously, we rolled rocks down upon them, killing all of them. At that time, there were some Amdo volunteers on the pass below and to the opposite side of our position, but they had fled, unable to hold the ground. Their position had been seized by the Chinese troops. The Chinese placed four artilleries at their position and fired some shells targeting the fort, but the shells fell onto the rocks below the fort.

After that, we moved to the roof of the prison at the fort, where I placed and fired a machine gun, while my fellow troops fired some shots from their guns, on the Chinese position. In retaliation, the Chinese fired artillery on us. Taking advantage of the sparks created by the Chinese artillery, I rapidly fired machine guns in the direction of the sparks. After a while, the Chinese stopped firing.

The next morning we found 12 dead bodies of Chinese troops. Then, some Chinese troops came from behind the Tag Kharel residence at the old fort. One among them said in Khampa dialect, "You surrender to us." Then another voice said in Tsang accent, "Are you not going to surrender to us? We have blocked your roads." In reply, we said, "We will never surrender. If you want to fight, come and fight now." After exchanging some heated words, we fired our machineguns and destroyed them. The next day, we found 12 Chinese soldiers had died, and the rest had run away.

Again just after midnight that night, when I, along with Chupon Poli Gyau, Namgyal Dorji of the Bodyguard Regiment, went to the fort for inspection, we saw some dark figures moving along the wooden fence of the monastery behind the fort. We shouted to them, "Hey!" and there were no response. As we listened closely to them, we heard one of them saying, "*thung ti*". There were five Chinese soldiers. We carefully fired several rounds of shots from our long-range rifles. Two of the Chinese fell down from the front cliff. Three others must have fallen down from the back cliff, as we did not find their bodies. Two among them had hand grenades and one long rifle.

At around 4 pm the next evening, from Shiga Nub, following the straight narrow path, about 10 Chinese soldiers came in line towards the fort. The first and last among them were carrying pistols. Targeting the first and last soldiers, we fired three Sten guns at once, killing both of the targeted and the other six soldiers. The remaining three ran away. Just after that, a large Chinese force advanced towards us through the dry riverbed below the fort. Since it was not easy to fire down from our position, we threw two hand grenades on them, and managed to obstruct their advance. Later, we heard from people who came through that valley that there were more than 50 dead bodies of Chinese soldiers along the road.

The next morning, when my adjutant Kusung Namgyal Dorji looked out from our window to check the dead bodies of the Chinese soldiers whom we had killed the previous night, the Chinese who had silently hidden inside the Duchung house sniped at him, wounding him seriously. In great pain, he asked me to kill him immediately. As there was no hope of his survival, I put some blessing pills into his mouth and asked him to pray to the Avalokiteshvara. Then with great sadness, I had to shoot him through his head, wishing to relieve him from the severe pain he was suffering, and he died. On that day, on the top of the mountain to the opposite of our position, our 15 soldiers were fighting a large Chinese force that was attempting to reach the mountaintop from behind. In that battle, many Chinese were killed or wounded. On the Tibetan side, Lhawang of the Gadang Regiment, Jampel of the Bodyguard Regiment and a monk volunteer Jamyang of Drathang were wounded, and all of them returned

to the fort. Lhawang's left hand had been broken. Despite this, he courageously fired guns with his right hand, with the help of someone who fed ammunitions into the gun.

Our small force on the mountaintop asked us to send some soldiers to help them, so we sent six soldiers to them. They were attacked by the Chinese troops on the way and one of them died. Some Chinese troops tried to come towards the front mountain. We stopped and scattered them. Afterwards, from the Karpo-la pass beyond the river, the Chinese rained rapid firing of artillery on us, killing two members of our force, Samphel and Jugring from Dargye Monastery. By that time, our troops on the mountaintop had finished their shells and ammunitions, and more and more Chinese troops converged on the mountaintop. Our troops on the mountaintop therefore blew the trumpet-signal for withdrawal, and they all left the position. The dead bodies of the Chinese soldiers that were killed in that incident were thrown down into the valley behind the mountain. Later, those people who came along that road told us that there were around 100 dead bodies of Chinese soldiers.

The next day, through binoculars we watched the position of the Chinese troops on the Karpo-la pass. A commander, with a pistol hanging from his body, who was while smoking, looking in our direction. I told Pachen of Dargye Monastery to watch him closely and I would shoot him. He said, "The distance is quite long, so the shots will not reach him?" I said, "It will." I took my USA rifle. Raising its nozzle level a little higher than the target, I fired one shot. The Chinese commander collapsed right there, and his hands and legs were shaking. I again fired one shot, but I did not know whether it reached there or not. All the Chinese troops ran away to the backside of the mountain.

Two hours later, from Karpo-la pass, the Chinese fired a larger sized artillery continuously targeting the fort where we were, wounding seriously our two Khampa volunteers, who died soon after that. Drakjun Dawa Tsering, a soldier of the Bodyguard Regiment, was thrown away among the cloud of dust blown off by a shell. I thought he was killed, but after a while he got up uninjured, saying "Bloody Chinese!" Though we tried to find out the location of their artillery with the help of binoculars, we did not find it. Therefore, we could not retaliate.

At that time, we had 11 fit soldiers and 42 people, who were either injured, old or children. We moved them down to the house below the fort for safety. There, we checked how many shells we had left with us, and there were only forty. Therefore, it was impossible to fight the Chinese. There was a trance performer at the monastery down at the fort, and I went to the monastery to consult him about whether we should stay or leave. Dönling Phüntsock of the Bodyguard Regiment and Poli Gyau followed me, one after another. From the opposite side, the Chinese from their barricade fired Bren guns rapidly on the two, killing both

of them on the spot in front of my eyes. I watched the Chinese barricade closely. I saw a Bren gun was mounted on a metal slab, and because of the light reflected by the metal slab, the gunner's forehead was clearly visible. I fired my US long-range rifle, hitting him exactly on his forehead. After that, the Chinese stopped firing and remained silent.

Then I went to the monastery and asked a monk staff about the trance performer. He told me that he and the other monks of the monastery had already fled from the monastery. The volunteer monks of Dargye Monastery and our soldiers who had been stationed at the monastery had also left. Then I asked him if there was any monk at the monastery who could perform divination. He replied that there were no such monks, but there was a chapel of a female deity, the protector of the monastery. Then I said that I should consult the deity about whether we should stay or leave. We met Tsechag Jolag Thaye and Tsepal there. With their help, I performed a lottery divination at the chapel. The result of the divination told us to leave. Then, again we performed a lottery divination to decide which way we should follow, the eastern or southern route. The divination advised us to take the eastern route. The monk official said that since the Chinese had arrived at the eastern side, it was very dangerous for us to travel through the eastern road. I said, "We consulted the deity since we did not know, so we must believe and trust it. It will never betray us."

After that, just before the dusk, we moved all the wounded soldiers, old people and children we had kept at the house below the fort to the monastery. After that, we told them that we had to leave. We decided to go from the backside of the monastery since all other sides had been blocked by the Chinese. We made a small hole on the boundary wall at the back of the monastery. Ngodup Dorji of the Bodyguard Regiment and Benchung were appointed to act as our rear guards. I led the people through the small hole in the wall. In the darkness, we walked down to the bottom of the fort. On the way, we came across some Chinese who were resting, and they said, "*thung ti*". If we fired at them, the sounds of the gunfire would attract many other Chinese troops. Therefore, we immediately took out our swords and charged at them, brandishing our swords and shouting "*pha ro, ma ro*"¹². We killed or wounded about 20 of them.

When our people walked among the large number of broken pieces of used bullets and shells, their footsteps made a loud noise. I asked them to walk slowly, without making any noise. Since it was dark, we had great difficulty seeing the road. If we went further continuously, we would face danger while crossing the bridge, as a large number of Chinese troops had arrived there from Menthang. We had little quantity of ammunition, so it was not possible for us to fight the Chinese back, so we climbed up the mountain.

We arrived at the house of a monk of Dönyiling Monastery who had come along with us. We ate and drank there. At that time, our group had 22 monks and monk officials of Donyiling Monastery and around 40 volunteer monks of Shang Ganden Chokor and Tibetan soldiers, but only 12 of them were fit men. The monks told us that they would stay back at the hermitage of their monastery just above us on the mountain. I said, "It does not matter. You have safely come up to this place with us. Don't say later that you could not escape when you came with Kusung Rupon." After that, we soldiers alone went ahead.

Up to that day, we had fought the Chinese for 16 days and nights. Leaving all the guns and other weapons stained with the blood of the Chinese soldiers whom we had killed during the war, we took the usable machine guns, Bren guns and Sten guns and fired them on the Chinese until all the rounds of ammunition were finished. During that battle, we lost six soldiers and six volunteer monks of Dargye Monastery. We killed approximately 450 Chinese troops in total, both officers and soldiers. Among them, the Chinese commander who we killed on the horse-path of the fort was said to be the commander of 20,000 soldiers. His dead body was treated with much special respect, unlike other Chinese commanders. A tomb was built for him at the Chudramlingka Park below the fort. All the troops marched past and paid respect to it. According to the monks of Donyiling Monastery, later on other Chinese passing through the tomb also paid respect to it.

Drakjun Dawa Tsering, a member of the Bodyguard Regiment, who fought the battle of Dowo Dzong narrates the following in his war report:

During the Lhasa uprising riot, I was on security duty at Norbulingka. When the Dalai Lama decided to go to southern Tibet, I was selected as one of the bodyguards who would accompany the Dalai Lama. So I had the opportunity to accompany the Dalai Lama up to the Tibetan area called Mangmang and performed all the duties related to the security of the Dalai Lama assigned to me along the way. Moreover, twenty mules, each loaded with two boxes of two thousand rounds of ammunition, were entrusted to me to take. On arrival at Chide Shol, I handed them to the concerned authority. Then, I, with other rear guards of the Dalai Lama, went after the Dalai Lama and his party up to the Indian border. After that, the officers and soldiers of the Bodyguard and the Khadang regiments were sent back to Lhoka to defend the area. Even after the Dalai Lama left, we (about 70 officers and soldiers under the command of Captain Lobsang Tashi) patrolled the Mangmang roads for five days. After that, we returned to Tsona. Two days later, we, a group of 25 soldiers, were instructed to go to assist the forces of Colonel Sotrey who were defending the Dowo Dzong. We immediately left Tsona, ignoring the great difficulties and hardships on the way, and arrived at Kalung Shigar. There a group of Amdo volunteers who had arrived from Gongkar told us that the Gongkar had

been lost to the Chinese. However, without being disheartened by the news, we moved ahead to fight the enemy.

It took us 12 days to reach Dowo Dzong. At 7:20 am the next morning after our arrival, a Chinese force came. We fought them for seven days and nights with strong determination. At that time, when we fought a battle at the main gate of the Dowo Dzong under the command and strategy of Colonel Sotrey, I held various positions, front, back and centre, on the battlefield in accordance with the situation, without caring for my life. I killed 28 Chinese soldiers.

During the fifth night, about 1,000 Chinese troops gradually arrived and tried to enter the main gate of the Dowo Dzong fortress. We four troops, including Wangchuk, killed the Chinese who was carrying gunpowder. The Chinese fired machine guns rapidly into the main gate of the fort. We retaliated. In an intense exchange of firings between us and the Chinese, we lost our fellow Nyemo-wa Dungpa Dawa Tsering. Though I was hit with many machinegun bullets, due to the power of the protective amulet, I was not hurt. Reinforcing my courage and strength, during that night, keeping some troops at the main gate, I went up onto the roof. There were already several of our troops there. With their support, I fired 84 rounds of bullets onto the Chinese, but I did not know how many of them were killed or wounded.

Thereafter some Chinese came through the Talam road ravine. I fired slingshots on them, killing a senior Chinese commander and his horse and 36 soldiers. Altogether, I killed 67 troops and horses in battle. Killing or wounding on a battlefield is not a matter of surprise, but our small force was able to combat and defeat a very huge Chinese force, comprising more than a hundred thousand troops. This clearly shows that we had a protector deity who supported our truthful cause, and it also shows the greatness of our soldiers' patriotic courage.

After that, at the instruction of Colonel Sotrey, when I went down to the lower area of the Dzong fortress to see our two Tibetan men who appeared to have gone down from the Dzong fort, the Chinese attacked me with artillery shots with strong intensity, throwing me a distance of 12 feet. However, except that a small piece of shell hit me on my right shoulder, I was not injured seriously.

In 1959, the leader of the Bodyguard Regiment and Commander-in-Chief of the volunteer monks of Dargye Monastery jointly made a resolution, pledging, "We must struggle hard to achieve the religious and political independence of Tibet by devoting all our patriotic courage and strength towards our goal. Even if we do not attain victory in battle immediately, we shall never retreat, not even by one step." It was signed by, among others, the officers and soldiers of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment, soldiers of the Khadang Drapchi and the Gyantse regiments, volunteer monks of Shang Ganden Chökhör and Dargye monasteries and many militias from Dotö and Domé. Sacrificing their lives, they fought the

Chinese for five days and nights at Dowo Dzong fortress. At the time, suddenly Rupon Sotrey purposely spread a rumour that upper Dzong fortress had been seized by the Chinese. Discouraged by this rumour, the majority of the soldiers hurriedly fled from the area. Leader Pachen from Dargye Monastery also fled. Thus, their resolution was discarded.

Seven days later, at round 6 pm of the eighth night, when Colonel Sotrey and all other remaining fellow troops at Dowo Dzong went to Donyiling Monastery, they were attacked on the way by the Chinese with machineguns. About 20 of them were killed or wounded, and some of them were arrested and taken with them. Initially when the battle began, there were many Chinese troops on the top of the mountain that lay to the east of Dzong. A few of our soldiers were wounded. Though we sent additional troops there, they were wiped out by the Chinese, by killing, wounding or capturing them. Severely defeated and with a lack of back up troops, the Tibetans were in a difficult position. Therefore, all the 80 officers and soldiers at Donyiling Monastery had no option but to flee.

The Dzong fortress was surrounded by about ten thousand Chinese troops and the main gate by more than a thousand troops. All the escape roads were blocked. So we broke open a small hole on the boundary wall of the monastery to secretly get out of the monastery. The gap between the walls was so small that it was very difficult to pass through it quickly. While passing through the wall, the Chinese fired a machinegun and killed Woyuk Phuntsok, one of the members of our group. Section leader Chupon Gyau of Shigatse Regiment and Tenpa Tsering of Samye Monastery were lying dead in the northwest watch house. Nethongpa, whose legs had been injured, committed suicide by shooting himself with his pistol. Namgyal Dorji, while firing his machinegun, was gunned down by the Chinese. He had been a very brave soldier, obedient to his officers and friendly to his colleagues. His death saddened me greatly.

On the ... day of the ... month of 1959, at around 7:30 am, when the battle started, the Tibetan force had a small number of troops and the Chinese had a very large force. One of Shigatse Lhawang's hands was broken and a new soldier of the Bodyguards Regiment was wounded. They came to the fort. Tseten Wangchuk, a member of the Tibetan Police Force, jumped down from a cliff of about ten-storeys height, and died after seven days. At around 2 pm of the fourth evening after the fight began, our commander sent 18 soldiers to the mountaintop to help us. Among them, Rongsa Tse Karpo of the Bodyguard Regiment lost his life under Chinese attack. Kusung Major Dhondup Tsewang was seriously wounded inside the watch-house at the monastery, and he succumbed to his injuries. In short, our nine soldiers died under the enemy's attack in front of my eyes. It is difficult to tell the exact number of soldiers who died in the battle, but I will always remember all those Tibetan brave soldiers who laid down their lives battling the enemy.

At the instruction of our commander, when I went down to the lower Dzong to see the two men who had descended to the lower Dzong, I found that one hand of Lieutenant Chushul Ngawang of the Bodyguard Regiment was wounded, and one leg of Lieutenant Tashi Tsering of the Shigatse Regiment was badly wounded and he was unable to walk. They said to me, "Please, have all our officers and troops leave this place and take us with you when you go." I told this to our Colonel.

Thereafter, I was carrying a gun and some quantities of ammunition. When we walked through a narrow valley, I faced some difficulty in making my way, and lagged behind the other troops. After a while, there were only 14 troops and most of the officers and soldiers of our group were out of sight. To our opposite side were more than a thousand Chinese troops. With my knife attached at the nozzle of my gun, and loaded with ten rounds of ammunitions, I took the lead of the remaining soldiers and walked through the river valley in front of the main gate. It seemed that the Chinese did not see us. They did not fire at us.

When we arrived at Tseri, I counted our members, and I found Squad Leader Tashi Phuntsok and someone else were missing. We became 12 now. There was a small lake and we took a rest near it. For eight days, we did not have sleep, food or water. Extremely exhausted, both physically and mentally, we fell asleep until sunrise the next day. We suddenly woke up and checked how much distance we had covered. The fort was near us. We hurriedly started off our journey. Not knowing the way, we ended up at a valley to the left side of the fort. It was about 8 am. There were many people living in tents and rearing cattle. They, as well as we, were happy to meet each other. They appreciated us, saying that we had fought bravely and gave us food, which was like a lifesaving medicine to us. We will never forget their kindness. We had lost our way. They showed us the bypass for Sekhar Gutok¹³. However, we were not in any condition to follow the shortcut road. Our Shigatse army instructor was carrying some valuable goods with him, but he had no weapons, so he returned. We continued our journey following the same road we had followed and after three days, we arrived at Sekhar Gutok. There were 16 Tibetan soldiers. We heard that two soldiers who had been wounded during the battle at the Dowo Dzong fort, had been left behind at a small monastery. We three soldiers went to bring them, and they were Amdo Rigden and Dranang Inchung.

In the hope of gathering all the scattered Tibetan soldiers, we waited for two days at Sekhar Gutok. A young soldier of the Bodyguard Regiment and two other soldiers arrived. We together entered Bhutan, from where we proceeded to the Indian border at Hathi Zar¹⁴, then Buxa (in West Bengal), from whence we went to Sikkim.

The following is a short excerpt taken from the report of Dorji Dhondup, a member of the Bodyguard Regiment:

When the Dalai Lama proceeded from Norbulingka to southern Tibet, I got an opportunity to accompany him as one of his bodyguards. At Chide Shol in Lhoka, as per the instruction of the Dalai Lama, I went with Colonel Sotrey of the Bodyguard Regiment to Phuma Janthang at Yamdrok to stop the Chinese force in the event of their sudden advancement from Tsang. Thereafter, at Lhodrak Dzong, we fought a Chinese force, who converged on our position, for six days and nights, guarding our ground and risking our own lives. However, due to lack of military supplies and supporting troops, and increasing arrival of Chinese troops, we failed to hold our ground, and finally we fled and came to India via Bhutan.

In the report of Lhundup Chodrak, a volunteer monk from Shang Ganden Chokhor, he recounts:

In the beginning of the second Tibetan month in 1959, we forty monks of the Ganden Chokhor, two soldiers from the Gadang Regiment and two local militias, totaling 44 people in all, and taking weapons from the monastery, rode off towards Lhasa with the aim of protecting the Dharma, the government and the Dalai Lama. On the way at Yoyuk, we met monks of Sera coming from Lhasa, who told us of the desperate situation in Lhasa. Finding it was impossible for us to go to Lhasa, we decided to travel to Lhoka by crossing the Do Kharu river crossing at Nyemo. However, upon arrival at Kharu crossing point, we found that all the coracles had been taken to the other side of the river by the men of Chushi Gangdruk. So we arranged logs together and used them to cross the river.

At Yakde, we met several members of Chushi Gangdruk. Along with them, we went to Yamdrok Pede, where we met many Tibetan Army's soldiers who had fled from Gongkar after suffering defeat under the Chinese. From there we headed to Nakartse. Some amongst us suggested that a few of us should go to Dzara. We, a few monks of Ganden Chokhor, went to Dzara, where we battled with the Chinese force. After offering a short resistance, we lost our resistance power and fled to Taglung, where we met Kusung Rupon. We accompanied him to Lhodrak Dowo Dzong fortress, where we, the monks of Ganden Chokhor jointly with the troops of the Bodyguard Regiment, and shoulder to shoulder, fought the Chinese. Regarding the duration of the battle, I do not need to tell it here, as Kusung Rupon knows it very well. We believe that our effective resistance against the Chinese was due mainly to the skillful strategy of Kusung Rupon. In that battle, the followings monks of the Ganden Chokhor lost their lives:

1. Namling Lieutenant Jedrung Ngawang Tsonyi of Langchung
2. Rigdol Dadrag of Namling Chabla Ashi Tsering
3. Rigdol Kalsang of Gyatso Gangpa Dzasar
4. Rigdol Kalsang of Shang Gyatso Gangpa Dzasar
5. Dradul of Shang Nyara Dingang.

Barshi Jampa was captured alive by the Chinese and taken to Kongpo where he was imprisoned. During that battle, we seized some guns, including Sten guns and long rifles, from the Chinese. However, we lost all our personal belongings and government properties, to the enemy. After that, by way of Bhutan, we came to India and joined the Volunteer Army in Mustang.

Eleven: In the accounts of Lhundup Chodrak, a volunteer monk from Ganden Chokhor of Shang, he narrates the following:

In the sixth Tibetan month of 1959, after the Chinese launched military offensives in Lhasa, the Chinese troops arrived at the Shang Ganden Chokhor Monastery. They were very hostile to the monks, and arrested all the monks and imprisoned them. We twenty monks managed to flee the previous night and arrived at Nagtsang, where we collected around 100 monks and procured weapons, as many as we could. Each of us got a horse and rode back to the monastery with the firm determination to retaliate with the Chinese. On the way at Shang Gyatso Nyangra, we suddenly encountered a Chinese force. We fought intensively for several days, killing or wounding many Chinese soldiers. From our side, we lost about 13 members, including Lobsang Konshon, a brave and determined monk. The following were the thirteen monks:

1. Lobsang Konshon,
2. Lhundup Chodrak from Shang Nyara Mandrong Surpa,
3. Rigdol Kunsang from Nagtsang Dokhag,
4. Lhundup Rinchen from Namgling Dzongyab,
5. Rigdol Kalsang from Namling,
6. Lhundup Chophel from Namling,
7. Lhundup Yeshe from Shang Gyatso Golegpa,
8. Rigdol Palden from Namgling Dru Gangkar,
9. Lhundup Yeshe from Shang Gyatso Golegpa,
10. Pacho from Nagtsang,
11. Lhoru Bu Anyam from Shang Dureydong and
12. Two Nagtsang nomads whose village name I do not remember.

After that, owing to a lack of reserve force and military supplies, we fled to Nagtsang via the northern route. The Chinese pursued us up to Nagtsang

Gomnag, from where we launched a counter attack on them. During that incident, our force lost Namgling Toglung Lhundup Woesser and Namling Dzongkyab Lhunkhang Rigdol. After that, we fled towards upper Tibet, but the Chinese encountered us at Chogcu Menthang. We fought them, during which our member Lhundup Sangpo was wounded and captured by the Chinese. The rest of us fled on horses, leaving behind all our belongings. When we reached Lo Menthang, we met those monks of Ganden Chokhor who had joined the Volunteer Army and fled into Bhutan from Dowo Dzeng. Altogether, there were around 100 monks of Ganden Chokhor.

D. The Dalai Lama and His Entourage Arrive in India for Asylum

As mentioned above, in the close of April, due to our inability to hold ground in Lhoka, the majority of the officers and troops, by way of Nyal, Jora and Khatag, we headed to India. One morning when we were painstakingly walking through the high snowy mountain of Margo, a pale-blue Chinese helicopter appeared from the north of the mountain for patrolling purpose. Though it must have spotted the cavalcade of thousands of people and horses on the snowy mountain, it flew straight past without doing any harm to us. We soon reached the Indo-Tibetan border, where the border security force stopped us, saying that we were not allowed to enter the border unless they had permission from the Indian government.

Due to the result of the appeal made by the Dalai Lama and his entourage to the Indian government after they arrived safely in India, all the Tibetan refugees arriving at the Indian borders were allowed to enter India. Therefore, more than ten thousand Tibetan soldiers, who had arrived at Indian borders, entered India. There they again had to climb another snowy mountain. Many of them lost direction and end up in desolate places. There were no villages to beg food from; they had to endure tremendous hardships because of having no food and water. The horses and mules were unable to go through the path and many of them died or were left behind during the journey. The people were unable to carry even the small luggage they were carrying with them, and they left them on the way. The weather was extremely cold and sleet fell continuously. After two days of this arduous journey, we reached Luguthang, a small village in Mon. After that, travelling for three days through Thimpo Gang and other villages of Mon, begging or buying food on the way, we reached Mon Tawang. From Tsona, a group of Tibetan soldiers arrived there, by way of Mangmang, Lungla and Thonglek. Some Tibetan troops who took Margo road also arrived there at the same time. Another group of Tibetan soldiers who fled from Lhodrak, and travelled through Bhutan, arrived at the transit

camp at Buxa, on the Indian border (with Bhutan). One group of Tibetan soldiers, travelling via Jayul and Pema Ko, arrived in Assam.

The Tibetan soldiers who came from Margo and Tsona had brought their own and the government's guns and ammunition along with them, and the weapons were confiscated by the border police at Tawang, and each soldier was given a receipt for the weapon. Tsedrung Jampa Wangdu, a representative of the Tibetan government, arrived there to console the people and look after their welfare. We stayed one month in Tawang, and the Indian government cared and helped us at its best level, and provided us with sufficient food aid by dropping packed food from a helicopter every day.

Thereafter, we were informed that we had to move to a transit camp at Mismari (in Assam). We prepared to leave. We heard that horses, mules and winter clothes were useless in the hot Indian plain, so the people sold the few horses and mules they had with them. The horses and mules were undersold in Tawang at a very cheap price of about 10 *tamkar* money for each animal and belongings sold for any price. There were no vehicle roads, so we travelled on foot. It was the month of May, when the summer heat was at its peak.

Travelling through Senge Dzong and Bomdila, we reached Mismari, where we stayed for several months. There, the Tibetan government set up a welfare office, which looked after the welfare of the people. The Indian government in particular gave us excellent care. They distributed food daily to us, and we had been grouped into different camps created with bamboo huts. They also gave us cotton trousers and shirts, cheap shoes, toiletries and medical facilities, among other things.

Individually or jointly, Tibetans sent petitions to the UN and its branch the International Court of Justice about Tibet's tragedy. Representatives of various foreign governments and reporters came there, one after another, to interview the people about the situation of Tibet, and the people explained as much as they knew to them. As the climate was very hot, most of the officers and soldiers who had long hair had to cut it. The cut hair, when collected, made a big heap of garbage.

According to the wishes of the people who arrived at Mismari, after reaching a unanimous decision, the representative and leaders of the people, requested the Tibetan government-in-exile, both in written and verbal communication, to appeal to the Indian government to give them military training and help them return to Tibet. Later, when the Tibetan cabinet ministers and the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup visited the refugee camps at different times, the leaders of the people also submitted to them petitions with the same request. However, they did not receive a positive reply and their plan remained unfulfilled.

After that, the Indian government and Tibetan government-in-exile jointly decided to send all the Tibetans at Mismari camps either to schools, road construction or resettlements in various parts of India. The majority of the people repeated their

request, through both written and verbal communication, to send them to military training in order that they could fight the enemy, but their request again was not granted. Therefore, several thousands of people, including officers and troops of the Tibetan army, members of Chushi Gangdruk, Amdowas and other people as per their desire, were sent to Sikkim for the time being, since Sikkim was nearer to Tibet. Travelling through Shiliguri by train and bus, they arrived in Gangtok. Around 100 officers and soldier, including Colonel Sotrey of the Bodyguard Regiment, Captain Phuntsok Tashi of the Drapchi Regiment and Lieutenant Khetsun of the Ngadang Regiment, all of whom came from Buxa transit camp through Bhutan, arrived there. All of them were employed in the road construction, from near Phodong Monastery up to Mengen and Tsunthang (in Gangtok).

Through the Tibetan welfare office at Gangtok, the members of the Tibetan army and volunteer force requested that the Indian government send them to military training, and it replied that their request was under consideration, but did not give any practical response. While doing road construction works, three soldiers died at different times under the collapse of trees and boulders. Their wages were so small that they were not able to get adequate food. They did not have proper tents to live in and faced great troubles due to rains and floods.

In September 1959, with special permission from the Dalai Lama, about ten officers, including colonels, captains and lieutenants of the Ka, Kha, Ga, Nga and Cha regiments of the Tibetan Army went to Mussoorie to have an audience with the Dalai Lama. He gave them advice. At that time, the army officers submitted to him a report regarding the welfare of the Tibetan community in Gangtok. They also told the Dalai Lama and the Kashag about the general situation of Tibetans in Gangtok and requested their advice for the future. They returned after that.

There were more than 500 Tibetan army officers and troops, including those who accompanied the Dalai Lama from Norbulingka to the Indian border as his bodyguards. They included Brigadier Takla Phuntsok Tashi, Colonel Sonam Tashi and Captain Lobsang Tashi from the Bodyguard Regiment; Brigadier Trepal Dorji Tseten, Colonel Sonam Dorji, Colonel Wangden Tashi, Captain Kalsang Dradul, Captain Tenzin Phuntsok, Captain Dorji and Captain Phuntsok Dorji from the Khadang Drapchi Regiment; Lieutenant Ogyan Dorji from the Gadang Regiment; Brigadier Dokhar Sé Sonam Topgyal, Lieutenant Namgyal Wangdu and Lieutenant Khetsun from the Ngadang Gyantse Regiment; and some soldiers from Cadang Dingri Regiment.

Except for a few who arrived in India, the majority of the Tibetan soldiers fell into the Chinese hands. They were first detained at Drapchi barracks, and the new army camp, and thereafter, were put into labor camps at Nachen Trang in Lhasa, Samye, Kongpo, Tsang Ema Gang. They were brutally tortured, executed or starved

to death, and many of them committed suicide. Those few who remained also suffered premature death after a few years due to various causes.

One day in 1959, during the Lhasa uprising movement, when all the officers and troops of the Shigatse army were holding a meeting at the barracks, because of the traitorous actions of Brigadier Nuna Migyur Dorji of the Gadang Shigatse Regiment, the Chinese suddenly surrounded the barracks and captured all of them. The officers and troops were imprisoned, and later were put in labor camps at Nachen Trang, Samye and Kongpo. The majority of them underwent various extreme tortures and died from various causes.

Concerning the Cadang Dingri Regiment, Brigadier Drakjun was not at Shelkar when the Lhasa uprising broke out. Yeru Drongsar Wangdu Gyalpo, Yonru Kunga, Captain Tamdin Tsering and Captain Khanglo Pechung of the Regiment had returned to their homes. At that time, a large Chinese force of several thousand troops suddenly appeared in Shelkar and Dingri, and shot dead a lama (Alag) and his wife. Thereafter, at the tipoff of a Chinese translator named Shigatse Samdup, they made a surprise attack on the Dingri armoury, killing armoury guard Captain Tamdin Tsering in an exchange of fire. Colonel Kunga and his troops were captured and the armoury was seized. All the troops and officers were imprisoned, and then were put into labor camps at Nachen Trang, and other places. After a few years, all of them died from brutal Chinese torture.

In 1960, when the Dalai Lama was at Bodhgaya, the representatives and leaders of the Tibetan army and people present there, after prior deliberation amongst themselves, submitted to the Dalai Lama a petition signed by all of them. In the petition, they had taken a great oath, pledging that all the people of the three provinces of Tibet would stand in unity and struggle continuously for the Dharma and Tibet's independence, without deviating from the wishes and instructions of the Dalai Lama. Copies were printed and distributed among the people.

From amongst the Tibetan soldiers who had arrived in India, some young and bright ones were sent to school at Mussoorie for language training. Those who emerged proficient in education were appointed to the government offices. In 1960, when the headquarters of the Tibetan exile government was moved to Dharamsala from Mussoorie, some soldiers and officers of the Bodyguard Regiment of the traditional Tibetan army were called to Dharamsala to serve as bodyguards of the Dalai Lama.

The Tibetan government appointed four skilled former bandmasters of the traditional Tibetan army as band instructors of the Tibetan Cultural Institute (now the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts). The students were taught different traditional band instruments including trumpets, drums, bagpipes and flutes to sing the Tibetan National Anthem and songs such as "Rabkar Kailash (White Kailash)" and "Chakna Pemo (Vajrapani)" and some military songs and slogans. These songs later became very popular in all the Tibetan schools.

Some young soldiers were sent to the US for military training. Some soldiers from the Mustang Resistance Force (Lo Organization) were sent to Chakrata in Dehradun and various posts of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. The remaining aged soldiers were sent to Mysore for resettlement, as will be discussed below.

After the Dalai Lama arrived in India, many petitions were sent to the United Nations and foreign countries, requesting their support for Tibet's truthful cause. As a result, several resolutions were passed in the UN general assembly at different times, calling for human rights and self-rule in Tibet. The Tibetan issue has since become an international issue and has drawn great attention from the world community.

Many hundreds of thousands of Tibetan refugees, including soldiers, arrived in India through Bhutan, Nepal and the Indian borders, separated from their parents and family members, and leaving behind their country and belongings into Chinese hands. Arriving in a strange place, they faced extreme difficulty in communication, travelling, living and earning a livelihood, because of not knowing the language of the host country. In this situation, the Dalai Lama gave advice and guidance to the people, just like giving an ear to the deaf and an eye to the blind. At the same time, the Tibetan government, giving main emphasis to the preservation of the Tibetan religion, culture and customs, set up monasteries of different Buddhist traditions, schools, children's homes, settlements, handicrafts centers and business units for the benefit of both the community and individuals, at present and in the future.

Diplomatic relationships were established with the foreign countries and bureau offices were opened in various foreign countries to continuously maintain support for the Tibetan truthful cause. Numerous Buddhist centers were established in foreign countries. Many boys and girls were sent abroad for education or vocational training. Democracy, with a system of joint religion and polity, was introduced, and the system of assembly of people's deputies was instituted. The constitution of future Tibetan democracy was formulated. Various kinds of means and establishments were created for regaining Tibet's independence. Discussion of all these in detail is beyond the scope of this book. All these are the results of tireless efforts made by the Dalai Lama for the regaining of the Tibetan people's freedom.

After 1959, more than ten thousand Tibetan resistance fighters, comprising local people of Shotarhosum and Adrag Dzamar regions in northern Tibet and the Tibetan national troops who had fled from northeastern Tibet engaged in resistance fighting against the Chinese. As previously requested by the Tibetan Welfare Association in Kalimpong, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US government sent military trainers to train them in the art of guerrilla warfare and wireless operation. Thereafter, some wireless technicians were dropped from the sky in Litang, Nagtsang in northern Tibet and near Driguthang, while some quantities of weapons and ammunition were dropped onto Drigu. Gyalo Thondup, who took the main responsibility, collected many young ex-members

of the Tibetan national army, Chushi Gangdruk, Amdo volunteers and volunteer people who wanted to go to Tibet and fight the Chinese again. With great secrecy, they were taken from Shiliguri to East Pakistan, the modern day Bangladesh, from where they taken to the US by plane for military training. They were given a short training in guerrilla tactics in Colorado at a place called Camp Hale, which was nicknamed "Dhumra", meaning "The Garden", by the Tibetans.¹⁵ After that, along with radio operators, weapons and military supplies, they were parachuted into Shotralhosum, Adrag Dzamar and Markham at different times. Guerrilla members were sent to the US continuously for training with the plan to send them to Tibet by land or drop them into Tibet from the sky. The militia of Shotarlhosum and Adrag Dzamar however were determined to remain there as a combined defensive force, rather than fighting guerrilla warfare against the Chinese from different sides. This gave an advantage to the Chinese. Therefore, in 1961, the Chinese, after due preparation, suddenly surrounded and attacked the above two regions from four sides, and bombarded them from the sky. Within a short time, all the militias of the above regions were scattered, killed or captured alive. They were totally defeated. After that, they lost wireless contact with the US. As a result, around 100 Tibetan guerrilla trainees waiting in the US at that time were sent back to India in 1962 after one year, due to not knowing where to drop them in Tibet.

Previously when the Tibetan guerrilla force was established secretly in Mustang by Gyalo Thondup, many volunteer monks and lay Tibetans who had arrived in India and Nepal from upper Tibet by way of northern Tibet enrolled themselves in the force. Some former military instructors and members of Chushi Gangdruk and Amdo volunteers who had received military training in the US were appointed as military instructors to this military organization. At that time, the guerrilla force of Mustang had around 2,000 members, counting both leaders and troops.

In 1962, violating the highly rhetoric Sino-Indian treaty called the Panch Sheel or the Five Etiquettes, the Chinese attacked India from the borders. The slogan "*Hindu Chini bhai bhai* (Indian and Chinese are brothers)" became "*Hindu Chini dushman, dushman* (Indian and Chinese are enemies)." Though China failed to accomplish its goal and withdrew its forces from Indian borders soon, it in fact attempted to annex large Indian border areas including Mon, Assam, Sikkim, and Ladakh. The Indian government realized only then that they had been deceived.

Consulting with the Tibetan exile government's foreign minister Gyalo Thondup, the Indian government started recruiting many young Tibetans into the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Indian security force defending the Indo-Tibetan borders, and Intelligence Bureau (I.B). Similarly, a secret Tibetan army called Est. 22 (secret code name), also called the Special Frontier Force (SFF), was set up in Dehradun. The representatives of the exile Tibetan government visited all the Tibetan settlements in India, and announced and encouraged young Tibetans

to voluntarily join the newly established army. As a result, many young and healthy young people, including monks, joined the army voluntarily for the sake of their country. About 300 young and physically fit ex-members of the traditional Tibetan army also joined it, while the remaining ex-servicemen who were either old or sick were sent to Mysore for settlement.

The Est. 22 whose headquarters were located at Chakrata (in Dehradun) had around ten thousand Tibetan soldiers. Different types of vocational trainings, military instructors and other facilities were provided by the Indian government, while the overall responsibility of its operation was taken by the exile Tibetan government. The Tibetan government deputed officials to give them advice and guidance on political matters. The facilities including food, shelter and uniforms were sufficiently good. However, the soldiers were anxiously looking forward to an opportunity to go back and fight against the Chinese as soon as possible, and they even did not take salary for several months in this hope. After that, regardless of whether they had salary or not, they patiently and diligently performed their daily duties and trainings. Initially, military drill commands and expressions were taught to them in Tibetan. Later, a band party was created, and instructors were selected from amongst the members of the band party of the traditional Tibetan Army, instead of hiring instructors from outside. The band was taught the Tibetan national anthem and different types of military songs and music.

In those times, all the officers and soldiers of the Tibetan Army had burning courage and determination, and were even ready to sacrifice their lives to return to Tibet and fight the Chinese for the reestablishment of Tibet's independence. However, they were posted to Ladakh, Assam and other Indo-Tibetan borders on a rotation basis as border forces, and when not on border duties, they remained at the base (Chakrata), where they got regular training.

This is a short Tibetan military history up to 1963.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Tibetan spelling: *gser skyems* (golden drink). It is a beverage (wine, black tea, etc.) offered to the gods for the good success of an important work, a journey, etc.
2. Norbulingka is the summer residence of the successive Dalai Lamas since the seventh Dalai Lama. Each Dalai Lama built his own residential palace at it and the fourteenth Dalai Lama also built one.
3. Desi Sangye Gyatso (1653-1705) was the third regent of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1671-1682) who founded the Chakpori Medical College in 1694. He was just 27 years old when he was appointed as the administrator in 1679. After the death of the Dalai Lama, he ruled as regent, hiding the death of the Dalai Lama, while the infant

sixth Dalai Lama was growing up, for 15 years, two years more than the Dalai Lama had told him to. During this period, he oversaw the completion of the Potala palace. Eventually, the discovery of this deception was not taken kindly to by the Chinese emperor Kangxi.

4. Tibetan adage: kha'i mchil ma nang bzhin 'dor ba. spit saliva from their mouths
5. Thought, custom, culture and habits.
6. The eight royal emblems (*rgyal srid sna bdun*) are 'khor lo rin po che (precious wheel), nor bu rin po che (precious gem, btsun mo rin po che (precious queen), blon po rin po che (precious minister), glang po rin po che (precious elephant), rta mchog rin po che (precious horse), dmag dpon rin po che (precious general).
7. The eight auspicious symbols (*bkra bshis rtags brgyad*) are 1) gdugs mchog (excellent umbrella), 2) gser nya (paired gold fish), 3) bum pa (a treasure vase) 4) pad ma (lotus) 5) dung dkar gyas 'khyil (a white conch shell coiling to the right) 6) dpal be'u (knot of eternity) 7) rgyal mtshan (victory banner) 8) 'khor lo (an 8 spoked wheel of doctrine.)
8. Male offspring of yak and cow.
9. The 8th day of the 3rd Tibetan month is celebrated as the day to offer grand tormas to the Mahakala and other protector deities. On this occasion, the government officials had to take off their winter official costume and wear summer costume clothes until the Ganden Ngamchö, 25th of the 10th Tibetan month (Tsongkhapa's death day ceremony).
10. "Dalai Lama *zindabad*" means "long live Dalai Lama" in Indian language.
11. *Pag* (spelled *spag*) is paste of barley flour and tea, water or *chang*.
12. Literally *pha ro ma ro* means father's corpse and mother's corpse; it is used for abusing others.
13. A residence of Marpa Chokyi Lodro (1012-1097) built as an ascetic penance by his foremost disciple Milarepa (1040-1123 or 1052-1135)
14. The place is named this because of the large population of elephants living in it.
15. Camp Hale, between Red Cliff and Leadville in the Eagle River valley in Colorado, was a U.S. Army training facility constructed in 1942 for what became the 10th Mountain Division. It was named in honour of General Irving Hale. Soldiers were trained in mountain climbing, skiing, and cold-weather survival. When it was in full operation, approximately 16,000 soldiers were housed there. From 1959 to 1964, Tibetan guerrillas were secretly trained at Camp Hale by the CIA. The site was chosen because of the similarities of the Rocky Mountains with the Himalayan Plateau. The Tibetans loved the surroundings so much that they nicknamed the camp "Dhumra", meaning "The Garden". The CIA circulated a story in the local press that Camp Hale was to be the site of atomic tests and would be a high security zone. Until the camp was closed in 1964, the entire area was cordoned off and its perimeter patrolled by military police. In the nearby mining

town of Leadville, where instructors from Camp Hale occasionally went for rest and recreation, numerous rumours spread about the camp but no one guessed its real function.

The Tibetan project was codenamed "ST Circus", and it was similar to the CIA operation that trained dissident Cubans in what later became the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In all, around 259 Tibetans were trained at Camp Hale. Some were parachuted back into Tibet to link up with local resistance groups, most of whom perished protecting the civilian retreat from Tibet into India, their positions overrun by PLA soldiers. Others were sent overland into Tibet on intelligence gathering missions. Still others were instrumental in setting up the CIA-funded Tibetan resistance force that operated out of Mustang, in northern Nepal (1959-74). After Camp Hale was dismantled in 1964, no Tibetans remained in Colorado.

(adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Hale)

List of Correct Tibetan spellings of Proper Names



| Phonetic | Romanization |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Abra | ab ra |
| Adrak Dzamar | a brag rdza dmar |
| Echu Dogyang | e chu mdo gyang |
| Adruk Gonpo Tashi | a brug mgon po bkra bshis |
| A-kya Dorji Senge | a skya rdo rje seng ge |
| Alo Chondze | a lo chos mdzad |
| Amdo | a mdo |
| Amdowa | a mdo ba |
| Anan Dawa | a nan zla ba |
| Bachok | ba lcog |
| Bagdro | bag gro |
| Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal | Sba ba phun tshogs dbang rgyal |
| Bari | ba ri |
| Barkor | bar skor |
| Barma | bar ma |
| Barshi | bar zhi |
| Batang | 'ba thang |
| Beri | be ri |
| Bondrong Chopel | bon grong chos 'phel |
| Bugangpa | sbud sgangs pa |
| Bultog | bul thog |
| Bum Tenzin | bum bstan 'dzin |
| Bumlu Khangpa | bum lug khang pa |
| Bumthangpa Thupten Chopel | bum thang pa thub bstan chos 'phel |
| Cadang | ca dang |
| Chadang | cha dang |
| Chagjang Ngodup | phyag sbyang dngos grub |

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Chakpori | lcags po ri |
| Chamdo | chab mdo |
| Changlochen | lcang lo can |
| Chapel | 'chab 'phel |
| Chidzong Gang | spyi rdsong sgang |
| Chokhor | chos 'khor |
| Chongye Naragpa | 'phyongs rgyas na rag pa |
| Chudangmo | chu dwangs mo |
| Chukala Wangdu | chu ka la dbang 'dus |
| | |
| Dagpo | dwags po |
| Damcho Sonam | dam chos bsod nams |
| Danma Dzopa | ldan ma mdzod pa |
| Dapon | mda' dpon |
| Dartsedo | dar rtse mdo |
| Dasang Dradul | zla bzang dgra 'dul |
| Dawa Chorab | zla ba chos rab |
| Dawa | zla ba |
| Dechen Yingsel | bde chen dbyings sel |
| Dekyilingka | bde skyid gling ga |
| Demonpa | bde smon pa |
| Dengko | gdan khog |
| Derge | sde dge |
| Dhonden Karpo | don ldan dkar po |
| Dhondup Ling | don grub gling |
| Dingri | ding ri |
| Diru | dri ru |
| Do Chupa | rdo chu pa |
| Doda Kawa | do da ka ba |
| Dokhar Se Sonam Topgyal | mdo mkhar sras bsod nams stobs rgyal |
| Dongdru | dong gru |
| Dorji Yulgyal | rdo rje g.yul rgyal |
| Do Senge | rdo seng ge |
| Dosho | dro shod |
| Dowo Dzong | do ba rdzong |
| Dragto Bulag | brag stod bu lags |
| Drakjun | drag 'jun |
| Drakpa Gyatso | grags pa rgya mtsho |
| Drakpa Tenkyong | grags pa bstan skyong |
| Drakyab | brag yab |

| | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Dranang Inchung | sbra nang in chung |
| Draotang | gra'o thang |
| Drapchi | grwa bzhi |
| Drayel | sbra yel |
| Dre Garshing Samdup | 'bras mgar shing bsam grub |
| Dre Guge Jamyang Dawa | 'bras gu ge 'jam dbyangs zla ba |
| Dre Khugang Wangdu | 'bras khu gang dbang 'dus |
| Dre Nyangoi Dragyagdo | 'bras nyang sgo'i gra rgyag rdo |
| Drepung | 'bras spungs |
| Driguthang | gri gu thang |
| Driyul Tsering Wangdu | gri yul tshe ring dbang 'dus |
| Dromo | gro mo |
| Drumpa | grum pa |
| Drupa Rongchok | gru pa rong mchog |
| Dungpa Thangpe Bagdro | dung pa thang pe bag gro |
| Dungphu | dung phu |
| Dzachukha | rdza chu kha |
| Dzasak | dza sag |
| Dzasam | rdza zam |
| Dzesam Kha | mdzes zam kha |
| Dzira Bese | zi ra 'bad srad |
| Dzoda | mdzo da |
| Dzong | rdzong |
| Gadang | ga dang |
| Gajang Tenpa Tsering | dga' byang bstan pa tshe ring |
| Galing Sharcho | dga' gling shar chos |
| Garthar | mgar thar |
| Ganden | dga' ldan |
| Ganden Phodrang | dga' ldan pho brang |
| Ganden Tripa | dga' ldan khri pa |
| Gangtok | sgang tog |
| Garwa Lama | mgar ba bla ma |
| Getak Trulku | dge rtags sprul sku |
| Gozo Nyerpa | go mdzod gnyer pa |
| Gojo Chopa Tsang | go 'jo gcod pa tshang |
| Gokhar Sonam Gonpo | sgog mkhar bsod nams mgon po |
| Golok | 'gu log |
| Gongkar | gong dkar |
| Gonpo Banlok Rinchen Dhondup | mgon po ban log rin chen don grub |

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Gungli | gung li |
| Gyalo Thondup | rgya lo don grub |
| Gyaltzen Tashi | rgyal mtshan bkra shis |
| Gyamo Ngulchu | rgya mo dngul chu |
| Gyande Tengpa | rgan sde |
| Gyantse | rgyan rtse |
| Gyaton | rgya ston |
| Gyetson Sating Dzung | dge ston sa ting rdzong |
| Horkhog | hor khog |
| Jago Topten | bya rgod stobs ldan |
| Jampa Chosang | byams pa chos bzang |
| Jampa Tendar | byams pa bstan dar |
| Jampa Tsering | byams pa tshe ring |
| Jampal Yeshe Tenpai Gyaltzen | 'jam dpal yes shes bstan pa'i rgyal mtsan |
| Jamyang Dawa | 'jam dbyangs zla ba |
| Jamyang Gyaltzen | 'jam dbyangs rgyal mtshan |
| Jangmar | byang mar |
| Jangngopa Rigzin Dorji | byang ngos pa rig 'zin rdo rje |
| Japok Tashi Wangdü | ja phog bkra shis dbang 'dus |
| Jarag | bye rags |
| Jayul | bya yul |
| Jigme Namgyal | 'jigs med rnam rgyal |
| Jingpa | byings pa |
| Joda | 'jo mda' |
| Kala Migmar Phuntsok | ka la mig dmar phun tshogs |
| Kalsang Chojor | skal bzang chos 'byor |
| Kalsang Dradul | skal bzang dgra 'dul |
| Kalsang Lhundup | skal bzang lhun grub |
| Kalsang Tsultrim | skal bzang tshul khrimis |
| Kalsang Wangdu | skal bzang dbang 'dus |
| Kalsang Yeshe | skal bzang ye shes |
| Kandze | dkar mdzes |
| Karchung | dkar chung |
| Karma Yuldzong | skar ma g.yul rdzong |
| Kartok | dkar tog |
| Kasho Chogyal Nyima | ka shod chos rgyal rnam rgyal |
| Katog Rigzin | ka thog rig 'dzin |
| Kazi Ogyan Dorji | ka ji o rgyan rdo rje |

| | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Khabong Migmar Dhondup | kha bong mig dmar don grub |
| Khadang | kha dang |
| Kham | khams |
| Khanglo Pechung | khang lo pad chung |
| Kharkha Wangdu | mkhar kha dbang 'dus |
| Kharo-la | kha ro la |
| Kharsam Gyalpo | khar sam rgyal po |
| Kheme Sonam Wangdu. | khe me bsod nams dbang 'dus |
| Khenchen Lobsang Tashi | mkhan chen blo bzang bkra shis |
| Khendrung Chopel Thupten | mkhan drung chos 'phel |
| Khetsun | mkhas btsun |
| Khyungpo Tengchen | khyung po steng chen |
| Khyungrampa | khyung ram pa |
| Kongpo Gyamda | kong po rgya mda' |
| Kumbum | sku 'bum |
| Kundeling | kun bde gling |
| Kunga Tsenje | kun dga' tsan rje |
| Kunphel-la | kun phan lags |
| Kunsang | kun bzang |
| Kyichu | skyid chu |
| Kyipukpa Wangdu Norbu | skyi sbug pa dbang 'dus nor bu |
| Kyire | skyid ras |
| Kyorshung | skyor gzhung |
| Labrang | bla brang |
| Lachak | bla phyag |
| Lagong Nyenda | la gong brngan mda' |
| Lamda | slam mda' |
| Langdun Kunga Wangchuk | glang 'dun kun dga' dbang phyug |
| Langthongpa | glang mthong pa |
| Lhakpa Goke | lhag pa go skyes |
| Lhalu | lha glu |
| Lharigo | lha ri sgo |
| Lharutara Thupten Tendar | lha ru rta ra |
| Lhatse | lha rtse |
| Lhodrak | lho brag |
| Lhoru Bu Anyam | lho ru bu a nyam |
| Lhundup Chodrak | lhun grub chos grags |
| Lhündup Chopel | lhun grub chos 'phel |
| Lhundup Rinchen | lhun grub rin chen |

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|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Lhundup Yeshi | lhun grub ye shes |
| Lobsang Dorji | blo bzang rdo rje |
| Lobsang Konshon | blo bzang dkon gzhon |
| Lobsang Nyandrak | blo bzang gnyan grags |
| Lobsang Tashi | blo bzang bkra shis |
| Lobsang Tsewang | blo bzang tshe dbang |
| Lobsang Tsewang | blo bzang tshe dbang |
| Lobsang Yeshi | blo bzang ye shes |
| Lobsang Yonten | blo bzang yon tan |
| Lodro Gyatso | blo gros rgya mtsho |
| Lodro Phuntsok | blo gros phun tsogs |
| Luguthang | lu gu thang |
| Lukhangwa Tsewang Raptan | klu khang ba tshe dbang rab brtan |
| Lungla | rlung la |
| Lungshar Dorji Tsegyal | lung shar rdo rje tshe rgyal |
| Majawa | rma bya ba |
| Mangang | mang mang |
| Markham | rmar khams |
| Marlampa | rmar lam pa |
| Mentsikhang | sman rtsis khang |
| Migdor | mig rdor |
| Minyag Ami Yeshi Wangden | mi nyag a mi ye shes dbang ldan |
| Monlam Chenmo | smon lam chen mo |
| Mon Tawang | mon ta wang |
| Mondrong Khyenrab Kunsang | smon grong mkhyen rab kun bzang |
| Nachen Trang | sna chen phrang |
| Nagchu | nagchu |
| Nagsho Diru | nag shod dri ru |
| Namgyal Gyatso | rnam rgyal rgya mtsho |
| Nagtshang | nags tshangs |
| Nakartse | snang dkar rtse |
| Namgyal Phuntsok | rnam rgyal phun tshogs |
| Namgyal Wangchuk | rnam rgyal dbang phyug |
| Namlingpa Paljor Jigme | rnam gling pa dpal 'byor 'jigs med |
| Namtso-la | gnam mtsho la |
| Nangchen | nang chen |
| Neu Dzong | sneu rdzong |
| Ngabo Ngawang Jigme | nga phos nga dbang 'jigs med |
| Ngadang | nga dang |

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|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ngawang Drakpa | nga dbang grags pa |
| Ngawang Jampal | nga dbang 'jam dpal |
| Ngawang Namgyal | nga dbang rnam rgyal |
| Ngawang Tenpa | nga dbang bstan pa |
| Ngodup | dngos grub |
| Ngoshiwa | dngos bzhi ba |
| Norbu Dhondup | nor bu don grub |
| Norbulingka | nor bu gling ga |
| Norgye Nangpa | nor rgyas nang pa |
| Nortolingka | nor stod gling ga |
| Nyarong | nyag rong |
| Nyandrong Gongma | gnyan grong dongs ma |
| Nyingme Sithar | snying med srid mthar |
| Nyingtri | nying khri |
| Nyugshi Anan | myug ghi a nan |
| Ogyan Dorji | o rgyan rdo rje |
| Oyug | 'od yug |
| Pacho | dpa' chos |
| Palbar | dpal 'bar |
| Padang | pa dang |
| Paljor Dorji Shatra | dpal 'byor rdo rje bshad sgra |
| Panchen Rinpoche | pan chen rin po che |
| Patok Kaldor | pa thog skal rdor |
| Pema Ko | pad ma ko |
| Phabong Kha | pha bong kha |
| Phadang | pha dang |
| Phari | phag ri |
| Phulungwa | phu lung ba |
| Phunkhang | phun khang |
| Phunrabpa | phun rab pa |
| Phuntsok Dorji | phun tshogs rdo rje |
| Phuntsok Rabgyal | phun tsogs rab rgyal |
| Phuntsok Tashi | phun tsogs bkra shis |
| Phuntsok Wangyal | phun tshogs dbang rgyal |
| Phuntsok Yugyal | phun tshogs g.yu rgyal |
| Phurbu Tsering | phur bu tshe ring |
| Phurchok Yongzin | phur lcogs yong 'dzin |
| Poge Wangdu | spo dge dbang 'dus |
| Pomda Nyima Gyalpo | spom mda' nyi ma rgyal po |

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Pomda Rabga | spom mda' rab dga' |
| Pomda Togyal | spom mda' stobs rgyal |
| Reting | ra sgren |
| Rama Druga | ra ma gru kha |
| Ramoche | ra mo che |
| Rampawa | ram pa ba |
| Rangjung Rigpe Dorji | rang byung rig pa'i rdo rje |
| Rigdol Kalsang | rig 'grol skal bzang |
| Rigdol Künsang | rig 'grol kun bzang |
| Rigdol Palden | rig 'grol dpal ldan |
| Rigzin Paljor | rig 'zin dpal 'byor |
| Rinpoche | rin po che |
| Riwoche | ri bo che |
| Rupa Tsingdor | ru pa rtsing rdor |
| Sadhu Rinchen | sa du rin chen |
| Sadhutsang | sa du tshang |
| Samdup | bsam grub |
| Samkhar Thupten Donyo | bsam khar thub bstan don yod |
| Samkharwa | bsam mkhar ba |
| Sampho Tenzin Dhondup | bsam pho bstan 'dzin don grub |
| Samye | bsam yas |
| Sangye Chorab | sangs rgyas chos rab |
| Senge Nanyag | seng ge na snyag |
| Sera | se ra |
| Sera Je | se ra byes |
| Sera Me | se ra smad |
| Seshim-la | zas zhim la |
| Shagjang Ngawang Gyaltsen | shag sbyang nga dbang rgyal mtshan |
| Shakabpa Losel Dhondup | zha gab pa blo gsal don grub |
| Shakabpa Wangchuk Deden | zha gab pa dbang phyug bde ldan |
| Shamthab Ngonpo | Sham thab sngon po |
| Shelkar | shel dkar |
| Shelkhar Lingpa | shel dkar gling pa |
| Sherab Yeshe | shes rab ye shes |
| Shigatse | gzhis ka rtse |
| Shol | zhol |
| Shopando | sho pa mdo |
| Shotarlhosum | sho star lho gsum |
| Shukyupa Jamyang Khedrup | shag yu pa 'jam dbyangs mkhas grub |

| | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Sibda | sib mda' |
| Silthog Thang | zil thog thang |
| Singpa | sings pa |
| Sonam Dorji | bsod nams rdo rje |
| Sonam Tashi | bsod nams bkra shis |
| Sopa Tamdin | bzod pa rta mgrin |
| Sotrey | bsod kras |
| Surkhang Se | zur khang sras |
| Surkhang Surpa Wangchen Tseten | zur khang zur pa dbang chen tshe brtan |
| Takla Phuntsok Tashi | stag lha phun tshogs bkra shis |
| Taktra Ngawang Sungrab | stag ra nga dbang gsungs rab |
| Taktse Penpa Wangdu | stag rtse spen pa dbang 'dus |
| Talama Thupten Norsang | ta bla ma thub bstan nor bzang |
| Tamdin Tsering | rta mgrin tshe ring |
| Tanawa | rta sna ba |
| Taring | phreng ring |
| Tashi Dhondup | bkra shis don grub |
| Tashi Lhunpo | bkra shis lhun po |
| Tashi Norbu | bkra shis nor bu |
| Tengchen | steng chen |
| Tenzin Chodrak | bstan 'dzin chos grags |
| Tenzin Gyaltzen | bstan 'dzin rgyal mtshan |
| Tenzin Phuntsok | bstan 'dzin phun tshogs |
| Tethong Gyurme Gyatso | bkras mthong 'gyur med rgya mtsho |
| Thimpo Gang | thim pu sgang |
| Thonglek | mthong legs |
| Thupten Gyalpo | thub bstan rgyal po |
| Thupten Jampa Tsultrim | thub bstan byams pa tshul khrims |
| Thupten Kunkhyen | thub bstan kun mkhyen |
| Thupten Lekmon | thub bstan legs smon |
| Thupten Sangpo | thub bstan bzang po |
| Tö Dzelung | stod mdzes lung |
| Tokha | to kha |
| Tongsum Jolag | stong sum jo lag |
| Topa Drugu | stod pa gru gu |
| Trelingpa | bkras gling pa |
| Trepal Dorji Tseten | bkras dpal rdo rje tshe brtan |
| Trimon Norbu Wangyal | khri smon nor bu dbang rgyal |
| Tsagur Shakpa | tsha gur zhag pa |

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Tsapung Gang | tsha pung sgang |
| Tsarong Dasang Dradul | tsha rong zla bzang dgra 'dul |
| Tsarong Wangchuk Gyalpo | tsha rong dbang phyug rgyal po |
| Tsatul Tsang Lobsang Gyaltseri | tsha tul blo bzang rgyal mtshan |
| Tsering Wangdu | tshe ring dbang 'dus |
| Tseten Phungyal | tshe brten phun tshogs |
| Tsewang Raptan | tshe dbang rab brtan |
| Tsogo Ngodup Dorji | mtso sgo dngos grub rdo rje |
| Tsogowa | mtsho sgo ba |
| Tsona | mtsho sna |
| Tsuglakhang | gtsug lag khang |
| Wangden Tashi | bbang ldan bkra shis |
| Wangdu Chungchung | dbang 'dus chung chung |
| Yak | g.yag |
| Yangphel | yang 'phel |
| Yangzom | dbyangs 'dzoms |
| Yeru Drongsar Wangdu Gyalpo | g.yas ru grong gsar dbang 'dus rgyal po |
| Yeshi Dargye | ye shes dar rgyas |
| Yonru Kunga | g.yon ru Kun dga' |
| Yuchukha | yu chu kha |
| Yuthok | g.yu thog |

Appendix



1. SINO-TIBETAN TREATY

821/823 A.D.

Translated from the inscription on the west face of the stone pillar at Lhasa. The great king of Tibet, the Divine Manifestation, the bTsan-po and the great king of China, the Chinese ruler Hwang Te, Nephew and Uncle, having consulted about the alliance of their dominions have made a great treaty and ratified the agreement. In order that it may never be changed, so that it may be celebrated in every age and every generation the terms of the agreement have been inscribed on a stone pillar.

The Divine Manifestation, the bTsan-po, Khri gTsug-Ide-brtsan himself and the Chinese Ruler, B'un B'u, He'u Tig Hwang Te, their majesties the Nephew and the Uncle, through the great profundity of their minds know whatsoever is good and ill for present and future alike. With great compassion, making no distinction between outer and inner in sheltering all with kindness, they have agreed in their counsel on a great purpose of lasting good—the single thought of causing happiness for the whole population—and have renewed the respectful courtesies of their old friendship. Having consulted to consolidate still further the measure of neighbourly contentment they have made a great treaty. Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they are now in possession. The whole region to the east of that being the country of Great Tibet, from either side of that frontier there shall be no warfare, no hostile invasions, and no seizure of territory. If there be any suspicious person, he shall be arrested and an investigation made and, having been suitably provided for, he shall be sent back. Now that the dominions are allied and a great treaty of peace has been made in this way, since it is necessary also to continue the communication of pleasant messages between Nephew and Uncle, envoys setting out from either side shall follow the old established route. According to former custom their horses shall be changed at Tsang Kun Yog, which is between Tibet and China. Beyond sTse Zhung Cheg, where Chinese territory is met, the Chinese shall provide all facilities; westwards, beyond Tseng Shu Hywan, where Tibetan territory is met, the Tibetans shall provide all facilities. According to the

close and friendly relationship between Nephew and Uncle the customary courtesy and respect shall be practised. Between the two countries no smoke or dust shall appear. Not even a word of sudden alarm or of enmity shall be spoken and, from those who guard the frontier upwards, all shall live at ease without suspicion or fear, their land being their land and their bed their bed. Dwelling in peace they shall win the blessing of happiness for ten thousand generations. The sound of praise shall extend to every place reached by the sun and moon. And in order that this agreement establishing a great era when Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and Chinese shall be happy in China shall never be changed, the Three Jewels, the body of saints, the sun and moon, planets and stars have been invoked as witnesses; its purport has been expounded in solemn words; the oath has been sworn with the sacrifice of animals; and the agreement has been solemnized.

If the parties do not act in accordance with this agreement or if it is violated, whether it be Tibet or China that is first guilty of an offence against it, whatever stratagem or deceit is used in retaliation shall not be considered a breach of the agreement. Thus the rulers and ministers of both Tibet and China declared and swore the oath; and the text having been written in detail it was sealed with the seals of both great kings. It was inscribed with the signatures of those ministers who took part in the agreement and the text of the agreement was deposited in the archives of each party.

2. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING TO SIKKIM AND TIBET (1890)

Signed at Calcutta, 17 March 1890

Ratified at London, 27 August 1890

Whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, his Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, his Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor;

Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:—

- I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.
- II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.
- III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article 1, and to prevent acts of Aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.
- IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.
- V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.
- VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.
- VII. Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.
- VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1890, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 27th day of the second moon of the 16th year of Kuang Hsu.

Landsdowne

Signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiary

**3. REGULATIONS REGARDING TRADE, COMMUNICATIONS AND PASTURAGE
APPENDED TO THE CONVENTION BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING TO
SIKKIM AND TIBET OF 1890
Signed at Darjeeling, India, 5 December 1893**

- I. A trade mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that mart.
- II. British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation I to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yatung, where resthouses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.
- III. Import and export trade in the following article arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.
- IV. Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation III, entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade; but after

the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced.

Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

- V. All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Customs Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.
- VI. In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.
- VII. Dispatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer, who will forward them by special courier. Dispatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese Frontier Officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.
- VIII. Dispatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.
- IX. After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such regulations.

General Articles

- I. In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate superior, who, in turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective Governments for disposal.
- II. After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.

III. It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be appointed by the British and Chinese Governments under the seventh article of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the said Convention; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred to, namely, Trade, Communication, and Pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part of the Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Commissioners have hereto subscribed their names.

Done in quadruplicate at Darjeeling this 5th day of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, corresponding with the Chinese date the 28th day of the 10th moon of the 19th year of Kuang Hsu.

A. W. PAUL,
British Commissioner
Ho Chang-Jung, James H. Hart,
Chinese Commissioners

4. ANGLO-TIBETAN TREATY

Signed at Lhasa, 7 September, 1904

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F.E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and LoSang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the Representatives of the Council of the three monasteries, Sera, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

- I. The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.
- II. The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

- III. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with the Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.
- IV. The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.
- V. The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.
- VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,0001.—equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such places as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual installments of 1lakh of rupees each, on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

- VII. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity and for the fulfillment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.
- VIII. The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.
- IX. The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government.
- a. No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power;
 - b. No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;
 - c. No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;
 - d. No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;
 - e. No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or to the subject of any foreign Power.
- X. In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th of the 7th month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Seal of Dalai Lama, affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche)

(Seal of Thibet Frontier Commission)

(Seal of British Commissioner)

(Seal of Council)

(Seal of the Dre-pung Monastery)

(Seal of Se-ra Monastery)

(Seal of Ga-den Monastery)

(Seal of National Assembly)

F.E. Younghusband, Colonel,
British Commissioner

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Seal of Dalai Lama, affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche)

(Seal of Thibet Frontier Commission)

(Seal of British Commissioner)

(Seal of Council)

(Seal of Dre-pung Monastery)

(Seal of Se-ra Monastery)

(Seal of Ga-den Monastery)

(Seal of National Assembly)

F.E. Younghusband, Colonel,

British Commissioner

Amphill, Viceroy and Governor-General of India

5. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RESPECTING TIBET

Signed at Peking, April 27, 1906

(Ratifications exchanged at London July 23 1906)

(British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XCIX, pp. 171-173)

WHEREAS His Majesty of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exists between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regulations of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say--His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland: Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished

order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extra-ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China; And His Majesty the Emperor of China: His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs--who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:-

- I. The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.
- II. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.
- III. The Concessions which are mentioned in Article IX(d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.
- IV. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.
- V. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.
- VI. This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang-Hsu.

ERNEST SATOW

(Signature and Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary)

6. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA RELATING TO PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET

Signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicholson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:-

Arrangement Concerning Tibet

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangements:-

Article I.

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

Article II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

Article III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

Article V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

**Annex to the Arrangement Between Great Britain and Russia
Concerning Thibet**

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the Ratification of the Convention of the 7th September 1904, to the effect the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August 1907.

7. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA AND TIBET AMENDING
TRADE REGULATIONS OF DECEMBER 5, 1893

Signed at Calcutta, 29 April, 1908

(Ratified at Peking on October 14, 1908)

(British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-1908, Vol. CI, pp. 170-175)

Preamble

WHEREAS by Article I of the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27th April, 1906, that is the 4th day of the 4th moon of the 32nd year of Kwang Hsu, it was provided that both the High Contracting Parties should engage to take at all times such steps as might be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, the text of which in English and Chinese was attached as an Annexe to the above-named Convention;

And whereas it was stipulated in Article III of the said Lhasa Convention that the question of the amendment of the Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893 should be reserved for separate consideration, and whereas the amendment of these Regulations is now necessary;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese empire have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: Mr. E.C. Wilton, C.M.G.;

His Majesty Emperor of the Chinese Empire: His Majesty's Special Commissioner Chang Yin Tang;

And the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorized representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen and take part in the negotiations, the Tsarong Shape, Wang Chuk Gyalpo.

And whereas Mr. E.C. Wilton and Chang Tachen have communicated to each other their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form and have found the authorization of the Tibetan Delegate to be also in good and true form, the following amended Regulations have been agreed upon:-

1. The Trade Regulations of 1893 shall remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with these Regulations.

2. The following places shall form, and be included within, the boundaries of the Gyantse mart:-

- a) The line begins at the Chumig Dangsang (Chhu-Mig-Dangs-Sangs) north-east of the Gyantse Fort, and thence it runs in a curved line, passing behind the Pekor Chode (Dpal-Hkhor-Choos-Sde), down to Chag-Dong-Gang (Phyag-Gdong-Sgang); thence passing straight over the Nyan Chu, it reaches the Zamsa (Sam-Srag)
- b) From the Zamsa the line continues to run, in a south-eastern direction, round to Lachi-To (Gla-Dkyii-Stod), embracing all the farms on its way, viz., the Lahong, the Hogtso (Hog-Mtsho), the Tong-Chung-Shi (Grong-Chhung-Gshis); and the Rabgang (Rab-Sgang), & c.
- c) From Lachi-To the line runs to the Yutog (Gyu-Thog), and thence runs straight, passing through the whole area of Gamkar-Shi (Ragal-Mkhar-Gshis), to Chumig Dangsang.

As difficulty is experienced in obtaining suitable houses and godowns at some of the marts, it is agreed that British subjects may also lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the marts, the locality for such building sites to be marked out specially at each mart by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities in consultation with the British Trade Agent. The British Trade Agents and British subjects shall not build houses and godowns except in such localities, and this arrangement shall not be held to prejudice in any way the administration of the Chinese and Tibetan local authorities over such localities, or the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside such localities for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. British Trade Agent to the Municipal Office at the mart for a permit to lease. The amount of rent, or the period or conditions of the lease, shall then be settled in a friendly way by the lease and the owner themselves. In the event of a disagreement between the owner and lessee as to the amount of rent or the period or condition of the lease, the case will be settled by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities, in consultation with the British Trade Agent. No building is to be commenced by the lessee on a site before the municipal office has issued him a permit to build, but it is agreed that there shall be no vexatious delays in the issue of such permit.

3. The administration of the trade marts shall remain with the Tibetan Officers, under the Chinese Officers' supervision and directions.

The Trade Agents at the marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence one with another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Trade Agents and the Local Authorities

shall be referred for settlement to the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa. The purport of a reference by the Government of India will be communicated to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa shall, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

4. In the event of disputes arising at the marts between British subjects and persons of Chinese and Tibetan nationalities, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conferences between the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities of the Judicial Court at the mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and to do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any of such mixed cases, the Officer or Officers of the defendant's nationality shall preside at the trial, the Officer or Officers of the plaintiff's country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects who may commit any crime at the marts or on the routes to the marts shall be handed over by the local authorities to the British Trade Agent at the mart nearest to the scene of offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the local authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Chinese and Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects at the marts or on the routes thereto, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides. Should it happen that Chinese or Tibetan subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject before the British Trade Agent, the Chinese or Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative, or representatives, to watch the course of trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly, in cases in which a British subject has reason to complain of a Chinese or Tibetan subject in the Judicial Court at the mart, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court at the mart, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court to watch the course of trial.

5. The Tibetan Authorities, in obedience to the instructions of the Peking Government, having a strong desire to reform the judicial system of Tibet, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees

to relinquish her rights of extra-territoriality in Tibet, whenever such rights are relinquished in China, and when she is satisfied that the state of the Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

6. After the withdrawal of the British troops, all the rest-houses, eleven in number, built by Great Britain upon the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, shall be taken over at original cost by China and rented to the Government of India at a fair rate. One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials, but the rest-houses shall otherwise be available for occupation by British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of respectability who may proceed to and from the marts.

Great Britain is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse when telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India.

In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.

7. In law suits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned shall grant a hearing and take steps necessary to enforce payment; but, if the debtor plead poverty and be without means, the authorities concerned shall not be held responsible for the said debts, nor shall any public or official property be distrained upon in order to satisfy these debts.
8. The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by the China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers will be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The

persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the local authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen or conceal them.

9. British officers and subjects, as well as goods, proceeding to the trade marts, must adhere to the trade routes from the frontier of India. They shall not, without permission, proceed beyond the marts, or to Gartok from Yatung and Gyantse, or from Gartok to Yatung and Gyantse, by any route through the interior of Tibet, but natives of the Indian frontier, who have already by usage traded and resided in Tibet, elsewhere than at the marts shall be at liberty to continue their trade, in accordance with existing practice, but when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore, amendable to the local jurisdiction.
10. In cases where officials or traders, en route to and from India or Tibet, are robbed of treasure or merchandise, public or private, they shall forthwith report to the Police officers, who shall take immediate measures to arrest the robbers and hand them to the Local Authorities. The Local Authorities shall bring them to instant trial, and shall also recover and restore the stolen property. But if the robbers flee to places out of the jurisdiction and influence of Tibet, and cannot be arrested, the Police and the Local Authorities shall not be held responsible for such losses.
11. For public safety, tanks or stores of kerosene oil or any other combustible or dangerous articles in bulk must be placed far away from inhabited places at the marts.

British or Indian merchants wishing to build such tanks or stores may not do so until, as provided in Regulation 2, they have made application for a suitable site.

12. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities from whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexatious restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.

It being the duty of the Police and Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the marts, and along the routes to the marts, China engages to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts. On due fulfilment of these arrangements, Great Britain undertakes to withdraw the Trade Agents' guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. The

Chinese Authorities will not prevent the British Trade Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people. Tibetan subjects trading, travelling, or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet.

13. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate; but if no demand for revision be made by either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.
14. The English, Chinese, and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, and in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.
15. The ratifications of the present Regulations under the hand of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire, respectively, shall be exchanged at London and Peking within six months from the date of signature.

In witness whereof the two Plenipotentiaries and the Tibetan Delegate have signed and sealed the present Regulations.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this 20th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1908, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 20th day of the 3rd moon of the 34th year of Kuang-Hsu.

E.C. WILTON

British Commissioner.

CHANG YIN TANG,

Chinese Special Commissioner.

WANG CHUK GYALPO

Tibetan Delegate

8. PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA XIII

ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF THE FIRST MONTH OF THE

WATER-OX YEAR (1913)

(Translation of the Tibetan Text)

I, the Dalai Lama, most omniscient possessor of the Buddhist faith, whose title was conferred by the Lord Buddha's command from the glorious land of India, speak to you as follows:

I am speaking to all classes of Tibetan people. Lord Buddha, from the glorious country of India, prophesied that the reincarnations of Avalokitesvara, through successive rulers from the early religious kings to the present day, would look after the welfare of Tibet.

During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Ch'ing Dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of policing the trade marts. I, therefore, left Lhasa with my ministers for the Indo-Tibetan border, hoping to clarify to the Manchu emperor by wire that the existing relationship between Tibet and China had been that of patron and priest and had not been based on the subordination of one to the other. There was no other choice for me but to cross the border, because Chinese troops were following with the intention of taking me alive or dead.

On my arrival in India, I dispatched several telegrams to the Emperor; but his reply to my demands was delayed by corrupt officials at Peking. Meanwhile, the Manchu empire collapsed. The Tibetans were encouraged to expel the Chinese from central Tibet. I, too, returned safely to my rightful and sacred country, and I am now in the course of driving out the remnants of Chinese troops from DoKham in Eastern Tibet. Now, the Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky. Having once again achieved for ourselves a period of happiness and peace, I have now allotted to all of you the following duties to be carried out without negligence:

1. Peace and happiness in this world can only be maintained by preserving the faith of Buddhism. It is, therefore, essential to preserve all Buddhist institutions in Tibet, such as the Jokhang temple and Ramoche in Lhasa, Samye, and Traduk in southern Tibet, and the three great monasteries, etc.
2. The various Buddhist sects in Tibet should be kept in a distinct and pure form. Buddhism should be taught, learned, and meditated upon properly. Except for special persons, the administrators of monasteries are forbidden to trade, loan money, deal in any kind of livestock, and/or subjugate another's subjects.
3. The Tibetan government's civil and military officials, when collecting taxes or dealing with their subject citizens, should carry out their duties with fair and honest judgment so as to benefit the government without hurting the interests of the subject citizens. Some of the central government officials posted at Ngari Korsum in western Tibet, and Do Kham in eastern Tibet, are coercing their subject citizens to purchase commercial goods at high prices and have imposed transportation rights exceeding the limit permitted by the

government. Houses, properties and lands belonging to subject citizens have been confiscated on the pretext of minor breaches of the law. Furthermore, the amputation of citizens' limbs has been carried out as a form of punishment. Henceforth, such severe punishments are forbidden.

4. Tibet is a country with rich natural resources; but it is not scientifically advanced like other lands. We are a small, religious, and independent nation. To keep up with the rest of the world, we must defend our country. In view of past invasions by foreigners, our people may have to face certain difficulties, which they must disregard. To safeguard and maintain the independence of our country, one and all should voluntarily work hard. Our subject citizens residing near the borders should be alert and keep the government informed by special messenger of any suspicious developments. Our subjects must not create major clashes between two nations because of minor incidents.
5. Tibet, although thinly populated, is an extensive country. Some local officials and landholders are jealously obstructing other people from developing vacant lands, even though they are not doing so themselves. People with such intentions are enemies of the State and our progress. From now on, no one is allowed to obstruct anyone else from cultivating whatever vacant lands are available. Land taxes will not be collected until three years have passed; after that the land cultivator will have to pay taxes to the government and to the landlord every year, proportionate to the rent. The land will belong to the cultivator.

Your duties to the government and to the people will have been achieved when you have executed all that I have said here. This letter must be posted and proclaimed in every district of Tibet, and a copy kept in the records of the offices in every district.

From the Potala Palace.

(Seal of the Dalai Lama)

Source: W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven, 1967).

9. TREATY BETWEEN TIBET AND MONGOLIA

(said to have been signed at Urga in January 1913)

Whereas Mongolia and Tibet, having freed themselves from the Manchu dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent States, and whereas the two States have always professed one and the same religion, and to the end that their ancient mutual friendships may be strengthened: on the part of the Government

of the Sovereign of the Mongolian people-Nikta Biliktu Da Lama Rabdan, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Assistant Minister-General and Manlai Caaryr Bei Tzu Damdinsurun; on the part of the Dalai Lama, Ruler of Tibet-Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan-Agwan, Donir Agwan Choinzin Tschchantso, manager of the bank, and Gendurm-Galsan, secretary, have agreed on the following:-

Article 1

The Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet, approves of and acknowledges the formation of an independent Mongolian State, and the proclamation on the 9th day of the 11th month of the year of the Pig, of the master of the Yellow Faith Je-tsum Dampa Lama as the Sovereign of the land.

Article 2

The Sovereign of the Mongolian people Je-tsun Dampa Lama approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Sovereign of Tibet.

Article 3

Both States shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

Article 4

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.

Article 5

Both States, each on its own territory, shall afford mutual aid to their subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or on State business.

Article 6

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall, as formerly, carry on mutual trade in the produce of their lands-in goods, cattle & c., and likewise open industrial institutions.

Article 7

Henceforth transactions on credit shall be allowed only with the knowledge and permission of official institutions; without such permission no claims shall be examined by Government Institutions. Should such agreements have been entered into before the conclusion of the present treaty, and should the parties thereto be unable to settle matters amicably, while the loss suffered is great, the payment of such debts may be enforced by the said institutions, but in no case shall the debts concern the Shambinars and Hoshuns.

Article 8

Should it be necessary to supplement the articles of this treaty, the Mongolian and Tibetan Governments shall appoint special Plenipotentiaries, who shall come to an Agreement according to the circumstances then existing.

Article 9

The present treaty shall come into force on the date of the signature thereof.

Plenipotentiaries of the Mongolian Government: Acting Ministers of Foreign Affairs Biliktu Da Lama Rabdan and Assistant Minister-General and Manlai Caatyr Bei Tzu Damdinsurun.

Plenipotentiaries of the Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet: Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan Agwan, Donir Agwan Choinzin Tschichamtso, manager of the Bank of Tibet, and Gendum-Galsan, secretary.

According to the Mongolian chronology, on the 4th day of the 12th month of the second year of 'Him who is exalted by all'.

According to the chronology of Tibet, in the year of the Water-Mouse, on the same month and day.

10. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA AND TIBET

Simla 1914

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry

McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department; His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho; His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in

good and due forms have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles

ARTICLE 1

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, ally of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months. The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

ARTICLE 4

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

ARTICLE 5

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and

Tibet as are provided (or by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

ARTICLE 6

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX(d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term 'Foreign Power' does not include China, Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 7

The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled. The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the content of the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE 8

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

ARTICLE 9

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.¹ Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

ARTICLE 10

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE 11

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature. In token whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan. Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, orresponding with the Chinese date,

the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date. the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial of the Lonchen Shatra.

Seal of the Lonchen Shatra.

(Initialed) A.H.M. Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

11. ANGLO-TIBETAN DECLARATION

3 JULY, 1914

We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Thibet, hereby record the following declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed 322 Appendixes convention as initialled to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Thibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid convention she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom.

In token whereof we have signed and sealed this declaration, two copies in English and two in Thiberan.

Done at Simla this 3rd day of July, A.D. 1914, corresponding with the Thibetan date the 10th day of the 5th month of the Wood-Tiger year.

A. Henry McMahon,
British Plenipotentiary
(Seal of the British Plenipotentiary)
(Seal of the Dalai Lama)
(Signature of the Lonchen Shatra)
(Seal of the Lonchen Shatra)
(Seal of the Drepung Monastery)
(Seal of the Sera Monastery)
(Seal of the Gaden Monastery)
(Seal of the National Assembly)

12. ANGLO-TIBETAN TRADE REGULATIONS

3 JULY, 1914

Whereas by Article 7 of the Convention concluded between the Governments of Great Britain, China and Tibet on the third day of July, A.D., 1914, the Trade

Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and the Tibetan Government engaged to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir A. H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I.; His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet-Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje.

And whereas Sir A. H. McMahon and Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Paljor Dorje have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form, the following Regulations have been agreed upon.

- I. The area falling within a radius of three miles from the British Trade Agency site will be considered as the area of such Trade Mart.

It is agreed that British subjects may lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the Marts. This arrangement shall not be held to prejudice the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside the Marts for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan Trade Agent. In consultation with the British Trade Agent the Tibetan Trade Agent will assign such or other suitable building sites without unnecessary delay. They shall fix the terms of the leases in conformity with the existing laws and rates.

- II. The administration of the Trade Marts shall remain with the Tibetan Authorities, with the exception of the British Trade Agency sites and compounds of the rest-houses, which will be under the exclusive control of the British Trade Agents.

The Trade Agents at the Marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

- III. In the event of disputes arising at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts between British subjects and subjects of other nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British and Tibetan Trade Agents at the nearest Mart. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts, shall be handed over by the Local Authorities to the British Trade Agent at the Mart nearest to the scene of the offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the Local Authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects, shall be arrested and punished by the Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Should it happen that a Tibetan subject or subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject or subjects before the British Trade Agent, the Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative or representatives of suitable rank to attend the trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly in cases in which a British subject or subjects have reason to complain against a Tibetan subject or subjects, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative or representatives to the Tibetan Trade Agent's Court to attend the trial.

- IV. The Government of India shall retain the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts. Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by these lines. The Tibetan Authorities shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the Marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering with them in any way or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished.
- V. The British Trade Agents at the various Trade Marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the Local Authorities, whose districts they traverse, and shall be accorded the same protection and facilities as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Government.

No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights, to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the Local Authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen them.

- VI. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private company, institution, or individual in Tibet. It is of

course understood that companies and individuals, who have already received such monopolies from the Tibetan Government previous to the conclusions of this agreement, shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

VII. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexation, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever. The Tibetan Authorities will not hinder the British Trade Agents or other British subjects from holding personal intercourse or correspondence with the inhabitants of the country.

It being the duty of the Police and the Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts, Tibet engages to arrange effective Police measures at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts.

VIII. Import and export in the following Articles:-arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IX. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

X. The English and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

XI. The present Regulations shall come into force from the date of signature.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Seal of the Dalai Lama

Signature of the Lonchen Shatra A. HENRY MCMAHON,
British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the Seal of the British

Lonchen Shatra Plenipotentiary

Seal of the Seal of the Seal of the Seal of the

Drepung Sera Gaden National

Monastery Monastery Monastery Assembly

Negotiated and signed only by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries.

13. THE LAST TESTAMENT OF THE THIRTEENTH DALAI LAMA

1933

As you all know, I was selected not in the customary way of picking lots from the gold urn but my selection was foretold and divined. The regent tutor, Tatsang Hothogthu, my senior tutor Dorjechang Phurchog Rinpoche and other learned teachers taught me prayers and verses to recite and memorize; ordained me as a novice, taught me the art of debating, and initiated me to the sacred sermons and vows. When I was 18 years old and was making steady and sure progress in my religious studies, as was the custom, I was called upon to take over the burden of managing the political and spiritual affairs of my country. Though completely new to the political matters, I had to accept this responsibility imposed upon me by the fervent appeals of my people. When the English marched into Tibet in the Wood Dragon year (1905), it would have been convenient and easy to adopt a policy of friendship and make efforts to please them. But realizing the dangers and implications of such a policy in the future, I, in spite of the hazardous and difficult journey, went to Peking, the Chinese capital via Mongolia. There I was received with much pomp, reverence and splendour by the Chinese Emperor and his people, I went to China on the basis of the teacher disciple relationship prevalent since the time of the great Fifth Dalai Lama between the two countries. Not long after my arrival the Chinese Emperor passed away and the country was ruled by his sons to whom I explained the situation and problem of Tibet.

While I was returning to Tibet, the ambans in Tibet sent false reports to the Chinese Emperor and as a result commander Lui Chan and his soldiers were ordered to march into Tibet. They started interfering and even managed to take considerable political power into their hands. Consequently, I, my ministers and important officials of the State, in spite of the difficult journey, had to leave Tibet and go to the noble land of India. There, I appealed to the then English Government of India who brought the matter to the notice of the Chinese king. However, the Chinese king refused to reply and nothing came out of it. As a result of our past meritorious karma and the numerous prayers and services that were conducted in Tibet, internal strife took place in China. It was no problem, therefore, to completely drive out the Chinese force from Tibet. From then on the year of the Water-Monkey, there was renewed happiness and peace reigned in Tibet. The high and low, rich and poor, all were content and welcomed this period with great joy and happiness. As it would take time to go into all the events that occurred, I have only spoken about the main events. I need not go into details, as all of you are aware of the events, and, moreover, they are clearly recorded in the various treatises. I myself, I am sure, have carried out my duties to your satisfaction. I would like to make it clear here, however, that I am not reminding you of these events for the sake of it or because

I want to bring what I did to the forefront. I am now of advanced age and it is time I relinquished secular and spiritual duties so that I can start earning merit and concentrate on religious studies, keeping well in mind the future which is what really matters. However, the Gods whom I followed like a shadow, the venerable teachers, those who revere me, those who offered me their wealth and property, the rich and the poor, they, my subjects, all have not only in words but in heart imposed upon me their hopes and aspirations. Because of this, I can not think of giving up my responsibilities. Therefore, with what little I know, I am trying my best to serve you all earnestly and honestly. But remember I am now reaching my fifty eighth year and as you all are aware that between me and the new reincarnation there will be a period when there will be no ruler. Therefore take measures now. Maintain friendly relations with the two great powers, China and India, conscript able soldiers to guard the borders and make them sufficiently strong to ward off those countries with whom we have had border disputes. The armed forces should be drilled and disciplined so as to be effective and strong to overcome those who threaten us. These precautions should be taken at a time when the forces of degeneration are most prevalent and when Communism is on the spread. Remember the fate that befell the Mongolian nation when Communists overran the country and where the Head Lama's reincarnation was forbidden, where property was totally confiscated and where monasteries and religion were completely wiped out. These things have happened, are happening and will happen in the land which is the Centre of Buddhism (i.e. Tibet). So, if you are not able to defend yourselves now, the institutions of the Dalai Lama, venerable incarnates and those who protect the Teachings shall be wiped out completely. Monasteries shall be looted, property confiscated and all living beings shall be destroyed. The memorable rule of the Three Guardian kings of Tibet, the very institutions of the state and religion shall be banned and forgotten. The property of the officials shall be confiscated; they shall be slaves of the conquerors and shall roam the land in bondage. All souls shall be immersed in suffering and the night shall be long and dark. Now, when there is peace and happiness, when you have the power, work, work earnestly and whole heartedly for the general welfare. Use peaceful methods where peace is due, use force where force is necessary: work and persevere now, that there are no regrets later. In your hands, officials of the Government, the holders of the Teachings and my people, lies the future of the country. Without employing wrong and base methods, rise up together and work for the general good of the land. If you do, we too will have the assurance and protection given by the State Oracle to Guru Rinpoche and the lineage of the previous Dalai Lamas. For my part, to those who work and persevere for the general good, I offer them my prayers and blessings. For those who only work for their own welfare, the fate and Karma will take care of them. Though they might prosper for some time, leaving aside their Government duties and watching the time pass, all I see is disaster in the future. It would be too late then to regret.

In my lifetime conditions will be as they are now, peaceful and quiet. But the future holds darkness and misery. I have warned you of these things because of my experience and other important reasons. More I cannot say or advise.

Outwardly, many religious services and prayers were and are being conducted. But what actually matters is your inward way of thinking and your devotion to your duties. If you work earnestly and wholeheartedly, I for my part shall work ceaselessly for the enhancement of the Teachings and officials of the Government, for prosperity, happiness and peace as it has been in the past, so that the people may be content, rest and labour in peace. Thus I have advised you: examine well what is to be done and what is to be discarded, purify your daily life. These things are of supreme importance and value.

14. SEVENTEEN-POINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN TIBET AND CHINA

Signed at Peking, 23 May, 1951

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But, over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary government continued to carry out policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary Government—was overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary Government—was overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis the founding of the People's Republic of China (CPR) and of the Chinese People's Government (CPG) was announced.

In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CPG declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the CPR are equal and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR will become a big family of fraternity and co-operation, composed of all its

nationalities. Within the big family of all nationalities of the CPR, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, and the CPG shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country—with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan—have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the CPG and the direct leadership of higher levels of people's governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the CPR accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the CPR to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work, the CPG, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. In the latter part of April 1951 the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The CPG appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet. As a result of the talks both parties agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

- (1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People's Republic of China.
- (2) The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.
- (3) In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the CPG.
- (4) The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.
- (5) The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngorhthehni shall be maintained.
- (6) By the established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngorhthehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and

of the ninth Panchen Ngoerhthehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

- (7) The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the common Programme of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.
- (8) Tibetan troops shall be reorganised step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defence forces of the CPR.
- (9) The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
- (10) Tibetan agriculture, livestock-raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
- (11) In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet shall carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.
- (12) In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely severed relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.
- (13) The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.
- (14) The CPG shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.
- (15) In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and-apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG-shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name-list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and various quarters concerned and shall be submitted to the CPG for appointment.

- (16) Funds needed by the Military and Administrative Committee, the Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG. The local government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.
- (17) This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the CPG with full powers: Chief Delegate-Li Wei-Han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); Delegates-Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan. Delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet: Chief Delegate-Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape); Delegates-Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khenchung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung Thupten Lekmuun, Rimshi Samposey Tenzin Thundup.
Peking, 23rd May, 1951. Sd

15. PANCH SHEEL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE' REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TRADE AND INTER-COURSE BETWEEN TIBET REIGON OF CHINA AND INDIA.

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central people's Government of the People's Republic of China:

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the people of China and India;

Have resolved to enter into the present agreement based on the following principles:

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (2) Mutual non-aggression;
- (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit: and
- (5) Peaceful coexistence

and for this purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:
The Government of the Republic of India:

H.E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China, The Central People's Government of the The People's Republic of China:

H.E. Chang Han-Fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government,

Who, having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish trade agencies:

- (I) The Government of India agree that the Government of China may establish trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.
- (II) The Government of China agree that the Government of India may establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for their livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail bags and communications in code.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between the Tibet region of China and India may trade at the following places:

(1) The Government of China agree to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade: the Government of India agree that trade may be carried on in India including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

(2) The Government of China agree to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyalima-Khargo, (4) Gyanima-Chakra, (5) Ranura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Pulling-Sumdo (3) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agree that in future when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Art district of the Tibet region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding districts in India adjacent to the Art district of the Tibet region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimages by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

- (1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faith may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailash) and Mavam Tse (Mansarowar) in the Tibet region of China in accordance with custom.
- (2) Pilgrims from the Tibet region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.
- (3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and routes:

- (1) Shipki La Pass
- (2) Mana Pass
- (3) Niti Pass
- (4) Kungri Bingri Pass
- (5) Dana Pass, and
- (6) Lipu Lekh Pass.

Also the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of Elek Gatasangpu (Indus river) continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE V

For traveling across borders, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nations of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visas by the other party except as provided in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this article.

- (1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between the Tibet region of China and India, their wives and children, who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or the Tibet region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local Government of their own country by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border check posts of the other party.
- (2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries, who cross borders to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives, may proceed to the border districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.
- (3) Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by

their own country, but shall only hold certificates for a definite period of time (good for three months, half year or one year) duly issued by the local agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoint of the other party.

- (4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoint of the other party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.
- (5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph of this article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.
- (6) Persons who enter the territory of the other party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other party.

ARTICLE VI

The present agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight years. Extension of the present agreement may be negotiated by the two parties if either party requests for it six months prior to the expiry of the agreement and the request is agreed to by the other party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on April 29, 1954, in Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all text being equally valid.

Plenipotentiary of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China -
CHANG HAN-FU

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of India - N RAGHAVAN

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The Dalai Lama, flanked by ex-servicemen of the traditional Tibetan army
This photograph was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the
Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989.



The Dalai Lama with members of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment who escorted the Dalai Lama
up to the Indian border from Lhasa in 1959
This photograph was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare
Association at Dharamsala in 1989.



Members of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment who escorted the Dalai Lama up to the Indian border from Lhasa in 1959

This photograph was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989.



The Dalai Lama with the representatives of the Gadang (Shigatse) Regiment

This picture was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989




The Dalai Lama with representatives of the Ngadang (Gyantse) Regiment
This picture was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989



The Dalai Lama with the representatives of the Cadang (Dingri) Regiment
This picture was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989.



The Dalai Lama with the representatives of the Chadang (Police Force)
This picture was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989



The Dalai Lama with two members of the Tadang Regiment
This picture was taken during the long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama organized by the Ex-Servicemen's Welfare Association at Dharamsala in 1989



The Dalai Lama with soldiers of the Kadang Regiment, Dharamsala, 2003



The Dalai Lama with soldiers of the Khadang Regiment, Dharamsala 2003




The Dalai Lama with soldiers of the Cadang Regiment, Dharamsala, 2003



The Dalai Lama with soldiers of the Chadang Regiment, Dharamsala, 2003



An army leader and a government official examining a parade of the Khadang (Drapchi) Regiment on the ground at Shol, Lhasa



Army Band (left), bearers of regimental colors (centre) and Tibetan national flag (right) during a military parade



Troops of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment and Drapchi Regiment marching through the main gate of the Norbulingka



Tibetan troops based in Lhasa on parade on the ground in front of the Norbulingka Palace during the Yoghurt Festival



Tibetan troops marching through Barkor Street, Lhasa



The Kashag ministers inspecting a military parade at Drapchi, Lhasa




A group of officers and soldiers of the Chadang Artillery Regiment



Soldiers doing artillery practice on the ground of Drauthang, Lhasa



Soldiers of the Artillery Regiment demonstrating the transportation of artillery on mules on the Drapchi parade ground, Lhasa



Soldiers of the Bodyguard Regiment



Tibetan soldiers in Tibetan and Western uniform during the reign of 13th Dalai Lama
Photo courtesy: India Office Library, London



Tibetan soldiers on parade



A local militia on parade



Dalai Lama, accompanied by his retinue, on his escape to India in 1959



Bodyguard leader Dapon Takla, Dapon Trepal of the Khadang Drapchi Regiment, Gyapon Lobsang Tashi of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment, Volunteer Army leader Lithang Kunga Samten, along with others who escorted the Dalai Lama up to the Indian border in 1959



The Dalai Lama, flanked by his chief attendant Master Chamberlain (Dronche) Phala, bodyguard leader Dapon Takla and some leaders of the Volunteer Army




Gyapon Kalsang Dramdul of the Drapchi Regiment in officer's?? uniform



Major Japhok of the Drapchi Regiment in regular army uniform



Gyantse Drakjun Dawa Tsering, a soldier of the Kadang
Bodyguard Regiment, who served with distinction at Lhodrak
Dowo Dzong in 1959 under the command of
Rupon Sonam Tashi



Rupon Rigzin Paljor, famous commander of the
Chadang Artillery Regiment

Political and Military History of Tibet



The Political and Military History of Tibet is virtually the first comprehensive Tibetan military history. Based on many historical and biographical sources, including eyewitness accounts of many veterans of Tibetans' war of resistance against the Communist Chinese in 1950-59, as well as the author's own experience during his military service in Tibet, this volume elaborates the evolution of the Tibetan Army and various wars it fought with foreign forces throughout the Tibetan history. Besides military history, this volume covers Tibetan political history, especially Sino-Tibetan political intricacies and Tibetan internal political struggle during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as detailed description of the XIV Dalai Lama's miraculous escape to India in 1959 on the eve of PLA's violent suppression.

The author, Namgyal Wangdu, is a retired army officer of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), also known by Est. 22, based in Dehradun, India. He also served as an army officer in the traditional Tibetan army until 1959.

